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 IDENTITY DISASSOCIATION FROM HISTORICALLY EMBEDDED CULTURE AND IDENTITY-

Identity formation is an ongoing process shaped by multiple social actors and their interactions. Within the context of (re)construction of national identity, this study will focus on a divergent path of identity construction- eliminating historically embedded and tenacious cultural traits to make a new national identity. Given the two distinct cases- the de-Chineselized Taiwanese identity and the de-Islamized Turkish identity, this study aims to explore the reasons and conceptions behind the removal of substantial cultural elements that can best foster national unity and allegiance to the community, together with comparing the methods and ideologies applied by the actors during specific historical epochs. Through a comparative analysis based on a common goal but different experiences and circumstances, the study will also examine differing progress in national identity in two cases. Attempting to identify the reasons behind and to explain the circumstances under which establishing a national identity devoid of primordial culture can increase feasibility—then pointing out that the identity confusion and societal divisions in the two countries due to immense transformation in identity narratives may mutually draw upon each other’s experiences. This exchange of experiences aims to demonstrate the limitations of using cultural elements to reconstruct national identity, as understood through prevalent perspectives and theories in the study of national identity within the context of nationalism.
Keywords: National Identity Construction, Taiwanese Identity, Turkish Identity, Cultural Traits
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ÖZ
TARİHSEL OLARAK YERLEŞMİŞ KÜLTÜR VE KİMLİKTEN ARINMA –
TAYVAN’DA ÇİN KİMLİĞİNDEN UZAKLAŞMA İLE TÜRKİYE’DE MÜSLÜMAN KİMLİĞİNDEN UZAKLAŞMA ARASINDA BİR KARŞILAŞTIRMA

Bir toplumda, ulusal kimlik oluşumu süreklilik arz eden bir süreçtir ve çeşitli toplumsal aktörlerin etkileşimleri ile şekillenir. Çalışmada, ulusal kimliğin yeniden inşası bağlamında, tarihsel olarak köklü ve dirençli kültürel özelliklerin çıkarılması ve bu dönüşüm sürecininin evre ve aşamaları ele alınacaktır. Seçilen iki farklı ülkenin tarihsel süreç içinde nasıl bir kimlik dönüşümüne uğradığı incelenecek ve ayrıca bu ülkelerin verilerinin mukayesesiyle, benzerlikleri ve farklılıkları hakkında örneklere değinilecektir. Bu çalışma, iki ayrı örneği (Tayvan’ın Çin kültüründen arındırılmış yeni ulusal kimliği ve Türkiye’nin İslami anlayıştan arındırılmış yeni ulusal kimliği) inceleyerek, ulusal birliğe ve topluluğa bağlılığa temel oluşturacak en başat kültürel unsurlarının değişimi, nedenlerini ve bu değişimin kavramlarını keşfetmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bununla birlikte, belirli tarihsel dönemlerde farklı etki saikleri tarafından uygulanan yöntemler ve ideolojiler arşılaştırılmaktadır. Çalışma, ortak bir sonuca ancak farklı deneyim ve koşullara dayanan karşılaştırmalı bir analiz yoluyla erişmeyi ve ayrıca bu iki örnekte ulusal kimlikte kaydedilen farklı ilerlemeleri gözlemlemeyi hedefleyecektir. Varolan kültürel öğelerinden yoksun yeni bir ulusal kimlik oluşturmanın, hangi koşullar altında uygulanabileceğini açıklamak için, toplumsal olayların arkasındaki nedenleri belirlemek önem taşır. Ardından, kimlik anlatılarındaki muazzam dönüşüm nedeniyle iki ülkede yaşanan kimlik karmaşası ve toplumsal bölünlenmelerin, karşılıklı olarak birbirlerinin deneyimlerinden yararlanabileceğine işaret edilecektir. Bu deneyim alışverişi, ulusal kimliği yeniden inşa etmek için kültürel unsurları kullanmanın sınırlarına, milliyetçilik bağlamında ulusal kimlik çalışmalarındaki yaygın perspektiflere ve teorilere, tanıklık etmeyi amaçlamaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ulusal Kimliğin Oluşumu, Tayvan Kimliği, Türk Kimliği, Kültürel Unsurlar
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DEDICATION
To my parents and beloved family members
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This thesis can not be completed without the help of the lovely and earnest people around me. First, I feel indebted to my parents’ wholehearted support, materially and mentally; without them, I would not have the strength to proceed with this study. Second, I would like to express my sincere gratitude for the valuable advice and guidance from my advisor, Nuri hoca, our department director, Derya hoca, Oktay hoca from the International Relations Department, Bahadır Pehlivantürk hoca from TOBB University, and Şaban Çalış hoca from Selçuk university.
Throughout my extended sojourn in Turkey, the cherished companionship of my dear confidantes, Melike and Ercüment, along with the myriad of remarkable individuals I had met and engaged with, have coalesced into an indelible tapestry of unforgettable and enchanting moments. These precious experiences and lovely people will intricately interlace with the very fabric of this doctoral thesis.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................... IV
ÖZ ............................................................................................................................ V
DEDICATION ....................................................................................................... VI
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..................................................................................... VII
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................... VIII
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................... X
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................ XI
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................ XII
CHAPTERS
1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 1
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION ........................................................................................ 1
1.2 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................. 5
1.3 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS ........................................................................... 9
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .............................................................................. 13
2.1 DEFINING NATION ........................................................................................... 13
2.2 DISCOURSES ON NATIONAL IDENTITY ............................................................. 19
3 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TAIWAN’S IDENTITY .............................................. 31
3.1 ETHNIC DEMOGRAPHICS IN TAIWAN ............................................................... 31
3.2 JAPAN IMPERIAL COLONIZATION (1895-1945) ................................................ 41
3.3 ROC TAKEOVER AND RE-CHINESELIZATION .................................................. 47
3.4 RISE OF TAIWANESE CONSCIOUSNESS ............................................................. 56
4 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TURKEY’S IDENTITY POLICY ................................. 69
4.1 ISLAM’S ROLE IN TURKISH CULTURE AND POLITICS ....................................... 69
4.2 OTTOMAN LEGACY ......................................................................................... 73
4.3 CONSTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLIC .................................................................. 79
4.4 THE REFORM OF DETACHING ISLAM ............................................................... 84
4.5 CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN DE-ISLAMIZATION AND CONSERVATIVES .......... 99
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5 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DETACHMENT ................................................... 105
5.1 HISTORICAL EVENTS AND IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND ............................... 106
5.2 APPROACHES TO DETACH THE EMBEDDED CULTURE ELEMENT.................... 120
5.3 STATE’S AUTHORITY IN DE-CULTURALIZATION ........................................... 136
5.4 RECENT INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL IDENTITY ................................................... 154
6 IDENTITY CRISIS AND SOCIAL CLEAVAGE ....................................................... 162
6.1 NATIONAL IDENTITY PARADOXES IN TURKEY AND TAIWAN ......................... 162
6.2 POLITICAL AND SOCIAL BACKFIRE ................................................................ 170
6.3 SOCIAL CLEAVAGE........................................................................................ 182
7 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 202
REFERENCES .................................................................................................... 212
APPENDICES ..................................................................................................... 232
A. CURRICULUM VITAE ................................................................................. 232
B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZETI................................................... 233
C. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU .................................... 253
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 5.2 1 Content of National Identity Transformation in Turkey ...................................... 128
Table 5.2 2 Content of National Identity Transformation in Taiwan .................................... 133
Table 6.3 1 The Identity Background in Social Cleavages .................................................................. 193
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 3.4 1 Changes in the Taiwanese/ Chinese Identity of Taiwanese ............................ 68
Figure 5.4 1 Characteristics of Being Taiwanese ................................................................................................ 155
Figure 5.4 2 Multi-Layer of Being Turkish People .......................................................................................... 159
Figure 6.1 1 Identity Transition in Detaching Cultural Elements .............................................. 165
Figure 6.3 1 Presidential Elections Political Party Distribution in Taiwan .................. 196
Figure 6.3 2 Allocation of Political Party Ballots in Turkish Elections ............................ 199
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AKP Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
CHP Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partis)
DP Democrat Party (Demokrat Partisi 1946)
DDP Democratic Progressive Party
FP Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi)
KMT Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party)
MSP National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi)
PFP People First Paty (Taiwan)
PRC People’s Republic of China
ROC Republic of China (Taiwan)
RP Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)
SP Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi)
TPP Taiwan People’s Party
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Before diving into the main subject, this chapter will begin by exploring the research question that ignited the motivation behind this study. It will then proceed to elaborate on the pertinent scope of inquiry concerning national identity. Establishing the nucleus of this study is paramount, followed by a meticulous elucidation of the methodologies to be employed, ensuring potential contributions to the existing body of literature on identity formation. Conclusively, a delineation of the content of subsequent chapters shall shed light on the structural framework of this study.
1.1 Research Question
National identity matters but is not a straightforward issue like other social identities. Usually, national identity is not a matter of life or death in which people express their national identity. However, there are some examples where the expression of ‘national’ identity can raise significant concerns. For example, unintentionally or intentionally specifying themselves as Taiwanese, Uygur, or Tibetan, in recent years, Hongkongers are considered offensive and, in some extreme situations, may be charged with treason crimes by the Communist Chinese government. National identity does matter; it is veiled under other social identities and overlooked in daily life, only brought to light when needed or questioned.
As stated above, national identity matters greatly. In times of crisis, it can serve as a unifying force in domestic, yet externally, it may pose potential threats. Additionally, the examples provided reveal that the perfect suture of national identity and state identity is often challenging, except in some ethnically homogeneous nations like Japan and South Korea or in countries like the United States, Canada, or the UK, where the banner of a ‘melting pot’ of shared values predominates. In the cases of this identity study, one can also observe discrepancies between the populace’s understanding of national identity and the definition of state identity. This
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discrepancy raises curiosity: What are the reasons, backgrounds, and circumstances that lead to disengagement of the identities?
The incongruity between state and national identity can emerge in the form of misinterpreting citizenship as national identity. In practice, several countries acquiesce or approve their citizens to hold passports of other countries. Although acquiring other citizenship usually requires the declaration of allegiance to the nation-state, the sentiment of belongingness involves more personal emotions and psychology; it is difficult to ascertain through declarations of allegiance. Hence, the passport is merely an official identification of nationality/ citizenship but is hardly considered a decisive symbol of national identity. Indeed, it would be misleading to consider that national identity and nationality are interchangeable concepts while people can express a different national identity other than their citizenship.
It is typical for a sovereign state to bolster or craft its own version of ‘national’ identity, which essentially translates to the ‘state’ identity1. However, it is rare to find nation-states with entirely homogenous cultural identities. To foster loyalty toward the state, the ruling regime or authorities must blend and adapt the existing array of national identities to conform with their objectives. From this perspective, despite its substantial diversity, national identity can be molded into a unified force and integrity through various approaches.
In fact, most modern civic nation-states are composed of multinationals; in the real world, having a single national within state territory is very rare. Consequently, the discourse surrounding modern nationalism better reflects the process of national identity formation. The disconsonant reality between national and state identities (materialized as citizenship) sparked the inception of this study. Moreover, the inquiry into such inconsistency leads to further investigations of the ideas and schemes underlying the national identity construction.
1 I would like to present my gratitude to Professor Şaban Çalış for his invaluable inspiration in conceiving the notion surrounding the incongruities between national identity and state identity, which has served as the bedrock for constructing a substantive framework for the inquiry of this study.
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Using modern nationalism as a starting point, national identity and its constituents are manipulable and controllable under the premise that the original ethnic characteristics no longer hold authenticity. Through reshaping national identity during specific historical periods, I discovered two vastly different countries - Turkey and Taiwan - astonishingly removing deeply rooted cultural elements from their existing national identity. In popular nationalist discourses, much emphasis is placed on the selective reconstitution of historical cultures, disseminating them through propaganda to make them accepted and internalized by the masses. Does removing deeply ingrained primordial cultural traits exaggerate the capability to reshape any desired cultural elements? How justifiable is it to remove the cultural elements? Under what social and political circumstances do these two countries apply such measures to reconstruct their national identity? These two questions form the basis and core subject of this study.
Furthermore, in many national identity studies, the focus has primarily been on the continuity and reshaping of the primordial ethnic cultures. However, this comparative case study involves removing embedded cultural elements to establish a new national identity. Notably, this removal of cultural elements might be an ordinary occasion and discourse in countries emancipating from colonial rule.
However, the case we are examining does not aim to detach from externally imposed foreign cultures but rather to break away from the indigenous culture to form a new national identity. The juxtaposition highlights the peculiar similarities between these distinct cases. It also underscores the importance of offering different approaches in identity construction and the impact of controlled variables on identity outcomes. Also, we can verify which controlled variables significantly impact the construction of national identity.
On the other hand, the current disparity in the definition and interpretation of identity between the two countries is quite significant. This also raises another question: how do the removed cultural characteristics form an identity that opposes the new identity? These are not substantially exclusive, but contradictory identities need to be
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understood within the context of domestic and international domains, including politics and socio-economic conditions. For instance, historical and political conflicts and the interaction with mainland China have influenced Taiwanese people’s national identity toward the end of the Taiwanese spectrum. In Turkey, the intertwining of religion and politics has led to social and political divisions between pious Muslims and secular Turkish. Understanding the intricate evolution of these conflicting identities unveils a profound inquiry into their intertwined narratives. How their agitated relationship unfolds amidst the complex landscape of policies and political discourse emerges as a captivating enigma.
For instance, a Turkish Muslim is not cognate with others in more conservative Islamic Middle East countries. Likewise, Muslim identity may be veiled behind a modern Turkish citizen. Still, when confronted with the Christian population, such as in Europe, the Muslim identity will be brought to light to some extent. Similarly, the Taiwanese had been taught as Chinese and endowed with the mission to glorify and exalt the Chinese cultural inheritance to the utmost degree. They now strive to identify themselves as Taiwanese distinguishing from Chinese. These arouse curiosity to investigate the factors leading to changes in individuals’ identity salience ranking and how interpretations of identity are triggered differently in various contexts.
In this respect, there are always incongruous perceptions of being one national among the citizens. The incongruence first reveals people’s discursive inclination to claim their national identity. Second, this implies that any attempts to advocate or presume that citizens of the same nationality should only have ‘one’ national identity might cause mental disarray, identity dislocation, and social cleavage in some extreme cases.
Identity is self-realization based on the reciprocal interrelation of ‘we’ and ‘they,’ and the identification is achieved by claiming common or disparate characteristics. National identity mainly requires comparison with others to define unless one resides abroad. Otherwise, it is not often encountered that national identity takes precedence over other identities in everyday life. However, in both cases, we can observe that
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national identity illuminated through external others creates barriers and opposition within the domestic sphere. The robust debates over national identities reinforce the identities of opposing sides and will also influence the governing administration’s foreign policy strategies and formulation of other policies.
The study will seek to delineate a different pattern of constructing national identity to examine the conventional modernist nationalism paradigm in nation construction. Through the situations mentioned above and issues, the focus of this study can be broadly summarized as follows: What triggered the detachment of cultural elements in making a new national identity? What were the approaches and ideologies applied in accordance with the nationalist rhetoric? What are the responses of the individual, and how do they judge and claim their national identity? In return, how does it affect politics and policymaking? What is the current state of public perception regarding which national identity predominates? Last, what can be learned from the two identity-building paradigms to complement the identity theory?
1.2 Methodology
The identity question in this study does not purport a universal structural generalization; rather, it is about providing alternative concepts and patterns that can amplify the existing theory. A comparative investigation will be undertaken to analyze identity transformation in Taiwan and Turkey and recruit extensive historical information that constructed and deconstructed national identity. The study will set out with modernist nationalism and social theory to set the theme and outlook of the characteristics and debates of national identity building in Taiwan and Turkey. And then by incorporating structural effects and individuals’ perspectives and interpretations of national rhetoric and narratives to enhance the shaky ground of identity discourse.
Regarding the case selection, the rudimentary comparative studies between Turkey and China can be traced back a hundred years ago by the Chinese intellectuals’ works. For example, Kang You-Wei’s travel notes about the Ottoman Empire in 1908 described the Qing dynasty and the Ottoman Empire in the same boat regarding
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historical phase and Western threat (Dai 2000). Likewise, Keshu Liu’s New Turkey made a more comprehensive study in 1927. Both works attempted to borrow the experiences of reform from Turkey for building a new China, with the implication that China and Turkey shared similar social, cultural, and even ethnic (in Kang’s perspective) backgrounds and that the existence of the nation was in peril. Although the descriptions of the works are somewhat subjective interpretations, they are the funder stone of the comparative analysis of the historical development between Turkey and China.
Identity, though a social construction, is more related to the intricate inner sentiment of the individual. Especially in national identity, the identification markers are open to modification by social or political institutions and also able to personal interpretation. Moreover, constituents of national identity could be indoctrinated and transformed into formal national culture through education and political rhetoric. Hence, no one was born to be ‘someone’; even inherited and natural traits can be made up to some degree.
Identity studies are different crossover disciplines, from psychology to politics and sociology. Because identities are varied as small as self and gender or as significant as social class, religion, race, and nation. Identity theories are partial ways of explaining identity phenomena, and neither can the approaches and paradigms be universally applicable. Other than the national-level analysis of national identity, individual participation will be brought to light and observed, including the masses and elite perspectives in making and receiving national identity. Furthermore, focusing on the detachment identity cultural elements in different countries, the study will conduct integrated methods of relevant disciplines and provide the areal information that shall contribute to ‘cross-fertilization’ that can correlate different methods and discourses applied between the two cases (Morgenthau 1952).
The comparative analysis aims at developing concepts and generalizations at a middle level; that is, it is only valid for specific societies at one point in time and space (Bendix 1963:523). In addition, the cultural politics of nation-building and the process of nationalizing culture are best studied with a comparative framework to
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avoid home blindness (Löfgren 1989:6). The (re)construction of national identity without inherent cultural elements is set as the independent variable. At the same time, social and historical contexts, the advocators, and approaches employed are considered control variables to comprehend the populace’s acceptance and interpretation of national identity. Based on one independent variable, this study can maximize the differences between cases, thereby reducing the risk of overgeneralizing the construction of national identity, where historical divergences and patterns of process and structure are often overlooked (Donatella della Porta 2008:215).
The identity inquiry in Turkey and Taiwan, the comparative analysis might seem entirely unrelated and thus incomparable. Weber’s ideal types can guide the construction structures of the research question in comparative analysis by keeping specific characteristics common to the cases (Donatella della Porta 2008:206). The analogy of murder cases can exemplify the ideal type in case studies (Maoz 2002). This also shares a parallel with aircraft crash reports. Each report involved different aircraft, passengers, and crews, with designated flight routes and other conditions; each case is unique and needs to be analyzed independently. However, some underlying characteristics of incidents are similar across single cases that can help people to improve the safety of flying. The ideal type will eventually guide the collection of data and the account of each case so that the final results of an individual case can be meaningfully compared to each other and engender contribution to the field.
Therefore, to align Taiwan and Turkey’s cases into comparable settings, the ideal type concept can draw inferences from national building discourses and correlate the realities. The ideal type is based on the shared cultural markers constructing national identity to understand causal variables in different cases. In finding a way out from the boundless possibilities of individual choice for their national identity, nationalism, and comprehensive constructivist approach influenced by structuralist and symbolic interactionist sociology would be a sound theoretical instrument to link nation-states,
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national identity, and its holders on common ground where the comparative analysis can take place.
National identity, not different from other social identities, hinges on social structure and actions (McCrone and Bechhofer 2015:26). The preliminary attempt to bridge nation and identity to structure and actor is Ernest Renan’s enunciation that (1996) nations are the collective will of consent and a daily plebiscite. A century later, Michael Billig grasped the idea and developed banal nationalism which nationhood is substantialized through daily practices and routine, not temporal frenetic nationalist movements. National identity is reaffirmed and internalized through individual actors’ repeated exercises of national routines and activities, which will eventually internalize into individuals’ minds and become an ‘imagined community.’ This internalization of national culture raises the question of how structure dominates individuals’ beliefs and actions and to what extent individuals will have the freedom to decide their national identity.
The banal and daily plebiscite characteristics of the nation have raised a trend of bringing the structural effects and actors’ perceptions together in identity studies. Bringing nation-state and individual together as the operational field of national identity relates to the sociology notion of structure and actor. While analyzing the national phenomenon, scholars like Wendt (2006:150) conceded the importance of cooperating with structuralism and individualism to amend the inherent gap between holists and individualists. The crucial subject is interactions between the two levels that determine actors’ decisions and (re)produce the structure. National identity needs individual acknowledgments as foundations that should be part of systemic theorizing.
On the other hand, the structure- legal, political, and cultural institutions- imposes meanings on actors and ultimately sets up the framework for people and the banal features. That is to say, the structure can locate and explain individuals’ positions in the national identity-building project. In short, the social structure constrains but does not predetermine people’s behavior and decisions. The individual does not act spontaneously but coherently to the belief that they learned and conceived from the structure. But it is not to say that the structure entirely dominates individual behaviors;
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they are reciprocal and interactive with each other. From this perspective, the inquiry on national identity needs to include individuals as operating actors who also influence the selection and mobilization of their national identity. Hence, the study will presuppose that building national identity is not merely about the institutional or structural effects but also personal or collective daily repetitive national practices.
To avoid oceanic search without ending, in this study, I will concentrate on obliterating the prominent cultural elements of Islam in Turkey and Chinese culture in Taiwan, essential constituents of national identity and practices in everyday life for Turkish and Taiwanese people. In-depth analysis of historical, political, and social contexts radiate from the center of identity formation within the designated time frame for comprehensive understanding. Then, it is necessary to circumscribe particular temporality in each case. For Turkey, the subject timing will be the early Republican periods (between 1923-1938) in which the de-Islamization process was at the outset and on the wax. As to the de-Chineselization in Taiwan, the timespan will start from the democratization to the climax of the Taiwanese consciousness (between 1980-2000). Also, in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of the development of the identity, successive periods would be included as part of the discussion, Thereby, be it Islam religion or Chinese ancestry, they would be regarded as cultural markers in the given time frame that have been profoundly innate characteristics of the individual and their collective form- nation.
1.3 Overview of the Chapters
This study will start with theoretical discourses considered essential to national identity characteristics. Then, we will turn to the ethnocultural elements that naturally or intentionally form national culture and identity and why these elements are significant and indispensable yet must be eliminated in specific phases of national building. With abundant area knowledge of the two cases, we can understand the transformation of national identity in conjunction with finding different patterns and incentives. Moreover, the analysis will move on based on the common goal of building national solidarity among citizenries by (re)defining national culture. This study does not only attempt to form a deliberate understanding of why and in which
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ways national identities have been disassembled and re-constructed but also what individuals would respond to and claim their national identities in Taiwan and Turkey.
The second chapter will discuss the interrelation and the triad aspects of national groups, nation-states, and national identities that mutually support each other to construct a national belongingness. Aligning with the assumption that nations can be created or invented, so national identity can be constructed by selecting and manipulating cultural pool by means of assimilation, either by authoritative power or a public will. With the consideration of “activities and symbols associated with nationhood that are performed as part of people’s daily life and as reminders of being nationals (Özkırımlı 2010:171).” It is an important indicator when people are deprived of activities or behaviors that have national symbolic significance.
The following chapters will provide in-depth historical background and the identity policy in Taiwan and Turkey. As the subject of this identity study is located in very different periods in history, to make the case comparable, I will pinpoint some particular conjunctures that paved the way for or stimulated actors to take on national identity transformation. As to Turkey’s de-Islamization of national identity, the time frame will be delimited to the early Republican period, the outset and acme of Kemalist reform. For Taiwan, the wave of self-consciousness can be traced back to the colonial period, but it was only solidified after the democratization in the late 80s. Then, I will scrutinize the elided cultural elements from a historical perspective to show their importance and dispensability in making ‘us’ in different historical periods. Finally, discover the underlying intentions and incentives of initiating the de-Chineselization and de-Islamization process in remaking national identity.
After understanding the general historical background of national identity, in Chapter 5, based on the content described in the preceding chapters, I will pinpoint the decisive historical events and summarize similar catalysts that prompted the change in cultural identity in the two cases—followed by comparison between the actors, motives, approaches, and outcomes of de- culturalization progress. The different advocators’ and opponents’ claims and ideas on identifying the new ‘us’ and ‘other
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will be taken into the comparable ground. On the other hand, with a shared state-centric approach, both countries employ their history curricula in education as a platform to disseminate the contextual ideology of the new identity discourse. The textbooks scrutinized serve as the foremost manifestation of the decentralization process. Last, we will conclude with the degree of people’s perception of their new national identity. Under the comparisons, we can find the resemblances in the differences that will help to disclose plausible compensation for the deficit of each approach and develop new paradigms for national identity building.
In Chapter 6, the discussion will present the social division and the identity paradox in the two cases after the progressive remaking of national identity by detaching essential elements from the national identity. Initially, we delve into the ontological conflicts between the previously established and the redefined notions of identity, along with the ruptures in social continuity and historical discontinuities. Ironically, remaking national identity has an exclusivist tendency instead of creating a homogeneous culture to enhance internal integrity. People who should have shared a common context of national identity were divided into adversaries. As a result, the gaps between discrepant groups accepting or refusing the new national identity become incurable. To thoroughly inspect the social cleavage, we will examine the politicized cultural and social criteria and the actions that define who is one of us and who is not. And what are the (extended) meanings of these criteria that consequently segregate groups of people asserting different perceptions of their culture, especially in the information explosion era we live in?
In the last part, comparisons of the similar but distinct identity-making trajectories in Taiwan and Turkey can not develop a general theory to explain other identity studies, at least providing a new perspective and pattern on national identity formation and relative issues. As noted, the changes in national identity have been politicized as ideological divisions in Taiwan and Turkey, where social cleavage emerged and no signs of ceasing. After thoroughly analyzing the national identity-building process, it is clear that physical differences or ethnic ties, usually taken as robust cultural markers defining ‘us,’ are rather a personal perception and open to reconstruction.
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National identity matters for the authority to unite people and for individuals to locate themselves in the modern world. Perhaps the fluid, unstable quality of national identity will destine doubt and uncertainty for Taiwan and Turkey’s people. Hopefully, this study can foresee a plausible solution to ease the contradictory stance on national identity that divides social cleavage.
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CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The essence and theoretical underpinnings of national identity lack fixed explanations and discourses. Existing conceptions of national identity largely stem from various schools of nationalism, including primordialist, modernist, or constructivist, which offer a comprehensive explanation of the national phenomenon. If we assume ‘removing culture’ as a means of operation, then modernism can help explain the approach to shaping national identity. This chapter will draw inspiration from Weber’s ideal type and the ontology of area studies to propose a model that encapsulates key attributes essential for comprehending the phenomenon of national identity.
2.1 Defining Nation
Nations are named and self-defining communities whose members cultivate shared symbols, myths, memories, values, and traditions, inhabit and are attached to a historical homeland or territory, create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, observe shared customs and laws (Smith 2009:49).
2.1.1 Making Ethnicity National
The word nation comes from Latin, which depicts the idea of blood ties and is derived from the past participle of nasci, meaning to be born. On the other hand, The Oxford Dictionary has defined a nation as “a large body of people united by common descent, history, culture, or language, inhabiting a particular state or territory.” If we put the definitions above together, a nation is not only a de facto political entity of some kind but also a collectivity associated with broader ideas of culture, history, territory, notably ethnicity, and political institutions formed by the context in which they occur.
A nation is generally described as a group of blood ties by extensions inferring a common origin place. Scholars like John Armstrong (1982) and Clifford Geertz (1963) underlined the inquiry into the historical past of ethnicity. The nation should be
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located in an extended historical sequence of cultural making to discover its roots based on ethnic substance (McCrone 1998:13). It is the verity that a social group must have some common ethnic background at hand, or it can never become a nation. However, isn’t it biased for the ‘modern’ nation to claim its historical roots in ethnicity? How do modern nations transform ethnic origins into national cultures that integrate different strata of people within the specified territory? In which ways, ethnicity, kinship ties, and nationhood are mutually reinforced?
In fact, naturally given biological traits can not sufficiently define people’s attachment to the nation. Ethnic ties are only one of the elements forming the modern nation, which contains cultural, ethnic, and historical ties and civic elements like territory, common legal rights, and duties for all members (Smith 1991:14, 2009:49). In addition, group differences, even the physical ones vested with social significance, are cultural, not genetically transmitted (Banton 1967:3–4). The blood ties and their paraphernalia providing attachments to the nation are not sacred nor objective reality; they are only consecrated as individuals perceive and begin to believe the existence and meaning in the primordiality of their culture (Özkırımlı 2010:55–57).
This leads us to another question: How do people believe these ethnic ties represent their culture? Ethnic components such as language, cultural heritages, homeland, and history have become dedicated national culture elements that are a tool kit and raw materials for elites and authority to create a template for people to reproduce (Calhoun 2007:3). The biological link by the consanguinity does not matter in this sense. The aim is to recreate the glorious past, and the descendants will be portrayed with distinctive cultural qualities and virtues (Smith 1999:58).
Ruling elites deliberately select sets of rituals, symbolic practices, and rules that constitute traditions in accordance with the idea of the national building project. It is what Hobsbawm has found out in the state-building instances that traditions are pretty recent in origin and sometimes invented for the national interest. Ruling elites adapt old traditions to new situations or invent new traditions that best suit their ends. Although the invented traditions are present and manipulative, they should establish
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continuity with a suitable past and use history to legitimize action and cement group cohesion (Hobsbawm 1983:12).
For instance, political elites may choose a dialect as a new purified language, modify traditional values, or politicize existing myths of heroes and saints to provoke people’s passion toward the nation. Within this scenario, it is essential to have appropriate ethnic plots to fit the national story. Gellner also described how nationalism appropriates historical and ethnic past,
Admittedly, nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth, though it uses them very selectively, and it most often transforms them radically. Dead languages can be revived, and traditions invented, quite fictitious pristine purities restored (Gellner 1983:55–56).
Ethnicity, as a key component of national identity, is both instilled and expressed through various means such as media, education, daily customs, and ceremonies. Through these institutional channels, individuals internalize and identify with cultural elements associated with their ethnicity. Within the framework of constructivism, ethnicity emerges as a potent force in shaping national sentiment and unifying diverse populations. Consequently, people’s behaviors are influenced by their ethnic backgrounds. Ethnicity thus functions as a framework for social order, shaping and guiding individual actions (Banton 1967:5). Moreover, individuals are mobilized through cultural content and emotional attachments tied to their ethnic identity. This underscores how ethnic culture profoundly impacts individual behavior and perceptions.
Ethnicity is rather contextual; its meaning may differ within particular historical and spatial settings (Keating 2001:4). Skin colors have been inferred to different ethnic groups and nations, but it is no longer the essential criterion to define the national groups to which people belong. From past experiences, it is evident that ethnicity has often been utilized as a pretext to differentiate between “us" and "them," reinforcing internal cohesion while fostering a tendency towards conflict and confrontation externally.
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Nations cannot emerge without ethnic stories and culture, which furnish nation-states with their peculiar identities (Miller 1995:20). Ethnicity is, without a doubt, the source of common culture that sustains social solidarity within the national group. Also, we assume that ethnic ties and cultures are reproduction; the question is not about the authenticity of the ethnicity that forms a nation. Any claim for pure ethnic origin seems relatively absurd nowadays since it is based on the overgeneralization of the different ethnic compositions of the population.
Alleged common cultural traits are not objective facts that individuals can effortlessly express their national characteristics; instead, they depend on the cognizance of individual intuition, notably when confronting foreigners (Miller 1995:27). The nation is more like a matter of self-awareness, self-consciousness, and a self-defining group (Calhoun 1997:5; Connor 1978:389). Meanwhile, Ethnic origins instill vitality into the nation by transmitting the past and embodying it in the present. It is a source of securing belongingness that concretizes ethnic groups into nations and achieves the ultimate goal: building sovereign states with unitary identity.
2.1.2 Transition into Modern Nation
The capability to edit/fabricate and disseminate national culture with ethnicity was found in modernization. Gellner (1983) states that industrialization is the most significant force for changing the primordial political social order and structure. Nations only emerged when new communication and print technologies provided the fundamental mutual understandings among discrete people who later became the reading populations and the literate middle class. Similarly, Anderson (1983) emphasized the spread of vernaculars and print- language in imaging the nation. He asserted that the spread of vernacular language forged ‘unified fields of exchange and communication’ within the national group. Communication accessibility to the populace introduced individuals to their shared culture through dissemination.
The convergence of capitalism and print technology on homogenizing language varieties created the probabilities for the imagined community (Anderson 1983:46). The nation’s solidarity would only concretize if individuals perceived the common
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culture with their compatriots. With such solidarity, individuals would devote their loyalty to their nation; contrary to those who lived in agrarian societies, individuals demonstrated fidelity and loyalty to their local unit or landlord.
On the other hand, as disparities in development grow, individuals in less-developed nations may feel intimidated by those in more advanced countries. Nationalism drives societies towards temporary goals like industrialization, modernization, prosperity, and freedom to be like other developed nations (Nairn 1981). The example of Kemalism reform at the outset of the Republic and the democratization urged by the student protests in Taiwan in the late 80s resulted in political and social reforms based on the awareness of foreign threats and self-deficiencies. People observe through the examples of other nations that only progress can instill confidence in culture among the populace, thus fostering a sense of belonging to the nation.
Nations emerged “when general social conditions make for standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities (Gellner 1983:54).” To achieve national solidarity through homogenous culture, the nation-state should have full governability on education systems and public communications. Modern state and bureaucratic system is the force making national solidarity that they have authority and control over managing various resources. This includes governing the economic and political resources to integrate people into more interdependent collectivities and grant individuals interest in the national entity as the economy prospered (Zubaida 1989).
The Industrial Revolution of the 18th century laid the foundation for the formation of modern nation-states and made primitive ethnic cultures more utilizable to construct national culture and identity. Industrialization emancipates people’s thoughts by providing access to new ideas, technologies, and opportunities. Rather than depending exclusively on traditional hierarchies and structures, nation-states might adjust to address the requirements of social and political reforms and the increasing empowerment of citizens. The unprecedented transformation brought up the
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foreseeing process of acculturation and assimilation within the national group and emphasized the importance of understanding each other.
In brief, cultural characteristics are not solely inherited from ancestors or genes but are sometimes recreated or modified as necessary. It is believed that the methods of creating and constructing nations can differ significantly based on the existing ethnic makeup of the region, as well as the political system and institutions that were in place beforehand (Smith, 1991: 100, 101). It is pragmatic to consider “the nation is a combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, historical) and the subjective reflection in collective consciousness (Hroch 1993). In Modern times, nations are constructed collectively through the manipulation and imagination of cultural elements derived from ethnicity, often facilitated by modernized social and political institutions.
Modern and ethnic claims can complement each other’s shortcomings. For instance, modernist nationalism may not always embody tranquility and tolerance towards self-determination. At the same time, modern civic values can occasionally exhibit coercion and adherence to tradition, which contradicts their fundamental principles. In efforts to foster strong solidarity, modernists might draw upon an ethnic narrative for political mobilization, encompassing a broad spectrum of individuals yet potentially lacking the emotional resonance inherent in ethnic ties (Keating 2001:9). Leaders who provoke ethnic sentiments may utilize civic values such as democracy and secularization to garner broader public support and establish credentials as proponents of liberal democracy. National movements often incorporate both modernist and ethnic elements in their ideology (ibid. 2001:8), as observed by Gellner,
It is the existing culture that makes political units of all sizes and shapes. […] nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is reality, for better or worse, and in general an inescapable one (1983:49).
An ethnic group does not always coincide with the boundaries of a nation or state, just as a state is not always exclusively composed of a single ethnic or national group. The emergence of nations is influenced by the conditions of the time, highlighting
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the importance of temporal circumstances in their formation. A successful nation-state is typically a blend of ethnic heritage and modern values, underlining that the concept of the past is not merely a collection of historical facts but rather a selective interpretation by political perspectives of ethnicity.
2.2 Discourses on National Identity
After gaining a general understanding of how nationalism contributes to the formation of modern nations, this section will explore identity definitions. It will then proceed to discuss the significance and content of national identity based on existing discourses and the psychological aspects of those who hold national identity. Finally, it will synthesize potential methods and steps for establishing national identity.
2.2.1 Defining Identity
The word ‘identity’ came from the Latin root identitatem, a form of Latin idem, which means sameness and oneness. Generally speaking, identity is a matter of sameness and solidarity shared by the group members and the benchmark for people to locate themselves (Jenkins 2004:23). Any identity construction substantiative involves recurring self-affirmations that include identifying the ‘same’ or sharing attributes of the group member. Yet, in reality, the identifications of sameness are not objective entities; the sameness derives from comparative, otherizing the difference. Therefore, sameness and the different ‘others’ are reciprocal. In other words, the differences or the confrontation with others condition the internal sameness and subsequently make the identity exist (Yurdusev 1997:20).
Apart from the conventional statement of sameness as the core shared among group members, the differences precede sameness in defining who ‘we’ are. This is because the criteria for forming internal homogeneity are initially heterogeneous. As Hall observed,
Identities are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion than the sign of identical, naturally constituted unity- an identity in its traditional
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meaning (that is, an all-inclusive sameness, seamless, without internal differentiation) (1996:4).
The exclusivity of ‘us’ is provided by identity- a postulated membership of internal groups reflexive products of the non-identity relationship to the outside others. The validity of ‘we-ness’ owes to the ‘they-ness’ of the others (Bauman 1992:678). In light of the interplay between similarities and differences, understanding us versus them involves grasping what sets others apart and makes us similar. These distinctions and similarities form the foundation for perceiving and categorizing identity. (Jenkins 2004; Lawler 2014; Turner 1987)
For example, the name of an individual or a group is indirectly or directly given by the ‘other’; the ‘Turks’ was first written in Chinese history around 540 AD 2, while the northern nomad tribes united as a potential enemy against the Chinese dynasty. Furthermore, the Europeans later considered the Ottoman Turks significant others. Europeans and Turks reaffirm their identity hitherto regardless of internal heterogeneities through confrontations, interactions, and cultural differences amplified by different religious beliefs (Yurdusev 2010:289). From the history lesson, we can acknowledge that sameness and difference are not fixed nor stable content of the identity; they have been re-appraised along with the dissemination of cultural meanings in society and mainly under the effects of political power (Gary Taylor and Steve Spencer 2004).
The individual perspective on identity is a self-understanding synthesis perceived through life experiences and interactions with others. Identity is actualized through complex social interactions within which reciprocal recognition, self-presentation, or confrontation with others are made. So, identity is multidimensional and never finally settled while the external and internal variables change; only one aspect of identity would become prominent in accord with the social context within a specific time frame. This suggests that social identities are open to continuous reassessment or the
22The first written historical record of Turks is in the Book of Zhou, the official historical record of the Western Wei and Northern Zhou dynasties (557-581 A.D.) of China. The description of Turks living in the northern periphery is written in volume 50, the biography 42.
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ongoing construction process (Gary Taylor and Steve Spencer 2004:2). As Stuart Hall wrote,
Perhaps instead of thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact, with the new cultural practices they represent, we should think, instead, of identity as ‘production,’ which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation (1990:222).
In addition to interactions with the outside world, individual psychological states also influence identity with oneself and others. For example, when an individual proclaims a specific identity to other people around, no matter what others’ reactions may be; as a result, individuals can appraise those reactions by modifying, ignoring, or simply maintaining their own presentation to others based on reciprocal recognition. Identity is somehow in the deep recesses of the mind, usually below the consciousness (Miller 1995:18); in other words, it is an internalized cognitive schema within an individual’s memory (Billig 1995:69). Individuals’ willingness and involvement are more critical in this regard (McCrone 1998:41).
In sum, the concept of identity is manifold and malleable. There is no single and best way to access identity as if such a thing exists. The most predominant shared cultural or ethnic traits can be perceived and interpreted diversely under different circumstances and temporality. It is worth noting that it does not matter whether holding a real or virtual identity card; an individual’s ideas on their identity are difficult for others to measure and discern as they tend to re-create and reinterpret the cultural markers and attribute new meanings contingently to these categories.
2.2.2 Discourses on National Identity
National identity, generally speaking, a social, political, and psychological compound, rests upon individuals’ feelings of belonging to the nation, which is forged by a collective sentiment based on values, beliefs, customs, conventions, habits, language, and practices that make a nation distinct from another (Miller 1995:19; Smith 1991). Twofold criteria can manifest the national identity according to Guiberbau (2007:10,11). First is the continuity of the nation as historically rooted entities
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extending to the future. This continuity is personal experiences passed down to generations and coupled with meanings. The other is differentiation from the ‘others,’ based on the cognizance of a shared culture and traditions.
Upon examining the two criteria above, it becomes clear that the shaping of national identity largely depends on the sense of belonging to the nation and the belief in possessing shared attributes, fostering the sentiments that individuals belong to the same nation. In this light, the common elements can either be primitive, made up, or a mixture of both; the degree to which the discursive groups of people unify into a nation-state is more critical.
Smith’s stance on national identity corresponds to the reality between ethnic ties and citizenship. The modern nations have a modern outlook but undoubtedly consist of ethnic culture and historically related symbols. Except for the shared legal and political rights within the territory, the cultural elements often result in discrepancies in national identities among citizens (Smith 2009:29,49). Unsurprisingly, there is a tendency to homogenize individuals’ consciences on national identity as one totality within the state territory. Nationality and citizenship are not always equivalent to national identity, which is more complex and mutable than the birthplace on the identity card. Individuals’ roles as recipients and active moderators in national identity are usually overlooked due to the discreteness and heterogeneity of cultural interpretations. Individuals and their national identity are correlative; they are like symbiosis in the natural world where the survival and existence of two organisms are interdependent.
A nation will only exist if people feel themselves to be a nation. Contrariwise, in the modern era, a person is recognized as a subject only when being ‘nationalized’ (Lavi 2013:699). National identity provides a powerful sense of defining and locating individual selves to pursue shared interests and goals, which seems to be one of the universal human needs (Bauman 1992:679). By reconfirming the culture, individuals can rediscover and reorient themselves in the divergent, uncertain, and fast-changing modern world (Smith 1991:17).
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National identity is nevertheless an inseparable part of self-identity, even if it is most implicit and undershadowed by other social identities. It is quite natural that individuals may not prioritize their national identity in daily life, as it only becomes explicit when in exigency. Like other social identities, national identity has been contested and constructed constantly with the demarcation between ‘us’ and ‘others,’ which are tangibly interdependent and interchangeable. As Bauman (1992:678) described, “Identity is permanently under the condition of a besieged fortress. […] It is to be forever threatened by trespassing of enemies, dilution, slackening of vigilance.”
Yet, no matter how implicit national identity is in everyday life, in some extreme cases, it is this latent emotional identification with the nation that individual transcends their limit and voluntarily sacrifice their life. National identity becomes discernible while it is questioned and threatened. Also, William McIlvanney accurately described,
National identity is a bit like having an old insurance policy. You know you have one somewhere, but you are often not entirely sure where it is. Moreover, if you are honest, you must admit you are pretty vague about what the small print means (cited from McCrone and Bechhofer 2015:2).
The conscience of being a nation is about the consciousness of its defining attributes (Bauman 1992:686). In modern nations, a well-defined territory, legal-political institutions, legal equality of the citizens, and civic culture and ideology overrule as a component of ideal national identity; on the contrary, historical and ethnic backgrounds may be less authentic (Smith 1991:8–11).
2.2.3 Retrospection on National Identity
The perception of national identity is frequently filtered through the lens of nationalism, which mistakenly presupposes a universal explanation and blueprint for constructing national identity. The Western model of national identity is often upheld as the prototype in the modern world. However, is the Western model and theory suitable for other non-Western countries to build their national identity while they
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have different nationalist purposes and movements? It is believed that the methods of creating and constructing nations can differ significantly based on the existing ethnic makeup of the region, as well as the political system and institutions that were in place beforehand (Smith 1991:100,101).
The predominant theoretical approach oversimplifies the complex process of constructing national identity, assuming a standardized pattern that may not apply to cultural, social, and political contexts beyond the Western sphere. Smith (1991:18) describes nationalism as a doctrine that narrowly focuses on the nation as the essence of national identity, thereby providing a limited and conflict-ridden justification for political community. The conventional dichotomy between civic/ethnic and Western/non-Western models of nation-building reflects an inherent orientalist bias, which attempts to generalize all nations using preconceived and universally applicable variables.
While political science often discusses national identity as an offshoot of nation and nationalism, it tends to be overshadowed and underdeveloped. Scholars in the nationalist discourse primarily focus on the nation-state or its legal proxies, relegating national identity to a peripheral concern. Moreover, the provisional definition of national identity within nationalist literature often conflates with concepts such as nation, nationality, national culture, and citizenship (Smith 1991:14)3. Susan Condor and Jackie Abell commented,
(There is) a common tendency to elide the ‘national identity’ construct with pre-existing academic categories such as nation, nationality, nationalism, national character, citizenship, or imagined community. In addition, the ambiguities of the term ‘identity’ referent afford slippage between ‘the nation’ as an object of literary political rhetoric and assumption concerning the subjective self-consciousness of individual citizens (2006:52).
3 Smith listed some fundamental features of national identity, which also meet with the elements that define the modern nation-state. Those features are a historic territory or homeland; common myths and historical memories; a common, mass public culture; common legal rights and duties for all members; and a common economy with territorial mobility for members.
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Another negligence is that national identity hits the headline and is strategically employed for the sake of the nation-state only if the threat of enemies or crisis is in view. The overlook of national identity as an instant zeal for nationalist urge has been criticized by Michael Billig’s Banal Nationalism (1995), arguing that orthodox theorization has neglected the daily display of national culture from which the formation of national identity comes. National identity is not merely a momentum rage of chauvinism but is actively reaffirmed through everyday practices, like a national flag flying in the background without any attention. Similarly, people are not passive recipients beneath the structure; they can give meaning to who they are from what is available for selection. And this is why national identity should be analyzed according to context and the cultural markers people deploy in which situation they find themselves (McCrone and Bechhofer 2015:66).
2.2.4 Making National Identity
The shared commonness does not omit the fact that people who share one national identity are profoundly diverse and barely know each other. Without knowing their fellow members, the fellowship they think they share is imagination (Anderson 1983:6). Once the feeling of sameness stems from the collective imagination, national identity is often the controllable variable subsumed under the national building projects at the hands of national elites. Scholars have stated three stages of group identification. In the first stage, selection- a pool of cultural resources exists for elites/ individuals to create an identity that distinguishes them from other groups. In the second stage, acculturation/ assimilation- after identities are assembled for political needs outside the available pool of cultural resources. Individuals would voluntarily or forcefully learn the norms and paradigms related to identity through education or daily practices. Finally, in the third stage, reproduction, individuals respond to the identity and feel belongingness becomes salient (Billig 1995:66; Bruner 2005). These three stages generally epitomize the national identity construction process, usually conducted by nationalism approaches. Nevertheless, it is a practical pattern for analyzing national identity beyond nationalism.
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Selection
The question arises: what are the essential elements necessary for cultivating a cohesive culture? Well-established factors like race, language, religion, and homeland are considered objective criteria for fostering national sentiments. However, these elements are typically emphasized only when they contribute to the group’s identity and sense of uniqueness.
National identity is continually transformed or reshaped under the influence of culture, politics, and everyday practices where the individual can feel belonging. Because of the fluid quality of national identity, the debate is not whether people have it or not; it is rather the interpretation of the meaning of national identity within specific temporality. When choosing elements to form a national identity, it is essential to understand which objective cultural traits merely align with citizenship and nationality and which ones possess a more profound capacity to unite diverse individuals into a cohesive national group. For example, the place of residence and birth are visible identifications for being ‘national,’ yet when the borderline changes or mass migration occurs, and the nationality might differ from their feeling of belongingness. So, the authenticity of national culture, whether original or artificial, was not the question; the underlying subject is how to make people believe their nation is real.
Besides, cultural elements that lend nations an appearance of ‘naturalness or authenticity’ shall be considered among the choices that would accentuate the uniqueness of the nation. These features, common linguistic, racial, tribal, and religious traits that can distinguish them and us, are termed ‘tangible characteristics’ by Walker Connor (1978:389) and ‘public culture’ by David Miller (1995:25). They are the visible and observable manifestations of collective identity. Through preserving and transmitting these tangible characteristics, groups maintain continuity across generations and reinforce their shared cultural heritage. Aggregation of these features would become ‘collective knowledge’ from Durkheim’s collective
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representation, interlocking shared beliefs, norms, and values for individuals to act (George Ritzer and Douglas Goodman 2004:77; Wendt 2006:159,160).
Empirically, each nation assigns varying degrees of importance to different features. Sometimes, nations endowed with only some of these characteristics will not disclose their existence (Calhoun 1997:5–6). For instance, the Republican elites characterized Turkish people with a common language (Turkish), homeland (Anatolia), and modernity as a cultural supplement, while religion was pushed back. Likewise, Chinese traditional morality, values, and culture were flattered, and Taiwanese were encouraged to be ‘proud of being Chinese.’ In the subsequent chapters, we will also discuss how national identities in Taiwan and Turkey are established and affected by removing cultural traits.
Assimilation and Reproduction
National identity is the collective embodiment of culture implemented and propagated through public media, education systems, or public ceremonies from which individuals internalize and cognize these cultural elements as theirs. In reconstructing national identity in Taiwan and Turkey, cultural assimilation involves altering individual identities and cultural affiliations by removing certain cultural elements. This process may occur voluntarily or under external pressure. The following discussion will explore how authoritative institutions deploy the meaning and dissemination of culture to shape a culturally homogeneous society.
Cultural heterogeneity within the state can be abated through assimilation by different approaches. The exertion of political power in enforcing cultural assimilation can create a consistent ‘other’ group contrary to us. This consistency can assist ruling elites in assimilating opposition groups, mainly if those being ruled lack a strong sense of identity. Conversely, if the opposing group’s identity is robust, it may serve as the foundation for shaping a future national identity (Wu 1993:32).
In practice, authorities in Taiwan and Turkey have both actively appropriated elements of their respective national identity by means of disassociating historically
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embedded cultures to reconstruct new national identities. In similar situations, intellectuals deliberately overlook or forget the discomfiting facts and exaggerate a past worthy of reproduction (Bruner 2005:317). Rather than simply drawing from the cultural pool, actors have intentionally withdrawn pre-existing cultural traits, prompting revising of the national stories in the two countries.
Indeed, the governments of Taiwan and Turkey have strategically oriented their national cultures and edited historical narratives to instill state loyalty during different periods. When proponents of this identity gain political power, they embark on robust nationalist initiatives, effectively executing a reverse project of reshaping national identity across all facets. The education system, public media, and social institutions are the potent channels to employ the program of assimilation. In the cases of this study, the advocators in power (DDP of Taiwan and Kemalists of Turkey) enact their authorities to propagate detached cultural elements through institutions and systems.
National identity, a dynamic process, is continually reinforced through everyday symbols such as banknotes, flags, and anthems. Even very trivial aspects of life, such as folklore, landscapes, sports, rural life, and even weather, can be imbued with national significance through careful selection, categorization, and recontextualization (Löfgren 1989). Billig (1995) shared the same view, often overlooked due to their ubiquity, these symbols can be intentionally employed to disseminate national ideologies. The presentation of these symbols may seem mundane, but they subtly or explicitly promote a nationalist agenda.
Through the daily practice and display of these national activities, feelings of national solidarity and belonging are fostered and conveyed to dispersed individuals (Skey 2011:26). Collective sentiments of unity are rooted in and reproduced through everyday actions, forming the basis of national identity. These activities, often intentionally laden with national meanings tied to ethnicity and culture, enhance national identity within daily routines without conscious awareness. The crux of the matter lies in proponents’ strategies and principles in evenly distributing the national identity to the people.
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Binding Individual Identity with Nation-State
Individuals, as the bearers of the identity, their attitudes and activities need to be taken into account. National identity can be imposed and inseminated on the individual from exterior influences or events, yet it is an internalized outcome. The formation of the nation-state is significantly influenced by individual or collective actions, sometimes surpassing the impact of social structures. In Durkheim’s words, it is “society in us.” Hall described identity as a bridge between society and the individual mindset; these two agents interact reciprocally to articulate identification processes,
I use ‘identity’ to refer to the meeting point, the point for suture, between, on the one hand, the discourses and practices which attempt to ‘interpellate,’ speak to us, or hail us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses, and on the other hand, the processes which produce subjectivities, which constructs us as subjects which can be spoken (Hall 1996:5).
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus offers insight into understanding the interrelationship between social structure and individual identity. Individuals’ national identity is formulated by internalized customs, values, and beliefs, which affect and reshape the habitus. It is a mutual interaction and an evolving circle that exhibits dynamic relationships between the personal perception of national identity and the social structure. As Duara (1996:161) suggests, individuals can perceive nations differently, contributing to the definition and constitution of nations. So to speak, national identity is a collectivity of countless combinations and interactions by individuals and groups. Individual and collective recognition and response to different ideologies and cultures can either resist or reform societal structures (Delanty and O’Mahony 2022:41; Duara 1996:164). Hence, the best way to access national identity is to take the individual as the active agent rather than a puppet of the nation. National identity matters to people because they are bound up in it (McCrone and Bechhofer 2015:17).” Individuals are subjective and active actors in shaping their identities, not the passive recipients. Other than the nation-state’s influence, the task is to figure out for what purpose people would claim their national identity for themselves and others and how individuals perceive themselves and others through everyday activities and incarnate their ‘imaged’ nation.
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Individual-oriented layer in identity studies attracts criticism for over-generalizing diverse individuals’ preferences to apply to the whole society. In contrast, identity studies are always more related to the psychological field as a presentation of self. The personal sentiment of the nations provokes emotions that can override reasons. Since emotional reactions are beyond reason, it is hard to induce theoretical explanations. This criticism is mainly based on the predominant natural sciences- the search for universal validity- which affects social scientists to appeal to one-for-all theoretical explanations.
The crux of the identity question lies in both defining national identity and understanding the intricate relationship between individuals and the national framework. Individuals are socialized and constrained by social norms and regulations because people are unlike Miller’s radical choosers who can freely decide which national identity to adopt (Miller 1995:44). It is imperative to intricately examine the dynamic interplay between the societal framework’s influence on forming national identity and the subsequent reciprocal process wherein individual perceptions and choices actively shape and redefine the narratives surrounding national identity. National identity is best understood holistically, encompassing structural influences and individual perceptions.
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CHAPTER 3 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TAIWAN’S IDENTITY
This part of the chapter will elucidate and expound upon the significant historical context in which the formation of the de-Chineselization Taiwanese national identity played a pivotal role. Despite the population predominantly comprised of Han Chinese, Taiwan has also undergone forced assimilation into a Chinese identity under the authoritarian regime. It seems that the Chinese ethnic identity should match the Chinese national identity, but the subject here is what motivates people to query their identity. Furthermore, why, then, would Taiwanese people choose to discard the deeply connected Chinese culture, both ethnically and culturally, in establishing a new national identity?
3.1 Ethnic Demographics in Taiwan
Taiwan’s population comprises four different ethnic-cultural groups people: the majority of Han Chinese (approximately 95%)4, with a small number of Austronesian Indigenous people (2.5%)- the first inhabitants of the island, and the new immigrants (2.4%). The predominant Han population can be divided into Hoklo, Hakka, and Mainlanders based on origins and languages. Solid national solidarity can be constructed upon the homogeneous culture- majority Han ethnic ties by which most of the Taiwanese people share. Nevertheless, the Han-Chinese ethnic tie incessantly hounded Taiwanese people who doubted the extent of their Chinese lineage and culture while born and raised in Taiwan. The identity issues for Taiwanese people result from the divergent interpretation of ethnolinguistic bonds by the different regime rulings. In reality, there is a rupture between the picture of national culture/ identity and the one people perceive. To account for the discrepancy of this situation
4 State Information- People by Executive Yuan of Taiwan https://www.ey.gov.tw/state/99B2E89521FC31E1/2820610c-e97f-4d33-aa1e-e7b15222e45a. The latest official census shows that the new immigrant population increased to 2.5% of the total population, hence the percentage of the Han population is revised here (the retrieved data is 96.4%) according to the new report.
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and to find the reason behind the selection of culture representing nation-states, we will need historical and ethnic knowledge in the socio-political context. This chapter aims to provide an essential historical background that frames the ethnic-cultural identity from within and outside.
3.1.1 Austronesian Indigenous People
There are 2% of the Austronesian Indigenous people in Taiwan out of the total population, though they are the first and the ‘authentic’ Taiwanese residents. Basically, Taiwanese Indigenous dichotomize as the Plain Indigenous people and the Highland Indigenous people. The Plain Indigenous people had acculturated to the Han population since the seventeenth century through intermarriage with immigrant male Han Chinese. There are 16 lasting tribes, the highland ones, having distinct languages, heroic legends, and rituals that have nothing in common with the Chinese culture. For the past four centuries, the Indigenous people have been marginalized in social, cultural, and political realms due to constant conflicts with other Indigenous or non-Indigenous people and assimilation policies by different regimes.
The first written record of the Plain Indigenous people- the Sinkang Manuscript, is essential proof of their (the Siraya tribe5) existence as a primordial part of Taiwanese culture. According to the findings of the new scripts, the latest scripts date back to 1813 (more than 150 years after the Dutch left Taiwan in 1662). This infers that the Dutch also influenced the reading and writing capability of the Indigenous people and also presents as the first written evidence of original Taiwanese culture.
5 The Siraya is one of the Plain Indigenous groups, inhabiting in current Tainan area. They are one of the most populated inhabitants in Taiwan before the Han immigrants become the majority. Due to the large-scale reclamation of the Han people, the Siraya people were absorbed or assimilated by the Han communities. Some of them had to move to remote villages and mountainous areas for survival. As a result, their population dispersed and thus they lost their traditional language, culture, and identity. A small number of the Siraya people remained in their original places of origin) were highly Chineselized and reluctant to identify their Siraya identity. In the first systematic demographic surveys by the Japanese colonist period, the Siraya people were categorized as Han. “Taiwan’s Indigenous people- Siraya”, 2016, Indigenous Peoples Affairs Commission, Tainan City Government, Retrieved May 9, 2023 (https://web.tainan.gov.tw/nation/News_Content.aspx?n=934&s=5752)
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Nevertheless, the overall Indigenous cultures and languages were fated to be marginalized due to the predominantly Han-Chinese population and culture. In addition, the Indigenous people were often involved in conflicts in the past between the Spanish, Dutch, Chinese, and Japanese, which resulted in the gradual diminution and marginalization of their population. Very few religious rituals, words, and drinking habits relics of Plain Indigenous people have remained in Taiwanese daily life6. Under policies advocating for diversity and indigenous cultures, descendants of the Plains Indigenous Peoples, who have long been classified as Han Chinese and considered to have disappeared, are beginning to seek their lost cultural identities.
So why would the 2% of the minority population, even the diminished one, matter in making Taiwan’s identity? With the rise of multiculturalism and de-Chineselization, indigenous culture is a necessary supplement to Taiwanese culture. The manuscripts purposedly revealed prove That Taiwan’s culture has its authentic roots, not necessarily dependent on China.
To set out the spirit of respect, prosperity, and coexistence of diversity as the national cultures of Taiwan, the government has recognized the historical role of the Plain Indigenous people and respected their right to self-identification. For the past twenty years, activists and scholars strived to include the Plain Indigenous people as the legal subject of the ‘Status Act For Indigenous Peoples,’ which granted special social, political, and cultural rights. Not until 2016 did President Tsai apologize on behalf of the government for the injustices and inequalities made to the indigenous people in the past; she also proclaimed that Plain indigenous people should be identified in legal terms7. The positive transformation for improving the political and social status
6 Senior scholar Shih (1990) conducted a comprehensive anthropological study on a local community that venerates a pot, a belief and ritual believed to have been inherited from the Siraya tribe.
7 Office of the President, ROC (Taiwan). 2016. “President Tsai Apologizes to Indigenous Peoples on Behalf of Government.” Office of the President, ROC (Taiwan). Retrieved (https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/4950).
Following President Tsai’s policy on equal rights and development of Indigenous people, the government passed the draft amendment to the Indigenous Peoples Status Law submitted by the committee of Indigenous Peoples on August 17, 2016. The amendment aims to redefine ‘Indigenous
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of the indigenous people paved the way for a more Taiwanese/islands-centered national culture. Also, the reconciliation and concession by the government signal a cultural identification rather than an essential ethnic one that is and will be part of the diverse culture of Taiwan.
3.1.2 Han-Chinese
The Han Chinese immigrants from the southeastern coastal provinces of China established a permanent inhabitation in Taiwan during the Dutch rule of the southwestern part of the island in the early seventeenth century (1624-1661). They aimed to attract Han Chinese to work for the infrastructure and defense constructions and to grant preferential business treatment to Han merchants. Before the Dutch rolled out the agricultural plan, scattered fishermen, dealers, and adventurers were crossing the strait from southeastern China. Later, as the Dutch expanded their control over Taiwan, they needed more workforce to cultivate the land. So, the Dutch began to grow economic crops such as rice and sugar cane, which set the founding stone for agricultural activities and the foundation of Taiwan’s’ agricultural production for centuries. According to the Dutch East India Company’s poll tax record, at the end of their colonial rule, there was approximately 25.000- 30.000 Han Chinese population in Taiwan in 1661 (Chen 2005:79)8.
The Dutch colonial in Taiwan was based on developing international trade and increasing profit for the Dutch East India Company. However, their legacy is more than bringing Taiwan as an international trade hub and also has crucial effects on the demo-culture fabric of the island. The Han-Chinese settlement in Taiwan can be credited to the Dutch’s encouraging promotions. On the other hand, the
people’ by adding the Plain Indigenous people with legal Indigenous people status. The amendment shall be passed in the near future. (Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2017).
8 The original study on the Han Chinese population in the Dutch colonial period derived from Jiang Shusheng (江樹生江樹生). “荷據時期臺灣的漢人人口變遷荷據時期臺灣的漢人人口變遷 [Han Population Changes in Taiwan during the Dutch Occupation]”. collected and edited by 財團法人北港朝天宮董事會財團法人北港朝天宮董事會[the board of directors of Beigang Chaotian Temple] in 媽祖信仰國際學術研討會論文集媽祖信仰國際學術研討會論文集 [The International Symposium on Mazu Faith]. 1997
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unprecedented agricultural developments in Taiwan also provide a better living environment than their home town for Chinese migrants. Recent studies presumed that the Han Chinese people whose ancestors had lived in Taiwan since the Qing dynasty are the lineage of the vanished Plain Indigenous people. Contemporary nationalists often attribute multiculturalism to Dutch (and Japanese) colonialism to downplay the ‘Chinese legacy’ of Taiwan (Dupré 2017:32).
The second wave of Han-Chinese migrants arrived in Taiwan when the Ming dynasty fell to the Manchurian in 1644. The loyalist general of the Ming Dynasty, Zheng Cheng-gong (鄭成功鄭成功), retreated to Taiwan as a military base against the Qing Dynasty and hoped to reconquer China. After Zheng expelled the Dutch from Taiwan in 1662, he and his military established the first Han-Chinese regime in Taiwan, indicating the end of Western colonization and the beginning of Chinese presence in Taiwan. According to research, the Han-Chinese population reached 120,000 during this period, including Zheng’s accompanies and military. As there was no significant increase in the indigent population, it is presumed that it was the first time the Han population surpassed the Indigenous population. If they did not, the Han and the local population were close to each other (Chou 2010).
Zheng’s descendants surrendered to the Qing Dynasty in 1683, indicating that Taiwan became an extended part of Chinese territory for the first time in history. And the Qing Dynasty as China first gained sovereignty over Taiwan as an overseas frontier. In the beginning, the Qing government paid no attention to ruling the island, and the government even imposed strict restrictions on immigrants who attempted to cross the straits. Yet, the immigrant influx continued. The Qing fortified coastal safety and laid down further administration when Japan invaded Taiwan (in 1874); the first official was appointed to Taiwan for the ‘mainlandization’ of the whole island under imperial domination (Chuang 1987:188). The Han-Chinese population was estimated at 66,000 when the Qing recaptured Taiwan and reached approximately 2.5 million at the end of the Qing rule (Chou 2010:6). During the Qing Dynasty rule (1683-1895), Taiwan gradually transformed from an immigrant to a stable settlement society which local lineage and worship communities replaced their bond with the homeland in
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China. As long as the Han-Chinese immigrants became residents of Taiwan, they built a different type of Chinses society than the one in the Mainland (Chuang 1987:198).
The majority Han population in Taiwan is nevertheless far from homogenous. It is divided into three sub-ethnolinguistic groups: Hoklo (or called Minan) people (69%) who immigrated from Quanzhou and Zhangzhou city of Fujian province. Within the Hoklo migrants, they are divided by dialects and origins of the cities they came from. As to the Hakka (16.2%) people from Guandong province, their most identifiable characteristic is their Hakka dialect; the Mainlanders (5.5%) refer to the non-Hakka and Hoklo but Han-Chinese people. Mainlanders are diverse people from all over China who came with the defeated KMT army after Mainland China fell under the sway of the Communists.
The dialects initially divide Han immigrants into Hoklo and Hakka within the Han-Chinese group. Similarly, Hoklo and Hakka people are not entirely homogenous; different origins and accents substantial identification as the armed confrontations enhance opposition between and within the group. The Hoklo has never been a unified identity, and the two regional varieties hardly mingled. Not until recently has the division of Hoklo people united as opposed to the Mainlanders. On the other hand, the Hakka people’s identity has been built upon their contact with the Hoklo people. The distinction between Hoklo and Hakka was more related to the cultural differences, and division can be neglected when they need to face outcomes like Japanese colonists and the Mainlanders.
The Mainlanders had arrived in Taiwan from various provinces of China after the takeover. They were considered ‘outlanders’ by most Hoklo and Hakka people first because of their origins, and second, they generally occupied better social and political positions than the local Taiwanese. The social and political upheavals, coupled with periods of oppression, precipitated the enforcement of martial law for 40 years. Many of the Mainlanders were soldiers or their families who retreated with the KMT military to Taiwan temporarily. The diaspora experiences enhanced their feelings of homesickness, and even though the first-generation Mainlanders withered,
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their offspring have remained the foremost Chinese identity and belongingness compared with other groups.
The new immigrants (2.4%) indicate foreigners who acquire Taiwanese nationality through marriage or other approaches. According to the demographic report, the new immigrants are mainly from China and other southeastern countries (primarily by international marriage). They reached almost 580.000 population that, surpassing the Indigenous population last year9 . Meanwhile, the second generation of new immigrants is constantly exposed to a multi-culture atmosphere; thus, they are more open-minded to explore new ideas, challenge existing conditions, and appreciate other ethnic groups. According to a cultural identity scale survey, the new immigrants have adequately perceived and accepted Taiwan’s local culture, which indicates a stage of cultural internalization- commitment and social integration. At this stage, individuals understand and cherish the cultural difference between their originality and the dominant local culture in Taiwan (Wu and Tsai 2017). The influx of new immigrants and their descendants, boasting a myriad of cultural backgrounds, has the potential to enrich Taiwan’s national culture beyond the confines of the predominant Chinese-centric cultural paradigm.
In general, the ethnic composition of Taiwan’s population is rather homogenous- 98% of the Han-Chinese lineage or, say Chineselized population. However, the ancestry of a bloodline with Han Chinese has been politicized as a Chinese nationalism that has been compulsorily imposed on all local Taiwanese, disregarding the cultural composition’s diversity. The sense of inferior/ suppressed local Taiwanese and superior/ dominant Chinese culture deepens the division of people from their cultural identity. In addition, the ambivalent feeling of having the Han-Chinese lineage and cultural inheritance versus a sui generis Taiwanese identity haunted Taiwanese for a very long time. The Han-Chinese ethnic tie is the political, cultural, and ideological fetter for the prospective Taiwanese nation. The fetter tightened while eloquent
9 The new immigrant population can be found on the Ministry of Interior R.O.C. (Taiwan) website- Immigrant Statistics page. (https://www.moi.gov.tw/cl.aspx?n=3951)
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political propaganda was publicized in Mainland China: ‘Taiwanese is Chinese, and thus Taiwan is an unrepeatable part of China as we are all affinities.’
So, if set out from the assert that Taiwanese people are ethnically and culturally Han-Chinese, is it justifiable for Taiwanese people to have their own identity? Taiwan has been a periphery and isolated island across Mainland China geographically and politically. Through the lens of biological evolution, how much do the Taiwanese ethnically resemble the Chinese, which is a divergent and equivocal concept? The possible answer can be exemplified by other immigrant countries today. Ancestry does not preoccupy personal choice on national identity as different groups might mingle through marriage. Again, modern national identity weighs more on civic criteria rather than pure ethnicity. An outstanding scholar, Marie Lin, has contributed to genetic mapping and ethno-demographic studies of Taiwan’s population. Her decade-long research showed that the asserted majority Han-Chinese population in Taiwan has the Plain Indigenous lineage from centuries of intermarriage. Her analysis of DNA and genetic markers reflects a new recognition of the ethnocultural ‘group of Taiwanese’ distinct from the Han Chinese (Pan 2017). Despite this genetic study being criticized as being politically biased, the implied result of the study accords with the mix-ethnicity, multi-culture discourse on national culture in Taiwan.
3.1.3 Imagined Taiwanese
The Han-Chinse-centric national culture and identity have predominated in Taiwanese society due to the endearment to the homeland or the political deed. After years of imperative indoctrination of Chinese nationalism, groups with different cultures but shared similar experiences assembled as imagined Taiwanese that embraced the different cultures. ‘Four Ethnic Groups’ was introduced based on multi-culturalism, overthrowing the pressure of Chinese nationalism (Hsiao 2005:4–5; Lin and Huang 2019:21,45). Also, by highlighting Taiwan’s internal ethnic and cultural diversity, one can imply the existence of a unique ‘Chinese nation’ of Taiwan, thereby promoting the discourse of Taiwan as an independent nation-state (Chang 2006:48–49).
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The ‘Four Ethnic Groups’ comprise people of Hoklo, Hakka, Indigenous people, and Mainlander10 , which has been rhetorically taught in public institutions and implemented in social and political policies. The categorization is, though argued by Wang, “a result of political power wrestling, compromises, and interactive relationship with the public, not a categorization based on cultural homogeneity (2003:54–55, 61).” Wang (2003) referred to this ethnic categorization, formed based on the generalizing internal cultural heterogeneity and the absence of cultural homogeneity, as the “ethnic imagination” of Taiwan.
It is imagined because the Four Ethnic Groups emerged from the contrasting historical, social, and political contexts among different groups. According to Wang’s analysis (2003:57–58), group differentiation typically arises from the dynamics between dominant and oppressed groups. The most prominent and earliest example is between the Han-Chinese and the indigenous peoples. The image of Indigenous people has been reproduced and presented with prejudice and stereotypes by the dominant groups. When there is a forceful foreign group (Japanese and the Mainlanders), the inner group distinctions are usually conceded to resist the foreign groups.
However, upon closer examination, it becomes clear that the Four Ethnic notion is imagined. In contrast to Wang’s (2003)11 analysis hinged on historical objective conditions, over time, the objective conditions that previously caused confrontation have become increasingly indistinguishable through interaction and integration, especially within the Han ethnic group. Concerning the shared cultural components of ethnic groups, only the indigenous people can be generalized as distinct from the Han people. However, this solid ethnic identity opposing the Han people does not
10 The emergence of this ethnic group categorization is obscure because it is vague, and discrepant to the realities that there are culturally cross-groups and sub-groups. According to the ethnic group report, except for the Indigenous people with a clear ethnic identity, the other three groups only have loose group identity (Lin and Huang 2019:22).
11 In his later works, he stated that the Mainlanders’ ethnic consciousness emerged from subjective perceptions of their inferior social and political status instead of objective common cultural traits and past experiences (Wang 2016:243).
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disregard the significant diversity among the tribes. Different tribes speak different languages and observe distinct rituals and ceremonies12. Other than the indigenous people, the Han majority, with vague borderlines, is identified by subjective classifications and lifestyle; thus, it is prone to confusion and controversy if objective classification is conducted (Chen and Hsu 2004:2,3). Personal subjective identification is foreseeable to become the benchmark for Taiwan’s de-Chineselization identity that presents “personal attachment to a nation and the belief that its members belong together with any shared commitment (Miller 1995:22).”
Cultural differences are more straightforward to discern if confrontation or conflicts are frequent. In light of relentless confrontation with ‘others,’ even slight cultural differences may be exaggerated or minimized for various ends (Wang 2003:35,159). The rival confrontations and unequal social treatment intensify the cultural distinctiveness of the ethnic groups, which has become the leverage of identity perception for Taiwanese people. Under the sugar-coat of embracing multi-culture by the idea of Four Ethnic Groups, the conventional ethnic divisions rooted in the supremacy of Chinese culture were attenuated or reconciliation (Chang 2006:48; Wang 2003:161). After the alleviation of suppressed identities and socioeconomic inequalities, the internal strife among ethnic groups has eased. The path toward identity construction will now pivot towards a confrontation between Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism.
The ‘Four Major Ethnic Groups’ marked the sprout of the imagined Taiwanese community and signaled the initiation of valuing internal cultural diversities, setting the following stage for de-Chineselization. In the following part, I will discuss how Taiwanese consciousness sprouted, developed, and ultimately moved towards the de-Chineselization of Taiwanese national identity under different political and historical backgrounds.
12 The general introduction to each recognized tribe of indigenous people regarding their festivals, traditions, and rituals can be found on the website of the Council of Indigenous Peoples. 2010. “Introduction of Indigenous People.” Cip.gov.tw. Retrieved (https://www.cip.gov.tw/en/index.html).
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3.2 Japan Imperial Colonization (1895-1945)
Japanese colonial period was the first contact of modernization for Taiwanese people, and also a miserable experience to lament to each other. Moreover, now it has become a useful heritage to claim the uniqueness of Taiwanese culture. The following part will pinpoint the heritage of the colonization that fueled the Taiwanese consciousness.
3.2.1 Modernization
Imperial Japan was the first modern, industrial, militarily powerful East Asian country. Their experiences of radical Westernization made them acknowledge that linguistic standardization and cultural unification are the preconditions for modernization and national cohesion (Heylen 2005:499). “The Japanese colonial governor planned to modernize the cultural system of Taiwan, to shape it into a more Japanese-oriented type of culture (Shih 1988:46).”
Japan, a new modernized country that defeated mighty civilization, the legitimacy of colonial rule lay in the governance of civilized nations over uncivilized ones (Lee 2017:34). Thus, Japanese colonialism has been viewed positively with the purpose of modernization and nation-building, with these initiatives being used to emphasize Japan’s contributions to the modernization of its colonies, despite criticisms that these measures served Japan’s economic and political interests.
As WWII broke out and Imperial Japan invaded China, a fortified version of assimilation policies was carried out for the overall war preparation. The colonial government vigorously worked to integrate the cultural identity of the Taiwanese people on a spiritual level. Encouraging Taiwanese people, no matter being Han or indigenous, to embrace the Japanese (civilized) way of life and culture, promoting complete Japanization, and strengthening national consciousness. Through various forms of ideological propaganda and spiritual mobilization, the aim is to diminish the Taiwanese people’s sense of belonging to the Chinese homeland.
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, a shared language is a crucial component of a modern nation. Through the widespread adoption of the Japanese language, many Taiwanese people acquired fluency in Japanese, which surged from 1.65 million (32.3% of the total population) in 1936 to over 2.8 million (51% of the total population by 1940 (Tsai 2009), facilitating effective communication with the Japanese population and enabling their social and political participation in the Japanese-dominated society. Japanese served as the dominant language of communication in Taiwanese society.
Japanese education, a colonial political apparatus, shaped and directed the thinking, action, and historical consciousness of the new generation with civil values (Chou 1997:47). Those who enrolled in middle and higher public school or outstandingly study abroad had opportunities to experience and witness the inexorable trend of nationalism, free will, and self-determination. A rising wave of intellectual activists emerged, championing anti-colonialism and striving for self-determination and political independence for Taiwan as their ultimate goals.
3.2.2 Seed of Taiwanese Consciousness
From the periphery fortress of the Qing empire to an extended territory of imperial Japan, from the majority Han-Chinese population to the inferior colonials. The colonization experiences and the overall development of infrastructures contribute to forming and emerging a distinct Taiwanese identity. Meanwhile, the colonization period coincided with influential international events- WWI, the nation-state’s formation, ethnic self-determination, and the birth of the Soviet Union- significantly impressed Taiwanese intellectuals to call for a culturally and ethnically Taiwanese identity. For this reason, the recent nationalists advocating Taiwan subjectivity have outsourced from the colonization period as the prototype of the Taiwanese national identity and the inception of de-Chineselization. To some extent, the division between the Han groups was sewed, and the inhabitants of the island turned into an imagined community that,
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Taiwan was broken off from China before China transformed from an empire into a republic and modern nation-state. And from this point on, the historical trajectory of the two divided sharply: while nationalism in China rose after the moribund Qing empire’s 1895 defeat to imagine the Chinese nation without Taiwan the nationalism in Taiwan emerged as a reaction to Japan’s colonial nation-building to imagine a Taiwan that belonged only to the Taiwanese (Wu 2014:31).
The Qing dynasty ceded Taiwan to imperial Japan after losing the first Sino-Japanese war in 1895. When the Local intellectuals were shocked that the war was taken in China, whereby the Taiwanese people bore the cost. On May 23, 1895, the” Autonomy Declaration of the Taiwan Republic” was announced, and thus, the “Taiwan Republic” was established- the first democratic Republic of East Asia to adopt modern nationalism. Some scholars would describe or underline the voluntary will to form a dependent state as the antecedent of the succeeding Taiwan nationalism and the implication for Taiwanization. And emphasize Taiwanese people’s subjectivity in self-determination first time in history. Yet the ‘Taiwan Republic’ lasted no more than a month after the president evaded, and the original intention was merely to resist Japanese colonization by ostensible independence, remaining loyal to the Qing emperor (Lin 2001).
The assimilation project was implemented between 1920-1937, the turning point from military to civil rule and to moderate political, social, and cultural movements. The goal of the assimilation was first to cut off the Taiwanese’s tie with China (initiation of de-Chineselization) and to create complete devotion to Japanese culture and state. Like other colonial countries in the early 19th century, local people could resist or be assimilated by the colonists’ culture or language.
The colonial government implemented many strategic cultural and social institutions to modify Taiwanese identity fundamentally. During the midterm of colonial rule, the armed uprisings were replaced by nonviolent resistance facilitated by the first generation of modern educated youth, and political and social movements with different ideologies and anti-colonialist subjects began to thrive. These elites, fascinated by the urge for democratization, the rise of liberalism, and the trend of self-
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determination of the nation, became the initial driving force of Taiwanese nationalist consciousness (Hsiau 2012:76). Some Taiwanese scholars asserted that it was the social resistance to the assimilation that bred the nascent Taiwanese nationalism (Chen 2008; Dupré 2017:36; Shih 2013:390).
Cultural assimilation must start with a common language, so the Japanese authorities established public schools and introduced Japanese as a primary language of instruction. A centralized education system was implemented in Taiwan as a source and channel of systematic and dominant knowledge, tailoring individuals’ national identity and consciousness.
Wan- yao Chou’s (1997) study on the Japanese textbook 3rd edition for Taiwanese children from 1922-1936 analyzes and discusses the content of the texts and highlights the emphasis on practical/ scientific knowledge and homeland theme materials, which examine the relationship between school education and the formation of Taiwanese consciousness. Chou found out that in the Japanese language textbook, the reading contents regarding local knowledge about Taiwan weighted over Japanese culture and nationalism (ibid. 1997:16). The compilation of the content was based on the premise that “Loving homeland can expand the love for the nation and ultimately it can foster patriotism (ibid. 1997:40, 42).” The textbook intentionally disregarded the local history- the bond with China before colonization (ibid. 1997:45). Under the modern and systematic education system, Taiwanese people, for the first time in the eyes of the Japanese, learned about their local culture, gradually shifting away from their strong attachment to the Chinese homeland identity.
The oppressive feelings were downgraded, and the experience stimulated the sense of being Taiwanese. The confrontation between the colonizer and the colonized indirectly integrated the diverse local ethnolinguistic groups. Inspired by Taiwanese intellectuals, the vanguard of sociopolitical and literary movements initiated anti-colonialism movements that shouted, “Taiwan must belong to Taiwanese.” In essence, the foundational elements of Taiwanese consciousness originated from the intrinsic sentiment of anti-colonialism (Shih 2013:363).
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Nevertheless, the local dialects and bonds with Chinese culture continue to exist in private life. Many Taiwanese individuals continued to use their local languages privately, allowing them to retain some semblance of their cultural identity. However, Taiwanese usually affiliate sentiments towards Chinese culture and identity when confronted with the influence of Japanese culture. The Japanese did not go beyond functional literacy, a communicative tool toward modernity (Heylen 2005:505,506). Japanese language, the lingual franca, united the educated Taiwanese intellectuals and helped them to acquire and spread modern ideas to the public.
The Japanese colonial rule triggered the genesis of Taiwanese consciousness, lacking the essence of Taiwanese nationalism (contrary to Chen’s (2008) assertion13). As most activists bear strong ties with Chinese culture or oscillate between being subsidiary and equivalent Chinese ethnic groups, their Taiwanese consciousness was a supplement against Japanese colonialism, not a discourse of modern nationalism (Hsiau 2012:86,91,100)
3.2.3 Divergence of Identity
The older generation of intellectuals maintained a stronger attachment to Chinese cultural identity especially if their family inherited gentry status during the Qing Dynasty, which intensified their resistance to the assimilation policies by the colonists. The younger generation (born after the 1920s) was raised under Japanese education and culture, and their family’s status was elevated through education during the Japanese colonial period; they did not have an emotional attachment to Chinese culture and contrarily felt grateful for the economic and social benefits brought about by Japanese colonial (Chen 2008:211; Lee 2009:37–38)14.
After Japan’s defeat and withdrawal from Taiwan, the Taiwanese were able to break
13 Wu’s (2009) review of Chen’s (2008) book, criticized the oversimplified, and decontextualized narratives of the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism in the Japanese colonial period.
14 In Lee’s book, he used Lin Hsien-tang (1881- 1956), a Taiwanese anti-colonialism activist and politician with Chinese sentiment, to represent the older generation example. On the other hand, Peng Ming-min (1923- 2022) a well-known Taiwanese activist calling for democratization and Taiwan’s independence, illustrated the younger generation.
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free from the compulsive colonial culture. However, they seemed dithering about embracing the Chinese identity entirely different from what they had imagined. Based on existing research, regardless of whether Taiwanese people accepted or resisted Japanese national identity, most did not deny their Chinese ancestry (Chou 1997:44–45). The differences in generational and social backgrounds among Taiwanese people regarding their identification with either their ancestral homeland or with Japan persist, contributing to contemporary identity issues.
During the colonial period, Japan’s assimilation policies exerted a significant influence on Taiwanese interpretations of history and colonial experiences, leading to disunity. History serves as a crucial component of national identity, whether understood as the ‘subject of the nation’ (Duara 1995:4), a narrative in construction (Bhabha 1990:3), or as Foucault’s concept of “legitimized knowledge.”. The absence of a pre-colonial history consequently ruptured the connection to the past and contributed to identity disorientation.
The colonial experience has been fundamental in reshaping the de-Chinesized Taiwanese identity, reflecting the stance of Taiwanese authorities towards the meaning of national identity. The terminology used to describe the period of Japanese colonial rule reflects ideological debates about national identity and historical interpretation. While ‘Japanese era’ was colloquially used, the KMT party government officially referred to it as ‘Japanese occupation’ to depreciate colonization and emphasize sovereignty’s legitimacy. History professor Wang (王仲孚) contended that the dispute surrounding this issue transcends mere historical factuality, evolving instead into a realm of subjective historical interpretation. He posits that the classification of Taiwan’s colonial era as either ‘Japanese occupation’ or ‘Japanese rule’ hinges largely on subjective perspectives. ‘Japanese rule’ aligns with the Imperial (Military) Historical View, a perspective in Japanese educational materials and textbooks. If Taiwan seeks to establish its national identity, it must establish its own stance in historical interpretation.
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The DPP, which governed for four terms, tended to use positive descriptions to narrate the colonial past while often employing negative descriptions for the KMT’s authoritarian rule. Local civil societies have raised concerns regarding the conflation of ‘Japanese rule vs occupation,’ viewing it as part of a de-Taiwanization conspiracy aimed at subsuming Taiwanese history into Chinese history. This not only deviates from the historical facts of Taiwan and its subjectivity in explaining history but also poses a serious challenge to the profound emotions of the Taiwanese people. The argument persisted as an ongoing inquiry into identity even to the present day, relating to divergent national memory and historical interpretation15.
3.3 ROC Takeover and Re-Chineselization
After World War II, based on the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan ceded Taiwan to ROC, a member of the victorious Allied power. Nonetheless, due to Japan’s assimilation policies in the name of embracing modernization, Taiwanese people harbored conflicting sentiments about returning to China. Upon the KMT’s assumption of power, they immediately launched Chineselization, which further intensified after the total retreat in 1949. This section will explore how this enforced and singular cultural assimilation spurred the emergence of Taiwanese consciousness.
3.3.1 Japanized Taiwanese vs. Foreign Chinese Ruler
After fifty years of colonization and assimilation policies with a centralized education system, approximately 80% of the Taiwanese can understand basic Japanese 71% of school-age children of an attendance rate in elementary school (Chou 1994). Taiwanese people were profoundly under the influence of the Japanese, as Wu Shouli depicted that
In terms of Japanese language usage, in the elder generation, except in extreme cases of those who did not learn any Japanese, code-switching was frequent
15 Yen, Sze-Chi 顏思褀顏思褀. 2013. “台灣官方就「日據」與「日治」之爭定調台灣官方就「日據」與「日治」之爭定調 [The Official Stance in Taiwan on the Debate between ‘Japanese Occupation’ and ‘Japanese Rule’ Is Settled].” BBC News Chinese. Retrieved June 24, 2023 (https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2013/07/130723_tw_jp_occupied_dispute).
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between Japanese vocabulary and Taiwanese. For most of the middle-aged generation, who were capable of reading, writing, and talking in Japanese and inevitably used Japanese in public, their mother tongue was not diminished but receded to family and private life. Their mother tongue persisted but no longer functioned as a common communication medium. The young generation, the most affected by the assimilation, already learned Japanese; they may even be unable to speak Taiwanese (Wu 1946)16.
In fact, accepting Japan’s assimilation policies in pursuit of civilization as a goal led many Taiwanese to believe that Taiwan could become a civilized country like Japan. Thus, Taiwanese people had ambivalent feelings toward the assimilation policy, as depicted by Chen: the resistant collaboration (2008) or resistance through accepting assimilation (Chen 2006:254,255). Despite people’s aspirations for modernization and progress, the oppression and injustice trapped people between the desire to change and feeling powerless about the status quo. The emotional dilemma created a hopeful fantasy of returning to their homeland, resulting in dashed hopes and disappointments.
The Japanese colonization and assimilation policies created a distinct quality of Taiwanese without doubt. Different historical experiences between China and Taiwan have created physical and mental ruptures (Lee 2009:40–41). Colonial language education profoundly influenced Taiwanese communication medium, which the KMT government considered a predicament to their takeover (Hsiau 2012:113). Chen’s (2008:142,171) analysis of the Taiwanese intellectuals’ records shows that “the Taiwanese were unwelcome in China, yet they still held hopes for their ancestral homeland, despite harboring negative perceptions of China’s current situation.” This reflects the disparity in development between the two sides and the negative stereotypes each holds of the other.
Taiwanese people were initially eager to embrace the Chinese takeover, hoping for fair treatment as equal citizens by reuniting with the motherland (Wang 2003:67). However, they soon became disillusioned by the malversation of the new regime.
16 The original text of the newspaper column was cited from A-chin Hsiau’s book, Reconstructing Taiwan: The Cultural Politics of Contemporary Nationalism (2012:155).
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Taiwanese’s first impression of undisciplined, ragged, and ill-equipped Chinese troops generated an understanding and sympathy towards Japanese rule coupled with disdain towards China (Lee 2009:46,47). There was an inexplicable longing towards China illustrated as “the homeland melancholia of colonial people (Chen 2008:144) .” Nevertheless, when the harsh reality shattered dreams of reunification, disappointment, and frustration deepened, the stereotype would set in, leading to a conflictory identity.
The newly arrived Chinese political regime in Taiwan has adopted a conquering mentality. It established a system akin to the Japanese colonial governor during the colonial era, referred to as the Taiwan Administrative Executive Office, which had complete authority over the executive, legislative, and military powers (Li 2023). The first chief executive of Taiwan province, Chen Yi’s (陳儀陳儀) public speeches in the first year of the takeover implied a conqueror or rescuer attitude toward the enslaved Taiwanese people,
Japan ruled Taiwan with a slavery policy. So Japanese treated our Taiwanese compatriots as enslaved people, not regarded as the owners of Taiwan (1946a:3). Taiwan was a colony of Japanese imperialism. You were enslaved by the Japanese government and received unequal treatment. Now you are citizens of the Republic of China[…]. So your status has changed from slave of the Japanese government to the owner of the Republic of China (1946b:12).
The speeches accorded with most Chinese officials’ underlying logic of ‘Taiwanese equal to Japanese slaves and equal to enslavement’ (Chang 2007:3). The idea of emancipating and saving the enslaved Taiwanese and removing the enslaved (Japanese) ideology elevated the Chinese officials as the conqueror and saver of Taiwanese people. To save Taiwanese people from colonial slavery and to make Taiwanese people honorable citizens of China. Hence, “the government set up the goal of de-Japanized and Chineselized Taiwanese, and to achieve this goal, promoting and publicizing the national language- Mandarin, was the priority (Hsiau 2012:117).” This stance of belittling colonial culture stems from a sense of superiority rooted in Chinese consciousness. The de-Japanization of Taiwanese people becomes the primary task of the KMT regime.
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3.3.2 Chineselization
After Taiwan returned to the Republic of China from Japan’s Imperial rule, the Republic government rolled out sets of Chinseselization policies based on the Han-Chinese-centered national ideology. Sun Yat-sen, the revolutionist and the funder of the Republic of China (ROC), advocated the idea of creating a unified Han nation that included five other ethnic groups17. But, later, Sun changed his nationalism to Han-Chinese centrism, claiming that Han people are Chinese and the Chinese nation18 is an existing ethnic entity (Rawski 1998:2). The Chinese nationalism- one of the three principles of the Republic manifested in Sun’s lecture, he said,
By learning from past experiences, we should know that it is necessary to promote and fully understand the doctrine of nationalism to save the country. There are 400 million population in China, and we can affirm that they are all Han Chinese. With shared blood, speaking a common language, believing in the same religion, and practicing the same customs, we belong to a nation.[…] Our country is in peril now. If we ignore promoting nationalism and uniting 400 million people into solidarity, China will be doomed. To save our country from the crisis, we must advocate nationalism and save the country with a united national spirit19.
Before the establishment of the Republic, Chinese people were a community that shared superior Chinese culture and participated in ritual orders. Those who can acculturate Chinese culture can be a community member, so according to Duara, the
17 The five ethnic groups consist of Han, Manchurian, Mongol, Muslims, and Tibetian people who unified as one nation-state- the Republic of China. The idea of unified five ethnic groups as the basis of Chinese nationalism was stated in 中山學術資料庫中山學術資料庫 [Sun Yat-Sen Studies Database]. 1912. “臨臨時大總統就職宣言時大總統就職宣言 [Inaugural Declaration of the President].” 國父全國父全集全文檢索系統集全文檢索系統 [ Collected Works of Sun Yat- Sen Full Text Retrieval System]. Retrieved March 19, 2024 (https://sunology.culture.tw/cgi-bin/gs32/s1gsweb.cgi?o=dcorpus&s=id=%22DS0000000452%22.&searchmode=basic).
18 The Chinese (people) and the Chinese nation indicate different meanings in the Chinese language. The Chinese people (中國人中國人) usually means people of China, or in a political context. The Chinese nation (華人華人) can describe people who have ancestral and cultural ties to China, notbeing political Chinese.
19 This talk is the first lecture about nationalism, one of the three major principles of the Republic, given by its founder Sun Yat-sen on January 27, 1924. The text is translated from Chinese. “Concise Edition of The Three Principles of The People- Principle of Nationalism”. In Memorial of Sun Yat-sen. April 20, 2023 (http://www.sinofather.org/index.php?s=/Article/Content/article/content_id/800.html)
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notion of Chinese culturalism is not ethnocentric nor exclusive and relatively distant from nationalism (Duara 1996:155). China became the Han people’s nation-state and transformed the Chinese culture into an exclusive nationalist, ethnocentric conception not inherited cultural values followed by Sun’s revolution and as much by the modern nation-state discourse (ibid. 1996:156–57). Sun’s nationalist claim is prone to racism and pure biological ethnicity by claiming “the Han nation is China and diverse ethnic groups are to be assimilated into Han Chinese ethnicity (Rawski 1998:3).” This Han-Chinese-centered ethnic ideology has succeeded by the KMT government. The emphasis on Han-Chinese subjects, culture, and ethnicity was reinforced after the total defeat of the civil war and retreat to Taiwan in 1949.
From a Han-Chinese centrism perspective, the Taiwanese needed to be upright and honorable Chinese by following Sun Yat-sen’s nationalist ideology- to cultivate a national culture, which was the most significant mission. Chen Yi reiterated this concept in the General Report on Taiwan Province’s Education Situation. He said,
Taiwan’s cultural perception of national identity and nationhood is shallow and limited[…]. It was because the long-term Japanese rule in Taiwan employed policies to keep the population ignorant, which hindered the intellectual progress of Taiwanese compatriots. In order to develop a shared mindset of Taiwanese compatriots compatible with other provinces, it is necessary to prioritize cultivating national culture without delay (1946:70).
Given that language is a fundamental element in the formation of ethnic identity, the administrative executive office responsible for the takeover established the Taiwan Province National Language Promotion Committee (台灣省國語推行委員會台灣省國語推行委員會) in 194620. The Committee launched the National Language Campaign (國語運動國語運動) to de-Japanization and re-Chineslization of the Taiwanese people. The Office of Education issued a directive mandating the teaching of the national language (Mandarin) in all schools. At the same time, official documents were required to use the national language. Chen Yi emphasized the urgent need to implement the national
20 行政長官公署公報行政長官公署公報14 期期2月月[Executive of Administrative Office Bulletin No.14 Feburary]
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language on February 16, 1946. Later that year, on October 25, Japanese newspapers and magazines were banned, and Taiwanese writers were prohibited from writing in Japanese. After the 228 Incident in 1947, the policy extended to prohibiting playing or listening to Japanese music and speaking the Japanese language21.
Henceforth, to thy mono- linguism was implemented as only Mandarin policy (獨尊獨尊國語政策國語政策), which enforced Taiwanese people to only use/ speak Mandarin in life. Local languages (Taiwanese) were neglected again, like what the colonial government prioritized as ‘their language.’ In 1956 Speak Mandarin Campaign (說說國語運動國語運動) was promoted with the slogan ‘Language Disunity, National Disunity’ to regulate people only using Mandarin in public spaces, and schools also implemented measures to constrain the use of local dialects in school (Chen 1997:200). My father born in 1957 living Hoklo speaking family and environment witnessed the ‘Speak Mandarin Campaign’ with bitter memories. He has recalled it was common to see those who spoke Taiwanese would be punished by hanging a cardboard ‘I will speak Mandarin.’
Mandarin Chinese proficiency was a requirement for government officials, which caused the youth generation to lose their (Japanese) cultural resources. The rigid implementation of monolingualism caused local writers and educated intellectuals to forget everything they strived to achieve (Hsiau 2012:118–19). In this vein, the Chineselization policies, coupled with the ethnic hierarchy, favored the Mainlanders to the higher bureaucratic position because of their language benefits (Lee 2009:52–54). The Mandarin replaced the Japanese to be the dominant high culture. Subsequently, Taiwanese who could only speak Japanese and the Taiwanese language were once again left out of the ownership of Taiwan.
Since the government put the Chinese centrism culture as the prominent and only national culture, the deprivation of local culture and the superimposing of foreign
21 行政長官公署公報行政長官公署公報62 期期12月月[Executive of Administrative Office Bulletin No.62 December]
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culture engendered clear-cut distinctions between the local Taiwanese vs. Mainlanders. “Even the government can wrap the Chinese cultural and linguistic commonness that the Taiwanese could hardly refute. For the Taiwanese, it was a replacement of Japanese colonialism by Chinese nationalism (Heylen 2005:506,507).” Language differences, untrust in politics, and social hierarchy deepened the division between Chinese and Taiwanese.
For the Mainlanders, Taiwanese people were a cohort of the Japanese intruders who were to blame for countless instances of death and painful historical experiences of Chinese people. As to the Taiwanese, notable deficiencies within the political governance led to dissatisfaction that inevitably caused them to reminisce about the disciplined, modern, and efficient Japanese governance. Moreover, political participation and treatment were marked by a substantial lack of equity, resulting in widespread disappointment among the Taiwanese populace22.
The accumulated contradictory emotions resulted in massive rivalries between the military and the civilians, called the 228 Incident. The hostile confrontation between the local Taiwanese and Mainlanders would have persisted long after the massive suppression of 228 incidents in 1947. Consequently, a clear local Taiwanese consciousness in the context of high autonomy opposing the autocratic Mainlander rule emerged (Li 1995:101; Wang 2003:71)23. The total retreatment after the civil war of 1949 exacerbated the situation.
3.3.3 Enhanced Chineselization after 1949
The Chineselization policy drastically changed after 1949, after the KMT lost Mainland-territoriality. The de facto sovereignty of ROC remained in Taiwan and the
22 Memorial Foundation of 228. 2017. “The 228 Incident.” Retrieved March 20, 2023 (https://228.org.tw/en_pages.php?sn=7).
23 Wang and Li indicated a transformation of Taiwanese consciousness from an auxiliary of Chinese identity to a more independent, local-oriented identity after the 228 Incident. Wang emphasized more on the inequality that demarcated and underlined the shared experiences of local Taiwanese people. Li observed that the Taiwanese consciousness was the urge for political autonomy.
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surrounding islands. After KMT evaded Mainland China, in opposition to Communist China (PRC), the urgency to enhance Chinese identity among Taiwanese people was brought to the government’s headlines. Martial law was put into effect when the KMT was in a perilous situation at civil war with the Communist party to restrain the fundamental human rights granted by the constitution, which also justified the government’s employing favorable regulations and policies without any counterbalanced power. Taiwan was now the Republic of China, no longer a province of China. The essence and goal of the Chineselization had changed to make Taiwan the legitimate representative of the ‘real’ China. Yang (1992) believed that the radical implementations of post-1949 Chineselization policies caused continuous identity confusion for Taiwanese people.
Under martial law, this period was called the White Terror, islandwide political suppression, and human rights abuses in Taiwan, which lasted from around 1950 to the late 1980s. With the prospect of taking back the Mainland, the ruling KMT government needed to consolidate its power and eliminate dissent. During this period, individuals suspected of being Communist sympathizers or posing a potential threat to the regime were subjected to arrests, imprisonment, torture, and even execution. Many innocent people were victims of this dreadful and repressive period.
The White Terror was taboo in Taiwan but greatly affected political consciousness and collective memory. Although the inequalities between groups and disappointment toward the ROC government persisted, the repressive experiences, to some extent, slightly merged the local Taiwanese and the Mainlanders into a consolidation. It was not until the lifting of martial law in 1987 and the subsequent democratization of Taiwan that the dark past of the White Terror could be openly addressed and acknowledged. After the emergence of a focus on Taiwan subjectivity and Taiwanization, the dark era of the White Terror will become a shared historical experience among the Taiwanese population and serve as a cultural resource in shaping a de-Chineselized Taiwanese identity.
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The cultural policy in the 50s and 60s was an attempt to reorganize, establish, and idealize Chinese tradition in Taiwan to construct an authentic representative of China, the ‘only China’ in the world. The Chinese Cultural Revival Movement (中國文化復中國文化復興運動興運動) was launched in 1966, signified the new stage of Chineselization in Taiwan. This movement was the new apparatus for the KMT government’s struggle to retain its orthodoxy of Chinese culture in Taiwan as opposed to the PRC (Yang 1992:25). The government endeavors, through various social institutions and groups, including schools and media, to instill and promote the preservation of Chinese cultural traditions, which is deemed as an essential task in safeguarding the nation (Hsiau 2012:140).
The Chinese Cultural Revival Movement’s subjects were more encompassing than the previous period. Despite promoting Mandarin usage in every aspect of the public sphere, the movement included securing traditional Chinese culture by compiling historical records, traditional moral standards such as Confucian ideologies in school curricula, and national etiquette and living guidance examples for the citizens. Traditional Chinese values, morality, symbols, history, artworks, the Chinese language, and landscape scenery were celebrated24 . The cultural elevation also solidified Chiang Kai-shek’s position as a custodian of Chinese cultural legacy, casting Taiwan as a bastion of traditional Chinese culture (Lin 2005:188).
The cultural movement epitomized as a manifestation of the state’s cultural hegemony under political control, venerating and extolling the values of traditional Chinese culture. The martial law implementation fraught with a sense of crisis smooths the path for the control and mobilization of the movement (Lin 2005:47). In times of crisis or decline in a nation, given the example of the UK in Parekh’s analysis (1994:493–94), there is a risk of losing the glory of the past and failing to embody the qualities that once defined it. Therefore, it becomes imperative to rediscover cultural roots and revive the excellent traits of the past to prevent the loss of quality
24 Lin, Guo- xian. 2011. “中華文化復興運動中華文化復興運動 [Chinese Cultural Revival Movement].” Encyclopedia of Taiwan. Retrieved March 20, 2024 (https://nrch.culture.tw/twpedia.aspx?id=3968).
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character. This process is indispensable for the people of the ROC, the only inheritors of Chinese culture, as it forms an essential part of their identity.
3.4 Rise of Taiwanese Consciousness
Promoting Mandarin as the national language is an effective strategy for fostering Chinese culture and nurturing a strong sense of Chinese identity in which Taiwanese nationalism was born (Heylen 2005; Hsiau 2012). Learning and the capability to use Mandarin were associated with upward mobility. They brought tangible benefits to its speakers (Dupré 2017:40). At the turn of the century, most Taiwanese were proficient in Mandarin, which became the lingua franca in Taiwan. As Mandarin became the common language, did Taiwanese people transform into the ‘Chinese’ as planned by the KMT government? On the contrary, Heylen (2005:507) points out that the prioritization of Mandarin has led to divisions in labor and fostered grassroots resistance against the imposition of a Chinese identity.
Michael Hechter called this the ‘cultural division of labor’ in his Internal Colonialism (1975). Though Hechter emphasized that economic inequalities superimpose cultural differences which cause the cultural division of labor, in this case, it is the social and political inequality that elicits and deepens the division in Taiwan’s case (cited from Özkırımlı 2010:80, 81). In addition, the Mainland elites not only occupied essential seats in the government but also had the power to allocate and reserve the place for their members. They dominated the most important sectors, such as politics, state enterprises, large businesses, and real estate, yet the locals participated in small or medium businesses. Thus, the Mainlanders also benefited from preferential treatments like land acquisitions, access to resources, taxation, etc. (Dupré 2017:41). In this sense, local Taiwanese were excluded and denied access to the bureaucratic system until democratization (Chen 2006:278; Lee 2009:52).
The ROC government adopted mono-culturalism to consolidate national unity, yet on the other side, the local culture, language, and history were disregarded and discriminated against. The series of Chineslization policies was like what Anthropologist Keesing described as the phenomena of ‘fetishization of the culture’
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that dramatizes the celebration of cultural tradition while the local cultural traditions are vanishing (Keesing 1989:31). The authenticity of past culture is a “mythmaking inherent in political processes, in all time and spaces (ibid. 1989:24).” The cultural identity developed in the context of the mono- ethnolinguistic policies was to make people believe that their cultural identity and national identity must be congruous, which is unrealistic. Meanwhile, mono- ethnolinguistics-oriented national culture is rigorous and unwelcome to absorb other local or sub-cultures, which may exclude and neglect the members of non-dominant cultures.
The forceful changes in the cultural division of ‘us and they’ inspired the local Taiwanese to discern their uniqueness first from the Japanese and later from the Mainlanders. Japanization and Chineselization as the ‘other’ exerted pressure on indigenous Taiwanese culture, ultimately enabling the Taiwanese people to appreciate the uniqueness of their cultural heritage, which later contributed to the prototype of an ‘authentic’ Taiwanese national identity.
The processes of Japanization and Chineselization become evident that the governing authorities employed strategies to manipulate and regulate public discourse and the education system to instill the designated high culture among the populace. The outcomes of these assimilation processes were the satisfactory (re)creation of a national culture sponsored by the state. New cultural and national identities can efficiently be instilled in individuals with exclusive education and public communication control. Nevertheless, the imposed culture, be it Japanese or Chinese, is vulnerable, highly moralized, rigid, and standardized, as the operations must conform to the political ideology (Yang 1992:55–56). Once the mandatory instruction lost the support of national sponsorship, the dominance of the established culture became uncertain, which consequently created a space for cultural separatism
to emerge, manifested in movements such as de-Chineselization and the shift towards Taiwanization.
Taiwanese people have experienced a drastic national identity transformation by different ‘colonizers.’ From this view, Taiwanese people evolved into a self-defining
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group that differed from their ancestors and the Chinese people in and from China. The suppressive assimilation from the ruling power and unequal treatment pushed local Taiwanese people to search for and rethink their cultural uniqueness (Hsiau 2012:76). Under the authoritative rule, only local literature activities were allowed, which served as the seed to cultivate Taiwanese consciousness and identity. However, it is essential to note that Taiwanese consciousness in this period was to resist Japanization and lacked a substantial framework separate from Chinese culture.
The 228 Incident highlighted tensions between local Taiwanese and the ROC government and extinguished the endeavor to be Chinese. The following year, martial law was imposed in Taiwan in 1948 amid setbacks for the KMT in the civil war. Under the guise of a state emergency, the KMT government escalated repression, transitioning from de-Japanization to a (re)Chinalization agenda. Society was gripped by fear of suspicion, affecting dissidents and innocents alike. This shared trauma fostered solidarity among local Taiwanese, marking the initial phase of reconciliation and laying the foundation for the emergence of a distinct Taiwanese identity.
Political stability during the 1960s and 1970s established Taiwan’s economic growth. This stability allowed for the transformation from an agricultural-based to an industrial society, leading to urbanization and an increase in the labor population. Urbanized and diversified societies demanded greater social and political rights, including more political participation. Though the hostility and tension between Mainlanders and local Taiwanese have alleviated compared with the last decade, inequality remains in every aspect of society. Increased education access and common usage of Mandarin led to a more informed and politically aware population, fostering a desire for greater political freedoms and reforms. The economic transformation reshaped the political and social dynamics, setting the stage for the subsequent wave of reforms in the late 1970s.
The catalyst for democratization and liberalization was international and diplomatic frustration. The ‘ROC in Taiwan’ turned out to be the ROC of Taiwan as there was little chance of reconquering Mainland China- the sacred duty of Chinese people.
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Since the ROC has lost its legitimate cultural and political Chinese representative, the Taiwanese began to query their claimed ‘authentic Chinese’ cultural and national identity.
As long as the Chinese identity sponsored by the KMT government no longer fits with the territorial, administrative, and cultural boundaries over which the KMT has sovereignty. The contradiction between the imagined and substantial Chinese identity yielded a modern Taiwanese consciousness. ‘Face the reality’ and then ‘Embrace the local culture’ was the most appropriate term to describe the concern of the reformist activists in the late 70s (Hsiau 2012:143–44). The first term illustrated that the government should accept that the KMT regime no longer represented China. The second one is rediscovering and revitalizing the local Taiwanese culture, which the authority had purposedly downplayed as indecent, rough folk culture. The rise of concern for local culture and its uniqueness awoke public consciousness, which prefaced de-Chineselized Taiwanization in the following decade (ibid. 2012:150).
Transformations of national identity from Chinese to Taiwanese among local elites were commonly seen under the impact of the misery memories and social circumstances. Li’s (1995:60–63) studies analyzed ten Taiwanese intellectuals’ (including local and Mainlanders) identity transformation with different backgrounds can best conclude the mentioned situations. He summarized four background inducements germane to the rise of Taiwanese consciousness. First, disappointment about the KMT rules and political ethics; Second, the oppressive rule of the governing authority ignited a sense of Taiwanese consciousness among the opposition, especially those who had witnessed the 228 incident and White Terror; Third, the availability of higher education and exposure to new concepts such as democracy and freedom had a profound emotional impact on shaping Taiwanese identity. These intellectuals firmly believed that for Taiwan to thrive, it must embrace democratic values, freedom, and respect for human rights; fourth, a series of diplomatic frustrations inspired intellectuals to redefine Taiwan’s status as the sovereignty over China was denied, and the reconquer seemed impossible.
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One of the prominent intellectuals, Peng Ming-min, the representative of the new generation shifting toward Taiwanese identity and endowed with the title of ‘The Father of Taiwanese Independence,’ publicized the Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation in 1964, advocating complete decoupling with China; he wrote,
‘One China, One Taiwan’ has long been a solid truth. […]The ‘re-conquest of China’ is absolutely impossible! Anyone with basic common sense will unquestionably arrive at such a conclusion. […]Why does Chiang (Kai-shek) keep shouting the slogan of the ‘re-conquest of China?’ This slogan is the only means for him to maintain power and command the people. He has used this empty check for fifteen years to declare martial laws and control over ten million people.
Chiang’s regime only represents a select few inside the KMT, which does not represent China, nor can it represent Taiwan. It cannot even represent the KMT. […]For more than ten years, Taiwan has practically been a country. Regarding population, productivity, and cultural level, Taiwan ranks in the thirties among the one hundred members of the United Nations.[…] We should abandon the illusion and burden of a ‘great country’ (China) and face reality by building a democratic and prosperous society. We must give up our reliance on the KMT and the Communist parties. Away from the KMT and the Communists, Taiwan must choose a third path- self-salvation25.
Peng and his fellows were sentenced to jail for crime rebellion. His declaration was a pioneering act in rejecting Chinese culture, identity, and the representative figure for the ROC. He challenged the conventional Chinese-centric narratives and asserted a distinct Taiwanese nation-state, which sparked a shift in the mindset of the Taiwanese individual. His statement fostered a sense of self-awareness, promoting the recognition of Taiwan as a unique entity with its history, culture, and aspirations (Lee 2009:118–19). Although he eventually went into exile overseas, and this statement was considered seditious discourse at the time, his statement was pivotal in integrating overseas pro-independent groups, which would lead social movements and shape Taiwan’s political landscape in the following decades.
25 Peng Ming-min, Hsieh Tsung-min, Wei Ting-chao. “Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation.” Hi-on org/ Peng Ming-Min Foundation for Education and Culture. ( http://www.hi-on.org.tw/ad/peng_0707_z05.html) accessed on 05/05/2023
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3.4.1 Democratization, Liberalization, and Taiwanization
Due to domestic and international pressures, the KMT government perceived the need to implement political reforms within the party in order to safeguard its legitimacy in governing Taiwan. 1972, the Shanghai Communiqué issued by the United States and the PRC stated that
the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all US forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of ‘one China, one Taiwan,’ ‘one China, two governments,’ ‘two Chinas,’ and ‘independent Taiwan’ or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined26.”
Chiang Ching-Kuo, son and designated successor of Chiang Kai-Shek, the Premier of Executive Yuan, circumspectly initiated the Taiwanization process consciously and discretionally in order to break the restraint by the Communiqué. During the reign of Chiang Ching-kuo, the ROC shifted its focus towards sovereign independence as its core diplomatic principle. He advocated that the ROC government in Taiwan was a factual existence, abandoning the debate over who was the sole legitimate government of China and attaching the ROC state identity to Taiwanese identity in a political context (Wang 2017:95,98).
After the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, more active and progressive movements for promoting democratization and criticism of the KMT regime were tolerated. It was not until the successive president, Chiang Ching-kuo, abolished martial law in 1987 that Taiwanese nationalism became more apparent and prominent. He moved forward to lift media censorship and political party bans and to grant the freedom to publish newspapers. Meanwhile, recruiting local Taiwanese officials inevitably changed Mainlanders’ predominant political and social status. Social movements and
26 Office of the Historian. 1972. “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972 .” Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute United States Department of State. Retrieved (https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d203).
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activities were given some freedom, but the liberation was the “beginning of a transformation characterized by both repression and embracement (Chang 2006:47).” Some might argue that Chaing was merely following the popular trend, not aiming for democratization any time soon; in any case, it opened up new possibilities for the development of Taiwanese consciousness moving forward.
Lee Teng- hui, the first Taiwanese local-bred elite and high-ranking KMT member, was appointed to succeed in the presidency after the death of Chiang Chin-Kuo in 1988. His presidency signified the threshold of the native Taiwanese’ being mainstream in the bureaucracy. During his presidency, he pushed forward Taiwanization and democratization with the idea of a ‘new Taiwanese,’ a ‘community of shared future,’ and ‘ROC in and of Taiwan.’ He said:
Taiwan had been a periphery outside of Chinese civilization and was an abandoned land. Taiwan was developed in its own way, all alone. […] Thus, we should put those past conflicts between Mainlanders and Native Taiwanese aside and unify them. The ‘new Taiwanese’ is those who recognize themselves as Taiwanese, have sympathy with Taiwan, and are willing to exert themselves as Taiwanese. For the KMT, the precondition of survival and development depends on prioritizing Taiwan (Chang 2006:56–59).
From Lee’s words, we know that he endeavored to establish an all-encompassing civic identity that integrated diverse Taiwanese culture by introducing the concept of a ‘community of shared fate’ to describe the emotional bond within the Taiwanese nation. Lee’s idea had a profound influence on a unified domestic identity. His efforts in transforming the ROC state “from a cultural agent of Chinese nationalism to a powerful agent sponsoring the growth of Taiwanese identity (Chu 2012)”.
During Lee’s last term, he took a more assertive approach toward Taiwanization. He admitted that the KMT’s repressive rule was lack of legitimacy without the consent of the Taiwanese people. He voiced his support for the ‘Two-state Theory (兩國論兩國論)’ by framing the relationship between the PRC and the ROC as a distinctive ‘special state relationship (特殊國與國關係特殊國與國關係) (Lee 1999).’ This portrayal can be construed as
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an affirmation of the pursuit of Taiwan’s independent identity and a manifestation of the evolving Taiwanese consciousness.
Lee has been credited as the ‘Father of Taiwan Democracy’; his political reform set the ground for the impetus of Taiwanization taken up by the activists and the opposition (founders of the DDP). Lee’s reforms included the parliament’s overall re-election, abolishing the long-standing parliament that did not represent most Taiwanese people. Also, by allowing the direct participation of Taiwanese citizens in electing their representatives and the president, these democratic practices empowered the people. They reinforced their sense of being Taiwanese together in shaping the nation’s future.
In the 1990s, identity politics shifted towards a civic consensus, urging the emerging Taiwanese population to embrace a new Taiwanese culture (Dupré 2017:45). This civic discourse eventually evolved into multiculturalism (Wei 2008:94). The democratization and normalization preluded the mass awakening of Taiwanese consciousness and the pro-independent DDP, eventually winning their first presidential election in 2000. Since then, the power of grassroots provocations on Taiwanese consciousness has devolved to the official bureaucracy.
3.4.2 Taiwanization Urge by the Local Intellectual
Taiwanese consciousness is thought to have taken root in Taiwanese literature since the 1930s, influenced by the growing repression of colonial rule (Chen 2006:260, 2008:273). Since the Japanese colonial period, intellectuals have typically expressed their discontent through writing and literary expression. These expressions often served as a refuge for suppressed social movements (Hsiau 2012:108). Their words have served as a powerful force in shaping the collective identity of Taiwan. From their writings, we can glimpse the political and cultural trends under authoritative governance.
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By adopting Habermas’ (1992) theory of the public sphere, literary works can play a crucial role in shaping and solidifying national identity as a space for exchanging and expressing ideas. While local literary works were the only available space and channel to reflect and present the society, experiences, and struggle, it would be a positive force to counterbalance the unscrupulous authorities and cultivate a culture in the national culture. Since the colonial period, intellectuals have been interested in Taiwan’s unique culture and history; hence, they believed that literature could serve as an effective medium to maintain and strengthen the populace’s sense of Taiwanese consciousness and identity, which it does (Hsiau 2012:158).
Despite lacking ancient culture and frequent debates among literary schools, they all paid tribute to empathy for Taiwan’s unique culture and identity. Local literature was advocated to present the real life of Taiwanese people in an understandable vernacular style. Writing in colloquial Taiwanese (Hoklo) was a passive way to resist Japanese assimilation (Hsiau 2012:76; Tu 2014:93–94). This subject has been slighted and excluded from the national literature. The care for the land was the impetus for intellectuals to delve into the distinctiveness of Taiwan’s culture and literature, giving rise to the emerging sense of Taiwanese consciousness.
Not until the massive call for democratization was the Taiwanese identity considered part of the Han-Chinese national identity. In the late 1980s, as democratization took place, local Taiwanese literature underwent a significant shift toward the exploration of the Taiwan-centrism/ subjectivity of Taiwanese literature(Hsiau 2012:158; Tu 2014:97). Before that, Taiwanese literature had been claimed as a peripheral branch of Chinese literature or presenting strong Chinese consciousness was no more than a political performance to insinuate into dictators (Chen 1998:223–24). An ‘origin’ Taiwanese literature with prominent Taiwanese nationalist consciousness emerged, which indicates the split of Taiwanese identity from Chinese identity and confrontation against Chinese-centrism (Wu 2006:87–90).
Before the blooming of Taiwanization in the 80s, decisive public cultural and political movements paved the way for de-Chinselizing Taiwanization/ localization. The
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Zhongli Incident in 197727 and the Formosa incident in 197928 were massive public disobedience movements in which non-KMT oppositions began to forge alliances over the Island, laying the groundwork for forming political parties. The harsh suppression after the Formosa Incident incited a more radical opposition group to promote non-Chinese Taiwanese consciousness. Under the leadership of intellectual dissidents, a significant portion of the Taiwanese population turned away their cultural and national identity from conventional Chinese-centrism. These incidents were the last straw of the camel’s back, catalyzing and evolving a de-Chineselized and independent Taiwan’s consciousness (Liu 2005:89–90). After the Formosa Incident, the sentenced individuals and their defense lawyers were portrayed as heroes to inspire Taiwanese nationalism and courage the oppressed fellows and descendants. These heroes later became political stars and sanctified ‘symbolic myths’(Smith 1999:58,66) for virtuous conduct, and their glorious fight and sufferings regenerated as the energy source for future social movements.
After the Formosa Incident, Chen Fang-min, an exiled Taiwanese writer, experienced a drastic transformation from a traditional Chinese cultural identity adherent to an advocator of de-Chineselized Taiwanese cultural identity. His writings depicted the transition of his Taiwanese identity and provided an overview of the general process of local intellectuals’ identity transformation and desire to get rid of the Chinese shackle. He wrote,
Anything that refers to China is overall and has a broad historical perspective, but anything that mentions Taiwan is partial and narrowly regionalism. This simple dichotomy has been perpetuated for a long time through official political propaganda. Today, some Chinese ideologues accept everything without hesitation.
27 In 1977, during the officials’ elections, a controversy over electoral fraud led to the Zhongli Incident where a crowd attacked the police station. Subsequently, the police deployed tear gas and fired shots at the civilians, resulting in two deaths and one severe injury. The Incident is considered the first instance of dispersed opposition organized collective movement.
28 The Formosa Incident, also known as the Kaohsiung Incident started with a gathering and march organized by members of the Formosa Magazine asking for rescinding political party and media restrictions and advocating freedom of speech and democracy. The authorities responded with a harsh crackdown on the gathering. Following the march, there were massive arrests that shook the entire society and were commented on as the most severe police-civilian clash in Taiwan. since the 228 Incident.
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[…] I now possess the thoughts, actions, and attitudes of Taiwan Consciousness. The same is true of my political beliefs. Henceforth, I will never hypocritically use the word ‘China’ when explaining everything happening in Taiwan. When I say China, I must mean the real China—the ancient continent of Asia. When I say Taiwan, I mean the Island I long for, admire, and live on (Chen 1998:136).
Individuals may have different interpretations of national identity due to their diverse family backgrounds and life experiences (Li 1995:58–60); however, these can summarize a common scenario in forming Taiwanese consciousness: dissatisfaction with the corrupt governance of the national government and increased exposure to ideas of freedom and democracy (ibid. 1995:60–62). In response to the oppressive governance of the KMT regime, the pendulum swings towards fostering a stronger sense of independent Taiwanese identity among intellectuals, leading to the rejection of the regime’s national discourse and ideology. Remarkably, the suppression of the Formosa Incident spurred local intellectuals towards a greater inclination towards the Taiwan independence movement.
The de-Chinselization Taiwanization was the labor of the local intellectuals that abided by the constructivist view of Elie Kedourie that nationalism is a product of disaffection of the intellectuals to construct their nationalist narratives (Suny and Eley 1996:23). The de-Chineselization has been the core of the construction of Taiwanese national identity which involves carefully selecting and emphasizing elements from its historical trajectory that contribute to the process of de-Chineselization (Liu 2005:162–63). These factors serve to establish Taiwan as a distinct nation, separate and different from mainland China.
Following the 1990s, with democratization, various social movements continued; Taiwanese consciousness gradually replaced the Chinese-centric identity and became mainstream in Taiwanese society. Based on surveys regarding Taiwanese identity (see Figure 3. 4 1), during the 1990s, a considerable segment of the Taiwanese populace held dual identities and remained relatively stagnant but generally in decline. The percentage of individuals identifying as ‘Taiwanese’ gradually increased from 17.6% in 1992 to 39.6% in 1999, while those identifying as only ‘Chinese’ decreased by half, from 25.5%. The identity trend also manifested resistance and antagonism toward the
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PRC’s nationalist discourse. The Taiwanization process intensified following the DPP’s victory in the 2000 presidential election, spurred by opposition to the PRC. This accentuates the intricate relationship between Taiwanese identity and cross-strait relations.
Taiwanese consciousness and identity have become highly politicized issues, often intertwined with the discourse on reunification and independence and interrelation with the PRC. While national identity inevitably distinguishes us from others, it is crucial to note that excessive politicization can lead to polarization and oversimplification of identity. The historical narrative in the preceding chapters aims to elucidate how Taiwanese identity emerged and evolved within the context of historical and political backgrounds.
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Figure 3.4 1 Changes in the Taiwanese/ Chinese Identity of Taiwanese
Sources: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, retrieved from https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961
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CHAPTER 4 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TURKEY’S IDENTITY POLICY
The purpose of this chapter is to understand the historical and cultural background before the formation of the new national identity in Turkey. It begins with a description of the socio-cultural impact of Islam on Turkey throughout history and how the contradictions between religious traditions and Western culture were interpreted and handled in the face of the wave of Westernization in the 19th and 20th centuries. Until the Empire was fated to decline, the focus will shift to discuss the context in which the Western-style educated intellectuals in the late imperial reforms set aside Islam’s influence on national identity construction. Determined implementations to acculturate the populace to fit into modern and secular national identity have opened up future divergences in Turkey’s national identity.
4.1 Islam’s Role in Turkish Culture and Politics
Islam has played an essential and active role in Turkish culture and politics, which also has a profound influence on Turkish people’s identity even today. The influence of Islam on Turkish Muslims can be generalized into two primary factors. The first is the historical duration of their embrace of Islam, and the second is the extensive permeation of Islam into the political, societal, and personal spheres of life.
It has been more than a thousand years since Turks converted to Islam. The first group of Turkish people who converted to Islam were the Bulghar Turks of the middle Volga region and the Turks under the Karahanid dynasty in the 8th century (İnalcık 2016:197). Collective conversion to Islam among the Turks after continuous contact and understanding around the 10th century (Günay and Güngör 2015:228). They were the Oghuz Turks “who played a major role in the history of Islam by dedicating themselves to unifying and protecting Islam through holy wars (İnalcık 2016:198–99).”A more massive conversion to Islam during the 13th and 14th centuries
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manifested a long process for Turks to acculturate Islam from their initial contacts (Günay and Güngör 2015:228; İnalcık 2016:197).
After a long period of exposure to and understanding of Islam, the Turkish people not only have their traditional culture influenced by Islam but also hold an essential position in the history of Islam, especially at the state and law levels29 . Islam’s universality and superior civilization have attracted the Turkish people to embrace Islam (Günay and Güngör 2015:283). The Empires established by Muslim Turks contributed to Islam’s promotion, sustenance, and regeneration (İnalcık 2016:199). The long-haul relationship between the Turkish people and the Islamic faith has intricately woven Islam into the fabric of Turkish culture and identity.
From an individual perspective, being a Muslim is one facet of the personal identities of the Turkish people (Özdemir and Frank 2000:45). By a closer examination, the criteria of being a Muslim rests only upon an individual’s self-perception and feeling of belonging, in other words, if one sees themselves as Muslim, they are a Muslim. (ibid. 2000:44). According to the Hadith30 , a child born to Muslim parents is inherently considered a Muslim, provided they are raised to understand and embrace Islam. In this sense, Muslim is a given and natural trait, or in the context of nationalism- primordial ethnic ties, which serve as cohesive power, that form a unified Turkish national identity.
Islam is more than a spiritual reliance; the religious teachings are based on moral virtues that contain every aspect and detailed guidance on individual behaviors and social relations between people. For example, the Hadith and Sunnah31 provide
29 For a detailed analysis of the relationship between Islam and the state system, especially in the implementation of laws, Halil Inalcik’s (2016) and Hayashi’s (2019) work can provide ample insights.
30 “Sahih Muslim 2659a - the Book of Destiny - Sunnah.com - Sayings and Teachings of Prophet Muhammad .” Sunnah.com. Retrieved (https://sunnah.com/muslim:2659a).
31 Kandemir, M. Yaşar. 1997. “HADİS.” TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi [TDV Islam Encyclopedia]. Retrieved March 10, 2024 (https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/hadis).
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comprehensive explanations and information about how Muslims shall behave and act which is not clarified in the Quran. The religious guidance implements and embodies the spiritual belief into actual life activities, while Turkish people also incorporate some of their Turkic traditions within Islam frameworks. Primordial ties like religion, the substratum of collective identity, somewhat integrate with regional culture.
Öğretici (2019) examined the reaming practices of Shamanism rituals under the framework of Islam religion. The ‘Muslim Shaman’ applies rituals or healing methods in Islamic form that people would go for when having problems. Although it was inevitable for the Turks to give up some old belief systems while embracing Islam, his study showed that Turkish people managed to keep some of the Turkish cultures alive by incorporating them into Islam in modified forms (ibid. 2019:26). For several centuries, the Turkish populace has done more than embrace the beliefs and practices of Islam. Indeed, Islam is present itself in local customs and folklore traditions. This integration signifies a profound and enduring cultural synthesis.
Another explicit example of the influence of Islamic values and rituals in Turkish cultural practices can be observed on the website of the High Board of Religious Affairs (Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu)32, where an extensive Q&A section covers a wide range of topics related to the dos and don’ts for Muslims in daily life. These topics encompass general morality, values, Islamic beliefs, the Quran, attire, entertainment, dietary guidelines, intimate relationships, and even issues such as in vitro fertilization. These explanations demonstrate the pervasive impact of Islamic principles that people intend to consult religious affairs for guidance and instructions even when living in a secular state.
Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı [ Directorate of Religious Affairs]. 2020. “Hadislerle İslâm [Islam with Hadiths] Vol.1, P.41.” Diyanet Hadislerle Islam [ Religious Islam with Hadiths]. Retrieved March 10, 2024 (https://hadislerleislam.diyanet.gov.tr/sayfa.php?CILT=1&SAYFA=41).
32 High Board of Religious Affairs [Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu]. “Sıkça Sorulan Sorular (Q&A).” Retrieved June 25, 2023 (https://kurul.diyanet.gov.tr/DiyanetSikcaTiklananlarSorular/1/Dini-Fetva-Sikca-Sorulan-Sorular%C4%B1).
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The repetition of daily activities grounded in a shared belief system can facilitate the development of collective consciousness. Participating in religious activities, such as communal prayers, religious festivals, and pilgrimages, reinforces their spiritual beliefs and provides a platform for social interaction and cultural exchange. These repetitive actions, rooted in their shared religious beliefs, played a crucial role in establishing a distinct sense of identity and fostering a sense of belonging among Muslims.
Islam not only presides in individual or private life but is mainly articulated with politics and allegedly allegiance among other Muslims in the world before nationalism became faddish. The Empire’s core and legitimacy were based on a solid Islamic identity (Barkey 2012) and self-identified as “the mightiest, most civilized empire on earth and acting to bring Islamic order to all peoples (Özdemir and Frank 2000:13).” The Ottoman Sultan, the Caliphate, the head of all Muslims globally, united Muslim loyalties under the Empire’s umbrella. Islam also offers a potent set of symbols for political mobilization, capable of galvanizing people to wage wars in the name of securing Islamic justice (Hayashi 2019:19). It can be asserted that Islam was the most influential cultural factor that undeniably shaped the system, governance, and social, familial, and individual relationships prior to the rise of nationalism. Under the rule of the great empire primarily identified with Islam for several centuries, Islam became an integral part of the Turkish people’s identity.
Borrowing from Bernard Lewis’s (1988:4–5) explanations of why Islam remained so attractive for an appeal or allegiance, from the perspective of modern nationalism, religion was an important identity before the emergence of modern states, mainly for two reasons. According to Lewis, Islam has served as the foremost determinant of group identity and allegiance through a long period of mutual absorption and assimilation before the emergence of modern national identity. It is natural for people without national sentiments to seek allegiance from their Muslim identity, especially in crisis or exigency. Secondly, Islam offers a source of legitimacy for governance, wherein the ruler’s authority is sustained by deriving legitimacy from Islam rather than relying solely on nationalist assertions.
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In the face of potential threats from rising European powers, the Ottoman Empire’s bureaucratic elites began several Westernization reforms. The reform signified a breakage of the centuries-long mutually tolerant relationship between Islam and the state system, reflected by conservative Muslim scholars who opposed Westernization (Barkey 2012). Westernization has been the question of intellectual inquiry in Turkey since the late imperial period to the establishment of the republic, seen either as a life-saving straw or the final straw that breaks the camel’s back.
The introduction of Western culture not only influences local culture but also undermines the legitimacy of Islamic rule and the unity of Muslims. On a personal level, it not only challenges one’s own cultural identity but may also arouse a more robust psychological defense of one’s own cultural identity as long as people feel repudiation of divine principles and a self-imposed estrangement from their community.
In short, Islam has been part of Turkish people’s identity reciprocally and also composes a meaningful part of the Islam community. “Islam shaped Turkish culture in various aspects, including religion, politics, law, art, society, and government, (these cultural elements) stamped with the imprint of a common Islamic past (Lewis 1961:233–34).” Islam, similarly, is not just a religion but also an integral cultural component internalized within Turkey. It is foreseeable that efforts to modernize or adopt modernization often result in skepticism and apprehension, stemming from fears of eroding inherited primordial cultures. The dilemma of cultural alignment continues to be a significant challenge in contemporary Turkey. The subsequent section will delve into the origins of Westernization, which laid the groundwork for comprehensive reforms during the early Republic era.
4.2 Ottoman Legacy
The tenets of Kemalist modernization, which served as the foundational doctrine of the Republic, largely stemmed from the late Ottoman-era reforms, particularly through adopting Western ideas and systems. The advocators of the Republic were raised and educated during the reform period under the influence of Western
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philosophies. It is necessary to understand the reformations carried out in the late Ottoman Empire if one wants to analyze the establishment of the Republic through Kemalist reform.
The 18th century was the turning point of the Ottoman Empire. Observing the transcendental changes in the economic system and the industrialization with the rising tide of colonialism and nationalism in and from Europe, the Ottoman Empire, once superior in civilization and military, was challenged and felt lagged (Berkes 1973:43). The significant advancements in politics, economy, and military in Europe have sparked debates in the Ottoman Empire about adopting Western civilization as plausible solutions for the stagnant empire. The encounters with technically and culturally superior European countries significantly influenced subsequent developments and the establishment of the Republic.
Before the Tanzimat, the millet system divided the population into religious compartments, which, through centuries, had merged into ethnic identity and nations. Under the millet system, non-Muslims were highly autonomous within their religious congregation; this multi-cultural and loose governance distinguished different ethnoreligious identities within the Empire (Barkey 2012:21,22). The development of European trade gave rise to non-Muslim merchants becoming the wealthy, secularized middle class gradually free from the hold of their Churches. Different ethnic-religious communities aspired to learn and regain their cultural traits that would emerge as a ‘nation’ (Ahmad 2003:36). This move aimed to incorporate non-Muslim populations as full citizens of the Empire under the framework of Ottomanism also aimed to mitigate the emergence of nationalist sentiments and identities among non-Muslim groups by integrating them into the broader imperial citizenship.
The Tanzimat reform altered the Muslim self-identity relative to non-Muslims. The Edict of Gülhane to the Reform Edict of 1856 proclaimed that all ethnicities and religions are protected by law, ensuring that non-Muslims are regarded as equal individuals under the law alongside Muslims (Zürcher 1993:51) and granting
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privileged freedom of economic activity from which Muslims resented (Karpat 2001:96). Legal equality undermines the long-standing Muslim position as ‘protectors’ and is culturally and politically superior according to Islamic tradition. Because “infidel (non-Muslims) and true believers (Muslims) were different and separate, to equalize them and to mix them was an offense against both religion and common sense (Lewis 1961:107).” Through this, we can understand how Muslims might resist the concept of citizenship that treats non-Muslims equally, as they feel a loss of superiority and definition of identity. This resistance mindset can also be observed in other Westernization reforms.
Deepening economic disparities between Muslims and the Greek business people who became the subject under European protection (Hayashi 2019:348) and the synthesis of Ottomanism and Islamism proposed by Sultan Abdulhamid (Karpat 2001:12–13) resulted in religion-based ethnic zeal and confrontation between Muslims and non-Muslim populations, weakening their sense of belonging to the Empire and accelerating their independence as a nation-state.
Accordingly, the Christian population transformed into religio-national communities, asserting their distinct cultural, linguistic, and religious identities and advocating for greater autonomy or independence (Cağaptay 2006:5–7). Upheavals and wars causing loss of territory, diaspora, and victims agitated Muslims’ resentment and Christian animosity, culminating in a nascent national identity among Turkish Muslims, primarily concentrated within the land of Anatolia (ibid. 2006:5–7). The differences based on religion evolved into ethnic divisions, manifested in the form of nationalist movements during the 19th century.
In accordance with massive deportation and population exchanges of non-Muslims population, a homogenous Turkish demography in Anatolia was engendered. The CUP rule reinforced Turkification, developing a distinct identity among Turkish Muslims living in Anatolia, the homeland (Cağaptay 2006:8–9). The Turkification of the land of Anatolia embodied the idea of vatan (motherland) by Namık Kemal, which might be the first discourse to link people’s loyalty and adherence to the
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motherland (Karpat 2009:24). The idea became the fundamental belief of Muslim Turk nationalism discourses, symbolic significance which remains an essential criterion of national identity (Smith 1991:14).
The Empire took the shortcut of the Western experience and the modernist nationalism discourse by developing accessibility and permeability to public communication. With technological advancements at the time, the dissemination of books and newspapers was greatly facilitated by the innovation of printing (Mardin 2006:99,101,102). Other infrastructural developments such as railways, roads, and postal services were also part of the modernization reforms (ibid. 2006:106). The most significant reform was education, where the lower and middle classes benefited from the secular school (Ahmad 2003:47). Apart from introducing new technologies and techniques to bolster the empire’s declining strength, the new education system nurtured students who would become the future leaders of Turkey.
During Sultan Abdulhamid’s reign, these civil and military schools were maintained and extended; he added no less than eighteen new higher and professional schools (Lewis 1961:181). Students who enrolled in the Military Academy or Medical School were imbued with a shared ideology and patriotism through their training; they formed the nucleus of the Young Turk movement within military schools (Mardin 2006:109). “By introducing the educational reform, Sultan Abdulhamid dug his own political grave (Ahmad 2003:47)!” The reforms initiated during the Tanzimat era and continued by the Young Turks, influenced by Western empiricism and scientism, fostered the emergence of a new cadre of intellectuals who would concerted endeavors exerted a profound influence on molding the modern national identity of Turkey.
The newly educated intellectuals not only played a pivotal role in the modernization reform, “they cut themselves from the tradition and created a cultural elitism, and formed a distinct group, cutting off cultural ties with the masses, leading to lower-class people relying more on communication through mosque sermons (Mardin 2006:115–16).” “The old cultural elitism of Ottoman culture was replaced by a new,
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albeit more subtle, form of cultural elitism which persisted in subsequent reform efforts (ibid. 2006:84).
Despite their efforts, the reforms could not halt the Empire’s decline. Apart from the Empire’s inherent political, economic, and social problems, all the reforms attempted to neglect the incompatibility between Islamic doctrine and the concept of a modern nation-state. The reform during the Young Turks period displayed the “culture crisis between the Islamists and Westernizers” with a wide range of compromises and confusions (Lewis 1961:234).
The Westernization movements created clashes between traditional values and Western ideologies in both the Ottoman Empire (Tanzimat era 1839-1908) and the Self- during the late Qing Dynasty in China (Strengthening Movement 1861-1895). These two Westernization movements shared similar political and social backgrounds- the rising trend of colonialism and foreign threat and both initially had implemented instrumental modernization. Various new constructions and ideologies blossomed, yet the orthodoxy of Islamic culture and Confucian thought remained the cornerstone of civilization for many.
The discussion about the applicability and methods of Western dominant culture amidst indigenous culture raised debates during the same decline phase of the Qing Dynasty. Concurrently, a similar discourse advocated for a moderate reform approach known as ‘Chinese Core with Western Practice,’ which emphasized preserving the core of traditional Chinese culture while introducing dominant Western technologies, education, and arts. “Due to national pride and cultural sentiments, the unequal binary relationship has been a long-standing characteristic of Chinese cultural thought (Tsai 1991:163–64).” This concept echoes the approach of Ottoman moderate reformists, who advocated for modernization while upholding Islam as the predominant cultural force33.
33 More comprehensive discussion about the confrontation between the supporters of Islamic and Western civilization, and their struggles to sustain their belief in the late Ottoman period please see (Lewis 1961:234–38).
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Insofar as the sick man of Europe and East Asia attempted to cure his ailments using Western ‘medicine’ but adopted superficial remedies that failed to address the root causes. The grandeur empires ashed in the increasing heat of the nationalists’ endeavor. We can draw upon Stavrianos’ analysis of the failure of Qing Daynasty’s Self-Strengthening Movement to predict the ongoing struggles between tradition and Westernization since the Tanzimat reform. Although the following reasons for the failure of Westernization are specifically focused on the late Qing dynasty, they share similar contextual backgrounds of tension, conflict, and compromise between tradition and Western influences, which also emerged in the Ottoman Empire and subsequent Republican Westernization reforms.
As Stavrianos (1990:564) commented on the failure of the Self-Strengthening Movement, several factors were at play: 1) The majority of the population remained rooted in traditional lifestyles and had limited exposure to Western influences. 2) Most central officials and newly appointed intellectuals still leaned towards tradition; what they set up was merely duplicating the West they saw. 3) There was a sense of pride in their civilization, which somehow was discriminatory to the foreign culture and civilization. 4) Reformers believed traditional ideologies (Confucianism and Islam) could be renovated and integrated into Western civilization (ibid. 1990:561).
Ziya Gökalp (1918:16,17) shared a similar view in the fourth reason that Westernization does not necessarily contradict Turkish culture and Islam tradition. As Western instruments and sciences were imported, the ideas about nationalism and religion can be studied without dispute. Turkish and Islamic cultures were compatible with modernization. His statement was like sitting on the fence, suggesting utilizing the culture for the best use and ultimately creating a “civilized Turkish Islam.” “The Western civilization would be achieved with discoveries of their national culture and by retaining their Turks and Muslim identity (1923:48).” This discourse proved that traditional ideologies and beliefs had a remarkable stronghold against Westernization, confirming that tradition could be essentially and practically a stumbling block to the progress of Westernization.
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Nevertheless, these reform movements at least laid the foundation for establishing modern nation-states in Turkey, enabling social groups to have a greater awareness and understanding of Western civilization. With the transformation of Ottoman people’s mentality after the constitutional period, they began to see themselves as Turks rather than Ottoman (Ahmad 2003:73). A group of Muslim- counter elites and a nascent bourgeoise that was willing to fight the gains it created and make a patriot state(ibid. 2003:75).
In the late years of the Ottoman Empire, frequent contact and engagement with the West intensified the reflection of us and others (Yurdusev 2010). Religious and historical traditions aggravated resistance towards Western influences, consequently rendering Turkish people more susceptible to vulnerability (Stavrianos 1990:540). From the desperate experiences of wrestling between Westernization and religion, the moderate reformist view was a cautious example for future government leaders. The attempts to circumvent the contradictions between Islam and the modern nation-state appeared futile, ultimately leading to the more radical de-Islamization reforms after the funding of the Turkish Republic by Atatürk.
4.3 Construction of the Republic
To grasp the intricacies of Turkish national identity formation during the Republican era, it is essential to delve into the philosophical musings and ideologies experiences of the esteemed founder of the secular and modern republic- Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. His ideal and ideology of the republic began with the detachment from the empire and Islam, initiating a series of reforms centered around secularization to establish a new Turkish national identity.
4.3.1 Principle of the Republic- Kemalism
The new generation of intellectuals bred during the reform period believed in “vulgarized materialism mingling with scientism, social Darwinism, and materialism” (Hanioğlu 2012:38). In this vein, Kemalism is a fusion of diverse theories, pragmatically harnessing these theories regardless of their inherent contradictions; it
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i a patchwork but devoid of a clear core ideology, which inevitably leads to various and changing interpretations and applications for personal concerns and problem-shooting (Çeçen 2012:23,24; Hanioğlu 2012:33,37). Regardless of the diverse and nebulous basis of Kemalism, what is in common among the interpretations is their collective rejection of religion that unfolds their belief that science would be the panacea to create a rational, prosperous modern society.
The founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, received his education in secular military schools and embraced a rough concept of ‘science as the panacea for every problem,’ inevitably making him more receptive to criticisms of religious institutions (Hanioğlu 2012:39). The core principle of Kemalism is scientism based on positivist ideology; it shall be the ultimate doctrine of life to develop secular and scientific values in Turkish society (Çeçen 2012:25,26). From this perspective, science will triumph over religion and become the new religion in human history. His well-known axiom, “In life, the truest guide is knowledge and science34,” presented his understanding of the supremacy of science and knowledge over religion.
From the standpoint of positivist scientism, “religion constrained objective thoughts, hindering the exploration of metaphysical worldviews and the advancement of science (Ergı̇l 1989:5).” Accordingly, “science prompt development, whereas religion would impede progress (Hanioğlu 2012:40).” That is to say, the extensive involvement of religion in personal life made it challenging for individuals to attain an objective perspective and cultivate independent and original thoughts. Hence, having a rational and independent-thinking populace is necessary to achieve the ideal of using science to save the nation. Moreover, secularism is a method of breaking away from religious constraints. Atatürk’s vision of establishing a modern and secular
34 Original text in Turkish, “Hayatta en hakiki mürşit, ilimdir, fendir”, the talk by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk at the tea visit hosted by the teachers at Samsun İstiklâl Trade School on 1924.09.25.)
Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Başkanlığı. n.d. “Samsun Öğretmenleriyle Konuşma [Talk with Teachers in Samsun]. Retrieved June 27, 2023 (https://www.atam.gov.tr/ataturkun-soylev-ve-demecleri/samsun-ogretmenleriyle-konusma#:~:text=D%C3%BCnyada%20her%20%C5%9Fey%20i%C3%A7in%3B%20uygarl%C4%B1k,ve%20y%C3%BCkseli%C5%9Fini%20zamanla%20izlemek%20%C5%9Fartt%C4%B1r).
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populace and state strived him to minimize the influence of religion in government and public spheres.
However, Atatürk was not deaf to the struggle between secularization and traditional Islamic culture. Berkes (1973:522) summarized the modernization process into two main approaches: dismantling tradition or embracing modernity that aligns with traditional values. On the one hand, Islam is, without doubt, an invisible force, uniting people to make sacrifices for the nation’s well-being and providing spiritual and physical support posed a formidable obstacle to nationalist efforts. In contrast to Ziya Gökalp’s (1923:45–47) thought of adapting religion to modernization and separating culture and civilization, Atatürk believed that Western civilization is the only culture that should be adopted as a whole. Tradition can not meet ‘universal civilization’ standards and contribute to a de-Islamization of Turkey as part of the West (Hanioğlu 2012:49). Thus, “those estranged cultures should be burned down (Atalay 2018:119–20).”
Despite Kemalism lacking a fixed creed and methodology, using a scientific discourse, he advocated de-Islamization as the core principle to establish a new Turkish national and state identity. The efforts dedicated to filling the void left by the religion were embodied by emphasizing the ethnic and cultural origins of Turkishness. Karpat (2009:49) and Hanioğlu (2012:51) stated that Turkish nationalism emerged with the intention of constructing a new national identity devoid of religious influence, wherein scientism replaced religion as a prominent cultural element. Regardless of the debatable definition of Turkishness in relation to complex ethnicity and cultural realities within the territory, whether to include Islam in Turkish nationalism has been a contentious and ongoing debate. The oscillations shift over time and in response to changing circumstances, highlighting Kemalism’s dynamic and uncertain nature, generating space for ambiguous interpretation and other alternatives.
In response to the pressing challenges of survival and decline, nationalists realized the imperative of emancipating the Turkish nation from the shackles of religious tradition, which they perceived as a detrimental root. The Turkish nation’s cultural
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identity, values, and essence were being besieged, eclipsed by the dominance of unscientific and obscurant religion and the entrenched Sultanate. Consequently, the only viable course of action deemed necessary was a deliberate departure from religious influence.
Once we grasp the fundamental ideals of the Republic’s founders, a more pressing question emerges: who will become the subject of these ideals? From the Ottoman Empire, a diverse and tolerant multicultural society with Islam as its rallying call, to the singular ethnic republic confined to the territory of Anatolia, who remains within the borders of the new republic, having lived on this land for generations, with various faiths, whether choosing to leave or forced to depart? What kind of national identity will they embrace? These questions will be explored in the following discussion.
4.3.2 The Homeland of Turkish Muslims
The foreign occupations and unrest upheavals, notably by Greece on the western coast and Armenia at the eastern frontier, catalyzed the sentiment of Turkish nationalism, transforming the collective Turkish- Muslim into a national community (Ahmad 2003:75). For the sake of the integrity of the Turkish nation. Atatürk’s strategy aimed to unite the remaining Anatolian Muslims by appealing to their religious and cultural heritage during wartime, which turned out quite successful (Cağaptay 2006:11). Through a widespread mobilization campaign during the war, the bond between the nation and its land and people was solidified, nurturing a profound sense of nationalism.
The words millet (nation), milli (national), and Milliyet (nationhood) were transcribed to the modern meaning that aimed at uniting and organizing all Muslims remaining in Anatolia who belong to different ethnic and cultural groups (Ahmad 2003:80). Also, the idea of homeland may seem receptive as the attachment to faith (Karpat 2001:329). Followed by the National Pact in January 1920, which delimited the ‘national’ border in line with the majority of the Muslim population (nation), despite their different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, willing to live together and fight for unity
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(nationhood) (Ahmad 2003:80–81; Zürcher 1993:138). Cağaptay (2006:159) shared a similar view on ‘inclusive Turkishness.’ He stated that the nationalism dictated as ‘Turkishness’ was based on Muslims as long as they accepted cultural assimilation, particularly the language. At the same time, people from non-Muslim or non-Turkic backgrounds were marginalized from the society and the state. This perspective reflects a modern concept of citizenship that carries discriminatory undertones35.
The triumph of the Battle of Sakarya (1921) marked a crucial turning point in the Turkish War of Independence. The nationalists were recognized as the real government of Turkey (Ahmad 2003:82; Lewis 1961:253). The victory in this battle solidified the confidence of the Turkish population. The armistice was signed in Mundanya, and later, a peace conference was held in Lausanne on November 20, 1922. The treaty of Lausanne confirmed the sovereignty and independence of the Ankara government by international society. It was widely accepted as the foundation of modern Turkey in terms of territory and people. In writer Burhan Cahit Morkaya’s eloquence, he wrote,
The Treaty of Lausanne is the cornerstone of the present-day Turkish State. Back in 1922, the Istanbul government executed a death sentence to the Turkish people through the signing of the Treaty of Sevres. However, in 1923, with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the new Turkey’s freedom, independence, and dominant presence were officially recognized and accepted by the international community (2022:25).
During and after the war, approximately one million Greeks fled to Greece, deterred by the appraisal from the Turks when Turkish armies regained control over the occupied territory. Within the framework of the treat a massive compulsory population exchange between Greek- Muslim and Anatolian Orthodox36. In relation
35 Feroz Ahmad has an alike but different view on the definition of citizenship. He claimed that the Turkish nationality (citizenship) during this period depended on their residence nor their ethnicity within the border defined by the National Pact. Because the non-Muslim communities (mostly the Orthodox) were fighting for their own independent state (Ahmad 2003:81).
36 Under the framework of the population exchange there were 1.200.000 Anatolian Orthodox moved to Greece, and 400.000 Greek- Muslims moved to Anatolia. The leaving Orthodox population comprised almost 10% of the total population (1.2 million) in Turkey, which indicated a significant
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to this matter, Anatolia transformed into an ethnic and cultural homogeneous territory where the Turkish people could envision the concept of a homeland, and strengthening national consciousness among the people became considerably easier (Cağaptay 2006:13; Emgili 2014:111; Karpat 2010:136). As a result of the population exchange, the multi-ethnic demography homogenized within the remaining territory of the future Republic.
The groundwork for a modern nation-state, central government, culturally (at least religiously) homogenous people, and territory capable of exercising sovereignty was almost ready. The next step for the nationalists was to arrange a new national culture that fit with their modern secular ideology to integrate the people. The lacking of a national culture emerged as a primary concern for the nationalists in the aftermath of WWI (Ortaylı and Küçükkaya 2012:110). In virtue of Muslims could change their Islamic identity into a national one only through the path of Islam (Karpat 2001:329). The worries were not about the existential culture but about a common culture that would solidify political allegiance.
To fully achieve and uphold the Kemalist nationalist ideals of the Republic, it is crucial to establish and embrace a secular national culture and identity among the populace. Everything is ready to roll; just waiting for the perfect timing. The essence of the nation-state was all set, and the next phase of reforms focused on thorouoghly de-Islamization of the regime and social life. However, considering the enduring influence of religion on society, family structures, and individuals, the subsequent reform efforts are marked by contradictions and uncertainties stemming from the clash between Westernization and religious values.
4.4 The Reform of Detaching Islam
The establishment of the Republic was a turning point in Atatürk’s secularization policy. Even though the collapse of the Sultanate and Caliph was anticipated,
economic setback due to the insufficiency of labor forces and the influx of agricultural labor force (Emgili 2014).
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o speak openly of the position (about abolishing the Caliph and Sultanate) would jeopardize the goal of modernization at which we aim. Even in the Assembly, there was the tendency to seek communion with the seat of the Caliph, a union with the central government (Atatürk 2008:371).
Atatürk’s talk showed his vigilance not to push against Islamic symbols before gaining control over the parliament. To win the war with optimum public support and mobilization, he even cooperated with religious leaders, acquiesced in the sultan-caliphate reign, and accepted the title with religious connotation ‘Gazi’ (Kasaba 1997:22; Ocak 2001:106–7). It is perceived as an interim recourse, maintaining their rightful stance instead of the tumultuous rival unrest (Berkes 1982:170). In tandem with seeing the light at the end of the tunnel of the military struggles, starting with the abolition of the Sultanate, Atatürk made a significant shift of stance to secularize from head to toe.
The secularization reforms in the Republic would be entirely different from the theoretical basis, a veiled ideology in action at the time of Young Turks (Mardin 2006:201). Secularization, one of the fundamental tenets of Kemalism and a cornerstone of the Republic’s founding principles signifies that the new state is devoid of any religious influence or affiliation. The implementation of secularization was the most radical and irreconcilable for Muslims, at least perceived this way than other principles.
The reform led by Atatürk during the 1920s and 1930s in Turkey reached its pinnacle, the implementation of groundbreaking Westernization reforms that were unprecedented in their scope and ambition. The Reform can be discussed as two distinct phases based on its scopes. According to Cağaptay (2006:43), in the 1920s, it primarily concentrated on establishing the foundations of the new Turkish Republic and consolidating its sovereignty. The emphasis was on setting up a secular and democratic state system with a modern Turkish national identity. On the other hand, the 1930s, called the ‘advent of high Kemalism,’ shifted towards a more comprehensive modernization in lifestyle and daily practices. Therefore, the subsequent section will align with Cağaptay’s overview, initially concentrating on
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legal restructuring to establish the foundations of the Republican system and broadening its scope to encompass societal and cultural reforms affecting individuals.
4.4.1 Legal Reform Toward a Secular State
The subject of the Sultanate and Caliphate’s abolition raised robust debates domestically and internationally. The Egyptian ulema accused the new Turkish government is ‘infidels’ because the Sultanate and the Caliphate were inseparable from Muslim countries; other pro-caliphate people shared the same views (Berkes 1973:506–7). Berkes’(1973:506) subtly expressed statement suggests that the symbiotic relationship between the Caliph and the Sultan had triggered concealed thoughts in Atatürk’s mind- if the Sultan had gone, so had the Caliphate.
With the establishment of CHP and the Assembly election, supporters of the Caliph were ousted, finally enabling Atatürk to embark on reforms with determination (Mardin 2006:202). Atatürk(2008:590) introduced a series of significant initiatives that addressed some vital issues, including the Republic’s proclamation, the Caliphate’s abolition, and the establishment of a central education system (restraining religious education institutions like medreses and tekkes.
One of the key aspects of modernization pursued by the Republic was eradicating the pervasive influence of Islam from the economy, education, art, politics, and, first of all, from state affairs and law to set the foreground (Ocak 2001:108,109). In addition, in contrast with Islamists’ version of reform and the frustrations, the nationalist elites considered “Islam an all-purpose bogey representing everything that reform, progress, and civilization were not (Kasaba 1997:28).” Henceforth, Atatürk employed legal reforms to repeal Islam’s legal framework, the “new order is confirmed in the state constitution and ruling legitimacy in the name of the nation (Lewis 1961:265; Mardin 2006:202). The meaning of the legal reform was more than an institutional Westernization; it also separated the idea of sacred and profane realms and integrated the population under a consistent legal system.
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Morkaya focused on the social and political situations of the early Republican period and sympathized with the educated elites and nationalists. His views presented the ideal form of the modern state,
It was impossible for a society that wanted to live and rise to establish a new state on such old and ignorant foundations. At a time when religion did not influence state formations in the world, and even political unions began to change according to the shape of social interactions, it would be ridiculous for the new Turkish State to be governed by rules set for ignorant tribes (2022:34).
The initial step was the abolition of the Caliphate on March 1, 1924, in the Assembly, which aimed to separate religion from politics and governance and prevent Islam revival (Atatürk 2008:676). On the other hand, without the Sultanate-Caliphate, the nation-state could only focus on the interest of the Turkish people instead of the distanced Muslim population in the world. Atatürk made a respondent statement after knowing the exchange of amenities related to the rescinded Caliph; he said,
Into the hand of this great monarchy, whose authority was to extend over the whole of Islam, they placed as the only power that of the Turkish people, that is to say, only from 10 to 15 million of these three hundred million subjects.[…]If the Caliph and Caliphate, as they maintained, were to be invested with dignity embracing the whole Islam, ought they not to have realized in all justice that a crushing burden would be imposed on Turkey, on her existence, her resources, and all her forces would be placed at the disposal of the Caliph (Atatürk 2008:582, 583)?
The abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate rendered these titles meaningless and laid the touchstone of the secular state, making it easier for nationalists to wipe out the title’s influence in the political and social realms. The Turkish state was at least legally a civilized modern country that disowned any uncultivated and undesired past. However, the factions within the Assembly about the abolition of the Caliphate did not cease, even causing polarization within the Assembly and the party members (Berkes 1973:508,509). The advocacy for Islamic principles continues to pose a persistent challenge, but Ataturk shows no hesitation in his reform progress.
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With the declaration of abolishing the Caliph, two additional laws were enacted. One law abolished the Ministry of Sharia and the foundations (evkaf), while the other ordered to close of religious schools (madrasas), sects (tarikats), institutions, and dervish lodges (tekke), and the religious high school was put under the authority of the Ministry of Education (Atatürk 2008:677; Berkes 1973:521; Cağaptay 2006:13). Religious teaching and education were not prohibited, but under the surveillance of the state, while the compulsory secular education discouraged opening and attending religious school (Berkes 1964:466–67). Imam-Hatip schools for training prayer leaders were founded, and religious instruction in primary schools was allowed to counterpoise the need for religious education (Mardin 2006:276). In the most basic way, the educational secularization reform was achieved through providing compulsory secular education. However, it is also evident that there remains a degree of tolerance towards religious education to avoid severe backlash.
It is worth noticing that the initial constitution and its amendments illustrated hanging and contradictory interpretations of religion in the Republic. For instance, the 1924 constitution37 was contradictory regarding the secularism principle of the state; Article Two-“Islam as the state religion,” directly adopted from the previous constitution. Atatürk also admitted that the state religion was the most undesirable result, but considering the prevailing circumstances, it was the compromise he had to make (Atatürk 2008:588). Not until the amendment in 1928 did Article Two finally cut off the bond between the State and religion; a hassle that had bothered Atatürk was obliterated. Meanwhile, the Assembly’s duty to enforce religious law was abolished (Article 26) (Ertan 2007:411). The later amendment of 1937, emphasizing
37 Article 2.- (Original Version) The religion of the Turkish State is Islam; its official language is Turkish; its capital city is Ankara.
Article 2.- (First Amendment: 10/4/1928 - Law No. 1222, Article 1)
The official language of the Turkish State is Turkish; its capital city is Ankara.
Article 2.- (Latest Amendment: 5/2/1937 - Law No. 3115, Article 1)
The Turkish State is republican, nationalist, populist, statist, secular, and revolutionary. The official language is Turkish. Its capital city is Ankara.
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the secular nature of the state, indicated a fundamental step towards the secularization of the Republic.
Despite any discrepancy in religious affiliation between the state apparatus and individuals, scholars acknowledged that the Constitution and its successive amendments were deemed secular in delineating the separation of state and religion, ensuring the freedom of religion and conscience (Ertan 2007:412–13). The more significant symbolic significance was that the oath of office serves as a commitment to uphold the principles of the State, signifying a loyalty that surpasses devotion to God (Webster 1939:252). The constitution is the result of the republican elites’ ideal for modern secularization and somehow concession to the religious opposition. The constitutional amendments also reflect the tug-of-war between religion and secularism in Turkey.
Further legal reform deeply affects individuals’ lives and interrelations. 1926, following the Swiss Civil Code template, Turkey introduced a Turkish version of its own, eradicating the traditional Sharia doctrine (Özsu 2010:72)38 . The civil code aimed to modernize and standardize legal practices, family relationships, and women’s rights on which Islamic religion had a profound influence. The civil code implemented the principles of the republic into practical societal life and elevated interpersonal legal relationships to the standards of modern civilization (Berkes 1973:531). Whereby modern women’s image profoundly became the symbol of modernization reform (Göle 1997:86; Kadıoğlu 2006:178). This transition marked the end of religious interpretations in legal systems, inaugurating a cultural control by modernization- secular modern law.
The legal reform served as the cornerstone for establishing a secular state, simultaneously severing ties with its historical and cultural roots. The reform reveals
38 In Özsu’s paper he described the civil code adoption was “Turkey’s long-awaited coming of age, its readiness to dispense with its past and embrace the challenges and opportunities of contemporary civizlization. He also cited the work by Miller that the Turkish civil code was a ‘loose interpretation’ or ‘legal transplant (2010:73)‘
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the ambitions of the Kemalist elites, as well as their cautious approach to avoid offending religious communities. Did the Kemalist legal reform succeed? Partially, it did bring about changes in the social and cultural dynamics of the Muslim population. However, as Webster (1939:256) noted, the majority lagged behind the reform. It was acknowledged that a more comprehensive approach was needed to address and eradicate the regressive influences of religious beliefs on the economic and social perspectives of individuals and society at large (Karpat 2010:140).
4.4.2 The Modern New Capital- Ankara
The same year of August, before the Republic was announced, Ankara was approved by the Assembly to be the new capital. Located in the center of Anatolia, the new capital implied a new nation-state’s emergence and the rupture with its imperial past. Istanbul, the center of the Islamic Empire for five hundred years, had deep connections to the society and history of people from which Atatürk aimed to distance the new Turkish State (Lewis 1961:260–61). In this context, constructing Ankara as the new capital signified embracing modernization and a break from the past, an architectural demolition of historical ties.
Building the modern capital, in essence, was a manifestation of visible politics or the civilizing mission of the modernization program. (Bozdoğan 1997:136). In other words, Ankara was strategically chosen as the new capital to reflect and embody modern life’s political aspirations and cultural values. Given the street names, squares, and city layout, the construction of Ankara aimed to merge symbolic narrative with its physical design and commemorate the resurgence of Turkey from the Empire (Kezer 2015:37–39).
Büyükyıldız’s book retraced making Ankara the republic’s Westernization glories. As he described,
Ankara, a small Anatolian barren town, transformed into the modern capital of the Republic where Western-style suited gentlemen and ladies could enjoy their social life. People in the new capital got accustomed to the annual dance ball held by Kızılay (Red Cresent), the horse rides organized by the Equestrian Sports
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Club every Sunday, and watching the Opera. Promoting European lifestyles and habits was actively endorsed in the nascent capital to cultivate a modern Turkish cultural milieu and national identity (2008:48).
The making of Ankara provides a fertile ground to understand how the republican of modern life and political culture were projected into action, and the result seemed satisfactory. Ankara epitomized the drastic changes in Turkish society and cultivated a new generation with a novel worldview (Hanioğlu 2012:48). “The Yenişehir (New city) is an Anatolian Paris (Büyükyıldız 2008:50).” “Ankara has transformed the map of Europe, and we can claim that Europe starts in Ankara (Yedigün as cited in Kezer 2015:22).” Indeed, Ankara metaphorically aligns more closely with European city. However, can changes in appearance and infrastructure truly alter people’s inherent reliance on their culture? This is a question worth pondering39.
4.4.3 Secularization and Further De-Islamization in Making National Culture
The legal reforms introduced modern and rational concepts to the Turkish populace. The government tightened its grip on secularization and modernization after political opposition) and military resurgences (Şeyh Said rebellion in 1925) (Lewis 1961:267). As Zürcher (1993:184–85) described Atatürk’s rule after the resentment and revolt of the reform, “his rule after 1925 may be regarded both as a daring attempt at achieving a modernization leap for Turkish society and as a regressive phase in the development of mature and democratic political in Turkey [...].”A modern nation could not be sustained only by a secular state system; its existence required a secular society comprising a modernized population. While the structural transformation was largely enacted by decrees, it is now imperative to intensify the reform, aiming to diminish further the imprint of religion in the tapestry of everyday life.
39 In addition to the esteemed depiction of the newly constructed capital, it is indisputable that the creation of Ankara from the ruins of war and depleted finances had an unfavorable aspect in terms of city planning. The exaggerated portrayal of the city’s development served to flatten the intricate layers of visions, conflicts, and resistance, thereby reducing the intricate and multifaceted process to a mere product. To gain a deeper understanding of the alternative perspective on the magnificent urban landscape of the capital, one may refer to the works of Kezer (2015). In addition, Sibel Bozdoğan’s (1997) article provided indepth analysis of the binary contradiction of nationalist discourses of modernity in architecture.
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Language Reforms
A shared language is the crucial cultural character that constructs a nation and national identity. The language reform aimed to elevate the status of Turkish vernacular as the national language to retrieve the Turkish essence, contributing to a new imagined Turkish community (Anderson 1983:42; Mardin 2002:119). The initiative of the Turkish Language Reform replaced the Arabic script with the Latin alphabet in 1928; the same year later, the use of Arabic scripts was prohibited in all public spaces40. The adoption of the Latin alphabet marked a notable departure from the iconoclastic movement against traditional values, signaling the onset of a crucial step in modernization (Berkes 1964:474). The language reform had more symbolic meaning in facilitating modernization and distancing Turkey from its Arabic and Islamic heritage, promoting a secular and Western-oriented national identity (Mardin 2002:124; Zürcher 1993:189).
Further reform to purify and Turkify the Turkish language can be envisaged, while Arabic and Persian profoundly influenced the Ottoman written language. The Turkish Language Research Society, established in 1932, embarked on a fundamental mission to expunge Arabic and Persian influences and to syncretize the written and oral Turkish (İnan 1959:294). The Kemalist elites promoted the development of a pure Turkish language as an auxiliary of Turkic nationalism for the republic (Mardin 2002:122). It is called linguistic nationalism (Altunışık and Tür 2005:20); utilizing the national language to foster national identity is a common strategy. Interestingly, in language reforms, a significant approach has been the process of deconstruction aimed at removing scripts and words associated with Islamic connotations. Observing the usage of Turkish today, it is evident that language reforms have played a pivotal role in reshaping the overall de-Islamization of identity.
40 The Law on the Acceptance and Implementation of Turkish Script. Retrived from Resmî Gazete İle neşir ve ilânı : 03. 11. 1928 - sayı 1030. TBMM [Grand National Assembly Of Türkiye]. Available at: https://tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc007/kanuntbmmc007/kanuntbmmc00701353.pdf (Accessed: 19 July 2023).
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Again, through the concerted efforts of the Language Society, Persian and Arabic words were removed. Instead, they meticulously sourced more indigenous Turkish words from various historical materials to substitute and Turkify the Turkish language. As a result, approximately 9000 Turkish equivalent words were approved and published as pocket glossaries (Webster 1939:255). These newly collected words were intended to substitute the Ottoman vocabulary. For some apparent instances, Matbuat Cemiyeti (Gazette Society) was translated into Basın Kurumu (Media Institution), Mülkiye Mektebi (Bureaucracy school) to Sosyal Bilgiler Okulu (Social science School), Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti (Turkish Language Research Society) to Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language Association)41.
Besides, everyday language expressions have transformed, adopting a more Turkish essence and moving away from Islamic influences. It was customary for devout Muslims to constantly express their faith by reciting the word of Allah, both in public and private settings. Along with modernization, language connoting religion or Allah was replaced with more secular words. For example, merhaba (hello) replaced a traditional selamaeyküm, and hoşçakal replaced Allah’a ısmarladık (Özdemir and Frank 2000:51).
Persian and Arabic symbolized elite culture during the imperial era, but the vulgar Turkish was crowned with the national culture of the republic. Persian and Arabic would be used as mediums of academic research in higher education, and studies on Islam will be categorized as a branch of philosophical research that can be compared with Western philosophical thoughts (Berkes 1973:533). By eliminating Persian and Arabic, Turkey has shed the predominantly Islamic high culture of the Ottoman Empire and moved closer to Western modernization. While rediscovering the roots of the Turkish language, it has redefined the richness and diversity of Turkish culture to promote national unity and a new sense of identity.
41The words Cemiyet, Matbuat, Mektep, Mülkiye, Tetkik were all orinigated from Arabic according to the Güncel Türkçe Sözlük [Daily Turkish Dictionary] edited by the Türk Dili Kurumu [Turkish Language Association]
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The language reform is a pivotal chapter in the making of modern Turkey, deeply entrenched in its pursuit of national identity. Initiated by intellectuals and visionaries, this ambitious endeavor sought to refine and purify the Turkish language, creating a unified and unique linguistic expression that resonated with the nation’s spirit.
Language serves as a crucial medium for transmitting knowledge within the education system, and the education system itself can also instill new language policies. Language reform and history studies were two indispensable sources of national culture in Atatürk’s mind (İnan 1959:294–95). However, it was a time when secular education institutions and qualified teachers were lacking, and social educational institutions provided opportunities for ‘national education’ outside of schools.
Social Institutions
The centralized education system is the most potent instrument to instill national ideals and construct national identity. Like all the other reforms, the ultimate goal was to modernize and guide people misled by superstition (Berkes 1964:477). In 1924, all educational institutions were subsumed under the Ministry of Education and introduced compulsory education for all schooling-age children (Berkes 1973:533). Later, Compulsory religious courses were removed from the school curriculum (ibid. 1973:533).
While the public schools remained insufficient in remote areas, the Turkish Hearth, comprising intellectuals, was one of the forces driving social reform by direct contact with people. Its principle was to enhance the national identity and consciousness of Turks, promote Western culture, and thus “awaken opposition against the conservative forces (Georgeon 2006:53).” Reşit Galip emphasized intensifying the idea of Turkishness among the relatively less developed segments of the population- ‘Köycülük Actions’ (ibid. 2006:56). It was considered a guardian of Kemalist reforms, playing a vital role in disseminating Kemalist reforms and secular ideals to the
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general public, including efforts to increase literacy rates and promote the adoption of the Latin alphabet (ibid. 2006:64–65).
The People’s Houses took over Turkish Hearth’s role in Anatolia due to Turkish Hearth’s incompetence to assimilate conservatives and non-Turkish populations and its independence (Georgeon 2006:68). The People’s House, unlike the Turkish Hearth, was the regime’s cultural propaganda subsidiary. They bloomed in the vast Anatolia region, forming a network directly engaging with the populace (ibid. 2006:70–71). Between 1920 and 1930, these institutions filled the gaps left by the insufficient formal education facilities during the Republic’s early years. They also served as a solution for the republican elites to recognize the widespread need for instilling republican ideals and modern culture in rural areas.
The People’s Houses, a subsidiary of the state, acted as an intermediary between the citizenry and the authorities. They collected local data and meticulously recorded folklore resources, subsequently leveraged to cultivate and define national culture and identity. (Georgeon 2006:20) The Houses developed three communicative activities for educational purposes, including publishing magazines and books, establishing libraries, and hosting meetings and workshops (Karpat 2009:334). Güvenç (2016:38, 256) restated that People’s Houses hosting movie nights, dance balls with jazz bands, and classrooms to introduce Western civilization to everyone were more effective than schools in educating the rural population. Even after the close of the People’s Houses in 1951, new communication tools, vocations, and habits developed within the People’s Houses system would remain an essential part of daily life (Karpat 2009:334).
Although the Turkish Hearth and the People’s House were not formal education institutions, their ‘getting into people’ notion cultivated the villagers into civilized Turkish citizens. Through cultural, social, and artistic activities, they advocated for Kemalism, particularly in promoting a secularized national identity. They may appear as social organizations, but they were all branches of the CHP nationwide. Karpat (2009:325) indicated that such humanistic social organizations would benefit social
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reform in any era. Their role as ideological propaganda tools of the government had led to a disconnect between the new Turkish identity and the cultural-historical realities, making it challenging for the broader populace to embrace fully.
De-Islamization in Daily Life
In the Ottoman public sphere, clothing was significant beyond personal fashion. It symbolized communal affiliations, especially among members of different Sufi orders. Religious attire served as markers of distinction earned through devotion to the order (Kezer 2015:105). In this sense what people wore expressed their identity and belonging to a specific community. Therefore, attire bearing religious symbols and religious identity naturally became one of the targets for reform by the republican elites in their efforts to secularize.
For instance, the fez visibly symbolized being a Muslim and their allegiance to the community of Islam (Lewis 1961:267). Hence, it was a sacred identification for the Turkish people, and wearing or not was a religious debate (Berkes 1973:547). In Atatürk’s words, the fez “sat on the head of our nations as an emblem of ignorance, negligence and fanaticism and hatred of progress and civilization (Atatürk 2008:713–14).” The Hat law was implemented in 1925. Other prohibitions on individuals without religious positions from wearing religious attire or symbols, as well as the enactment of a law in 1934 making it a criminal offense for men not to wear hats while wearing a fez, was not surprising (Lewis 1961:269). Wearing a turban and veil was also discouraged because it was considered a conservative and regressive mindset (Lewis 1961:271).
Individuals’ choices in clothing reflect personal preferences and identities. “To embrace modernization and Westernization, they sought to eliminate all symbols and mentality associated with the past, even though they had been exercised for a long time (Ergı̇l 1989:13).” Berkes (1973:548) argues that the Hat law secularized religiously significant headwear as fashion preferences, and the law directly affected
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the final visible symbol of Muslim, and such deep-reaching influence into personal lives will also bring about significant reactions (Lewis 1961:270).
With the Hat law, the focus was now on how people lived. Hence, several changes affecting the routines of daily life were made to conform to modern/Western norms, such as changing the rest day of the week from Friday to Sunday in 1924 and adopting the Gregorian calendar and solar clock in 1925 (Lewis 1961:271). These changes affect the worship and rest days of Muslims. The adoption of these Western systems continues to serve as a defining characteristic of ‘secular Turkey’ with regard to other predominantly Muslim countries.
On June 21, 1934, the Assembly passed the Surname Act, abiding by the purification of the Turkish language program. People were encouraged to take a Turkish surname, whereas most of the registers in the telephone guidebook of Ankara had Arabic root surnames (Aslan 2006:160). Aslan’s (2006:169) study concluded that adopting a Turkish surname changed people’s perception of Turkish national identity. Taking a surname also disassociates Turkish people from their imperial past and Islamic influences, making people resemble their European counterparts. This brings to mind the metaphorical expression of Mardin’s (2002) ‘playing games with names’ approach. Through macro-level structural changes, identity markers were altered. Here, it essentially involves playing games through naming.
Kezer (2015:1–13) provided the example of the 1937 Turkish history exhibition- part of the history thesis project, which Atatürk inaugurated to promote the official narrative of the nation’s history. The selection of cultural artifacts in the exhibition was carefully curated to portray the envisioned content and character of the nation-state they aspired to create. The exhibition strategically presented the modern nation-state building project, showcasing state interventions that led to developments in various areas. It served as a favored medium for nationalist leaders to portray their self-image and desired perception by others. In addition, the highlighted “before and after” displays emphasize the success of building modern Turkey through the Republic, contrasting it with the perceived failures of the Ottoman Empire.
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The secularization reforms were not only Atatürk’s vision of a modern, secular nation-state but also fostered a shared new cultural framework among the Turkish population. Due to the dominant influences of the Ottoman and Islamic cultures, Turks were viewed as barbaric, the ‘simple-witted driven cattle’ who believed in fatalism and had no choice but to stay loyal to their landlords or leaders (Webster 1939:248–49). However, this perception shifted, and Turk took on a new and positive meaning (Mardin 2002:122). This transformation allowed the concept of Turkism to play a crucial role in shaping the nationalist ideology, most important of all, replacing religion in the cluster of national culture.
From the large-scale and deep-reaching reforms impacting personal lives, it is evident that the national elites saw Westernization and de-Islamization as incongruent ideologies, viewing civilization in binary terms—either Eastern or Western, without space for a moderate or hybrid approach aiming for common ground. Such dualistic thinking has caused ambivalent emotions regarding identity recognition. Abided by Atatürk’s logic, becoming a modern Turkish requires shedding the traditional Islamic constraints, which essentially entails having the majority of Turks ‘forget’ who they were and are.
To be modern Turkish citizens in the Republic, they have lost their comfort zone where they feel secure by the religion and its alliances (Berkes 1973:552). The majority of the Turkish people were crammed into an alien civilization, divergent from and even considered inferior to its own culture. The ideological confrontation between tradition and modernity will haunt Turkish people in the form of their national identity and remain a vigorous debate in the society. Furthermore, how Turkish people reposition themselves in this ambiguous and contentious self-identity is worthy of everyone’s attention.
Moreover, Atatürk’s secularization reforms were implemented through authoritative measures at the expense of traditional cultural, religious, and social systems. Not to mention that the will of the massive population was disregarded. The top-down enforcement of de-Islamization, while swift and effective, had intensified the resolve
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of conservative elements to cling to their traditional Islamic cultural values. The radical process of de-Islamization caused a profound disruption in the social fabric and collective memory that had been deeply connected to a shared past. As a result, a divide emerged between the willingly modern citizens and the religiously conservative rural population, creating an East vs. West contest analogy. The social clash that emerged as a result of the divergent values and perspectives within the society will be discussed in the forthcoming part of this study.
Finally, although the conservative resistance never ceased, the comprehensive reform process has indeed contributed to shaping a new Turkish national identity and cultural affiliation. A nationhood that incorporated linguistic, cultural, lifestyle, and even ideological fields, liberated from the shackles of the past empire and Islam tradition was reshaped under the Atatürk reforms to become a significant emblem and principle of Republican identity. However, we can not ignore the fact that cultural change depending on decree did not keep up with the pace of reform. Some of the citizens close to the center (geographically and politically) of the newborn Republic have accepted and supported the secular state system and relished their palatable secular life. For opponents defending Islamic tradition, secularists resorted to ruthless repression, which failed to secure predominance for secularism as the foundation of the Republic; instead, it gradually weakened the hold of secularists on the state and society (Çalış 2021:34). In this spirit, a nationalist and secular Turkish national identity has taken root, but it is undeniable that Islam, though receding into the background, still wields influence in the personal sphere.
4.5 Confrontations between De-Islamization and Conservatives
Westernization was the elixir of the hopeless Ottoman Empire, but Western civilization and Islam remained epistemologically contradictory. The Sultan, serving as both the political leader and the religious figure of the Caliph, approached the question of Westernization with worries and doubts in some aspects. As the Tanzimat, the Young Ottomans, and the Young Turks before the Republic, their Westernization reform efforts were based on Ottomanism and Islamism, which considered Islam the
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primary force to sustain social cohesion. Therefore, the semi-material way of Westernization without detaching Islam did not incite severe opposition.
Implementing Westernization would bring about a potential breakage of social and political cohesion. The compatibility and clashes between Westernization and Islamic traditions were subjects of ongoing discussions. Nationalist elites needed to carefully inspect the bottom line of the public acceptability of Western ideas and practices and, on the other hand, employ adequate reforms that could make meaningful changes. Conversely, Islamists were concerned that Westernization might lead to the collapse of traditional social and political unity. Additionally, with the increase in the homogeneity of the Muslim population, regimes populated by the Muslim majority were more inclined towards religious identity rather than national identity.
Opposing secularization and modernization as the salvation of the Turkish nation, Islamists had their interpretation and solutions to deal with the crisis. According to Lewis (1961:234–36), Islamists can further be divided into essentialist and moderate groups. Both groups argued that Islam was the true civilization and that Islam was not to blame for the Empire’s decline. The moderate Islamists acknowledge that Islam was open to science and technology from Western civilization. Thus, Islamic principles should prevail in other areas, such as government systems, education, and legal frameworks. Westernizers can also be divided into moderate and radical factions. Moderate Westernizers emphasized substantial technological Westernization, as technology can be easily imitated and widely adopted. However, they shared a similar view with the moderate Islamists that true civilization, Islam, cannot be achieved through imitation alone. For radical Westernizers, Westernization is seen as a requirement for survival. They consider imitation and borrowing meaningless and dangerous, asserting that Turkey must fully embrace European civilization to become a part of it.
The bias toward either Islam- solidarity, unity, or Westernization- secularism, Republic brought forth political and societal turmoils in the last decade of the Empire. The concern about challenging the authority endowed in the name of Islam was
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handled with caution. Even during the war of independence, the nationalists displayed their loyalty to the Sultanate, the symbol of the Empire and the Caliph. This tendency was stated in the opening speech of the National Assembly in April 1920,
If the National Assembly continues its meetings in the provinces temporarily until peace is achieved [...], the National Assembly is the representative body of our nation. It is even possible for the esteemed Sultan to send a representative for the opening session. Moreover, by doing so, the Islamic world will see that the National Assembly does not dare to convene in the caliphate center due to the threat from enemies, which will have its benefits.
[…]our Assembly will liberate the Caliphate and the Sultanate from foreign pressures and take measures to rescue the Ottoman state from dissolution and captivity. With complete independence and a conscientious commitment to the Caliphate, as a nation that takes pride in its Islamic identity and embraces a worldview within the Islamic world, we believe that a nation cannot be enslaved. With this conviction, the entire civilized world and humanity, observing our actions step by step, will support you (Atatürk 1920).
At the very beginning of the Republic, the apparent opposition was among some conservative reformist elites upon the abolishment of the Caliph. Some of them were devoted and loyal to the throne and Caliph and still considered the Sultan as the head of the state. Rauf Orbay, a member of the Assembly and comrade in arms of the Atatürk, talked with Atatürk worried about abolishing the monarchy. He said
I am devoted heart and soul to the throne and Caliph.[…]It is my duty to remain loyal to the padişah. […]It is difficult for us to make ourselves masters of the general situation; this can be secured by higher office and the sublime dignity everybody considers unapproachable. This office, this dignity, is the throne and Caliph. The abolition of this dignity and the attempt to replace it with a body of a different character would lead to disappointment and disaster. This is unthinkable (Atatürk 2008:565).
Rauf Orbay was also uncertain about the establishment of the Republic as the state system; he explained,
I do not believe a name alteration could change or dissuade us from our design. […] it would be a grave mistake to believe- especially after the bitter experiences of the relatively recent past- that an alteration of the form in the higher places could satisfy the real needs (Atatürk 2008:655).
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Another example is Lutfi Fikri, an intellectual chamber of deputies during the second constitutional period of the Empire, who had living experiences in Europe. He was opposed to the abolition of the Sultanate and the Caliphate. In an article published in the Tanin newspaper on November 10, 1923, he encouraged the Caliph not to resign and defended the Caliphate. In his own words, “We must state with surprise and regret that those who attack this moral treasure (he means the Caliphate) are neither strangers nor belong to those Muslim nations who are jealous of the Turks. (Atatürk 2008:660)”
Despite the opposition and polemic debates, the abrogation of the Caliphate and Sultanate was proclaimed- the most groundbreaking de-Islamization reform. However, this did not directly affect the lives of ordinary people who continued to live within the confines of traditional lifestyles. However, it was not until the Republic’s early years (1920-1930s) that extensive Westernization policies significantly influenced Turkish Muslims’ daily lives. The focus of reform shifted from material Westernization to establishing a modern Turkish unity/ identity that would separate from the imperial past. Local religious institutions used to maintain social order, morality, and faith were shut down in the name of modernization and secularization. These reforms sparked discontent among the general population due to their far-reaching impact.
Atatürk’s radial changes fomented dissent who were active and successful generals in WWI and the War of Independence. Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Refet Bele, and Rauf Orbay were loyal to the Ottoman past, obtaining support from conservative old elites and bourgeoise in Istanbul. They later formed an opposition political party (Progressive Republican Party) in November 1924 (Ahmad 2003:86; Lewis 1961:265). The party’s doctrine was to respect religious traditions and against oligarchy purposes (Karpat 2010:132–33). Atatürk was lenient on his compatriots, but the turmoil in the east region forced him to solidify the principle of secularizing further, reminding him of the necessity to eliminate religious influence.
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The following February 1925, the Kurdish uprising- led by dervish şeyhs who aimed to overthrow the Republic and restore the Caliphate, prompted Atatürk to take decisive actions. The rebellion further solidified Ataturk’s determination to suppress any force threatening the new government, including Islam. He responded by closing and disbanding religious covenants and prohibiting meetings and ceremonies to curb opposition activities (Lewis 1961:263–66; Zürcher 1993:168–69). The nascent multi-party politics trial ended with the ban after the rebellion. This decision also signaled the introduction of bold reforms in response to the challenging situation.
In December 1930, the Menemen incident was provoked by the Dervish Sheik, who urged to bring back the Sharia rule and Caliph. A group of violent crows supporting the religious sect beheaded the secular military official ordered to crush the eruption. The uprisings indicated that the effort to erase religious dominance was unsatisfactory and skin-deep (Kadıoğlu 2006:187). Due to the fear of conservative Anatolia defecting from the secular state, the nationalist elite disposed of the Republican ideology from above (ibid 2006:188). This is why Atatürk has faced criticism for disposing too much effort and energy into altering people’s minds and cultural practices. The considerable emphasis placed on cultivating national consciousness, including the construction of historical narratives and enforcement in attire and appearance changes, was not matched by a comparable effort to establish a democratic nation-state based on Western ideals (Mardin 2006:202).
The clash between the Westernizers/ nationalists versus Islamic tradition and institutions and pious Muslims never ceased. The government in Ankara, with military victories and popular support, was threatened by the esteemed offices of the Muslim faith, which still held great prestige and authority among all Muslim Turks (Lewis 1961:257). Besides this, there was a gap between the reformist elites and the mass population on the values they featured, illustrating the center-periphery, dominant-alienated, modern, and Islam counter relationships. The urban elites and intellectuals were exposed to the idea of Western civilization and accepted it. Yet the mass population in rural Anatolia remained intimate with the Islam tradition where ulema dominated family and personal matters (ibid. 1961:265). The ambivalences in
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the national culture and identity, whether a modern secular citizen or a Muslim Turkish, remain a heat debated in public and political apparatus to wage supporters of counter camps. On an individual level, Turkish people are physically and earthly de-Islamized but mentally and spiritually Muslim, even in the recession of their minds.
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CHAPTER 5 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DETACHMENT
In Chapter 2, we sketched identity as a dynamic set of criteria that distinguish ‘us’ from ‘them’ based on distinct and shared characteristics. In reality and academic studies, national identity cannot be understood through a single level or binary opposition (similarity and difference) as it encompasses multiple dimensions, including individual, social, cultural, political, and national aspects. Each dimension that forms national identity involves different variables that interact and influence how individuals perceive their national identity. Therefore, when defining national identity, it is essential to understand the meanings of the distinctions and similarities that differentiate ‘us’ from ‘them.’ The subject of this study lay on detaching the embedded cultural element, be it ethnic or religious, from the national identity. I will approach this detachment as changes or diverse interpretations of the meaning of these cultural elements. Given that from a modernization perspective, Islam hindered progress, and Chinese culture resembles colonialism coated in post-colonialism to despise local culture. The cultural elements that have long been embedded in national identity must be swept away in response to changing interpretations and meanings to meet the demands of the circumstances.
In the previous chapters, we have discussed the historical background of redefining the essence of national identity, aiming to move away from deeply rooted cultural norms. The emergence of nationalism and the quest for a renewed national identity often occur when drastic changes, where established political and social systems have started to dissolve (Goalwin 2022:20–21). Taiwan’s national consciousness, for instance, evolved as a prominent response to international exclusion from the community. On the other hand, Turkish nationalism found its footing, as the collapse of the Empire can be foreseen. These phenomena reflect how radical transformations create fertile ground for rediscovering and asserting national identities. In this section, I will attempt to compare the decisive historical events, ideologies, and methods adopted in establishing a new framework for national identity through the examples
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of Turkey’s de-Islamization and Taiwan’s de-Islamization in different temporal and spatial contexts.
In the final section of this chapter, we will discuss the aspects of national identity that involve de-Chineselization and de-Islamization in everyday life, whether through conscious or unconscious behaviors and activities. These actions and activities, whether intentional or unintentional, reinforce or challenge the newly constructed version of national identity. Additionally, institutions with the power to attribute meaning to identity (government or non-governmental institutions) play a crucial role in understanding how identity holders adapt to or resist the erasure of cultural substrates in the formation of the new identity.
5.1 Historical Events and Ideological Background
The critical historical events triggering the removal of cultural traits in Taiwan and Turkey’s national identity construction will be enumerated, along with an examination of how these pivotal historical events shaped nationalist ideologies and pushed forward to detach the cultural element from national identity.
5.1.1 Changing the Situations by and with ‘Other’
In this section international treaties and declarations have been selected as pivotal turning points towards the formation of new national identities. The content of these international agreements or declarations will also lay the foundation for removing cultural traits in shaping national identity. This foundation necessitates recognition by others to proceed.
UN Resolution n# 2758- Change of Being Legitimate China
After the Chinese Civil War in 1949, China was divided into two countries according to international law. However, both sides firmly opposed the notion of “Two Chinas,” leading to a practical consensus that there is only one China, although with differing interpretations of each. Amidst the shadow of the Cold War, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) supported North Korea during the Korean War, and internally, China was
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undergoing devastating socio-cultural destruction by the Cultural Revolution. These factors allowed Taiwan to be legitimate only China for a while.
The ROC survived twenty-two years in Taiwan, unceasing military confrontations with Communist China. The U.S.-Soviet confrontation became a slackening tension in the international arena, and the prospect looked good (Hobsbawm 1995:242,244). In the 70s, The Soviet Union lost its control over China, and President Nixon of the United States took the opportunity to recruit China into allying against the Soviet Union (ibid. 1995:246). In 1971, with the consent of the United States and other member countries, the United Nations passed a resolution recognizing the PRC as the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations42. Since the ROC lost its legitimate political Chinese representative, the Taiwanese began to query their cultural and national identity. In the past two decades, the ‘claimed authentic’ Chinese culture representatives, ideologies, and mandarine language were shoved down Taiwanese people’s throats.
The other day, after being withdrawn from the UN membership, President Chiang Kai-shek broadcasted the Letter to Our People Concerning the Withdraw from the United Nations43. In this Letter, he condemned the United Nations for its breach of
42 The Original text, “Recognizing that the representatives of the government of the People’s Republic of China are the only lawful representative of China to the United Nations and that the People’s Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, Decides to restore all its rights to the People’s Republic of China to recognize the representatives ofo its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.” 2758 Restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations. (1971) United Nations. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192054?ln=en (Accessed: 25 July 2023). *The words in bold emphasis by me. * Update: On July 26, 2023, the House of the US passed the Taiwan International Solidarity Act. The content asserts that UN Resolution #2758 only recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal representative of China in the UN, and it does not address Taiwan’s representation in the UN. It is considered a response to China’s misinterpretation of the UN resolution to exclude Taiwan’s participation in international affairs. The United States opposes any actions that would alter Taiwan’s current status without the consent of the Taiwanese people. Text - H.R.1176 - 118th Congress (2023-2024): Taiwan International Solidarity Act. Congress.gov, Library of Congress, 26 July 2023, https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/1176/text.
43 退出聯合國退出聯合國 [ Withdraw from the UN] 檔案支援教學網檔案支援教學網 [Archive Resource for Teaching]. Available at: https://art.archives.gov.tw/FilePublish.aspx?FileID=1634 (Accessed: 27 July 2023). File No. A307742000K/0061/A272A/1
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trust, emphasized the principle that Han people and Communist bandits cannot coexist44, and asserted that the ROC, based on Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu Islands, is the legitimate representative of China and Chinese people. He further emphasized that the sovereignty of the ROC over mainland China will not be interfered with by foreign powers.
To make matters worse, a series of diplomatic setbacks occurred before and after the ROC’s withdrawal from the United Nations, leading to a wave of international nations’ diplomatic severance with the ROC. The most significant blow came in 1979 when the United States ended diplomatic relations with the ROC. This profoundly impacted the ROC’s international standing and internal affairs, as the military alliance with the United States had been essential in projecting the ROC’s legitimacy and authentic status as ‘China,’
The harsh international situation showed the breakage of the only one China claim. If Chiang had not stiffly persisted and implemented this ideology in Taiwan, Taiwanese people would not have been the international orphans trapped by the so-called Chinese national identity, which would have been exploited by the Chinese Communist Party as a tool for cognitive warfare and united front ideological propaganda.
If the Taiwanese were no longer the legitimate Chinese, then who is Taiwanese? Since the top-down enforcement of Chinese culture was nevertheless indisputable, and in the martial law era, the expression of Taiwanese people was controlled and subject to extreme repression. As mentioned in Chapter 3, some intellectuals (Peng, Mingmin’s Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation) realized Taiwan should stop claiming itself as the only and legitimate China; the consequences were severe for those who spoke up their minds: imprisonment, forced exile, or facing other hardships (Chen 2015:79).
44 This is a Chinese idiom, describing two adversaries that can not exist a the same time. This idiom had been used as an ideological expression by disdaining the communist regime as bandits to staunchly assert that ROC was only the only China.
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The national status of the Republic of China (Taiwan) has suffered a severe blow in the international community. The Republic of China lost its claim as the only legitimate representative of China and had its international recognition as a sovereign state stripped away (Lee 2009:127). This means that others no longer recognize Taiwanese identity as equivalent to being Chinese, leading to disillusionment among Taiwanese people regarding their identity with China. Over the years, the emphasis on reviving Chinese culture in Taiwan has resulted in cultural confusion. In this situation, the perception of culture does not align with the reality in the world (Yang 1992:7). This phenomenon has appeared in the expectations of Taiwanese people towards Chinese culture.
As sequences of diplomatic frustrations, the government now had to respond to the request for reform while local intellectuals began to reevaluate the future of Taiwan’s national identity. A new wave of social movements was also brewing. One subject about the reform is that the government should accept that the KMT regime no longer represented China. The second is to rediscover and elaborate on the Taiwanese culture, which the authority had purposely excluded. The constant concern over local culture and reformation awakened people’s consciousness, further prefacing Taiwanization in the following decade (Hsiau 2012:150).
The Treaty of Treaty of Sèvres and Lausanne with the Other-
Amidst the world war that engulfed Europe, the Ottoman Empire made the unfortunate choice of siding with the wrong faction, ultimately ending up as one of the defeated central powers. The post-war territorial realignments in Europe were driven by the aspirations of nationalist movements to establish nation-states. The Ottoman Empire was a defeated side, and the people perceived a sense of exploitation and oppression from which Turkish nationalism, stemming from anti-imperialism, arose (Georgeon 2006:8). Historical reputation for military prowess, war triumph, and highly developed and ample civilization is thoroughly eclipsed by defeat in war and the humiliation of oppression.
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On 31 October 1918, the Armistice of Mudros was concluded, and the Allied powers decided to occupy Istanbul, gaining control over the strategically important Dardanelles, Bosporus straits, and other military bases (Zürcher 1993:133). Through the Sultan’s authorization, the Allied powers effectively assumed control over the Ottoman Empire’s administration, military, and territories, reducing it to only Anatolia, Istanbul, and its surrounding areas. After the Unionists fled to Europe, the Ottoman government and the Sultan were like rubber stamps for the Allied powers in order to retain the little power left (Ahmad 2003:79). Facing the perilous situation that the Empire lost its sovereignty as shattered occupied land, and the fear of losing their home but no homeland to go, the national resistance movement was in the midst of preparation (Ahmad 2003:78; Hayashi 2019:401; Zürcher 1993:135–36).
Not for long, the Amasya Circular was issued and proclaimed to Anatolia the following June after the Armistice was signed, stating that
The territorial integrity of the nation and its Independence are under threat. Our central government finds itself besieged and influenced by the Allied powers, impeding its ability to fulfill its obligations. This situation portrays our nation as on the brink of extinction. Our nation will be rescued through the determination and resolve of the people (Atatürk Ansiklopedisi 2020).
The publicization of the circular prologized the national independence of the remaining Muslim Turkish populace. It was a straightforward call to unity and cooperation among the Turkish people to fight for their sovereignty. The document also laid the groundwork and held immense symbolic value for establishing a new state. In the urgency of the War of Independence, the spontaneously organized resistance movements by people and soldiers from various regions, under the pretext of defending the nation, were all referred to as Kuva-yi Milliye (National Forces) (Özkaya 1992:451). The emergence and existence of the National Forces reflected the desires and sentiments of the masses. “The will of the people gave strength to the National Force, which was an essential element to dominate the will of nationhood as declared in the Erzurun congress (ibid. 1992:451,454).”
In essence, the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres symbolized the demise of the once-mighty Ottoman Empir, who was utterly surrendered. The history textbook portrayed
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the Treaty as a turning point where the Turkish people became the subject of the state. The Sultan’s signature lost its sway over the territories, failing to confer value upon its populace or uphold the pivotal elements that bound the Turkish nation together. (Tarih III 2014b:310). Also, in Çeçen’s (2012:56) words, the Treaty was to prevent Turkish presence in the area and establish any powerful polity resembling the Empire. And it was the united will of the Turkish people to fight and annul the Treaty that attempted to wipe the Turkish nation out from the map.
As a result, the Armistice of Mundanya cued the success of the War of Independence. Subsequently, the Lausanne Conference and the signing of the Lausanne Treaty overturned the humiliating provisions of the Sèvres Treaty. The Lausanne Treaty considered the Republic’s touchstone, defined the modern Turkish state’s borders, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Furthermore, it represented the recognition of Turkey’s statehood and international personality (İnan 1959:206). The signing of the Treaty of Sèvres was a pivotal event that galvanized Turkish national consciousness, igniting a collective determination among the Turkish people to take up arms to defend their territorial integrity. Subsequently, the diplomatic negotiations and outcomes of the Mudanya and Lausanne conferences symbolized the triumph of Turkish nationalism, effectively thwarting foreign dominances within their homeland.
Mondros- Mundnaya! Sèvres- Lausanne! These geographical names symbolized the Turkish miracle45 overturned sorrowful memory by fighting for their independence under extreme hardship (Tarih IV 2014c:131–32). “The Sèvres Treaty proved what the Ottoman Empire could do the worst to the Turkish people (Morkaya 2022:16)46”. It impressed an endless shameful past47 (with the Empire being the instigator of this
45In the Turkish text, ‘Türk Mücizesi’ describes the strength of the Turkish people’s determination and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s diligent efforts in establishing the Turkish nation-state
46 Morkaya’s (2022) depiction of the pivotal treaties that led to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey aligns with the republican historical narrative and reflects the discourse of Turkish nationalism prevalent at the time. It highlights the decline of the empire, the Sultan’s subservience to foreign powers, and the Turks’ assertion of their national identity through armed resistance, ultimately winning their state and sovereignty with pride.
47 The original Turkish text used in the history textbook was, “Osmalı Hükümeti için sonsuz bir
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bitter past) (ibid. 2014c:64). The Treaty of Lausanne is undeniably a significant milestone in the history of the Republic of Turkey. Regardless of the actual events and historical records, the Treaty of Sèvres and the Treaty of Lausanne stand as watershed moments in Turkish national identity. They mark the transformation from oppressed and neglected subjects of the Sultan to citizens whose consent are the basis of national sovereignty. These treaties are widely praised in various accounts for the glory and honor of their victory as a result of the wisdom of their leaders and the unwavering spirit of the Turkish people.
The international treaties, aside from redefining nationhood by removing the agency representing China and transforming it into a new sovereign nation, have had a significant impact on national identity. While international treaties may seem distant or irrelevant, they wield considerable influence in shaping how nation- states perceive their position and identity in the international arena. The formation and shaping of national identity stem not only from domestic policies and societal interactions but also from how ‘they’ understand ‘us’ internationally. The treaties engaged in nation-building have sparked domestic nationalism and a renewed quest for reestablishing national identity.
5.1.2 Factors of Detaching Embedded Element
After understanding the role of the triggering event and international treaties in reconstructing national identity, now it is time to look into other factors that potentially influence national identity. In the following section, I will analyze and investigate the origins that fostered a powerful sense of nationalism and how the international ‘other’ reflects and defines ‘our’ nation-state, shaping a new form of national identity that made the masses believe and internalize the removal of deeply rooted cultural aspects were necessary.
ayıp olan, Anlaşma Devletlerine de hiçbir fayda sağlamayan ‘Sevr Antlaşması’ adlı diplomatik belgeyi imzalattı.” (Bold emphasis by me)
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Source of Nationalists’ Sentiment
The most notable phase of Turkey’s de-Islamization was during the Republic’s early years, led by Atatürk’s reforms (1923-1938). On the other hand, Taiwan’s de-Chineselization occurred in the post-1980s era. Taiwan faced international isolation after exiting the UN, leading to resentment and resistance towards Chinses culture, coinciding with the democratization of domestic politics. This transformation was advocated by grassroots local elites, who sought political and cultural Taiwanization.
It is doctrinal that national memories are part of the constituents and buttress of the national identity. Ernest Renan (1996) stated that shared suffering unites people more strongly than shared happiness. Grief has more significant influence than triumphs, instilling a sense of duty and encouraging collective efforts. Parallel to Guibernau’s (2007:11–12) perspective of the psychological dimension of national identity, the strength of emotion can often override reason, particularly regarding the robust sentimental identification with one’s nation. This deep emotional connection can drive individuals to make sacrifices.
The misery and troublesome condition of a nation have the potential to ignite nationalist fervor and evoke a profound sense of belonging to a shared cultural, historical, and social identity. Individuals’ affection to build their identity would be the focus when they were more threatened and less safe. This form of nationalism was the realization of the infringement upon national sovereignty, and it evoked a passionate response from the nationalists, often expressing their discontent and anger (Gellner, 1983:1). In such situations, the individual can sacrifice their life to sustain existing identification and attachments (Yuval-Davis 2006:202). Smith (1991:72) also underlined that national consciousness and sentiments could create a nation and unity even if the population has no idea of the ideology and doctrine of the nation. Such sentiments can manifest in acts of heroism, dedication to a cause, and a deep commitment to serving the nation’s interests.
The brutal events and loss of human life that occurred between 1914 and 1917 accelerated the adoption and the will of liberal democracy in politics (Hobsbawm
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1995:110). After World War I, nationalism became a significant force in modernization, along with US President Wilson’s principle of self-determination, which offered hope for developing countries to gain independence from (mostly) their colonizers or rulers. New nation-states emerged with this wave of nationalism. Turkey was in this wave, and Taiwan would benefit from it decades later.
The concept of national self-determination poses a double-edged sword in establishing the Turkish Republic. On the one hand, it encourages other ethnic groups formerly under the empire to establish their own nation-states, essentially resulting in the loss of much of the empire’s territory, albeit within the framework of the Turkish Republic's system (Ahmad 2003:79; Berkes 1973:482–83). Similarly, within the same framework, Taiwan, seventy years later, faces similar contradictions. While inheriting the Chinese language and culture, following the self-determination of the ‘Taiwanese nation’ is fraught with contradictions. This contradiction persists in subsequent discourses aimed at removing cultural methods.
Apart from Wilson’s principle of self-determination, the idea that supported the establishment of a Turkish nation-state, the hope of saving the Sultanate and Caliphate also served as sources of national unity (Berkes 1973:475). The degradation of the empire in all aspects, loss of territory, and occupied by foreign powers were vital sources to uniting the remaining impoverished Turkish population under the banner of fighting for sovereignty. The mobilization in the war proved the potential for Turks to be a national group from which a collective sense of Turkishnees gradually emerged. Nevertheless, at that time, they had no expectations that Westernization and the republican system would replace the Caliphate and the Empire.
Ataturk recalled an incident he was told about by a teacher in Inebolu during the War of Independence. In the face of a dire life-and-death situation, the residents of Inebolu, including students and teachers, bravely united to protect their ammunition from falling into the hands of the enemy. Rather than surrendering it, they actively relocated the munitions to a safe location (İnan 1959:150). This act of unity and determination, driven by the imminent threat posed by the enemy and the profound
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desire to preserve their nation’s existence, exemplifies the exceptional level of solidarity that pervaded the nation during those challenging times. The collective state of mind among the people mobilized the entire nation, demonstrating their unwavering commitment to safeguarding their country’s sovereignty.
As to Taiwan, the Taiwanese were emancipated from the Japanese colonial but fell into another colonial-like authoritative regime. Local Taiwanese people experienced discrimination and cultural deprivation, enduring significant psychological trauma due to mainly the prolonged 30 years of the White Terror. ‘The Suffering of the Taiwanese’ and ‘Taiwanese’ Misery’ were the catchwords for opposition intellectuals to intensify Taiwanese national consciousness (Liu 2005:175).On the other hand, Taiwan’s de-Chineselization movement mainly occurred when it was no longer recognized internationally as ‘China.’ Concomitantly, the slogan by President Chiang, “Stay calm and strive for and self-reliant in the face of changes,”48 was posted and reiterated on every corner of Taiwan. The propaganda seemed to tranquilize people’s anxiety about their international status and identity, or, say, the diplomatic crisis highlighted the sense of shared destiny that unity between the local Taiwanese and Mainlanders, who had been hostile counterparts (Lee 2009:128). The quake in national status has ironically fostered domestic unity among the diverse ethnic groups in Taiwan, which were divided due to socio-economic and political inequalities.
In addition, it was the first time since the KMT takeover that university students were tolerated to initiate social movements to defend the sovereignty of the ROC. Most profoundly, in the National Taiwan University, the most outstanding institution of higher education, unprecedented freedom of speech and discussion gatherings were held (ibid. 2009:129). The withdrawal from the United Nations and a series of
48 The slogan was declared on June 15, 1971, in the National Security Council meeting. For the full speech concerning the withdrawal of the UN by President Chiang see “我們國家的立場和國民的精我們國家的立場和國民的精神神 [Our Nation’s Stance and the Spirit of Our People].” 財團法人中正文教基金會財團法人中正文教基金會 [Chung Cheng Cultural and Educational Foundation], 1 Sept. 2014 (www.ccfd.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1967:0014-32&catid=198&Itemid=256.) Accessed 3 Aug. 2023.
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diplomatic setbacks have caused cracks in the Chinese identity crafted by the KMT, leading to a growing concern among intellectuals regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty and
the Taiwanese identity, the most important of all, to prevent extinction from the world map.
Another unexpected social movement was the Statement On Our National Fate by The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, publicized on 29 December, the same year the UN Resolution was made. In the statement, the We was specified as people who love the island and have ancestral roots traced back a hundred years. We all shared a conviction to live together in peace. And we do not wish to be governed by Peiping. We oppose nations disregarding the rights and wishes of 15 million people and making unilateral decisions to their advantage. God ordained, and the United Nations Charter has affirmed, that every person has the right to determine their destiny49. This statement marked the first clear indication of a collective Taiwanese national identity among the people who love and identify with Taiwan (Lee 2009:130). The concept of self-determination discussed in the statement would lay the groundwork for the subsequent emergence of The Taiwanese People’s Self-Determination Movement. During this period, Taiwan’s local elites advocated for political and cultural Taiwanization, emphasizing Taiwan as an independent and autonomous entity seeking greater recognition and status in the international community. Taiwan’s nationalist consciousness emerged from the templated Chinses identity being refuted.
The rising influence of the PRC in the international realm has pushed the Taiwanese further to the Taiwanese side of the spectrum. China has become more unbridled in asserting, ‘One China and Taiwan is part of China.’ Thus, any claim on the uniqueness of Taiwanese cultural, identity, or political perspectives is intolerable. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China’s suppression of Taiwan has reached its highest point in the past decade50. Apart from military threats, one of the most common forms of
49 Peiping was the old name of Beijing used by the ROC, here means the Chinese communist regime. The full statement can be accessed from the website of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan http://english.pct.org.tw/Article/enArticle_public_19711229.htm
50 The Foreign Ministry of ROC filed events in which China oppressed Taiwan. For chronologically
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suppression is related to the names used for Taiwan in international activities. China pressures event organizers to replace ‘Taiwan (ROC)’ with names like ‘Taiwan-China’ or ‘Taiwan province.’ In Olympic events and international organizations, Taiwan is only allowed to compete under the name ‘Chinese Taipei,’ a prominent example of such suppression.
The Intersection of National Identity-Nationalism and Ideology Fusion
By positing nationalism as the foundational principle underpinning the construction of national identities, it becomes apparent that nation-states transcend mere definitional boundaries or static political structures. Rather, their significance is continually reshaped and reinterpreted over time. Consequently, it becomes imperative to acknowledge the role of other ideologies and concepts that nationalists leverage in the process of national identity formation. In the following sections, exploration will be conducted to elucidate the intricate nexus between nationalism and various ideological plays in both scenarios.
The Turkish nationalist discourse emerged primarily within the context of modernization, with secularization being its predominant focus. The main objective was to reduce the influence of Islam in both political affairs and societal and cultural realms. As such, Turkish nationalism, interwind with modernization and secularization, would become the new religion with the national flag, anthem, victory war stories, and other symbols, all of which can serve as solidarity and connection between the state and individual belief.
Following this logic, Turkish nationalism implements the ‘civil religion’ to replace the old belief system. As Atalay (2018:29) narrated, the Republican elite’s nationalist project featured Rousseau’s top-down ideology hinged more on adherence and loyalty. However, what is at stake is to make the civil religion bear with cultural norms, cooperation, and internalization by individuals. In other words, civil religion is a
listed incidences please see“Instances of China’s Interference with Taiwan’s International Presence.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC (Taiwan), en.mofa.gov.tw/cl.aspx?n=1510. Accessed 3 Aug. 2023.
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belief system that revolves around national identity, often supplanting traditional religions. National elites were like clergies (Gellner 1983:32) who would missionize a series of measures, including establishing a secular government system and modernizing education and social institutions to cement a more modern and secular belief as the cornerstone of Turkish national identity.
Taiwan’s de-Chineselization of national identity, a central discourse within the framework of nationalism, has primarily emerged under domestic democratization and developed by the looming threat from the other side of the strait (Liu 2005:18). The diplomatic setbacks mentioned above prompted the Taiwanese to question the KMT’s claim of legal inheritance of the Chinese culture and tradition. Throughout the democratization pursuit, notably against the ‘One China’ reunification rhetoric was the primary concern for the people and gradually transformed into an urge for Taiwan independence (ibid. 2005:19). In opposition to the authoritative KMT and its Chinese centrism discourse, Taiwan’s burgeoning national consciousness emerged alongside the quest for democratization, sparking a renewed search for a unique Taiwanese culture, at least distinct from Chinese one (Liu 2005:24–25). Intellectuals advocated local culture to support their plan and resist the ingrained Chinese cultural influence. Worthy of note is that China’s claim on unification as the principle of Chinese nationalism has played a pivotal role in swaying Taiwanese nationalism and identity.
Otherness in International Relations
The concept of the ‘other’ serves as a mirror reflecting our characteristics and boundaries, contributing to the formation of self-identity. In this context, national identity becomes prominent during interactions with ‘other’ countries or in international contexts, exerting a profound impact on individuals’ emotional connection to their sentiment of nationhood. Through this socialization process, the nation-state and its people collaboratively construct and reconstruct their national identity (Shih 2013:282). In other words, national identity is (re)constructed through various interactive negotiations, redefinitions, and constructions. Beyond
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encompassing interactions among domestic groups, national identity also involves engagements and struggles with other international actors.
For example, national governments do not solely sign international documents and treaties in the name of the people’s will; their implementation also requires the cooperation of the populace. The international treaties and agreements mentioned earlier were determined by powerful ‘others,’ such as the Allied powers, the US, and the UN, directly defining the national identity constituents of both Turkish and Taiwanese people. Faced with these formidable others, the two countries, being in a disadvantaged position, could do no more than acquiesce and opt for different paths to pursue new meanings of their national identity.
The UN resolution stripped the ROC of its China representation and sovereignty over mainland China, significantly influencing Taiwanese national identity. Consequently, the ROC (Taiwan) faced diplomatic setbacks internationally, realizing it was no longer recognized as the only China. Despite this, the KMT government persists in an unwavering stance on China’s representation, holding onto hopes of mainland reunification in the future, leaving no other alternatives. These staunch and almost stubborn efforts in vain to maintain China’s representation have led to uncertainty regarding Taiwan’s international status and confined its national identity within the China framework. This disconnect between subjective national identity and international reality emerged.
The situation left the Taiwanese people to inquire whether they are now part of China and, if so, which China they belong to. Are they still Chinese descendants who inherited authentic Chinese values and traditions? With international recognition and growing economic power, unification has become the most rhetorical nationalist aspiration for the PRC. As a result, with the ongoing political and economic pressures from China, Taiwanese individuals find themselves compelled to redefine a fresh national identity that distinctly separates them from China, even regarding China as the clear and consistent ‘other’ or primary adversary.
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Similarly, signing the Treaty of Sèvres had transformative implications for national identities. For instance, when faced with the termination of their reigning Empire and the apprehension of foreign rule by Western powers, the Turkish people united in a fervent display of nationalism, standing together as ‘Turks.’ As described by Yurdusev (2010:285,286), Turkey has consistently been perceived as the ‘other’ in relation to Europe, and this sense of otherness has been reinforced through various mutual interactions and engagements over time.
For the West, Turkey has tried to transition from a defeated, uncivilized ‘other’ to a triumphant, determined, better other. Atatürk, a staunch advocate of positivist ideology, aimed to counteract deep-seated prejudices against the Turkish population by consistently proclaiming the victory of the War of Independence and implementing modernization reforms. However, one of the primary factors maintaining Turkey’s status as a significant ‘other’ is religion, which acts as a double-edged sword. Religion establishes cultural, social, and political boundaries of identity and serves as a burden hindering Turkey’s progress towards modernization, perpetuating its status as the perpetual ‘other’ in the Western world.
5.2 Approaches to Detach the Embedded Culture Element
On the common ground of detaching cultural elements from national identity, this part will discuss the notion of citizenship, different approaches, and actors between the two cases to formulate plausible better schemes to strengthen national identity. First, it is essential to examine the criteria of nation-states deciding and regulating their citizenship, given that it is a formal and apparent definition of the national identity. With citizenship as the template for national identity, analysis of the actors’ initiations and approaches can gauge the disparity between expectation and reality of the perception of identity.
Two methods are observed alone with different actors’ dispositions and historical and political backgrounds. The top-down approach is executed by state authorities and its affiliations through different institutions in the education system, political and social policies, public communications, celebrations, and commemorations. In other words,
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the nation-state, a soft and symbolic violence domain51 where cultural, economic, and symbolic capital can be employed to meet their interest, form a structural approach to constructing national identity. On the other hand, the bottom-up approach emphasizes individuals’ will or cognizance to share common beliefs with the other members, which is more akin to the self-determination nationalist.
From defining citizenships, approaches, actors, and concepts of remaking national identity, we can compare interactions between the individual, the government, and the state. I hope that by analyzing and comparing the different trajectories remaking national identity, we can delineate the external factors contributing to variations in the internalization of people’s sense of national identity.
5.2.1 Citizenship as National Belonging
Yuval Davis (2006:205,209) described citizenship, of which the state historically constitutes only one layer, as an integral aspect of individuals’ political belonging and rooted in reciprocal responsibilities and rights between individual and state. Also, shared values like common culture, religion, and language are particular identifications of collectivities. Within a multicultural state, a common set of values, such as democracy and human rights, are the most attainable identifications and most permeable boundaries of all.
In reality, national groups and cultures hardly align with the boundaries of modern nation-states. Nowadays, what is sought after within these borders is the identity of the state itself, defined by definite criteria that separate citizens from non-citizens. Likewise, McCrone and Bechhofer’s (2015) study on national identity in England and Scotland with empirical inquiry showed that holding the same citizenship does not mean individuals share the same idea of who should be included as their fellow citizens.
51 Symbolic violence (also called soft violence ) is a concept created by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (cited from George Ritzer and Douglas Goodman 2004:523).
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Eliminating historically embedded elements was the attempt of states to incorporate subjective sentiments of national belonging and allegiance into the citizenship granted to individuals. The strategies for disentangling ingrained cultural components represent a dimension of enfranchising citizenship; in this regard, Turkish citizenship is defined as modern and secular, and Taiwanese citizenship is characterized by Taiwanese values and love for Taiwan. Such definitions would somehow exclude citizens who are supposed to be entitled to equal rights and responsibilities. We must also remain vigilant. As Kymlicka (1996) suggested, overly emphasizing citizenship by differentiated groups may lead to disunity and might cause division, undermining the original goal of using citizenship equality to unite national identity and promote unity.
In the context of the progress of detaching religion for the integrity of the newly founded republic, religion theoretically is no longer the core identification of Turkish citizenship. Atatürk proposed a secular state that upheld modern principles of citizenship to ensure unity among its citizens within the remaining territory. His strategy involved implementing assimilation policies aimed at fostering cultural homogeneity within the population. Has Turkey articulated the local divergences without an ingrained religious tie into a united citizenship? As Kadıoğlu (2007:285) stated, Turkish citizenship is not attached to the Turkish national identity. Defining citizenship based on de-Islamization identity may exclude other citizens who should have equal rights and responsibilities. Also, the citizenship endowments in the 1920-the 30s hinging on oscillating Turkishness and voluntary adoption or contributing to the war and so on, yet all requirements were based on free evaluation by the Kemalist government, which underlines ongoing impacts of modern Turkish identity (Çağaptay 2003)52.
52 In Cagaptay’s paper, he listed several law regulations that naturalized and denaturalized Turkish citizenship in 1920-30. Not until the 1930s were Muslims superficially the requirement of Turkish citizenship, later Turkish ethnicity/ Turkishness replaced the Muslim. Thus during the early years of the Republic, there was uncertainty regarding the definition of Turkish citizenship. However, what can be confirmed is that the Republic was steadily moving towards a more civic and less ethno-religious-based Turkish nationalism.
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Thus, scholars proposed a denationalization of or cultural citizenship to include other ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups other than Sunni Muslim and Turkish language to participate democratic process (Kadıoğlu 2007; Rosaldo 1994:57). What she suggested was not amending the law to expand citizenship to other nationals but to broaden membership’s conception to a more multicultural right that would integrate the ‘other’ into the Turkish nation-state (ibid 2007:291). This proposition brought up debates over the ‘Türkiyeli’ that have never ceased in the public. The term is territorial and more objectively civic to identify all people living in the republic’s borders, disregarding their ethnicity and religion53 . According to the polemic about the Türkiyeli, most Turks in Turkey still have a strong sense of belonging to Turkishness and their ethnic culture and religion. The Kemalists’ endeavor to de-Islamize was just one facet of the broader denationalization of citizenship. However, the challenge persists in forging a cohesive national sentiment that transcends ethnic and cultural boundaries, embracing a more nationalist, civic, and cosmopolitan ethos instead.
Similar mandatory cultural assimilations were also implemented in Taiwan’s Japanization and Chineselization processes. After the democratization, political parties advocating for Taiwanization came to power. Education and policies centered on ‘Taiwanese values’ began to shape the new meaning of Taiwanese citizenship. Based on the public opinion and ambiguity of Taiwanese values, constructing an identity and civic meaning around de-Chineselization aligns with the advocated notion of embracing multicultural citizenship by Kadioglu and Renato. Following Kadıoğlu’s concepts of denationalization and multiculturalism, we can examine Taiwan as its de-Chineselization identity construction has been based on a multi-cultural discourse. Could the prescription be effective and plausible to establish a new national identity attuned to citizenship?
53 “TDK’den ‘Türkiyeli’ Kelimesiyle Ilgili Açıklama [Explanation of the Word ‘Türkiyeli’ from the Turkish Language Institution (TDK)].” Cumhuriyet (Newspaper), 21 July 2023, www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/turkiye/tdkden-turkiyeli-kelimesiyle-ilgili-aciklama-2101282. After the TDK gave the definition of the word, Insomuch as there were criticism and revulsions appeared on social media, the explanation of the word was erased shortly.
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Merely decades-long assimilation into Chinese culture, the emotional and cultural attachment of Taiwan’s elderly and Mainland immigrant families to their Chinese homeland remains profound. Regardless of the cultural identity policies imposed by rulers, subsequent generations have gradually developed connections and emotions towards this land and its adjuncts. In addition to the primitive linguistic, ethnic, and customary links to Chinese culture, the development of a shared sense of belonging as Taiwanese citizens must turn towards the long-neglected and marginalized indigenous and regional cultures. Utilizing common universal values such as democracy and human rights to define ‘Taiwanese Values’54 is the most accessible yet challenging criterion, particularly in contrast to the PRC.
The challenges for the two cases are distinct. For Turkey, the ethnic and religious attachment to the Turkish national identity remained effective, so the denationalization or Turkiyeli concept seems unable to gain majority public consensus. As a country surrounded by several potentially hostile neighbors and the experience of separatism by other nations, multiculturalism could be a once-bitten twice shy recollection for Turkish people. To reduce the incongruencies between national identity and citizenship, it is imperative to strike a balance within the realm of popular national identity that tends to lean towards the axis of ethnic, religious, and cultural attachments. The trajectory can only shift towards a more secular and civic-oriented cultural identity by achieving an equilibrium.
For Taiwan, the challenge lies in the lack of a crystalized definition of acceptance of the national culture. Besides, shedding the imposed Chinese identity of recent times is a far easier task compared to the deeply ingrained Islamic culture of the Turkish
54 A political discourse was expressed by President Tsai in a television interview in 2018. However, the connotation of Taiwanese values is too broad to indicate every common value and idea shared by Taiwanese people which as a result becomes an obscure and pure political rhetoric. 三立iNEWS [Set iNews]. 2018. “中國威逼！共機頻繞台 會不會武力犯台？ 蔡英文：不排除這個可能 [China’s Coercion! Chinese Military Aircraft Frequently Encircle Taiwan. Will There Be a Military Invasion? President Tsai Ing-Wen Responded: We Do Not Rule out This Possibility.【鄭知道了[Cheng Had Known] Part 2】”. www.youtube.com. Retrieved February 16, 2024 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P0q4y49ncn8&t=1991) at 33:11.
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people. Of course, multiculturalism in Taiwan is a way of re-remembering the suppressed and obliterated local culture. By embracing these oft-overlooked facets of Taiwanese society, a more inclusive and comprehensive notion of Taiwanese citizenship and belonging can gradually take root, enhancing the country’s social fabric and fostering a sense of unity within its diversity. This entails recognizing and valuing the diverse indigenous, regional, and ethnic identities without deviating from any specific culture. Once there is no clear stance on national culture, it creates a vague impression of national identity and leads to misinterpretation and misapplication of regional culture, similar to Orientalism.
Under the ongoing discourse of Taiwan as a multicultural nation-state, different ethnolinguistic groups as citizens all have the right to pursue the revival and preservation of their indigenous cultures. However, this can inevitably lead to challenges in social integration and conflicts with the notion of a unified national identity. The minority and religious issues in Turkey have already foreshadowed the potential dangers of multiculturalism for national integration.
5.2.2 Top-Down and Bottom-Top
This section will discuss advocates who seek to remove cultural elements and their socio-political backgrounds to understand how their discourses and ideologies affect national identity. It will also explore approaches that can help achieve a new identity. Finally, it will compare and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the current identity perceptions by people.
Actors
Turkey was established by military and bureaucratic elites educated in the modernized military academy and professional schools. The secular national identity remade in Turkey was under the order of Ataturk, and his adherents are known as Kemalists, who were also the decision-makers during the early republican period. The political elites were the most crucial force and sole bearer in making a new Turkey. They were free to decide what was necessary- Western and what was
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disposable- religion. They believed that the structural and environmental changes would eventually shape individuals to fit into the new circumstances (Kasaba 1997:24). From their perspective, the elite assumed that only scientific rationalism could help Turkey prepare for modernization. So, it was indispensable to achieve modernization without secular Turkish nationalism (Zürcher 2001:210).
The nationalist elites in the early Republican period were disengaged from the mass population and the popular culture, which was less seen in other Asian countries (Mardin 2006:203). Karpat had a similar stance, stating national elites’ essential and initiative role in constructing the new Turkish nation and national identity. However, the new generation of educated individuals who adapted to Western values and took over the religious clergy’s function became disassociated from the general population who remained attached to the religious tradition (Karpat 2009:52,53). The seed of social division was planted since the effort to westernize the Empire, growing and taking roots. Due to the failure to engage with the people, intellectuals fell short in disseminating ideas and enlightening their people.
The obstacle that kept Turkey from civilizing was the tradition that intensively needed removal. In the center of Kemalists, once the CHP members secured their political and military position after independence, they began implementing the modernization program through a centralized modern education and civil law system. Although the radical reform encountered some resistance, it was carried out quickly and efficiently by the undoubted authority of the Ataturk and the one-party regime.
Contrary to Turkey, the desire to remake Taiwan’s national identity was proposed by mostly local Intellectuals and university students. Based on different studies on the identity transformation of the Taiwanese intellectuals55, the suffocating suppression
55 Ye (2001) used historical narratives (newspaper columns, diaries, and notes) to analyze the intellectuals’ identity transformation. Li (1995) utilized personal backgrounds (different generations and family backgrounds) to investigate the shift in national identity among intellectuals. However, their studies collectively point to the authoritarian rule of the KMT and its suppression of social movements, leading to intellectual awakening and a turn towards the latent Taiwanese identity.
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and break out of the 228 incident and the Formosa Incident were the turning points of the transition. The urge for Taiwanese consciousness was the backlash against KMT’s Chinese-centric ethnic and cultural policy, which generated social, economic, and cultural inequality between Mainlanders and local Taiwanese. These intellectuals are predominantly local Taiwanese intellectuals in constrst with the Mainlanders. Despite they were almost brainwashed by the ideal conception of Chinese consciousness, amidst various setbacks and suppressions, they awakened to become ‘Taiwanese.’
Not until the late 1980s, with the abolishment of the martial law and democratization process, could oppositions (including non-KMT members and pro-independents) organize political movements in public. Later, the key participants of the Formosa Incident founded the first opposition political party- DDP, which attained their goal of independence through Taiwanese consciousness and localization. It is undeniable that political and administrative actors in the presidency and the administration are influential in promoting new content of the national identity. Such as the legislation brought forward the Taiwanization project when the DDP was and is in the presidential office and presided over the majority of the legislature. Atatürk’s de-Islamization reforms were implemented solely by solely CHP administration. Afterward, the succedent Islamic-oriented political party also used its capabilities to restore traditional ethos.
Civil societies have been highly active in facilitating and bridging the culture and identity between the state and its people. Different actors cooperated with bureaucratic systems or outside of it. Thus, they all played a role in implementing new policies. For instance, democratization and Taiwanization were the efforts of underground civil societies that would contribute to pushing and supervising the government’s policies (Corcuff 2017:4). Under a proper democratic system, civil society and other interest groups stakeholders intermediate the state policies, which was not justified for us to expect during the single party regime- CHP and KMT with its exceptional circumstances.
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Top-down: Authoritative
As we presume at the beginning of the study, the malleability and fabrication of national elements to fit and construct the nation-state; nevertheless, the nature of ethnic foundations’ pivotal role in determining the methods and frameworks employed in nation-building are indispensable. Corresponding with Smith’s (1996:125) proposition on forming national identity and nation-state, he identified two distinct ethnic group models, each shaping divergent trajectories in forming nations. Smith’s patterns can help us explore the interplay between various societal segments and the substance of national culture emanating from the underlying ethnic heritage.
The pattern of Turkey’s de-Islamization national identity construction resembled Smith’s lateral ethnic/aristocratic approach. A small group of elites or educated intellectuals (aristocrats) engage and hold in their cultural practices as conduits to disseminating their culture throughout the larger population. They usually have the power to use the bureaucratic system to diffuse these cultural values to the entire
Table 5.2 1 Content of National Identity Transformation in Turkey
Turks Under Ottomans
De-Islamization of Modern Turkish National IdentityAfter the Republic Goal Goal
Supreme Rule over all Muslims, Superiority of Muslims, Conversion of Non-Muslim
Modernization, Promoting Western Culture as Turkish Indigenous Culture We vs. Us We vs. Us
Ottomans-Vulgar Turks vs. European Christians, Infidels
Modern Turkish Citizen vs. Pious Muslim and Non-Muslims Cultural Content Cultural Content
Islam, Caliph of The Muslim World, Multicultural & Ethnic Empire, Descendants of Ottoman, Legendary War Triumphs
Western Modernization, Secularism, Turkishness Grounded in Anatolia, Kemalism, Republic
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society (Smith 1996:114). The lateral strata of aristocrats would spread their culture and value to the rural population on the outskirts, potentially decreasing the authority
of religious clergy and subjecting them to state monitoring and control (ibid 1996:125).
Atatürk’s reform on modernization and Westernization was a radical and top -down procedure. He was determined that religion should not impede his revolution. So he abolished the Caliphate, overturned the existing social and political hierarchy, and stepped forward to repeal the Islamic law institutions like the Ministry of Şeriat and Şeriat Court, where theologian judges practice Islam. The religious institutions and clergies used to have immense power and influence on the educational facilities and dominated personal and family affairs, which could no more challenge the regime’s authority (Lewis 1961:265). The constitution affirmed the legislative authority of the National Assembly and reserved the judiciary to the courts. Yet, the actual commander during the early Republican period was Atatürk.
The construction of the national ideal comprised a different framework of economic, social, and political reform encompassing Turkish law, calendar, alphabet, numerals, clock, costume, gender relations, and other aspects of daily culture (Aytürk 2011). In this sense, “the state derived its legitimacy from its capacity to express and preserve the national identity (Parekh 1994:504).” Henceforth, the state was the central gear of social change with the authoritative top-down approach (Keyman 2007:231).
In the early days of the Republic, the modern Turkish identity was limited socially. To establish stability in the newly formed nation-state and to bring together culturally diverse ethnic and cultural groups, the national elites had to urgently redefine and disseminate a shared modern Turkish identity, transcending religious bonds. The central concept of becoming Westernized and secular was woven into the Turkic myth of origin and the land of Anatolia civilization. The lateral military elite, known as Kemalists, would spread their culture out from their circle and down to the demotic spaces.
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The process of secularization and modernization was not born from the aspirations of the general population. Contrary to the French Revolution, Turkey’s secular/ modern revolution did not rise from the momentum of the masses56 . The drive to adopt Westernization reforms originated in the initiatives of a burgeoning elite, who had been marginalized from the privileges of the nobility. Mardin (2006:193–94) drew a parallel between the Westernization revolution in Turkey and the French Revolution, highlighting that the ‘Turkish Revolution’ lacked the widespread backing that typically characterizes a revolutionary movement. Although some local nobles and the lower class offered support, it showcased resistance against foreign invaders.
Serpil Aydos’s (2010:83–85) book analyzed films supported by the state that propagate Turkish nationalism and contribute to establishing Turkish identity. Her study offered another perspective regarding the authoritative censorship’s role in controlling nationalist themes. The field of cinema plays a significant role in shaping and reinforcing a nation’s identity. Also, it assumes a pioneering responsibility in societal advancement. Nusret Kemal, writer, and the Financial minister, Mustafa Şeref, stated that “Turkey had undertaken various reforms, and it opportune to employ cinema to propagate revolutionary ideals to the people and the world, thus catalyzing national culture’s establishment and evolution (Abisel 1994:50; Öztürk 2005:49; as cited in Aydos 2010:82).”
Similar to other Westernization initiatives, the national-sponsored cinema was subjected to authoritative censorship to convey a uniform national perspective. The state censorship system in the cinema sector aimed to internalize the duty of safeguarding and advocating Turkish national culture and continuously operated, intending to establish the state- version of the Turkish nation (Aydos 2010:84–86). It monopolized the portrayal and interpretation of the Turkish nation, such as movies related to the War of Independence, which were the foundation of Turkish national identity (ibid 2010:83). Much like other Westernization efforts, the cinema sector
56 Mardin (2006:196) stated that the Republican reform was ontologically, and ideologically different from the French Revolution as the Republicans failed the Tocqueville’s standard. On the other hand, Kasaba (1997:24) resembles the French elites of the Revolution with the Republican elites’ authoritative and all-encompassing approach that has an influence on every aspect of life.
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elicited both positive and negative sentiments—being both necessary and undesired, compatible or conflicting. The concern over the influx of Western commercial films, which would undermine the local cinema sector, is the most important of all.
To a certain degree, the reforms undertaken by Kemalists, which included initiatives aimed at reducing the influence of Islam, can be viewed as a precursor to a form of totalitarianism. The Kemalists’ goal was not limited to importing modern technology alone but to making novel and modern individuals, necessitating the adoption of revolutionary steps to attain this goal (Atalay 2018:71). However, modernity comes at a price- freedom and liberty not only superficial submission of individuals, but it was also imperative to align both their thoughts and emotions with the principles of Kemalism.
Turks had long been identified as Muslims, and religion was ingrained in Turkish culture and identity. As Smith (1996) argued, a top-down or, in his words, lateral/autocratic approach covered a broad aspect, with efficacy by bureaucratic systematic implementation, but lacked depth. Plus, there was a limited bureaucratic system at that time in Turkey. Gellner (1983:10) likened this social structure to horizontal layers within agrarian societies, where different cultural divisions existed among these layers. Atatürk’s forceful secularization reforms undermined traditional culture and religion, ignoring public sentiment. While Islam had provided cohesion and comfort, the top-down de-Islamization deepened the resolve of conservatives. This created a rift between urban modernists and rural traditionalists, reflecting an East vs. West divide. The resulting social conflict stemming from these contrasting values will be examined further in the subsequent part of this study.
In addition, the same process was implemented in Taiwan during the re-Chineselized period after KMT’s takeover. The KMT and the Mainlanders- the core group close to governance, are the lateral ethnie/ aristocrat attempting to expand Sino-centrism into all aspects of life and culture. The result is twofold: first, to some extent, it positively enhances and acculturates Taiwanese’s Chinese nationalism and identity in part, and second, it results in exploiting the colonial culture of the Taiwanese that prepared the base for the rise of Taiwanese consciousness. Besides, the bottom-up approach
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launched Taiwan’s de-Chineselization and later transferred to the top down. However, unlike the previous authoritative approach, the DDP government’s Taiwanization policy is based on the democratic political system and the trending popular sentiment, which differs from the previous top-down approach during the KMT authoritarian era.
Undoubtedly, the top-down approach was effective and effort-saving compared with the bottom-up approach, in which different aspects needed to be considered. Measures by the announcement of regulations or paper of decrees tend to disregard and marginalize other cultures, leading some individuals to lose their longstanding cultural bonds. Notably, language policies rendered intellectuals voiceless or illiterate. This passive cultural marginalization fostered discontent, accumulating until it eventually culminated in a united resistance, exemplified by Taiwan’s advocacy for de-Chineselization and localization, driven by awakened and dissatisfied intellectuals.
Bottom-up
The Taiwanization movements can be dated back to the Japanese colonial period emerged to protest the social, cultural, and economic inequality under the authoritative regime in which public demonstrations and gatherings were prohibited. Any kind of appeal and social activities were mostly underground. Hence, what they could do on the edge of illegality was publish Taiwanese literature magazines with the implicit agenda of promoting Taiwanese consciousness since public demonstrations and gatherings were not allowed. This situation persisted under KMT’s rule till the late 1970s.
The sprout of Taiwanese consciousness began with the attention toward locality on literature, which resembles Hroch’s (1993) phase A of national movements typology in which the intellectuals and entrepreneurs, latter attracting university students, devoted themselves to distributing the empathy of the ‘homeland.’ From a pragmatism perspective, the local literatus and critics interested in the culture and history of Taiwan believed that literature is the best medium to show this uniqueness and to inculcate the national identity to the public.
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In addition, under the oppressive regime rule, only moderate reform by local intellectuals was permitted. The intellectuals overtly or tacitly called for political reform by discussing various political, social, and economic issues with their literary works. Although the local intellectuals did not obtain much echo from the public in general, it encouraged young students to discover the value of local Taiwanese culture. The likely peaceful demonstrations intensified and drew the masses’ attention as the government brutally razed non-KMT oppositions in the Formosa incident. In the late 1980s, the demonstrators founded DPP, which embodied Taiwanese nationalism and urged further democratization by organizing mass gatherings and protests. Meanwhile, the local dialect, Taiwanese (Hoklo), was widely promoted and used in public events, implying a firm nationalist ideology (Hsiau 2012:205; Ye 2001:53). The Taiwanization movement peaked after the diplomatic crisis and protests against the social, cultural, and economic inequalities were more tolerated.
As local intellectuals started to criticize the KMT’s oppressive Chinese nationalism, particularly with the eruption of the Formosa Incident, it became evident that a growing sense of Taiwanese consciousness was emerging. This was further developed into a collective Taiwanese identity. The establishment of Taiwanese
Table 5.2 2 Content of National Identity Transformation in Taiwan
Sino-Centrism Under KMT
De- Chineselization After The 1980s Goal Goal Unification, Recapturing the Mainland, Promoting Chinese Culture
Dependent Taiwan Nation, Promoting Indigenous Taiwanese Culture We vs. Us We vs. Us Authentic Han- Chinese vs. Communist China
Taiwanese vs. (PRC) Chinese, Stranger KMT Government Cultural Content Cultural Content Descendants of Legendary Emperor, Five Thousand Year History, Three People’s Principle, Mandarin
Immigrant Descendants, Four-Hundred Taiwan- Subjective History, Peripheral Experiences in the Past, Local Dialects
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national identity is formed on de-Chineselization, driven by social classes that had been historically marginalized or excluded. These groups represent the majority of the indigenous Taiwanese population, who have inhabited the island for centuries yet have lacked a unified political entity or a continuous literary tradition.
Twenty years of successful economic development and domestic stability had bred the new middle class, who started paying attention to social issues and inequalities, prompting a reflection on the legitimacy of past authoritarian rule by the government. Mab Huang depicted the notion shared by the local intellectuals as ‘limelight the reality’ expressed by intellectuals’ longing for good and fair governance in Taiwan (cited from Hsiau 2012:143–44). Although there were limited public responses due to the constraint by the KMT government, the awareness of local culture and society, as well as empathy for the lower classes’ arduous situations, paved the way for the further development of Taiwanese consciousness in the future.
Not until the early 1980s did the local intellectuals publicly begin to openly criticize the Sino-centric nationalism policies and rhetoric conducted by the KMT government. The de-Chineselization of the Taiwanese national identity promoted during this period coincides with Hroch’s nationalism Phase B. Emergent activists opposing KMT’s authority and Sino-centrism sought to win local support for building Taiwanese nationalism. With the development of nationalism and democratization,
Taiwanese consciousness has become incongruous with Sino-centrism. Compared with the previous intellectuals who were more or less cognizant of the Chinese sentiments and identity and thus did not think Taiwanese identity was exclusive and conflicting with Chinese/ Han identity. The Taiwanese literature in the 1980s was constructed with explicit nationalist discourse aiming to intensify or awaken readers’ Taiwanese consciousness through un-Chineselization (Hsiau 2012:158–59).
The de-Chineselization in Taiwan, however, driven by the local intellectual’s awakening within a definite cultural boundary- Taiwanese culture, has a better chance to diffuse to the whole society and to mobilize the population. Again, Taiwan’s approach conformed with Smith’s vertical/domotic ethnie pattern (1996). The advancement resembles a popular movement sparked by intellectuals. Given the
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shared historical experiences of the local population, their Taiwanese consciousness and the resulting bonds are more pervasive in countering the imposed Chinese culture. They were self-assigned to redefine and rediscover the real past that Sino-centrism had veiled.
Critiques
The historical complexities in Turkey and Taiwan have given rise to perplexing challenges concerning their national identities, encompassing the integration of diverse cultural groups and societies. Suppose it had simply made some additions or amendments to supplement the existing cultural package of national identity. In that case, the new identity would not have been able to penetrate at least half of the population as profoundly as it does now. Consequently, this created a counterbalance of societal divisions against different identity holders. Due to detachment of the cultural element, both countries have experienced identity confusion and societal tensions, partly attributed to past periods of enforced state-led cultural indoctrination during periods of authoritarian rule and martial law, which suppressed dissenting voices and restricted freedom of expression.
According to historical experience, building a modern nation-state has stemmed from the masses’ impulses, and the elites or intellectuals can elevate this claim to national status (Smith 1996:121). With the rise and awareness of the self-determination of the majority, the prior lateral aristocrat/ethnic actors would be replaced. In modern times, the replacement is carried out by democratic elections, and the elected party or candidate can actualize their ideology through the bureaucratic system to enhance their ideal homogeneity and sometimes vigorous nationalist policies to integrate competing compatriots.
In comparing the two approaches, the top-down is more effective in implementation than the demotic bottom-up one. As seen in the de-Islamization after the proclamation of the Republic in Turkey, the military ruling elites initiated secularization through the administrative system. Though it might look like formidable cultural enforcement upon the diverse population, the result left some room for desire; a secular, civil,
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modern Turkish identity has been widely accepted as the precondition of the citizen. Mardin (2006:203) also pointed out that if the nationalists wished to create a new national identity, they had to realize that the old regime’s social structure worked at multiple levels. Hence, their reform must penetrate all levels for an overall ideological change.
Unsurprisingly, the republican regime implemented unprecedented measures of Westernization at the expense of its citizens that permeated different levels of the social structure to achieve this goal. Moreover, for the past twenty years, the Islamism and conservatism political party in the governmental office has (re)mobilized religion as the core of the national culture. The efficiency of ‘bureaucratic incorporation’ was the acme of promoting Taiwanization after the DDP took the presidential office in 2000. While the policy of Chineselization was prevalent during the KMT’s term from 2008 to 2016, a grassroots-driven Taiwanization, supported by government policies, has now taken firm root.
Two approaches to nationhood were applied in different phases and temporality in Taiwan and Turkey. Focusing on the deprivation of core cultural elements, modern Turkey began with the unfledged bureaucratic incorporation methods by a small group of Kemalist elites. The religious populace opposed to secularization and Westernization have attempted to reconstruct and revive Islamic culture in the Turkish identity. On the other hand, Taiwanese consciousness is a gradual search for self and the relation with the land by local intellectuals (vertical) who share a common historic fate. Local intellectuals participated in and organized democratization activities. After they won the presidential election and gained a majority in the parliament, they eventually enacted de-Chineselization through a bureaucratic system.
5.3 State’s Authority in De-Culturalization
Despite having distinct origins and instigators, the remaking of national identity through de-Chineselization and de-Islamization in Taiwan and Turkey, as discussed in the previous section, necessitates governmental authority to nurture the public’s sense of the nascent national identity. To promote the acceptance of the new identity,
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the government must utilize its influence in enhancing and formulating educational strategies. Consequently, national identity becomes the realization of a shared sense of belonging within the framework of the government’s nationalist agenda.
Two leading schools of nationalists debunk each other’s view over nation-building, debating whether national unity and collective identity are congruously forged through ethnicity or modernity. Primordial ties like ethnicity, language, religion, and culture are vital but insufficient to create a national identity among the populace. The primordial ties require modern state-sponsored policies and projects to be sustained and implemented. In this vein, to construct a new national identity with different patterns, the pre-existing shared culture can be reinterpreted within the framework of nationalism, providing it with new perspectives (Calhoun 1997:56, 57). Nevertheless, in our case scenario, the reformation of the national identity extended beyond mere reinterpretation and modifications of fundamental elements; instead, it proceeded to eliminate integral cultural components and amalgamate them with alternative substitutes aligning with the nationalist aspirations for nation-building.
This section delves into how the government strategically employed bureaucratic and administrative authority to erode the pre-existing cultural element of the national identity. Commonly, the education system is the most dominant ideological apparatus in our times for the nation-state to promote and inculcate their ideology; whether the method is new or old, the material of the subjects’ is wrapped in the ruling ideology (Althusser n.d.).The education system, controlled by the central government, is the most potent apparatus for instilling national identity. Thus schools where adolescents learn about the world and themselves are the agents of government to instruct and mold students’ national identity. In this trajectory, amid the spectrum of curricula, history and language ascend prominently as pivotal conduits in sculpting cultural differences and forging the national identity for students. The ensuing analysis scrutinizes how, within the de-Chineseslization and de-Islamization process, politics and society affect educational institutions’ production, organization, and transmitting knowledge. Moreover, the analysis seeks to understand the manner and rationale behind legitimizing specific knowledge by a social and political group during a particular era.
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5.3.1 Historiography and History Education with National Ideology
“To vanquish a nation, first erase its history.”
Gong Zizhen (1792-1841)
“A nation without a past is a contradiction in terms; Historians have been core to the task of establishing claims for nationhood, and elaboration of nationalist ideologies (Kumar 2006:7).” Nation-building and national identity-making highly engage with history and historiography, as nationalism usually impels the formulation of historical narratives of the nation. The written national history is integral to manifesting nationalism; thus, education politics in terms of ‘telling our history’ are inseparable from national politics. Precisely, the historical curriculum transcends its role as a mere subject, evolving into the foundational repository of shared beliefs and collective memories for an entire generation. Overtime, these historical narratives have the potential to become deeply ingrained, functioning as reflexive responses during moments of heightened emotional states, such as anxiety and depression (Copeaux 2016:17). Nationalism facilitates and internalizes historical narratives to evoke a sense of patriotism among the populace in crucial moments.
The historical records depicting who are us and who are not us have become the collective memories that make us. History records, in this sense, is a response to the requirement of the present (McCrone 1998:44). Therefore, claiming “we” are Taiwanese, distinct from the Chinese or modern Turkish people and different from the Ottoman Caliphate manifested a form of choosing a ‘common origin’ in the historical narrative. Given a thought-provoking case documented in the Chinese dynastic histories, the Hunnic tribal leader considered the ancestor or branch of the Turkic peoples, Helian Bobo (Emperor Wulie fo Xia 381-425 A.D.)57 , claimed himself as descent from Yu the Great58. A similar description can be found in Turkish
57 Helian Bobo’s life is recorded in the Book of Jin, Volume 130- the official Chinese dynasty history.
58 Emperor Yu is a legendary figure in Chinese history who was the first monarch of the Xia dynasty and is regarded as the common ancestor of Han Chinese people and the spiritual symbol of the Chinese nation.
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high school history textbooks, stating that the Turkic people were part of the development of Neolithic and succeeding civilizations in Anatolia, being believed as the center of dispersion of proto-Indo Europeans (Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti 2014a:12)59. For these two examples, historical narratives create and define who is ‘us’ and ‘them,’ fostering collective identity and cultivating a more positive sense of national identity.
To remember or to forget the past is the marker of identity boundaries; to cherish and protect or to downplay and negate specific cultural heritage and origins redefines the content of the identity. In this vein, consanguinity is a less compelling marker of identification. The collective memory of the society is composed of history, embodied through documents, celebrations, rituals, iconic commemorative objects, and word-of-mouth stories (Wang 1996:35). However, these memories may not be based on authentic fact; the past is usually the product which people selectively created or imagined as a unified subject of history. Once the nationalists successfully engage and politicize collective memories/ histories with national culture and nationalism discourses, the allegiance to national identity emerges (Duara 1996:153,158). It resembles the chronic ‘collective amnesia and remembering’ (Parekh 1994), people assembling as ‘us’ or separate then reassembling as the ‘other.’
History pedagogy, historiography, and the selection of archival materials reflect the subjective interpretations of historians under specific social and political contexts (Wang 1996:40). It is not surprising that the stances of historians conspicuously correspond with their political affiliations and tendencies. As long as historians’ political affiliations obtain power in the administration or the legislation, they can implement their historical perspectives into mainstream national history. These politically oriented scholars formed the “cultural formation of an identifiable social group which engaged in sociocultural actions on its own behalf (Pinar and Bowers 1992:177).” Thus, together with the sociocultural initiations, there was a discernible
59 The linguistic tie between Turks and early civilization is deduced from “The name of Hittite was Hata Turkish people”. “ The origin language of the Hittite is Elamite just like Sumerian, which originated from Turkish.” (Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti 2014a:127, 128)
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shift in historical research topics following the change of the ruling party and the subsequent introduction of nationalist discourse. In other words, the detachment of the embedded cultural elements displayed the influence of contemporary social and political dynamics on the historical narratives.
On the shoulder of Foucault’s power-knowledge interwoven relation, history textbooks are a tangible example of the domination of power over knowledge. Once knowledge is politicized, it constructs a social system where knowledge and meaning are disseminated and generated within a specific historical ideology framework. Education is a crucial element in disseminating the image of the nation. The textbooks are the outcome of the competitions and compromises between the social, political, and cultural powers. The school curriculum is political, and its content and discourses are ideological to shape students’ understanding of national history and culture (Guibernau 2007:31; Pinar and Bowers 1992:164–66). Analyzing the chosen history textbooks from a particular span as an instrument enables us to employ the post-structuralist lens within the diverse interpretations of culture and history that form a national identity. History courses and textbooks, products of power holders’ historical explanations, are advantageous for sketching out national identity’s relative meaning within power dynamics.
There was always a dominant historical narration intertwining with political hegemony. Like, the Chinese- centrism under the KMT’s authoritative rule and Islamic culture during the Ottoman Empire is part of the endorsed historical discourse promoted by the ruling powers. In this vein, other perspectives different from the official ones were despised as vulgar, coarse, or not worth noting. After the political power changed, the leaders advocated historical perspectives that conform with their nationalist discourse, whereas the existing historical interpretations may be overturned. In our cases, the new historical interpretations aimed to reconstruct a new national identity and elevate the previously marginalized/ neglected cultures to the national one.
By analyzing the texts of history textbooks as part of compulsory education, we can gain insights into shaping the identity transition of the new generation at the specific
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epoch with the acknowledgment of rulers/governors’ control over historiography by which ideologies that affected the deliberate selection and exclusion of the cultural components of the past.
5.3.2 High School History Textbook Under Kemalism
The intentional ‘forgetting’ of the Pan-Islamic sentiments associated with the Ottoman Empire underscores a conscious effort to establish a cohesive narrative that reinforces the significance of the Turkish Republic and downplays the imperial past. Contrasting to the previous and succeeding textbooks conducting Islam-Turkishness synthesis, the textbook published in 1931 dedicated efforts to eradicate the influence of Islamic and cosmopolitan Ottoman culture in Turkish national identity and nationalism (Copeaux 2016:22–23, 31). As stated in the preface of the textbook, through strategically tracing back the cultural accomplishments and contributions of the great civilization prompted by Turkish people, the historiography attempted to wriggle out of the shadow of the prevalent Ottman and Islam past (Tarih I 2014a:I–VI).
The high school history textbooks from 1931 to 1941, based on the Turkish History Thesis instructed by Atatürk, triumphed, embodied the secularist Turkish historiography, and concretely manifested the Kemalist revolution’s ideology60. This textbook version stands out as the most explicit representation of the Republic’s ideology that synthesizes secularism, modernity, and scientism to Turkish nationality and national identity. This version of the history textbook provides the most conspicuous evidence of implementing Kemalists’ bedrock principle, scientism, civilization, and Turkish nationalism to replace and discard Islam’s influence on the Turkish national identity (Atalay 2018:160,161).
Scientism was the central ideology of Kemalism that considered religion irrational and the underminer of modernization (Hanioğlu 2012). The scientism approach to
60 For details of Atatürk’s ideas in his own words about Turkish history, please see Afet Inan’s work (1959:376–86).
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explaining human origin is apparent in the textbook. For centuries, Muslims have believed in the origin of humanity as the result of Allah molding Adam and Eve from clay, with the conviction that Allah is omniscient and eternal—a belief integral to the reforms of Kemalism. Opposition to religious superstitions can be found in the first chapter of the first volume of the history textbook, where the introduction to the origin of humanity challenges religious explanations of human origins through the lens of scientific evolution (Tarih I 2014a:3). The account emphasizes that the origin of life is rooted in natural evolution rather than Almighty powers beyond nature (ibid 2014a:5). This dissenting perspective toppled traditional religious creationism that aligned with the Kemalist reform agenda altering people’s world view to a more scientific understanding.
In general, the narrative of the history textbook integrates scientific and positivist Darwinst perspectives, viewing Islam as a part of historical progression and construction or, say, evolution61 . The text describes religion in a Durkheimian presumption that religion relies on ritual and ceremonial practices by which people comfort their shared fear with purifying measures. Moreover, “it was human intelligence that created the concept and discovered the secret of God (Tarih I 2014a:24).” In reciprocation, religion establishes a psychological and emotional connection for individuals who may not engage with it through even the most basic rational lens (ibid 2014a:22–23). This segment elucidates Kemal Atatürk’s endeavor to extricate individuals from internalized religious beliefs and thus enlighten people with reason and science. Simultaneously, undertaking social reforms aims to alter this internalization on a personal level, thereby shaping the collective fabric of society.
This scheme was reiterated by Atatürk and one of the founders of the Turkish History Society, Reşit Galip. They all asserted that the influence of religious superstitions had repressed Turkish people to develop. Conventionally, Turkish and Islamic historians often fused Turkish culture and Turkishness with Islamic civilization and reiterated
61 Şimşek and Yıldıırm’s (2015) work delved into the texts of the history textbook, with insightful qualitative analysis decoding the reference between religion and history in the context of nationalism (Kemalism).
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political and social obligations and commitment to Islam. It is time to “cast aside the divine and unveil the obscurity with the brilliance and force of revolution (İnan 1959:263).” The veiled plan was to reclaim the remarkable contributions attributed to the Turkish people under the banner of Islam and to liberate them from the religious constraints fostering negative backwardness perceptions and hostile stereotypes from the Western world (Copeaux 2016:55)62.
So, what would compose or fill up the history of Turks without the Islamic and Ottoman past? To illuminate the Turkish populace, which has somewhat receded in the shadow of the Ottoman legacy, it is imperative to articulate more comprehensive historical narratives to enrich Turkish history (Tarih I 2014a:XIII). Besides distinguishing themselves from other Muslim nations, the Republican intellectuals have embarked on the study of the pre-Islamic history of the Turkic people. Through this, they seek to sanctify the Turkish nation with a more Turkish historical perspective that eradicated Islamic influence (Atalay 2018:161; Georgeon 2006:3–4). Hence, to break from the dark past, the Turkic origins in Central Asia were accentuated by asserting that Turks contributed to the dissemination of great civilization through mass migrations; this marked the beginning of historical continuity (Yıldırım and Şimşek 2015:324). Historians Even strived to prove that Turkish people are not the inferior yellow ethnicity (Inan 1959:256) but the white race in the same categories as the Europeans- initiators of the civilization (Tarih I 2014a:16).
Afet Inan, a member of the Turkish History Board, expressed a similar view in the fourth and last meeting of the Turkish Hearth in 1930 and said
To strengthen national consciousness, Turkish people should understand and invigorate the concept of Turkishness […]. As a history teacher, I have noticed that Turkish history knowledge was deficient and that what had been taught was scant and false63. To avoid the young generation straying on the foggy road we
62 Original text is cited from the article ‘Atatürk’ in the Islam Ansiklepedisi (Encyclopedia), Ankara, 1946, Vol. 1, p.786-788.
63 The italic emphasis was made to highlight the subjective view of historical writing.
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had been through, we must lead the Turkish children to the bright ways (1959:261–62).
In challenging the notion that Turkish identity solely derives from the Ottoman Empire and Islamic culture, historical narratives emphasize the diverse roots of the Turkish people, tracing back to the Neolithic period. From a broader historical context, the narratives display a dispersion across regions and the establishment of various Turkic states. The intricate historical narratives weave Turkish culture into the fabric of ancient civilizations in Anatolia. The exploration of the land and its past seeks to reinforce the contemporary identity within the framework of the modern Republic.
Also, based on the Turkish History Thesis featured in the textbook underscores the Turks’ crucial role in establishing and perpetuating significant civilizations. Depicting Asia as the homeland of the Turks, these narratives draw connections to the Sumerian civilization64 , emphasizing the Turkish people’s contribution to the origins of world civilization. Through these narratives, a concerted effort is made to embed these historical perspectives in shared memory, contributing to forming a national identity. Despite the lack of clear archaeological evidence supporting this ideological claim, it significantly influences subsequent historical narratives and the Turkish identity (Copeaux 2016:163–64).
The textbook’s text concentrates on crafting Turkishness independently of religious influence, aligning with the rhetoric of “Turk is civilization, Turk is history” by Afet Inan (Copeaux 2016:57). They praise the valor and sagacity of Republican elites who, according to the narrative, liberated the Turkish populace from religious superstitions. These principles lay the foundation for Republican historiography, dominating even in other versions of textbooks that blend Turkishness with Islamic elements. This overarching narrative, as highlighted by Babahan (2014:174), persists and shapes the Turkish identity.
64 The history textbook describes as follows: “The Turks settled in their present-day sacred homeland, Anatolia, at least 7,000 years ago. According to historical records, the Turks of that time had already attained a high level of civilization. This civilization is referred to as the Sumer-Elam (Tarih I 2014a:30).”
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The content distribution of the history textbook between 1931 and 1941 demonstrates the effort to minimize the Islamic influence in Turkish nationalism and set out a Turkish-centered history narration. The four volumes are organized chronologically as ancient, medieval, early modern period, and Republic history. Turkish history started by tracing back the great civilizations in the world and the origin of human beings that relate to the primordial ethnic and cultural bonds with the contemporary Turkish people. The following period concentrates on the activities of various Turkic people and their empires in Eurasia, along with the emergence and influence of Islam. Concerning the early modern era, the focus shifted toward the decaying Ottoman Empire and rising European powers. The last volum explains the reason and legitimacy of launching the independence war and meticulously depicts all the hardships and visionary projects of the establishment of the Republic.
While redefining the Turkish people’s long-standing origins and culture, the Ottoman Empire’s historical significance is notably diminished. In the history textbook’s third volume (Tarih III 2014b), concerning the ‘Modern & Contemporary Period,’ only 22% of the entire volume (approximately 70 pages) is allocated to the Empire’s origins and institutional establishment. This section also foreshadows the seeds of decline planted during the Empire’s prosperity. The historical narrative emphasizes the relatively backward Ottoman Empire, juxtaposing it with Europe’s reforms and development in the 17th and 18th centuries, with a third of the volume focusing on the Empire’s trajectory toward its demise.
Despite the Empire’s glorious, flourishing existence spanning over 600 years across three continents, its portrayal under the Kemalist history textbook is relatively insignificant compared to ancient civilizations, origins, and the subsequent wars of independence leading to the establishment of the Republic. The content subtly guides towards the inevitability of the Empire’s downfall, hinting at the legitimacy of establishing the Republic and Kemalist reforms. This can also be seen as the Republic’s envisioned national identity, built upon the detachment from the Ottoman Empire, which claimed legitimacy to rule the Islamic world.
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In essence, the nascent Republic recognized the imperative of crafting a brand-new national identity for its populace, a task undertaken through the educational system’s history teaching. In alignment with Kemalist ideologies, particularly the principle of de-Islamization (secularisation), historians strategically forged ethnic connections between ancient civilizations and the Turkish people. They conducted scientism and materialism to replace religious creationism and fatalism. Despite all the efforts spent on education, according to field research in 1950 (Lerner 1958:121, 123), most rural inhabitants were more interested in earning a living rather than acquiring literacy. Moreover, as the villagers usually ostracized the appointed teachers, the literacy rate remained low. There was more room for the masses to read and understand the texts, not to mention to perceive and act like modern Turkish citizens.
5.3.3 Understanding Taiwan Series Textbook
After the lifting of martial law in 1987, there has been a reflective shift in historical education and perspectives, putting an end to the monopoly of Chinese orthodox historical interpretation. The convergence and exchange of diverse cultures in Taiwan have bred a unique Taiwanese culture that has long been suppressed and marginalized under the authority of outcoming rulers. At the same time, local culture has been considered vulgar and deemed unfit for the grandiose halls of high culture in the eyes of national culture. Once the political-social atmosphere loosened up, the concern for Taiwanese indigenous culture, history, and language became the inception of the local culture education reform.
The local culture and language or dialects are to be remembered in case of building Taiwanese consciousness—the desire to reconnect the land and the people sprouted after the democratization. Meanwhile, to delete the memories of the dull and rigid learning of Chinese history, geography, culture, and classics solely for examinations. Local culture is a notional living sphere where people practice and produce culture daily, creating a sense of identification and belonging to the living space. Scholars argue that only by re-exploring Taiwan’s local culture can we reconnect the historical memory and emotional ties of the people of Taiwan, severed by the divergent consciousness from mainland China (Zhuang 2003:185,186). Moreover, some even
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went further, asserting that the foundation and prototype of Taiwan’s subjectivity could only be established by acquiring local culture. This, in turn, will facilitate the development of cultural content that nurtures a distinct sense of Taiwanese identity (Lin 2004:84).
Since then, scholars have claimed to rectify the distorted colonial historical perspectives- the understanding of self through others. By challenging this Orientalist-like history narrative, the focus on local cultural education attempts to revitalize a historical framework with an origin in self-determination and an indigenous perspective (Chen 1996:45). The trend of criticizing and introspection on Chinese-centrism imposing on Taiwanese reflected on the education as well. Local culture-oriented education gained the attention of the public and government authorities. The DDP-governed counties and cities were the first to implement indigenous dialects and cultural material in schools after the regional election in 1989. Later, a consensus was reached between the government and the opposition to show consideration for the local Taiwanese culture. Following this agreement, the Ministry of Education initiated ‘local culture learning activities’ into the school curriculum concurrently with the introduction of new curriculum guidelines. This amendment was announced in 1993 and put into effect in 1996.
In the flow of concerns toward the local Taiwanese culture, Tu (2000:149,150), one of the editors in the Understanding Taiwan textbook review and approval committees and later appointed as minister of education by the DDP government, propounded that Taiwan should be the center of history studies, as the Chinese centrism was teetering on the brink of legitimacy. He proposed establishing a Taiwan-centric historical perspective that moves away from Chinese influence, suggesting a departure from the notion that Taiwan inherently belongs to the Chinese sub-culture. Also, a Taiwan-centered perspective inexorably dismantled Han-centric and Sino-chauvinism beliefs, having dominated in Taiwanese for the past 50 years.
The concentric circle paradigm articulated by Tu ( 2000:150, 345) runs through the entire text in the Understanding Taiwan textbook series. Beginning with the core exploration of Taiwan’s indigenous culture and history, the trajectory extends
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outward, commencing concern with China and radiating toward the broader Asia-Pacific region. The goal of the concentric outline will equip Taiwan’s forthcoming generations with the capacity to navigate and integrate themselves into the world. Tu believed this framework could assure Taiwanese culture and national identity, thus dodging the trap of unification and independence controversies.
In the history part of the textbook (Understanding Taiwan (History) 1997a:Introduction), starting with the archeological discoveries (e.g., Paleolithic Changpinian settlement) and the indigenous tribes as the primitive inhabitants of Taiwan to prove that Taiwanese may have distinct ethnical origins other than Han-Chinese, which is similar to the Turkish people tracing their roots in Anatolia’s ancient civilization and their central Asian origin. Even though it is hard to attest that the current Taiwanese people have any consanguinity with the primitive people (only some rituals and beliefs remained), the prehistory activities are favorable historical evidence connecting the people of Taiwan to the soil. Furthermore, this echoes Taiwanese culture’s multi-cultural essence, contrasting Han cultural dominance’s monopoly.
After delving into prehistoric cultures and human activities, subsequent chapters are dedicated to exploring the diverse cultural influences brought about by different rulers or changes in political authority. Due to its unique geographical location, Taiwan’s historical development has been closely intertwined with international relations, evolving into an international trade hub during periods of Dutch and Spanish occupation and serving as a military frontier during the Ming-Zheng and Qing dynasties. In modern times, Taiwan experienced Japanese colonial rule and the ‘presence’65 of the Republic of China. It is the first attempt in Taiwan to view the outcoming authority through the lens of the inhabitants and the soil, which played the leading role in the historical script.
65 The word ‘presence’ was replaced after the intense discussions to harmonize different ideologies, the period after WWII had been described as the ‘liberation of Taiwanese people’, which implied a deep-rooted Chinese heroism that was destined to save the compatriots from foreign rules.
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Eleven chapters out of two in the textbook (Ch 7, 8 1997a) were imparted to the Japanese colonial period from which the proto-nationalist consciousness based on resistant activities emerged. The other chapter consists of the cultural and educational developments under colonial rule that bred the first generation of Taiwanese intellectuals. These intellectuals initiated Taiwanese cultural enlightenment movements and paved the way for the future rise of Taiwanese consciousness. The narratives of the Japanese colonial period raised intense debates on excessively prettified colonists, and the content is over long compared with other periods66. The ideological disagreements concerning the historical standing and Taiwanese nationalism will be discussed later.
The textbook’s implications on national identity revolve around the integration of four ethnic groups and the acceptance of various cultures, all grounded in the democratic system. The multiculturalism, diverse ethnicities, and resilient Taiwanese spirit shaped by historical adversities give rise to a cultural identity rooted in a profound sense of psychological belonging. In the first chapter, ‘Our People Our Land’ of the societal part, the text utilizes the sweet potato resemblance in the shape of Taiwan as a metaphor for the Taiwanese spirit. It portrays the Taiwanese as akin to sweet potatoes, “not caring about the soil they take root in, only aspiring to flourish with abundant branches and leaves (Understanding Taiwan (Societal Part) 1997b:3).” This expression signifies Taiwan as an immigrant society, where regardless of one’s origin, all individuals have settled in Taiwan, integrating into a shared Taiwanese identity and consciousness (Wang 2000:152–53, 156).
The textbook defined the characteristics of the Taiwanese sharing the memories of 400 years of oppression under foreign rules, leading to courageous resistance and creating the diligent, down-to-earth, and dedicated spirit of Taiwan (Understanding Taiwan (Societal Part) 1997b:42, 63; Wang 2000:155). Along with the ancestors of Taiwanese people crossing the straits, risking their lives, which embodied “openness, inclusiveness, and adventurousness” as the predominant characteristics of Taiwanese
66 For example, the Qing dynasty period contains 212 years, but only had 25 pages; the Japanese colonial period only contained 50 years but had 29 pages.
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people. The insular geography makes Taiwanese people, like the ocean, capable of open-mindedly embracing different cultures, serving as the wellspring of Taiwan’s multiculturalism (ibid. 1997b:42). Nevertheless, to prevent a recurrence of misery past, the primary task is to ensure the safety of the island and the dignity of our people (ibid. 1997b:90). These open-minded, adventurous, multi-cultural characteristic under a sorrow shared history converge to create a collective identity of being ‘Taiwanese’ (ibid. 1997b:87,88).
The discourse highlights that the construction of Taiwanese identity does not lie in an ethnic nationalism origin, nor is it the previous Han-Chinese narrative. Instead, it is constructed and elaborated through collective consciousness, vaguely or emotionally defining what it means to be Taiwanese. The new guideline for the high school history textbook curriculum manifested the idea. “The establishment of the Taiwan Experience encompasses the liberation of Taiwan and government relocation, the development of democratic constitutional governance, and notable economic achievements (Tai 2007:405).” Through a deliberate selection and profound comprehension of shared historical experiences, these historical milestones collectively construct distinctive characteristics of Taiwan, shaping young generations’ understanding of their national identity.
This textbook edition was implemented in junior high schools from 1997 until its abolition with the implementation of the Grade 1-9 Curriculum Policy in 2001. Subsequent curriculum designs aimed for coherence from elementary to junior high levels, progressing from understanding local culture to a more in-depth exploration of Taiwan, China, and global interactions (Curriculum Guidelines for the 1-9 Grade in Socaial Field 2008:4, 5). Furthermore, with the permission of various high school textbook editions in 1999, there was a departure from the wholesale promotion of the Chinese-centric national spirit and a reduction in party-state influence, adopting a more diverse approach to the historical narrative (Tai 2007:404). In general, under the direction of de-Chineselization, the historical discourse of Taiwanese identity has been established with a focus on understanding and developing local culture. However, excessive emphasis on indigenous culture has also attracted criticism for overly fragmenting and sweating the details of the historical narratives.
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5.3.4 Critics
The Understanding Taiwan textbook series has raised robust debates as part of local cultural education bolster. The writing of Taiwan’s history and design of curriculum has been excessively politicized, evolving into an ideological dispute between reunification and independence camps (Chen and Chang 1997). Although both sides agree that a new curriculum focused on understanding Taiwan can enable the new generation to create a sense of belonging to the land, cutting off from Chinese culture results in cultural self-castration and causes a rupture in historical narratives, which leads to identity confusion. In this sense, the opposition emphasized that the Chinese nation should be at the core of the curriculum to keep the history continuity and anchor the uncertain national identity. Moreover, critics argue that under the guise of understanding Taiwan, such actions pave the way for Taiwan’s independence agenda. However, even fervent supporters of independence were dissatisfied with this textbook version, considering it not sufficiently Taiwan-centric.
On the other hand, responsively, the supporters accused the previous Chinese consciousness imposed on Taiwanese people of being false and distorted. During the past fifty years of KMT authoritarian rule, not just the history, the education system was the expression of political text, presenting Sinocentrism ideology, the cult of the leader. According to Tai (2007:401), the teaching of Taiwanese history is characterized by a minimal focus, , accounting for less than 20% of the content. The narrative often sidelines Taiwan within the China-Taiwan relationship, promoting a unification perspective that neglects Taiwan’s de facto peculiarity. This skewed narration results in a collective amnesia, hindering a clear understanding of Taiwan’s history and identity.
After heated debates at the National Compilation and Translation Center, which was responsible for approving the publishing of the textbook, with consideration of the opposition’s critics, subtle changes were made to mitigate the disagreement, but without substantial resolution. The rollout of the Understanding Taiwan textbook series in 1997 sparked numerous ideological debates, bringing Taiwan’s complexities and blurred identity to the forefront. It marked a pivotal step toward Taiwanization as
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the government moved away from party-state education and the overarching concept of Great China ideology, thus initiating Taiwanese identity67.
As a junior high school student in 1998, I was the second-gen using the Understanding Taiwan series textbooks. For an ordinary student, Understanding Taiwan was like other subjects, memorizing the texts following the teacher’s instructions for the exams. However, in my memory, the introduction to Chinese history, geography, culture, and classical literature occupied most of the curriculum and study time. Students were required to memorize the locations, capitals, and specialties of different provinces in China. Despite never having been to the so-called ‘homeland,’ the need to memorize these details for the ‘unknown future unification great task’ raised internal questioning. Even though Taiwan had begun its political democratization, most of the population was still affected by the discourse of a great China. In this environment, despite personal doubts, compliance was the norm.
5.3.5 Brief Overview
Over the past 50 years, Taiwan was made to be Chinese, coupled with the rising threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, prompting the need for a distinct national culture. Similarly, in Turkey, the challenge lies in consolidating the national identity of mostly Muslim Turks without Islam, so they tried to add other ancient ties to nourish the remnants of the territories. In the quest to construct a national identity that aligns with current needs, the making of history has, in reality, widened the gap between the government’s prescribed identity template and the diverse identification of the people.
The anxieties about national identity result from a significant sense of temporal and spatial estrangement. Taiwanese had been immersed in Chinese culture, values, and longing for the motherland. Turkish people, whose Muslim identity was predominant
67 華視新聞華視新聞 CH52 [CTS nesws CH52]. “【歷史上的今天】【歷史上的今天】1997.06.24_國中教科書【認識台國中教科書【認識台灣】修訂版完成灣】修訂版完成 [【【Today on History】】June 24, 1997 - Revision of the junior high school textbook Understanding Taiwan is completed.] Youtube, 17 Jun. 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tSEmh2W6XAE
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before the Republic, experienced a transformation from deprivation to alienation after the removal of decisive markers. This alienation, more psychological than physical, resulted from a loss of connection with the land they inhabited. After recognizing the need to fill the cultural void, authorities endeavored to rediscover and redefine indigenous cultures.
So, a profound unease regarding national identity has infiltrated cultural politics, shaping nationalist ideologies. In Taiwan and Turkey, emphasis on historical traumas, whether genuine or exaggerated, has solidified individuals into a cohesive whole. Taiwan emphasizes the sad memories of the 228 Incident and the White Terror period, during which it was under outsiders’ rule. On the other hand, Turkey highlights the consequences of the Sultan’s incapacity leading to the partition of territories by European powers, sacrifices during the War of Independence, and heroic deeds as shared elements of their poignant histories. Yet, empowered advocates face challenges in avoiding blind spots due to their unwavering ideologies. While aiming to overturn past cultural hegemony, education reform may inadvertently establish a new one, leading to excluded narratives and societal fractures.
From this standpoint, the origin of a nation is far from a collection of impartial facts, and the subsequent political and historical implications are equally non-neutral (Wu 2009:266–67). To establish the asserted origin, textbooks articulate the reasoning and ideologies behind authorities’ efforts to bridge the gap between the past and present. However, attempting to fill the cultural void can lead to decontextualization and simplified historical continuity, fostering diverse interpretations and societal divisions.
De-Chineselization in Taiwan and de-Islamization in Turkey, aimed at remaking collective identity, reveal authorities’ will, aspirations, and capability to employ their power. However, grappling with cultural dilemmas and confusion, individuals face challenges adapting to new narratives. Political power always permeates nationalist ideologies, yet a new national identity cannot be established overnight merely through manipulations; changes create confusion in one’s sense of identity, especially amid societal and political transformations.
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History textbooks serve as conduits for prevailing ideologies, particularly evident in democratic nations, where they often reflect the dominant views of the population. Taiwan’s de-Chinseslization textbooks exemplify a bottom-up approach to constructing a distinct Taiwanese historical perspective, breaking from past authority and emphasizing orthodox legitimacy. The education reform has significantly shaped post-martial law generations’ national identity. Conversely, between 1931 and 1941 in Turkey, high school history textbooks peaked in de-Islamization driven by top-down decrees. Although this directive had a limited impact on the public, after Atatürk’s death, a synthesis of Islam and Turkishness emerged as the primary discourse for national identity, showcasing a more nuanced approach compared to the earlier period of forceful de-Islamization.
5.4 Recent Individual National Identity
The previous analysis followed the conventional approach to accessing national identity as socially or politically constructed, and the individualistic view is mainly neglected. Despite the role of institutions in shaping national identity, this section will focus on the real national identity - how people perceive and read their national identity. Thereby, a wide range of public opinion polls will be analyzed to examine individuals’ views on national identity and its contents after the detachment of cultural elements. In the case of Taiwan, there is a direct identity questionnaire survey report at hand annually as a prediction and index for domestic politics and election strategies. Turkey has a multi-layered cultural identity survey report prepared a decade ago. In case of insufficient survey reports, political party supporters’ profiles will be considered to supplement individualist perspectives on their identity.
5.4.1 Toward de-Chineselized Taiwanese Identity
According to data from a survey conducted by the Institute of Social Sciences at Academia Sinica, Taiwan’s national identity exhibited significant growth from 1996 to 1997. The increase in Taiwanese identity can be attributed to the localization and mocratization efforts initiated by President Lee Teng-hui since the 1980s and to the series of international events during that period.
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At that time, then-president Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States sparked dissatisfaction from the PRC, reflecting a deteriorating relationship with U.S.-China. Meanwhile, Taiwan was holding its first direct presidential election, a move that the PRC did not desire as it could potentially result in the election of a leader with a solid Taiwanese identity. In response to this situation, the PRC conducted three military missile exercises near Taiwan, triggering the 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis. This crisis heightened tensions in Taiwanese society, causing a state of vigilance and fostering a sense of Taiwanese national identity.
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Data analyzed in this research were collected in the Sixth Round, the Fourth survey of the research project Taiwan Social Change Survey. The project was conducted by the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica (data gathered before the first Year of the third Round were conducted by the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica), and sponsored by the Ministry of Science and Technology (formerly known as National Science Council), ROC
Figure 5.4 1 Characteristics of Being Taiwanese
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In times of imminent military threats, there is arguably no factor more effective in uniting a nation and cultivating a shared national identity. President Lee Teng-hui’s efforts towards localization and democratization, combined with the external pressures and events of that time, played a pivotal role in consolidating Taiwan’s national identity trajectory during this period. During the period of DPP governance from 2000 to 2008, marked by a leaning toward supporting Taiwan’s independence, Taiwan-centric policies reached their zenith. However, the rise of Taiwanese identity slowed down a bit during the DDP’s term, with an explicit increase in binary Chinese and Taiwanese identity in 2003. This trend represents the initial attempt by the government to implement de-Chineselization, raising suspicions about its cultural authenticity (See Figure 5.4 1)
The DPP pursued various strategies aimed at emphasizing Taiwan’s distinct identity. This period saw notable changes in the education curriculum, particularly in history courses, where efforts were made to reduce the emphasis on Chinese history and promote a focus on Taiwanese history. This shift aimed to reduce the influence of Chinese cultural and historical elements in favor of highlighting Taiwan’s unique cultural identity. Second, the government strongly emphasized promoting local languages and arts within communities. The goal was to cultivate a sense of belonging and identity among people by fostering a connection to their local communities and land. Lastly, the symbolic de-Chineselization was the most debatable.
In order to distinguish the ROC passport from the Chinese passport, the “Taiwan” label was added to the ROC passport in 2003. All embassies abroad were affixed with Taiwan. Additionally, several semi-official institutions changed names, replacing ‘China’ with Taiwan or national to reflect a more Taiwan-centric identity. Most of the “Presidential Office” (Jieshou Hall68 ),” and the ‘Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall’ were renamed the ‘National Democracy Memorial Hall (Cho 2007:38).’
68 The term Jieshou (介壽) originally meant wishing for longevity, and later came to be commonly used to convey blessings to Chiang Kai-shek long-lived as the South Mountain. Taiwan has numerous entities named ‘Jieshou,’ such as schools, parks, roads, and more.
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Some pro-China scholars were critical of these changes and argued that the rapid push for de-Chineselization and de-Chianglization drove a wedge between the pro-unification and pro-independence factions, potentially fueling ethnic tensions. They also criticized the enormous costs associated with the renaming process (Ji 2007). On the other hand, while the changes were intended to solidify a Taiwan-centric identity, they also triggered concerns among moderate individuals who feared that the radical push for Taiwan identity could provoke China and potentially worsen cross-strait relations.
During President Chen Shui-bian’s turn, his intense efforts to move away from Chiang Kai-shek’s legacy and reduce China-centric influences caused pro-China forces to feel threatened and, in turn, become more united. Some moderate middle citizens were also cautious that the radical shift in Taiwan’s identity would trigger potential conflicts between cross-straits. This complex interplay of identity politics, regional dynamics, and external pressures contributed to the nuanced evolution of Taiwan’s identity during this period.
Taiwan’s national identity grew steadily in the late 1990s, with the notion of a Taiwan-centric identity gradually taking root among Taiwanese people. Previous hometown ties are no longer essential social groups. This reflects a departure from a Chinese identity concept and signifies a sense of self-determination. Many Taiwanese find themselves in a dual identity – identifying as both Taiwanese and Chinese. However, the meaning and content of Taiwanese identity still harbor significant ambiguity and uncertainty. This ambiguity has been exploited by politicians, leading to social divisions, especially during election periods. External threats have played a significant role in uniting the population under the concept of “same island, one destiny.” A prime example is the 1997 Taiwan Strait missile crisis, where the external threat catalyzed internal cohesion.
According to a survey conducted by Academia Sinica concerning the components of Taiwanese identity (with only the most significant indicators presented in the chart), we can observe from the survey results that while objective factors still hold importance within the realm of identity elements - such as holding Taiwanese
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citizenship, being born in Taiwan, speaking Mandarin, and residing in Taiwan (albeit in tiny numbers). Over the decade from 2003 to 2013, objective identity factors have slightly declined. Conversely, more subjective psychological identity factors, such as viewing oneself as entirely Taiwanese and identifying with the current Taiwanese government, have exceeded half the surveyed and are on an upward trend. The result of this survey suggests that objective factors are becoming less definitive in shaping a Chineselized Taiwanese identity, especially as Chinese culture and language remain dominant in Taiwanese culture. As Ernest Renan (1996) pointed out, a nation is formed through consensual agreement, through the daily plebiscite; the populace’s will is more significant than inherent primordial ties or objective facts. Taiwanese identity is gradually evolving towards internalization as a manifestation of individual self-consciousness.
5.4.2 Turkey- Secular Muslim?
The survey conducted by Eğtim-Bir-Sen’s (Union of Educators’) Otherness as a Common Identity in Turkey comprised multi-level ethnic, cultural, and religious identity and included the interrelations among the surveyees in Turkey. Although the research may be outdated, conducted in 2008 and published in 2010, it provided a comprehensive gaze on Turkish people’s multi-layered cultural identity. More importantly, following the top-down approach to de-Islamizing modern Turkish identity, we can better comprehend the thoughts and feedback of the general populace regarding their sense of identity and the disparities between their genuine Turkish identity and the template provided by the authorities.
In modern society, the term Turkish, a more civil concept that is less ethnic, is composed of different religious sects, beliefs, and ethnic groups. Even children born to parents with a particular ethnicity might not identify with their born ethnicity after being through school, socialization, and self-awareness. From a national perspective, in a multicultural and multiethnic country, the unity of all diverse cultural and ethnic groups can only be achieved by finding the minimum common ground and maximizing nationwide cohesion. This prevents the country from facing the crisis of separatism among minority or marginalized groups. From an individual standpoint,
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especially for minority groups, embracing a Turkish identity can lead to better opportunities and development in social and economic aspects.
According to the survey result, a significant correlation exists between individuals who identify Turkish as their primary cultural identity and their self-identification as Muslim. 52.6% of the surveyed would consider themselves Turkish, and 32.9% would consider themselves Muslim in the context of cultural identity. A nominal 2.3% of people associated themselves exclusively with being people of the Republic. Regarding the second level of cultural identity, Muslim identity occupied 48.4%. Not surprisingly, the Turkish identity came after with a rate of 25.5%, and a small amount of 3.5% identified themselves as the people of the Republic.
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Figure 5.4 2 Multi-Layer of Being Turkish People
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According to the multi-layered survey on Turkish individuals’ cultural identity, Turkish citizens primarily identify themselves as Turks and then Muslims in the second place of their cultural identity. This signifies a fair and successful shaping of Turkish national identity, which was neither prominent nor proud. Atatürk’s ideal goal of making a modern and ethnic Turkish national identity is partially successful. As previously noted, Islam continues to be a unifying force within Turkish society, occupying a secondary identity role if not a primary one.
However, another survey revealed that among those who prioritized being Muslim as their primary identity, nearly half (46.6%) of them feel that individuals wearing headscarves are most likely to be discriminated against in society. Additionally, among those with a primary identity centered around Islamic politics, the percentage is even higher at 57.7%. Wearing headscarves is considered the most easily discriminated aspect across various identity groups, at 37.6% (Aktay et al. 2010:103). As Göle (1997:87,88) depicted, the outcome highlights that Muslim women wearing the headscarves reflect blurred and conflicting boundaries between modernity-secularism and conservative Islam for Turkish people,
The report was published in 2010, in which the religiously oriented groups had not yet fully gained power. Therefore, it is not surprising that among those who prioritize being Muslim as their primary cultural identity, 40.5% believe that secularism fails to cater to the needs of devout Muslims adequately. Among those who prioritize being Turkish as their primary identity, 33.8% believe the government does satisfy the needs of devout Muslims. In comparison, roughly 28.5% think the needs are only partially or not met.
After nearly two decades, the freedom of religious practices and expressions has been ensured in conjunction with social and political reforms by the Islamic-roots government. The oppressed religious identity became explicit and promoted by the government. According to the 2019 Konda survey on polarization in Turkey, 78% of people considered religious conservative rights to be pretty satisfied, and 56% of conservative religious individuals reported satisfaction (Konda Araştırma ve Danışmanlık [Konda Research and Consulting] 2019:19–20). Even though the
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national identity of being ‘Turkish’ seems to outweigh the identity of being Muslim, under recent policies, Muslim identity has supplanted the mainstream secular identity.
In addition, there a rising concerns about the younger generation deviating from religious values; more elderly, less educated religious or conservative people tend to worry. It can be inferred that the older generation with lower socio-economic backgrounds tends to hold stronger religious sentiments towards their identity and their political inclinations (Konda Araştırma ve Danışmanlık [Konda Research and Consulting] 2019:32–33). The satisfaction of conservative religious individuals with their rights and their concerns about the religious alienation of the young generation indicates a challenge to the secular Turkish identity, which will face the resurgence of Islamic identity. The confrontation between secular and religious identity will become Turkey’s primary catalyst for societal divisions.
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CHAPTER 6 IDENTITY CRISIS AND SOCIAL CLEAVAGE
We have discovered that the new identity formed after removing cultural elements is fraught with contradictions regarding its insufficiencies in meaning and approach. Firstly, the replaced cultural elements and discourses may prove incompatible with the original cultural sets (such as Islam and modernity) or challenging to distinguish (like China and Taiwan), causing public resistance or confusion. Regarding the approaches used, the government can employ effective and extensive promotion and indoctrination through media, education, and other institutions. However, the depth of influence may not reach that of initiatives undertaken by intellectuals or grassroots movements. Bottom-up movements may also be confined to similar-minded individuals or overlooked by the government, yielding no results. Both approaches are the double edge of the sword.
6.1 National Identity Paradoxes in Turkey and Taiwan
Stripping away essential cultural elements is instrumental in (re)shaping a country’s sense of national identity based on specific temporal circumstances. The components and context of this national identity can be molded to foster changes and adaptations that promote unity. However, the most significant aspect of this identity is often constrained by deep-rooted ancestral bonds that the obsession would resist, severing historical and cultural ties (Shih 2013:283). In other words, the primordial ties (not the naturally given one but the acculturated one) are potential threats since having more competing bases to the project of civic nationalism and civil society (Calhoun 1997:31, 32).
The clashes and contradictions in national identity have left people uncertain, torn between their old and new selves with different pasts and characters. Based on the presumption that modern national identity shall, to some degree, be open to adaptability. The paradox in national identity underscores cultural manipulation or
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fabrication’s limitations to instill a homogenous national identity in the population. If a cultural trait is manipulable, it can also be removed or reshaped based on demand. If a cultural trait is so well ingrained in society and practiced in daily activities, it will be challenging even to make subtle changes. Neither scenario saw unquestionable success in their respective efforts to reconstruct identity.
As seen, the complete eradication of historically ingrained cultural elements— Chinese and Islamic cultures—proves implausible even in different tryouts. The removal of cultural traits results in blurred group boundaries, and the uncertainty of identity causes alienation and anxiety, which leads individuals toward the extremes of opposition. There are two-fold aspects for us to comprehend the paradox of national identity among Taiwanese and Turkish people. First, this involves recognizing the conflicting and incongruent aspects between the cultural components that have been eradicated and those that have been introduced to replace the eliminated, leading to a rupture in the continuity of culture. Secondly, examining how various groups interpret and employ the preexisting/new cultural labels to sustain or promote their identity claim transforms them into a polemic politicized discussion.
6.1.1 Rupture of the Culture Contingency
The nations exist when their historical legacies can be acknowledged now and in the future. Scholars like Miller (1995) and Smith (1991, 2009) emphasized the cultural domain, including ethnicity and its symbolic resources and meaning that distinguish other communities. In order to transform these symbols into a shared culture that members collectively believe in, it is essential to establish a historical contingency that conforms to inherited characteristics from the past that individuals can envision themselves sharing as part of the group in the present.
In a nation fraught with threats of foreign annexation and absconding unwanted pasts, the nationalists were obliged to promote new identifications by replacing the long-inherited cultural elements with emphasis on alternative criteria. In our cases, the attempt to establish a new identity by breaking with the embedded ties that people (are) used to define themselves. Eliminating ingrained ethnic-cultural elements
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predisposes a rupture in the national identity. If disruptions like this occur, time reordering is necessary. As the chronology is in the making, the national identity hinged on it is dynamic or unstable (Lavi 2013:697). As a result, the communities and people will encounter discontinuity and estrangement in their sense of belongingness as the existing bonds evolve and persist.
National identity is a community connecting the past and future across generations, and the present generation can hardly disavow it. The intellectuals or elites attempted to nurture the new identity and mitigate the rupture through different cultural engineering. Expectedly, resistance and doubts would oppose the reinterpretation of the past, undermining national solidarity. Rupture in cultural continuity due to reinterpretation of national culture, even if repairable through assimilation or persuasion, will lead to social division among groups with differing interpretations of national culture.
Shih’s (2013:283–84) Taiwanese-Chinese intertwined national identity pattern categorized four identity relationships that can apply to the dynamics between Turkish and Islamic identities. As depicted in the diagram (see Figure 6.1), the progression of Taiwan’s de-Chineselization and Turkey’s de-Islamization identities moves from left to right, aiming to achieve a complete Taiwanese identity and a secular Turkish identity devoid of Islamic influence. However, the actual condition of national identity, whether A, B, C, or D, is only partial.
To achieve a national identity without Chinese and Islamic culture (D), it is inevitable to accept a culture that still carries elements of both China and Islam (B& C). During the process of de-Chineselization in Taiwan, most Taiwanese identity In contrast, Turkey has shifted to the left, returning to a more Islamic orientation before modernization (A), with the majority of identification falling between B-C.has shifted more to the right, with some identification falling between (C& B).
Before cultural elements were removed, Turks and Taiwanese had complex ties and cultural overlap with their original cultural pattern in national identity. The
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importance of de-Chineselization and de-Islamization lies in establishing independent identities for Turkish citizens and Taiwanese, implying the incompatibility between the new and original identities. This leads to deficiencies in the new identity and causes confusion among individuals about their sense of self.
In the period of KMT rule, Taiwan was considered a subordination/ region of Chinese culture. However, through the process of de-Chineselization, Taiwan’s identity gradually deviated from China, aiming at mutually exclusive but turning out to be two intersecting spheres of identity. In essence, Taiwan has significant cultural, ethnic, and linguistic commonalities with China, so to create an independent Taiwanese identity could be baseless or leave the complexities as it is.
Likewise, during the Ottoman Empire, Turkish people were identified as Muslims without any ethnic markers. After the establishment of the Republic, Atatürk sought to construct a secular, modern, and nationalist Turkish identity separate from Islamic cultural influence. Religion has been highly internalized and instilled into every aspect of daily life; it is foreseeable that Islam is either subordinate to or intersected
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Figure 6.1 1 Identity Transition in Detaching Cultural Elements
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with Turkish national identity. Under the influence of Islamic movements in the political and societal landscape over the past two decades, Turkey’s secular identity has gradually shifted towards Islamic leanings.
As indicated above, the overlap between original and new national identities signifies a disconnect or incomplete acceptance of the new cultural identity. From a psychological perspective, individual characters play a crucial role in shaping personal identity. If someone loses one of the significant characters due to a cultural transition, can they still be considered the same person they were? On the other hand, individuals who fully embrace a new identity must also confront challenges in rationalizing missing characters to sustain the new national identity. The following part will discuss the argument of filling the gaps in the new identity and the encountered challenges to understanding the causality of the identity paradox.
6.1.2 Cultural Paradoxes
Identity involves recognizing ourselves by distinguishing the distinctiveness of our collective existence. Having a label or a name is essential for distinguishing ourselves from others. However, when faced with the uncertainty of life or death, the markers defining the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘other’ become blurred and perplexing, leading to a shift in identity content. Unforeseen transformations unsettle the established boundaries and frameworks, simultaneously offering new opportunities while triggering anxieties and crises. This upheaval creates an identity crisis, where individuals grapple with defining who they are amidst changing circumstances.
Apart from the identity confusion and opposition brought about by structural reforms, an ontological issue exists between the eradicated cultural traits and the substituted ones. The cultural traits being removed, whether artificially or inherently imposed or exercised, have already been ingrained as part of the culture. Such cultural elements are the predominant markers defining who they are. The substituted cultural elements usually raise adaptability in question, and too much focus on the soil may also potentially evolve the national identity into a parochial one.
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The identity conflict in Taiwan is primarily constructed upon divergent interpretations and understandings of history, culture, and politics. In nationalism, the establishment of modern national identity is based on the cultural construction forged by society or a shared civic culture rather than primordial ethnic ties. Therefore, the national culture and tradition are inventions, and it is not a tabula rasa invention; it has to be derived from existing traditions (Hobsbawm 1983). In this vein, historical materials are recontextualized for new purposes when shaping a cohesive collective identity. How would de-Chineselized Taiwanese identity invent its tradition and culture from tabula rasa, or to what extent attenuating the bond with Chinese culture and ancestors is the crux of wavering Taiwanese identity?
Regarding what and who should be Taiwanese and the causes of identity confusion, there are different perspectives due to the diverse cultural politics in history. Taiwan has undergone Japanese assimilation during colonial rule and internal colonial-like Chineselization under the KMT regime. Consequently, Taiwanese culture is instead a cultural compound containing diverse cultures yet essentially lacks distinctive characteristics that lead to short of confidence and self-assurance.
In view of the shaky cultural foundation of Taiwan’s national identity, it is reasonably common and practical to substitute cultural identity with political identity. Also, it is straightforward to distinguish Taiwan from China based on differences in political systems; this oversimplifies the intricacies of Taiwanese consciousness. As Huang (2006:145–71) suggests, political and cultural identities within Taiwanese consciousness are interdependent and intertwined. Once these two identities diverge, the population could be confused and distressed. For instance, as the ROC was deprived of being the only representation of China, Taiwanese people found themselves both estranged from Taiwanese culture and no longer recognized as Chinese. Even under a strong identification with Taiwan’s democratic system, there remains a significant cultural connection to the ancestral homeland.
The KMT’s Sino-centrism is not the sole reason for identity confusion; rather, it stems from losing the mainland to the Communists and as the defeated side of the ‘One China’ principle. Primarily, cultural symbols of Chineselization were direct
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reproduction as in China, yet in real life, cultural symbols resulted from manifold interactions among Taiwanese people. This contradiction creates significant confusion regarding what constitutes national culture (Yang 1992:112–14). In this vein, we do not attempt to refute that Taiwan’s dominant culture is Han Chinese-oriented. Other East Asian countries have developed their own culture based on Han culture, but it is ridiculous to claim culture under Han influence to be Chinese. KMT’s essentialist model of national culture (China= Chinese culture= Chinese people) cannot meet the demands of real cultural identity, resulting in a conflict between the illusionary national culture and the political life of the Taiwanese people, thus sowing the seeds of identity confusion in Taiwan.
The national identity paradox in Turkey ultimately springs from the challenges Western culture and modernization pose to traditional religion and society. Smith (1991:96) has pointed out that this identity crisis is due to the “dual legitimation: the legitimation of religion and tradition and legitimation by appeal to reason and modernization fostered by the government that adopts scientific techniques and attitudes.” The latter has relentlessly challenged to replace the prior legitimation under the Kemalist regime. In Western modernization, intellectuals are the first group to experience an identity crisis (ibid. 1991:97). However, in Turkey, modernization is not a natural, historical process but a series of material reforms driven “artificially” from the top-down by a small group of elites. The direct adoption of Western templates in institutions and behavioral norms without a modernization mindset can lead to confusion and identity crises among the masses (Aytürk 2022:202, 203).
Atatürk’s reforms, implemented during the early years of the Turkish Republic, aimed to modernize the country, often at the expense of traditional cultural, religious, and social practices. Göle (1999:195) stated that the top-down authoritarian modernization program would estrange the tradition, which is more devastating than the modernization implemented by the colonists. A denial of the past, looking forward to a new life and modernization as the tradition was overlooked and lost. As time passed, the tradition petrified on the outskirts of modernization and became an awkward part of social life.
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Religion is significant in Turkey’s society, culture, and individual life. At the same time, the radical Westernization and de-Islamization during the Republican era have brought forth many new ideas and values that conflict with traditional beliefs. For instance, there is a stark contrast between the role of women in traditional Islamic culture and modern society. Additionally, trivial contradictions arise between traditional Muslim practices and secular life, such as the Five Pillars and capitalist banking systems. Whether women should wear headscarves reflects the contradictions between religion and Westernized modern society.
For some conservatives, Westernization is seen as a threat to Turkey’s religious traditions and cultural identity, potentially leading to immoral behavior or societal fragmentation. However, it may also alienate Turks from their culture and identity. Thus, there has been ongoing confusion and contradiction among the Turkish people regarding navigating the relationship between religion and modernization. The controversy surrounding Turkish national identity is partly rooted in this struggle, as finding a balance between these two cultures and the spiritual and material worlds has been a persistent challenge in Turkish society (Kadıoğlu 2006:178,182).
Secular governance, economy, and lifestyle have been deeply rooted in Turkey. It has been an irreconcilable principle across various institutions and inculcated a group of secular adherents. Turkey’s secularization, even though it did not successfully overshadow the influence of Islam, remains a prominent model for other Muslim countries. Taiwan remained highly entangled with Chinese culture and (the Republic of) China and the hostility of the PRC. Taiwanese consciousness can only rely on its unique culture and identity derived from its democratic and liberal governance, contrasting with the actual ‘China,’ autocracy communist regime, forcefully imposes Chinese identity and sense of belonging on Taiwanese people.
We observe that efforts to de-Chineselize and de-Islamize represent deliberate cultural constructs aimed at forging new national identities. Undeniably, the processes of Taiwanization and secularization have effectively molded the identity of certain segments of the populace. Conversely, the introduced cultures may appear superficial, localized, and constrained in parochial scope; they might symbolize state
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authority and foreign cultures, thus making people averse to the culture. Both nations harbor factions that either embrace or reject these shifts. Beneath the contrasting identities lies the coalition of political parties, ultimately culminating in battles over national cultural and political allegiances.
6.2 Political and Social Backfire
Accepting and rejecting new forms of identity fundamentally reveal the nature of exclusion and incompatibility between China/Taiwan and Islamic/modern Turkey. Refusing a new identity would lead to political control over rejection. Departing from the past experiences of resistance, this part will focus on rather recent political and social activities that embodied the popular national identity by people’s will. If one embraces the new culture and identity, there would be no need for political management and control. Eventually, the new identity and culture will become internalized among some people. The new identity will also shift away from political control, transforming into the essence of culture and society (Chen 2006:298–99)69.
For example, de-Chineselization during the DPP governance has led to significant changes in public policies and education in Taiwan. This has nurtured a new generation with a Taiwan-centric identity. Even during the period when the KMT was in power (2008-2016) and returned to a more pro-China stance, the foundation of a population with a strong Taiwan identity had already been established. However, confrontations exist between those who maintain a sense of attachment to China and those who identify primarily with Taiwan.
In the case of Turkey, the assertive process of de-Islamization and secularization has taken place. Although there were instances of turmoil during this transition, a
69 This perspective is inspired by Chen’s work on assimilation during the Japanese colonial period. He argued that the Taiwanese people’s acceptance of assimilation was actually a form of silent resistance. Accepting assimilation meant embracing civilization and becoming civilized people in order to weaken the differential treatment under colonial rule and potentially gain future democratic freedom. This acceptance of assimilation is indeed a form of resistance. It can be observed that in the later stages of imposing Chineselization on Taiwan by the KMT government and the series of Taiwanization efforts by the DPP in office, as well as in the late stages of de-Islamization in Turkey, forces of resistance can be anticipated.
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majority of the population had to comply with the government’s directives. After the introduction of multi-party politics and democratization, unlike the early years of the Republic when dissent was harshly suppressed, an Islamic elite emerged that embraced Western politics, economic systems, and education while remaining devout Muslims (Cevik 2016:11). The organizations they founded, whether intentionally or not, strengthened the unity of Muslim identity. This paved the way for Islam’s politicization and society’s Islamization.
In navigating the dichotomy between two conflicting national identities, the act of individual choice is not exclusively a product of personal predilections. Rather, it is a process influenced by the vested interests of social collectives and the ideological inclinations propagated by political factions. Subsequently, our inquiry will pivot towards an inverted perspective—namely, comprehending the rationale behind specific collectives’ reluctance to embrace novel identities marked by concepts such as de-Sinicization and de-Islamization. We shall explore how societal and political entities exert sway over the individual’s decision-making sphere concerning national allegiance. Furthermore, this retrospective examination holds the potential to furnish a repertoire of methodologies aimed at amending and recalibrating the spectrum of national identifications.
6.2.1 Intimacy with China and the Social Movements
The emergence of Taiwan nationalism was the response to KMT’s Sino-centrism, re-Chineselization policy, and reflection on the Formosa incident. Local intellectuals managed the memory of oppression to raise a keen independent Taiwanese consciousness apart from anything but Chinese. The Taiwanization program continued and reached its summit during the pro-independent DDP’s presidency in 2000-2008. The DDP government carried out a series of Taiwanization reforms to foster Taiwanese national identity, including encouraging indigenous culture and revising history narratives to be more Taiwan-centered. The KMT and generally its supporters (called as blue camp), however, considered the Taiwanization program to refute the KMT’s legitimacy in Taiwan, which would eventually endanger its
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existence. Insomuch as they saw Chinese centrism discourses and close relations with the PRC as the last straw for the survival of ROC.
After KMT returned to the presidency in 2008 and 2012, the government abolished some of the reforms proposed by the DDP government. KMT’s presidency can be described as a reconciliation with mainland China and a return to Chinese cultural roots and heritage. President Ma was prone to the ‘independent China’ fraction, which acknowledged that ROC was a de facto independent political entity. Thus, there are two China in the world. His stance can be discerned best in his inauguration speech.
In President Ma’s inaugural speech70, he advocated for early negotiations with China based on the 1992 Consensus and the principle of “One China, Respective Interpretations.” He aligned with the popular Taiwanese sentiment of the “Neither Unification nor Independence, Peaceful Resolution” discourse while upholding the status quo in the Taiwan Strait within the framework of the ROC Constitution. He firmly believed that the ultimate resolution of the cross-strait issue lay not in matters of sovereignty but in lifestyles and core values.
In his address, President Ma also emphasized the legitimacy of the ROC’s governance in China. For instance, he firmly believed that “the most sacred duty of the ROC President is to safeguard the ROC Constitution”71 and that “the ROC will fulfill its responsibilities as international citizen and actor.” In terms of cultural identity, he stated that “both sides of the strait are Chinese people,” which significantly contrasted
70 President Ma’s Inaugural Address (2008) Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan). Available at: https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/45 (Accessed: 24 August 2023).
71 Before President Chen Shui-bian’s re-election in 2003, he proposed constitutional amendments to rectify any unreasonable aspects of the constitutional system and establish a more realistic framework. This move was symbolic of differentiating Taiwan’s governance from that of mainland China and marked the beginning of a new constitutional era on the island. A significant aspect of these amendments involved revising the ROC’s claim over ‘inherent territory’ and its name. Following approval in the Legislative Yuan and subsequent endorsement through a citizen referendum, these changes aimed to better align with the present circumstances (Liu 2005:255–57). For the related constitution amendment- Article 4, please see the Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan)- Additional Articles. Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan). Available at: https://english.president.gov.tw/Page/95 (Accessed: 24 August 2023).
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with the previous DPP administration’s emphasis on Taiwanese peoples’ cultural autonomy and independence.
President Ma’s stance was more moderate regarding a China-centric identity than the previous KMT position. Throughout his speech, President Ma also underscored the significance of ‘Taiwan.’ He articulated that “this island allows us to inherit various historical and cultural legacies, which continue to flourish” and noted that “the ROC has also found new life in Taiwan.” He affirmed that “the essence of the ‘Taiwanese spirit’ lies within the people of Taiwan.”
President Ma’s administration’s intensive interaction with the PRC also drew criticisms such as ‘pro-China inclination,’ ‘downgrading sovereignty, and even severe accusations of ‘betraying Taiwan.’ Apart from the opposition deliberately using simplified labels to provoke anti-China sentiments among the Taiwanese populace, these accusations also reflect two key aspects. Firstly, they underscore the shifting national identity of the Taiwanese people towards a more distinct Taiwanese identity, separate from the Chinese identity. Secondly, they highlight the potential threat to Taiwan’s national identity in the face of China’s increasing influence on the international stage. The charges and opinions that emerged due to President Ma’s interactions with China depict a dynamic and multifaceted situation involving political, cultural, and international dimensions in the Taiwanese national identity.
Taiwanese identity and consciousness nonetheless peaked after the signing of the Service Trade Agreement between Taiwan and China. The occupation of Taiwan’s parliament in 2014 by university students (Sunflower Movement) was the reaction to aggravated anxiety over Taiwan’s political, economic, and social insecurity under the grooming influence in China (Yan 2015:324). Although the occupation of the parliament has been debated as unlawful and freedom of protest, the movement declared the will of the Taiwanese people’s rejection of the PRC’s manipulation of any kind.
One reason the demonstrators opposed signing the service trade agreement was the assertion that KMT’s pro-China policy would eventually ruin the democratic and
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Taiwanese values, engendering a new wave of more radical pro-independent Taiwanese consciousness. The reconciliation with China tore the Taiwanese into pro-China versus independent camps. KMT’s pro-China inclination no longer accorded with the Taiwanese’s demands. Subsequently, KMT trounced in local elections at the end of 2014, 2016, and 2018 presidential elections. Since then, the demarcation of Taiwanese identification and Chinese identity has never been so clear-cut.
The anti-extradition bill protests in Hong Kong in 2019 significantly impacted Taiwanese identity. On a political and societal level, the movement has triggered deeper concerns among Taiwanese people about the democratic system they ought to defend as the Chinese government eroded Hong Kong’s autonomy72. The illusionary honeymoon with China was crushed by its autocratic regime. Taiwanese reevaluate their relationship with mainland China, deepening some individuals’ desires to maintain distance from China and also reinforcing their identification with Taiwanese identity and values. Subsequently, the political party upheld the Taiwanese identity and values and won the presidential election in 2020 and successive terms.
The first re-Chineselization during the KMT regime was successful. Specifically, the generation born in the 50s and 60s was deeply ingrained with Chinses nationalism and thus considered themselves the inheritor of Chinese culture and Chinese. They were taught traditional Chinese virtue and how to become good Chinese in Mandarin under authoritative rule. So, they are more likely to relate their national identity and ethnic bonds to China.
On the other hand, their successive generation, brought up during and after the democratization process having less connection with mainland China, overwhelmingly identify as Taiwanese and prefer Taiwan over ROC in describing sovereignty. Despite the different interpretations of the past, the imminent threats from the PRC aggravated the friction between generations.
72 BBC News. 2019. “Hong Kong: Timeline of Extradition Protests,” August 19, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49340717.
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6.2.2 Turkey
slam remained an essential source of Turkish national identity and resided in the realm of personal identity. Even under the firm and radical determination toward all-encompassing modernization, the old Islam religion has never been replaced by science and modern values- the new religion. The regime’s establishment marked a revolutionary political innovation, yet the social structure persisted conservatively (Karpat 2010:138). Hence, the regime’s evident endeavor to reshape communal customs and traditions and the coexistence of divergent viewpoints inherently gave rise to incessant internal conflicts. In the following, we will discuss the emergence of political parties that have risen and bear with Islamic populism and how business and social organizations have developed with the support of pro-Islamic political parties. We will explore how these organizations have fostered religious identity within their members and communities, subsequently uniting the populace under the banner of Islam.
Rising of Political Islam
The Republican elites were also aware that their reforms in the 1920s had not taken root (Kadıoğlu 2006:187) from the bitter experiences of the upheavals. Atatürk has been criticized for spending too much effort trying to change people’s ideas. The extraordinary amount of energy spent elaborating on national consciousness and historical myths and changing the headgear and dress was not paralleled by an equal effort to create the Western ideal of a democratic nation-state.
He aimed to construct a democratic nation-state, and the core of reform was modernization. Yet, to transform a multi-ethnic culture, an empire spanning three continents into an Anatolia territorial-based mono-ethnic nation-state required authoritative measures to implement Westernization reforms. A democratic republic, but ironically, its administration was autocratic and extended the traditional monotheism (Islam) and single-party rule (Delaney 1991:222). After a brief experiment with democracy, opposition parties were forced to shut down due to fears that they would become symbols of conservatism or support the revival of Islamic
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rule, exemplified by the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası) and the Liberal Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası). The authoritative single party alienated all classes of people except the bureaucratic elites.
After Atatürk died in 1938, his close comrade İnönü succeeded as the Republic’s president. Domestic and international situations drove the government to make some compromises. The CHP government was considered an authoritarian regime, a de facto party state, but this image began to change in 1946 (Karpat 2010:475). Coinciding with the economic crisis, inflation, resentments of the policies and reform, and stalemate of democratization commitment, İ nönü realized the need to undertake political reform to bring the Republic in line with the new order of the world after WWII (Ahmad 2003:99). Discrepancies among the party members surfaced after the land reform bill of January 1945; the statists wanted to keep their hold on the state, and the liberals urged for democratization and political reform (ibid. 2003:99–100). The problem within the CHP emerged and resulted in the fragmentation of CHP and the establishment of the DP.
The funding of the DP opened a new page for Turkey’s democracy. The DP mobilized resentment toward CHP’s party-state rule and won the election in 1950, acclaimed as the champion of religion and signified the beginning of the Islamic movement in Turkey(Delaney 1991:222; Göle 1999:120). DP’s triumph in the election was not merely the accomplishment of democratization but was a response against the secularization employed by the CHP government. According to Delaney’s observation, villagers voted for the political party that intended to reclaim Islam over modernization (ibid. 1991:223). The DP government tended to use religion to attract rural votes, so their policy value was against anything resembling the former CHP regime and especially their authoritarian style of implementing Westernization.
The DP government implemented religious policies that reflected its conservative and pro-Islamic stance in the name of fundamental human rights (Karpat 2010:491). Key initiatives included emphasizing religious freedom, opening religious schools, reviving religious institutions, allowing the call to prayer in Arabic, and the sale of religious literature (Zürcher 1993:232–33). While some supported these policies to
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promote Islamic values and religious freedom, others raised concerns about potential implications for religion’s role in politics and public life. The liberal religious implementations were believed to be the populace's desire (Ahmad 2003:108). During its brief time in power, the DP’s religious policies significantly impacted Turkey’s sociopolitical landscape.
Meanwhile a new type of populism emerged in an uncontrollable form within the CHP in 1950 that severely criticized the admiration of Western culture, which was consent shared by the villagers and town dwellers. Mardin (2006:219–20) described it as the decade of triumph of cultural nativism. The modern Turkish culture- secular and Western, by which people were forcibly endowed was alien. Consequently, a trend reoriented the students and elites to search for their cultural roots- the Islamic culture, which was replaced by Western culture.
The seemingly blooming of democracy and cultural revivalism withered and fell after the coup d’état in 1960. The military took over the government in the assertion to guard the Kemalism principle and to restore order. The military coup repressed Islamist movements and organizations, viewing political Islam as a threat to secular principles. The city residents primarily supported the coup in contrast with the DP’s rural supporters, which presented a controversial ideologies synthesis- democracy/ modernism and a military coup (Karpat 2009:112). As the 1960s progressed, Turkey experienced a period of turmoil characterized by violence and political instability. Similar scenarios in 1971 and 1980, staged as the military coup again, were the blasts of the extended struggle between secularism and the Islam religion. Political Islamists came under heightened scrutiny and faced restrictions curtailing their full political participation. Nevertheless, the rise of Islam gradually increased, and its influence over the cultural, political, and economic realm over decades despite political constraints (Keyman 2007:216).
Islamism, the source and text of political discourse in the Muslim world, is the cultural burden secular Turkey cannot avoid. As mentioned, Islam does not separate the ‘church and the state’ (Lewis 1988:2); the principle of good governance was specified in the Kuran and Hadith. Secularized Turkey, with a majority Muslim
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population, may still use Islamic ideals as a standard to criticize and expel authoritarian and incompetent regimes. Fuller (2002:50) believed that there is no other ideology could overrule Islamism; this could be partially true, as Islamism remained a strong enhancive even in a secularized Turkey, yet the secularism supporters should not be underestimated; excessive exploitation of political Islam to mobilize the public can marginalize secularists politically and socially, and may potentially lead to a backlash like past coup d’état, the Gazi Park protests. But Fuller correctly predicted that,
Islamism will be the dominant intellectual current in the region [...] the modern liberal governance is more likely to take root through organically evolving liberal Islamist trends at the grassroots level than from imported Western modules of instant democracy (2002:50).
While material changes brought about by modernization are easily observable, certain aspects of human society, such as culture and ideologies, remain deeply ingrained and resistant to transformation even in the face of modernization efforts in the Western context. Turkey grapples with the concept of modernity, as their interpretation of ‘being modern’ diverges from the singular European model championed by Atatürk. The influence of Islamic ideologies and traditional gender norms, coupled with a patriarchal and authoritative system, pose challenges to the full realization of modernization’s goals. As a result, doubts have arisen regarding the value and relevance of the version of modernity and civilization associated with Europe by Atatürk.
Islam as Populism
After sporadic democratic attempts over 30 years, multi-party democratic elections were initiated in Turkey in the 1950s. The ending of CHP’s single-party rule allowed Turkey’s political landscape to reflect the inclinations of the masses better. Mango (2010:7) pointed out the negative impact of the democratic system in Turkey. He described that politics and public administration had become the plaything of politicians - a phenomenon also known as populism. It is usual for “poll-driven democracy that politicians to appeal to the ‘people.’ According to Muller (2016:7, 8)
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populists criticize that elites and institutions are corrupt and immoral and only represent the valid opinions, voices, and interests of the ‘people.’ The claims of other parties or opponents are deemed narrow, false, and not reflective of genuine public sentiment.
Populists advocate for change and oppose the status quo, which inevitably threatens the existing secular system and elite rule. When a populist political party runs for power, they will show a critical manner of their political rivals as immoral and nepotism elites. If they are in power, they will deny the opposition at all costs (Muller 2016:8). In Turkey, populism has intertwined with Islam religion, in which the political parties either rose from the more conservative, rural community or use religion to attract support and ballots. AKP, the ruling party, a master of populism in safeguarding religious traditions and virtues, often labeled secular others unscrupulous73.
Göle (1999:12–14) exemplified the rise of populist culture- arabesque music and the paradox of the populist government’s clientism. In the 1980s, the surge in popularity of arabesque music symbolized the rise of populist culture among the lower strata, foreshadowing the migration of lower and middle-class individuals from rural peripheries to urban centers. These internal migrants to the city centers are the propellor of the religious movements and political parties that oppose modernist and Westernist scheme (Çalış 2021:35). This trend reminded Turkey’s Middle Eastern geographical characteristics, and they are not Westerner nor of the West. In theory, the emergence of Islamic populist political parties from the masses should align with popular preference. However, the genre of Arabesque music, characterized by its
73 For the Erdoğan’s ideological crtitics toward the non-us, see Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’dan CHP’li vekile çok sert eleştiri: ‘Sen kimsin be ahlaksız’ [President Erdoğan delivers a harsh criticism to CHP: ‘Who do you think you are, you immoral person?] (2017) IHA. Available at: https://www.iha.com.tr/haber-cumhurbaskani-erdogandan-chpli-vekile-cok-sert-elestiri-sen-kimsin-be-ahlaksiz-634975 (Accessed: 18 August 2023). And Erdoğan’dan muhalefete: bunlar LGBT’ci [Erdoğan accuses the opposition: ‘They are the LGBTs’] (2023) Sözcü Gazetesi. Available at: https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2023/gundem/erdogandan-muhalefete-bunlar-lgbtci-7659357/ (Accessed: 18 August 2023).
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earthly indulgence, contradicted the inclinations of the pro-Islamic parties, which typically leaned towards preserving Islamic traditions and morals.
Populism is not unique to Turkey; Taiwan has also frequently seen discussions and critiques of populism since its democratization. While the rise of populism and political opportunism in Turkey and Taiwan stems from different backgrounds and contexts, what can be affirmed is that this type of populism sharply delineates an exclusionary identity of us versus them, which can easily lead to societal divisions (ibid. 2016:8). Similar to Erdogan’s speech when he declared his candidacy for the presidential election in 2014.
We have become acquainted with the mindset of our people. [...] Who are you in domestic and international fields? Where do you find the audacity to look down on us, to look at us with arrogance? [...]We are the people. We are the followers of our ancestors who have written their epics with blood.74
The Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi), the predecessor of the current ruling AKP, was known for its strong emphasis on Islamist and far-right ideologies. The party effectively utilized religious symbols and slogans to create a sense of identity around Islam, which resonated with a large number of supporters. This adept manipulation of religious symbols was particularly evident during public gatherings and rallies, setting them apart from other political parties. Even more recently, these same symbols and discourses have continued to be employed, often intensifying their impact. As detailed in her work, White’s (2002:205) observation highlights how the Virtue Party’s rallies skillfully harnessed these symbols to unify and mobilize the masses. The oppositional metaphors used to condemn secularists were uncovered, lavish, and immoral, while Islamists were covered, austere, and virtuous. She wrote,
Women are the central locus of desire. Women’s virtue becomes national virtue. Desire, projected onto the political screen, sutures the aim of the Islamist elite
74 Original Turkish text, “[…] (halkın) nabzını tuttuk.[…] İçerde ve dışarda siz kimsiniz? Bize tepeden bakma, kibirle bakma cüretini nereden buluyorsunuz? Biz halkız.Biz destanlarını kanla yazmış şehitlerimizin takipçisiyiz.” The Italic words are my emphasis. Ak parti’nin Cumhurbaşkanı adayı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan [The presidential candidate of the AK Party, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan] (2014) Hürriyet [Hurriyet Newspapers]. Available at: https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/ak-partinin-cumhurbaskani-adayi-recep-tayyip-erdogan-26719347 (Accessed: 18 August 2023).
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with the lifestyle of the urban poor, who fear poverty and sexual dishonor and subsist by means of solid norms of mutual control of women’s bodies and movement. The resonance of the political message with local desire fuels emotion and support for Virtue.
Foundations
Since the 1920s, Kemalist secular policies have driven the country’s modernization and Westernization, including reducing the influence of religious institutions and restricting religion’s role in the public domain. However, a trend of reinterpreting and reconstructing traditional religious values and doctrines has emerged within the Muslim community. In addition, religious institutions and sects dispersed in rural and distant areas functioned like civil societies in the local communities.
The Islamic Foundation offers scholarships and dormitories and publishes books, among other initiatives. These religious organizations have cultivated a new generation of Islamic scholars, professionals, and public servants in education. The number of Imam Hatip high schools increased from 72 (junior high) and 39 (senior high) in the 1970s to 339 (Junior high) and 249 (senior high) in 1980, which was depicted as the legendary period of the religious school (Çakır, Bozan, and Talu 2004:64).
These schools have evolved from solely training religious officials to providing opportunities for their graduates to pursue higher education in mainstream universities. As a result, graduates of these schools have formed closed networks in various sectors of society (Ozgur 2012). The graduates of Imam Hatip schools have expanded their influence in religious affairs and found roles in diverse professional fields, contributing to the development and transformation of Turkey’s society.
The educated Islamic intellectuals’ presence and contributions challenge the historical secularist approach and present a more nuanced and dynamic understanding of Islam in contemporary society. Developing and establishing foundations have provided space for Muslim social activism in Turkey’s secularized society. These newly educated Muslim intellectuals have formed a network that allows Islam to
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modernize, challenging Kemalist secularist hegemony and Turkey’s cultural alignment with the West. Their interconnectedness facilitates modernizing Islamic thought and shapes Turkey’s societal and cultural landscape (Zubaida 1996:13).
6.3 Social Cleavage
It is the role of culture that separates and alternatively reinforces social and status differences. Cultural differences such as religion, language, and ethnicity are not the primary cultural markers. They became cultural markers only when infused with social significance and cultural power, in a similar way, when constructing national identity through extracting elements imbued with a ‘national’ significance. Thus, physical differences do not necessarily create cultural differences; the meaning imposed on the culture is more critical (Banton 1983:28, as cited in McCrone and Bechhofer 2015:142–43). Cultural differences, distinguishing us from others, are sets of everyday practices and understandings that come to be internalized and objectified in the context of power relations (McCrone and Bechhofer 2015:142).
Gellner (1983:64–87) describes the phenomenon as ‘entropy resistant,’ indicating that certain cultural traits, deeply rooted and already integrated into the society, become essential elements shaping the community, establishing a sense of cultural ingrainedness. He also stated that genetic traits are not as entropy-resistant as cultural traits. Different understandings of culture and the conferred meaning create political and social factions that continue to exist as politically or socially significant classifications even when exposed to education-induced acculturation or assimilation. Even if some (minority in Gellner’s indication) group agrees to cultural assimilation, they might employ political strategies learned from the dominant culture to present their pseudo-authentic culture as the primary culture, securing their political standing.
During the national identity construction, there will be a group of endorser of new national culture, which was not that of their genuine origins, first assimilating and then applying all means of political measures to ensure the legitimate status of the national culture. However, those that have become entropy-resistant will impede the integration of civic nation-state and national identity (Calhoun 1997:31; Smith
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1991:131). Chinese and Islam cultures are one of the deeply engrained traits that have obtained tenacity and vitality over time. Such cultural and religious habits are difficult to shed and can be taken as part of the ‘national’ root that makes Taiwanese and Turkish people. It is worth underlining that cultural traits can be manipulated and re-invented at any moment.
Henceforth, an apparent social division emerged due to consistent and possibly conflicting interpretations of national culture that demarcate us and others. The division, in return, would intensify the identifications that form social or political identity. To emphasize the unity of ‘us- Taiwan and secular Turkish,’ intensifying the opposition and hostility towards ‘others- Chinese and Islam conservatives,’ particularly in political maneuvers, can easily fracture society, creating opposing extremes.
If the desired cultural homogeneity is not fully achieved, latent social and political tensions will likely escalate because the eliminated cultural traits tangibly exist. Therefore, the new pattern of national identity may struggle to disseminate evenly throughout society due to economic and cultural inequality. These divergent views on national identity will lead to social cleavage between those who accept and reject. When the cultural interpretation of different viewpoints becomes politicized and labeled, coupled with the amplifying influence of social media, it triggers a polarized societal division. The following part will explore and compare the causal relationships leading to social division caused by the reconstruction of national identity in two cases.
Taiwanese intellectuals advocated the initial de-Chineselized Taiwanese identity. At a time when Mandarin was considered a foreign language for the Taiwanese served as the sole gateway for exposure to civilization and knowledge. Although reluctant,
Taiwanese people believe that acquiring the culture of the ruling authorities is essential to have leverage and then strive for equality with them. These cases demonstrate using one’s weapon to strike one’s shield. They are the phenomenon of civilization clashes- accepting foreign cultural assimilation to strive to preserve their
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traditional cultures (Chen 2008:141)75 . This contradiction translates into an ideological and perceptual struggle within modern society.
6.3.1 Secularist under Threat and Rising Islamic Culture in Turkey
The rise of contemporary political Islam in Turkey is a reaction to the disappointment and resentment of Western modernization. The disappointments arose from the radical measures by the authoritative regime. The resentments were the ontological incompatibility between Western and Islamic cultures. “The adoption of Western culture and secularization alienated the Muslim- Turkishness from their roots and culture, which was described as auto (self)- colonization (Sezai Karakoç as cited in Bora 2002:253).” The modernization process brought about social disorders dichotomies, concretized individuals’ dilemmas and confusion, and excluded dissenters as betrayers. Even worse, nationalism’s incompetence in dealing with these complexities is compensated only by resorting to authoritarianism (Bora 2002:254).
The aggressive Westernization reforms unavoidably aroused widespread resentments that caused political and armed insurrections even at the beginning of the reform. Apart from that, only a small amount of the urban bourgeoisie accepted Kemalist secularist and Western ideology. Countless villages constituting most of the country were far-fetched from the reform. The Anatolia population continued the highly engaged lifestyle with Islam, serving as education and community support in rural areas. The discrete adoption of secularism and modernity in different regions and groups has foreshadowed an implacable social division in Turkey.
75 The mentality of being unwilling to assimilate but feeling the necessity to accept assimilation in order to gain strength and resist the ruling authorities can be traced back to the assimilation policies during the Japanese colonial period. This complex interplay between accepting assimilation as a means to resist assimilation itself and preserving one’s own national culture has persisted to the present day, contributing to the ongoing identity dilemma in Taiwan. Related Studies: Tsui-lien Chen’s (2008) book analyzed Taiwanese nationalism and identity tendencies during the colonial period through two major axes: politics and culture, and emotion and reason. In Pei-feng Chen’s (2006) book, by analyzing assimilation education during the Japanese colonial period, he had some diligent insight into the interaction between the colonizer and the colonized and explored the connotations, characteristics, and significance of modern Taiwanese identity and consciousness.
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In this vein, a good modern Turkish citizen must adopt everything Western and secular but not Muslim; their thinking, manners, decent education, and capability to be employed are the cultural codes of modern secular Turkish (Göle 1999:38). These modern elites, leveraging their social and cultural capital through mastering the Westernized lifestyle, ascended to power. The radical modernization process during the early republican era resulted in a profound rupture with the local/ rural culture. The emergence of modern secular factions prompted those on the periphery to reassess and define their identity (ibid. 1999:119–20). By that, the de-Islamization divided Turkish people into ideological rivalries that disturbed the balance of politics and society.
On the other hand, the Turkish people’s de-Islamized secular national identity was ontologically paradoxical. There has been animosity towards the West- aggressor, intruder, and colonist while adopting Western civilization (Bora 2002:249; Kadıoğlu 2006:185). The skepticism about the West and its culture is the core ideology of the Islamist movement. Nevertheless, their initiators and successive supporters elevated as urbanized, educated middle-class through modernity and secular education.
The establishment of secularism hinges on democratization, but in many Muslim countries undergoing modernization, the practical implementation of democracy and secularism appears contradictory. Turkey’s journey toward secularization and modernization was the legacy of the authoritative regime (Göle 1999:62). After the single-party period, Turkey stepped out of its fumbling on the path toward democratization in 1960. Liberal and modernity as its disguise, regaining the pristine Islamic movement as the core, is poised to influence the future of Turkish politics and society. Democracy safeguarded the expression and activities of Islam sentiments suppressed by the secularist regime.
The Islamist movement appeared in the 1950s and flourished in the 1980s. The urbanization of the rural area did not merge into the center of secular life. Instead, they were enlightened to reclaim their Islamic identity in the political and social realm (Göle 1999:120). The most evident symbol of re-Islamization is the debates over the headscarf. Wearing a headscarf symbolizes women’s religious identity, which is
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considered a dangerous challenge to secular ideology (Kadıoğlu 2010:497). In addition to this, daily trivial that would violate morality, such as drinking alcohol, homosexuality, exposed clothing, and sexuality, ignite endless arguments. Condemning a breach of moral principles and backing up secular lifestyles and values are frequent occurrences in Turkey. Since then, religious conservatives have grabbed the chance to advocate their religious freedom as a fundamental right, causing deep anxieties among secularists.
For instance, during the Özal era in the 1980s, Turkey witnessed a noticeable rise in Islamist influence and a new gen of Islamic intellectuals and bourgeoise (Göle 1999:123–24), notably marked by Özal’s departure from the Kemalist and secularist principles. Under Özal’s government, amidst democratization and liberal policies, the Muslim bourgeoisie rose with the support of government funding (Lord 2023:225). In a conducive environment and institutional framework, religious organizations and education could facilitate Islamic movements’ horizontal and vertical mobilization by bringing together the conservative middle class and impoverished segments(ibid. 2023:272). Özal’s image as a devout Muslim and an engineer not only exemplified the potential compatibility between Islam and modernity but also explicitly expressed that public identification with Islam had not disappeared with secularization. Hence, Islam remains a fundamental component of Turkish identity, which would be more evident in the following decades.
The RP capitalized on these sentiments, opposing secularism, Western orientation, and positivist educational curricula. To strengthen its position, the RP effectively engaged with its voter base through communal religious networks, employing extensive local-level campaigns that set it apart from competitors who primarily relied on public meetings and media campaigns but lacked a grassroots presence (Zubaida 1996:11). The AKP, the ruling party holding power for 20 years, learning from the previous Islamist parties’ flaws, developed a blend of a neoliberal economy with moderate Islamic rhetoric (Kumbaracibasi 2009:156–57)
These operations signified the marginalized Islam culture and ideologies that crept into the national cultural framework. Like early Republican elites who obtained
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cultural capital, enrolled in the secular education system, and participated in public affairs, including running for elections, the Islamists successfully penetrated their influence and increased their social visibility. Islam, utilizing modernity and science, has formed a new influence in Turkish society. In politics, the Islamic-rooted party AKP, the single-party government since 2002, enthusiastically sailed to various reforms that made Turkey a better modern state. Yet the promising reforms and outlooks did not shun secularists’ fear and mistrust of the Islamic-infused party, whom they believed to impede modernization (Morris 2005:51).
From the perspective of the pious secularist, religion is incompatible with modernity and democracy. They also believe that religion is the reason that caused the Turkish nation in backward and a hidden but now visible threat to the Republic. The military, the guardian of Kemalism, was involved in safeguarding secularism to restrain the rising Islam influence overflow. “This keeps the military constantly on guard against the threat real or imagined. The civilians cannot be trusted, and they (the military) must put the country back on the right path (Morris 2005:34,42).” Military intervention in politics resulted in an already divided society becoming extremely polarized, fostering hostile sentiments among different groups.
Secular Life Disturbances
Social authoritarianism based on religion extends beyond government regulations, as conservative individuals act as enforcers of these authorities. This religious authoritarianism has significantly affected the lives and freedoms of secularists, particularly impacting women’s rights. The right to abortion became merely legal rhetoric, as no public hospitals were willing to perform the procedure76 . Women
76 Guardian, Türkiye’de Kürtajı Ele Aldı: ‘Yasal olsa da neredeyse yasaklı’ [The Guardian Covered Abortion in Turkey: ‘Legal but Almost Prohibited’] (2022) Independent Türkçe. Available at: https://www.indyturk.com/node/528686/d%C3%BCnya/guardian-t%C3%BCrkiyede-k%C3%BCrtaj%C4%B1-ele-ald%C4%B1-yasal-olsa-da-neredeyse-yasakl%C4%B1 (Accessed: 07 August 2023). In addition, in 2012, Erdoğan as the prime minister overtly stated his opposition to abortion, he resembled abortion as murder. For his statement on the abortion issue, ‘Her Kürtaj Bir Uludere’dir’ (2012) ntv.com.tr. Available at: https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/her-kurtaj-bir-uluderedir,z1M5Y2zmwEu6drogItVkiA (Accessed: 07 August 2023).
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wearing shorts are open to grumbling, with their choices subject to debate77 . Furthermore, the unilateral withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, which aimed to combat domestic violence and protect women’s rights, illustrates an apparent disregard for such issues.
As Zubaide (1996:15) described, the manifestation of Islam in Turkey exhibits remarkable diversity in ideological meaning and institutional forms. It extends far beyond politics, finding more profound development in the social and cultural domains. Islam in Turkey is effectively structured through various institutions, encompassing trade unions, business associations, foundations, media outlets, and educational initiatives, leaving an indelible mark on every facet of life. Consequently, this entrenchment renders detachment from the individual’s identity a formidable challenge.
These days, the AKP, with the increasing visibility of Islam, came into power since the 2002 election and achieved several reforms to meet the EU standards while attempting to shape the Islamic way of life through legal amendments and regulations. The bid to criminalize adultery and ban abortion failed. However, the wearing of headscarves and growing bears were allowed in public and official spaces, mixed gender classes and dormitories were closed, drinking alcohol in public was prohibited, adult content websites were blocked, and religious high schools were directly or promoted.
From a Muslim in private life to acting following Islam, we can discern that Islam is no longer a marginalized or overlooked culture within the principles of the Republic. It has become the dominant force in a divided society. This is like a déjà vu; the
77 The related statement was from former Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım when he was asked about an attack on a short-wearing woman in Istanbul. Yıldırım commented, “It is not something that a normal person would do You might not like it, but you can mumble about it...”. The quote is from the news: Başbakan’dan şortlu kadına saldırı için skandal yorum: hoşuna gitmeyebilir, mırıldanırsın [Scandalous comment from the Prime Minister regarding the attack on a woman in shorts: You might not like it, but you mumble...] (2016) Cumhuriyet Gazetesi. Available at: https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/basbakandan-sortlu-kadina-saldiri-icin-skandal-yorum-hosuna-gitmeyebilir-mirildanirsin-603808 (Accessed: 07 August 2023).
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authoritative regime in the early days of the Republic excused themselves to achieve Turkey’s secular modernization for democratic purposes. However, on the path towards democratic reforms, the realization of ‘religious freedom’ became a shackle imposed by secularists upon themselves78.
The resurgence of political Islam exacerbated secularists’ insecurity much as the Westernization reform was ostracizing pious believers. Given that the Republic Protests (Cumhuriyet Mitingleri) in 2007, the nationwide Gezi Park protest in 2013, and the military coup attempt in 2016 to some extent reflected secularists’ repulsion to AKP’s gradual Islamization and determination to protect the secular system in Turkey. These incidents were a collective response to defend the erosion of secularism somehow. The clash between Islam and secularism became fierce, and people were grouped reductively into secularists and Islamists.
Alişer Delek, a reporter, cynically manifested that society was torn because of people who stand on a moral high ground (according to religion) to criticize different thoughts and behaviors other than their own. He called this moral policing, and he wrote,
Both sides belittle, criticize, or dislike each other based on moral values. Moreover, each claims to be moral.[…] We find ourselves caught between those who consider themselves virtuous because they perform religious prayers and those assumed to be enlightened/intellectual because they consume alcoholic beverages. However, forming a new community (congregation) while disliking society and disregarding the superiority of universal moral values goes down in history as a dark stain on humanity79.
78 After years in power, Erdoğan’s religious background has become more pronounced, and confident, which confirmed the long-standing suspicions of secularism. In the meeting with Chris Morris (2005:62), Erdoğan was questioned as fundamentalist and he replied, “We are not a party based on religious value. When I am at home, I am a Muslim; when I am in office, I work for democracy.” In 2019 President Erdoğan made a speech on the occasion of the religious council’s closing ceremony, he said, “If religion does not influence a person’s life, one may fall into the mistake of imbuing their actions with religion over time. Therefore, Islam is not according to us; we will act according to Islam.” *Anadolu Ajansı [ Anadolu Agency] (2019) Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: İslam Bize Göre Değil, biz ı̇slam’a Göre Hareket Edeceğiz [The president Erdoğan: Islam is not according to us; we will act according to Islam], YouTube. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v80YpZ-I1cI (Accessed: 31 January 2024).
79 Delek, Alişer. “Ahlakçılık Terörü [ Moral Policing] .” Independent Türkçe, 18 May 2020, www.indyturk.com/node/181016/t%C3%BCrkiyeden-sesler/ahlak%C3%A7%C4%B1l%C4%B1k-ter%C3%B6r%C3%BC. Accessed 30 Jan. 2024.
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The disparity of cultural, social, political, and economic capital revealed ideological divisions in Turkey. The secularists have always suspected the Islamist- -root parties and have never been convinced by their liberal, democratic appearance. To these days, the AKP, with the increasing visibility of Islam, ironically has banned (religiously) immoral activities that exactly the early CHP made the same (guarding secularism) in reverse. The ideological fights now turned into politicized issues, resulting in the emergence of disparate factions or camps concerning their Islamic and secular identities among individuals.
Islamists are currently in a period of ascendancy. For secularists, their once cherished way of life is not only under threat, but even those who strongly identify as secular find their resistance to Islamists tempered by their religious beliefs. Secular advocates now hold onto symbolic founding principles but lack the influence and authority to advocate or implement solutions effectively. Any engagement with the revered symbols of either faction, whether religious or Atatürk-related, runs the risk of being viewed as sacrilegious by both sides, contributing to societal division.
6.3.2 The New Taiwanese but Ethnically Chinese
This section will discuss the societal divisions resulting from the ongoing de-Chineselization and examine the ethnic, social, and political backgrounds to understand the inclination toward opposition groups with different identification (either China or Taiwan). It will also analyze the factors behind the escalating discrepancies in identity while technologies and communication should harmonize and embrace diversities.
Generations and Social Backgrounds
After World War II, Taiwan’s identity experienced drastic shifts due to the disruptions in the nation-society structure, leading to changes in how people identified themselves (Wu 2016:73–74). The initial Taiwanese identity formed in the late Japanese colonization period but transformed into a Chinese identity, after sovereignty was transferred to the ROC after the war. The KMT’s internal colonial
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rule swayed the unsettled Chinese identity. After the harsh suppression of the 228 Incident, local Taiwanese elites leaned towards a non-Chinese Taiwanese identity.
With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and in collaboration with the United States, Taiwan underwent a series of efforts to promote a monopoly of Chinese national identity. It was only during the democratic reforms that repressed collective memories resurfaced in history, prompting a renewed focus on identity. The societal division in Taiwan, resulting from the muddled identity discourse, traces back to involuntary regime changes exacerbated by democratization.
The KMT’s authoritarian regime employed Greater China ideology and orthodox Chinese culture, making Taiwan’s indigenous culture distinctiveness invisible and non-existent. For most local Taiwanese, acquiring social and economic status required embracing Chinese culture, speaking Mandarin, and identifying as Chinese. Aside from the mainlanders who migrated to Taiwan with the KMT military, the Great Chinese ideology cultivated a generation (aged 50-60 or older) staunchly identifying themselves with Chinese culture. These individuals, deeply ingrained in their beliefs, see themselves as Chinese but view Taiwan as part of China. They often regard anyone asserting a Taiwanese identity as a betrayal of their roots and an extremist activist.
On the other hand, for those born after the lifting of martial law and coming of age during the democratization process (aged 30-40), their educational years were largely shaped by the discourse of Taiwanese subjectivity. This upbringing has influenced a tendency toward a ‘Taiwanese’ identity. Notions of being descendants of the Chinese, heirs of the dragon, and other narratives tied to being Chinese descendants are often seen as scripts from textbooks or tales told by elders. Exposure to various foreign cultures, particularly American and Japanese influences, has added diversity to their cultural and value perspectives. Additionally, the economic boom of the 70s and 80s, with vibrant developments and desires to explore new stuff, instilled confidence in many regarding their homeland.
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Lin’s (2020) thesis analyzes Taiwanese identity using birth generations as independent variables. His cross-comparative research data demonstrates that the political and social backgrounds of different generations influence the national identity of the Taiwanese. For those born between 1956 and 1968, the majority identified as both Chinese and Taiwanese (42%-51%). The generation born between 1964 and 1979 showed a stagnation in dual identification, with lower and decreasing tendencies toward Taiwanese identity compared to other generations. This period coincided with the KMT’s Greater China ideology, leading to an increasing inclination towards Chinese identity. The post-1980 generation witnessed a growth in Taiwanese identity (52%), and the generation born after the lifting of martial law (1988-1996) exhibited a substantial increase in identification with Taiwan (62%-78%).
Even though more than half of the Taiwanese population identifies as Taiwanese rather than Chinese (as depicted in Figure 3.4.1), the other half fluctuates between identifying as Taiwanese and Chinese. Despite the ongoing shift in mainstream public opinion towards a more Taiwan-centric identity, a consensus on the definition and components of Taiwanese identity is still elusive (Cheng 2013:121). The internal inconsistencies and contradictions between Taiwanese and Chinese culture in terms of identity perception exerted significant differences in politics and elections in Taiwan.
Politicized Culture
The complexities surrounding Taiwan’s national and ethnic identity have become intensely political. What initially centered on advocating for ethnic equality and citizenship rights has evolved into constructing a unique Taiwanese culture. This shift aims to accentuate the distinctions between ‘us’ (Taiwanese people) and ‘them’ (Mainlanders and Chinese), ultimately seeking to establish a brand-new national identity. Those who believe in Chinese national consciousness despise this politicized identity, viewing Taiwanese as unequivocally Chinese in terms of culture, language, customs, and ethnicity.
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The de-Chineselized Taiwanese identity is seen as severing ties between Taiwan and the Chinese, as well as abandoning part of their culture, which they foreignized as ‘Chinese’ culture; all these amount to betrayal of the Chinese nation. These critics, thought-provokingly similar to the PRC’s political propaganda, argue that Taiwanese identity is no more than a manipulated and fabricated story for Taiwan’s independence. Conversely, proponents of Taiwanese identity accuse those with pro-China sentiments of being manipulated by the KMT, claiming their Chinese national emotions are illusory (Hsiau 2012:333–34).
In recent times, Taiwan’s deepening social divide has gone beyond just generational gaps; it is significantly fueled by the politicization of identity and culture. The KMT’s China legacy (no matter which China it is) narrative and the DPP Taiwan-centric stance have become excessively politicization and subjective, leaving little room for diverse interpretations. For example, those aligning closely with or supporting the DPP get labeled as the ‘Taiwanese faction’ or ‘local faction.’ At the same time, those in competition with the DPP often get tagged as the “pro-China faction” or “non-local
Table 6.3 1 The Identity Background in Social Cleavages
Background Factors
Taiwan
Turkey Chinese Identity Taiwanese Identity Islam Identity Secular Identity
Groups
50 year-old and Above, (Old) KMT Elites
40 year- old and Younger Generation, Local Taiwanese
Rural Inhabitants, New Islamic Elites and Intellectuals
(old) Kemalist Elites, Urban Bourgeoise Ideologies Great China, Unification Taiwanese Subjectivity, Unique and Diverse Culture Islamism, Conservativism, Populism Secularism, Modernity,
Politicized Tags
Selling Taiwan, CCP Compatriots Authoritarianism,
Pro Independent, War Provocateur,
Religious, Reactionary, Unilluminated
Unbeliever, Immoral,
Political Preferences KMT and Pan-Bule Camps DDP and Pan-Green Camps AKP CHP
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faction.” Similarly, backing the KMT is linked with opposition to Taiwanese independence, anti-war sentiments, and advocacy and loyalty to the ROC. In Taiwan, political parties arbitrarily define and interpret groups, deciding who is considered to ‘love Taiwan,’ who is accused of ‘selling out Taiwan,’ and who is recognized as Taiwanese. This process tends to hinge more on subjective perceptions than objective realities.
The relation with the PRC is the determined external factors contributing to the social division in Taiwan. The evolution of Taiwan’s stance on China, from being the only representative of an intensely anti-communist China to the concession to the ‘One China policy’ and the ‘92 consensus’, has raised perplexing questions about Taiwan’s identity and its relationship with China. Along with the looming threat of China’s military invasion, agitation between Taiwanese and Chinese identity intensified. The debate revolves around whether Taiwan is still part of China and, if so, which China it belongs to; if not, how to redefine Taiwan but not trigger a potential military conflict.
PRC’s overt and tacit interventions in Taiwan’s politics and elections profoundly influence the Taiwanese people’s identity. In the first direct presidential election in 1996, the PRC tried to militarily deter the candidate- Lee Teng-hui, an advocator of
Taiwanese national consciousness, from being elected. The war in the Taiwan Strait is on the brink of breaking out.
However, Lee won and became the first direct elected president of ROC. The result partially reflected Taiwanese people’s antipathy toward the PRC’s threat and an increasing trend of Taiwanese consciousness. Moreover, the level of support for reunification reached an unprecedented low (18.8%), whereas the endorsement of
independence increased (20.5%). Similarly, back in 1997, when the PRC reacted to Lee’s ‘Two-State Theory’ with both verbal and military threats, the surge in favor of independence reached its zenith (28.1%)80.
80 中華民國大陸委員會中華民國大陸委員會[Mainland Affairs Council ROC]. “電訪民意調查電訪民意調查 歷年來民眾統獨立場歷年來民眾統獨立場之變化之變化 [Telephone Based Opinion Poll on Changes in the Public Stance on Reunification and Independence throughout the Years] .”中華民國大陸委員會中華民國大陸委員會[ Mainland Affairs Council ROC].
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Exploring the idea of national unity in the context of de-Chineselization in Taiwanese identity brings two main aspects into focus (Liu 2005:159). The first involves the intricate relationship with China, while the second looks at the complexities of national identity among the Taiwanese. The interactions with the PRC can immediately reflect and influence Taiwan’s sentiment of nationalness. Such as the PRC’s ongoing claim of sovereignty over Taiwan inevitably pushes Taiwanese identity further away from its Chinese roots.
Undeniably, the societal divisions in Turkey and Taiwan are influenced by multifaceted socio-political factors. The processes of de-Chineselization and de-Islamization have resulted in identity confusion and heterogeneity, standing out as the most apparent debated focal point for the societal division. The varying levels of resistance and degrees of acceptance among the population have led to the segmenting of groups with opposing identities. The opposing ideologies remained distinct and did not blend or absorb each other over time. Once in power, each group tends to defend and reinforce the ideology of their own goods. Therefore, failure to make compromises between the predominant and entropy-resistant parties foresees the worsening of the social cleavage. Moreover, the meant-to-be-eliminated cultural elements- Chinese and Islam lurking beneath the dominant identity discourses, wait for the opportune moment and environment to launch a comeback.
6.3.3 The Epitome of Social Cleavage: Elections
Political parties typically utilize the most robust issues of concern as their political agenda; their identification often becomes a social identity with partisan beliefs that differentiate them from other groups. Such collective identity and consciousness rather than political ideologies, through which individuals feel a sense of belonging to specific groups along with political awareness and ideologies, significantly polarize their support or rejection of political parties. Hence, voters’ perceptions of
2001. (https://www.mac.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=921BBB6CB6654CE9&sms=EE2481E0941D4B90&s=C048AA52F7FC862F)
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Figure 6.3 1 Presidential Elections Political Party Distribution in Taiwan
51.6
51.6
31.04
31.04
38.61
38.61
33.49
33.49
2.76
2.76
12.83
12.83
4.26
4.26
26.46
26.46
45.63
45.63
56.12
56.12
57.13
57.13
40.05
40.05
54.3
54.3
58.2
58.2
64.3
64.3
62.8
62.8
42.1
42.1
37.7
37.7
32.5
32.5
33
33
2012
2012
2016
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2020
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2024
2024
RATE
RATE
YEAR
YEAR
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS' PARTY
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS' PARTY DISTRIBUTION IN TAIWAN DISTRIBUTION IN TAIWAN
Pro-China KMT
Pro-China KMT
Middle (PFP-TPP)
Middle (PFP-TPP)
Pro- Taiwan (DDP)
Pro- Taiwan (DDP)
Taiwanese Identity
Taiwanese Identity
Both and Only Chinese
Both and Only Chinese
Resource: 中華民國中央選舉委員會 [Central Election Commission, Taiwan, ROC]. “2012, 2016, 2020, 2024總統副總統選舉概況 [The Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election Overviews for 2012, 2016, 2020, and 2024].” 選舉及公投資料庫 [Elections and Referendums Database]13 Jan.2024,
db.cec.gov.tw/Visual/President?dataLevel=N&legisId=00&typeId=ELC&subjectId=P0&themeId=4d83db17c1707e3defae5dc4d4e9c800. Accessed 26 Jan. 2024
Note: The hue of the bar reflects the representative color associated with the respective political party. PFP was considered one of the major divisions of the pan bule camp known for their positive and friendly attitude toward China. In the presidential elections in 2013, 2016, and 2020, the PFP candidate declared a relatively ambiguous neutral attitude toward China to stand out from the opposition. In the 2024 election, the TPP was the third power besides KMT and DDP. TPP candidate sought a centrist position to win swing voters’ ballots as many as possible.
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party differences and stances strongly reflect mass political polarization (Lauka, McCoy, and Firat 2018:108). During election campaigns, political parties manipulate the public’s political sentiments by steering their focus toward identity through appeals and emotional calls, deepening society’s polarization. The following analysis aims to understand the voting choices made by Turkish and Taiwanese voters amid conflicting identities, using the results of presidential elections.
The political parties’ appeals and interests are shaped by cultural identity, which reciprocally intensifies the inner group’s cohesion and distances the other groups. This type of political group cohesion is usually formed by general labeling of ‘other’ with stereotypes and negative campaigns. In some extreme cases, the political party in the office can convict the opposing party of violating the value or belief that would jeopardize national integrity (Ertugay 2022:33). As we can observe from both cases, during the election campaign, labeling us and other with positive and adverse tags, which allocate diverse people into two contradictory poles. Two polarized groups will seek to maximize the interests and demands of their respective communities through social and political activities.
Since the outset of the de-Chineselization process, Taiwanese consciousness has been at the core of the debate on which the choice of ethnic identity, national identity, and the future of the country is led. The cross-strait relationship, sparked by the binary opposition of Taiwanese versus Chinese national identity, has consistently been a pivotal issue influencing presidential elections. The KMT featured a more obscure stance on interpreting China- whether it is the ROC in Taiwan or unified China in the future. They also agreed on the One China Principle, with different explanations harboring high anticipation and friendliness towards cross-strait relations, without viewing China as a potentially aggressive adversary (Yu 2006:152,153). On the contrary, DDP commonly refers to Taiwan as ‘our’ country, utilizing local symbols to show their care for Taiwan’s safeguarding, sovereignty, and upholding democratic
constitutional governance forms the basis for opposing reunification and the One China principle (ibid. 2006:154–57).
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Cheng’s (2009, 2013:16–17) studies on Taiwanese identity as the independent variable analyzed people’s choices in the presidential election. She deduced that an individual’s national identity significantly affects whom they will vote. The survey shows that the higher the Taiwanese identity of the voters, their support for the DDP candidate would increase. This tendency portrays DDP’s consistent stance on promoting Taiwanese identity vis-a-vis the Chinese identity that caused DDP to fail to attract middle voters. Contrariwise, those with less Taiwanese identity (ambiguous or tend to Chinese identity) and the pan-blue camp would not vote for DDP due to its conspicuous Taiwanese nationalism.
Scholars have pointed out that political party competitions heavily influence Taiwan’s identity issues. The identity of the pan-blue camp is linked to a Chinese consciousness and cultural sentiments towards China, showing a causal relationship. On the other hand, the pan-green camp’s identity is positively correlated with de-Chineselization, Taiwanese subjectivity, and a sense of Taiwanese identity. Both sides leverage their advantages and employ negative campaign strategies to marginalize the other on relevant issues, seeking maximum interest, for instance, marginalizing Taiwanese identity as advocating for Taiwan independence, which is portrayed as a threat to the stability of the Taiwan Strait, or marginalizing Chinese identity as selling out Taiwan, showing carelessness for Taiwan. These political manipulations led by competitions have resulted in social cleavage while most of the population has recognized themselves as Taiwanese (Chang and Huang 2011:48–50).
Islam identity and affiliation have never been so lively brought up as political propaganda after the multi-party democracy was employed. Political parties are compelled to emphasize their belief to meet the demands of their loyal supporters, also as an inviolable moral sword to slash their opponents. Given that a significant portion of voters in Turkey identify as conservative and religious, it becomes a strategy for parties to emphasize and use religion as their primary political discourse to draw ballots.
Back in the outset of the party period, several religious-infused parties like DP, MSP, RP, FP, and SP played the Islamic card to gain public support, especially during the
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elections (Göl 2009:803; Zubaida 1996:11). These Islamic-oriented political parties displayed the strategic changes of Islamic movements from a cultural/ social phenomenon to a vigor political actor seeking to obtain power and reconstruct the society (as cited in Yavuz: 2003 Kumbaracibasi 2009:157–58). A similar scenario and script have unfolded in Turkey since the AKP ran for the general election in 2002 and the presidential election in 2014. Rhetoric like ‘preserving Islamic cultural traditions’
Resource: All election results and details are on the Supreme Election Council’s webpage.
T.C.Yüksek Seçim Kururlu [Supreme Election Council]. Seçim Arşivi [Election Archive]. www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/secim-arsivi/2612. Accessed 26 Jan. 2024
Note: In this chart, other political parties with different agendas were elicited to highlight CHP and AKP’s opposing ideologies and their supporters. Turkey only changed to the presidential system after the 2017 referendum, before that the president was only a symbolic leader. The first direct presidential election was held in 2014, it is meaningful to discern the population’s ideological preference. Since the president elected in 2014 did not have real power and CHP made a coalition with MHP, nominating a common candidate surprisingly with religious organizational ties, the result of the general election amplified the previous election.
51.79
51.79
40.8
40.8
52.59
52.59
49.52
49.52
38.44
38.44
20.95
20.95
30.64
30.64
47.82
47.82
0
0
20
20
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40
60
60
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100
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120
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2014
General Election 2015
General Election 2015
2018
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2023
2023
Rate
Rate
Years
Years
Presidential and General Elections' Party Ballots DistributionDistribution
Pro- Islam AKP
Pro- Islam AKP
Secular CHP
Secular CHP
Figure 6.3 2 Allocation of Political Party Ballots in Turkish Elections
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and ‘protecting Atatürk’s secular legacy’ are commonly used arguments by opposing political camps.
In addition, individuals’ identities become evident in their voting preferences. According to the Konda report in 2018 on AKP’s supporters’ profile (Uncu 2018:20–23), a significant majority of AKP supporters considered themselves conservatives (89% and 78% among the educated middle class), with 69% identifying as religious and 18% expressing strong dedication to their faith. Furthermore, 87% of female AKP supporters practiced head covering, including headscarves, turban-style, or full-body coverings. On the other hand, among CHP supporters, 60% unequivocally stated they would never vote for AKP, 59% identified themselves as modern, and 60% of female supporters did not wear head coverings. Additionally, 50% of CHP supporters only identified as believers, and 6% even identified as atheists (Doğan 2018:13, 14, 28). The survey implies that secular voters are more inclined to vote for the CHP, whereas individuals with a stronger connection to religious traditions are likely to support AKP. Divided identities crystallize through political party ideologies, as a speech made by Erdoğan in 1994,
You cannot be both secular and a Muslim. You will either be a Muslim or secular. When both coexist, it is as if they repel each other like opposite magnets. Both cannot exist together. In such a situation, it is not possible for someone who declares themselves as a Muslim to come back and say at the same time that they are also secular81.
The intricate interplay between opposing religious sentiments, political preferences, and generational gaps highlights the divisive landscape of Turkish politics. Here, individuals’ identity with secularism or conservative religion significantly influences personal choices and the ideologies of political parties that form party solidarity, deepening societal polarization and discord. The main divisions in both Taiwan and
81 Original Turkish text, “Hem laik, hem Müslüman olunmaz. Ya Müslüman olacaksın, ya laik. İkisi bir arada olduğu zaman adeta ters mıknatıslanma yapar. Mümkün değil, ikisinin bir arada olması. Durum böyle olunca ben Müslümanım diyenin tekrar yanına gelip bir de aynı zamanda da laikim demesi mümkün değil.” Source: TarihUnutmaz. 2013. “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: "Hem Laik Hem Müslüman Olunmaz [One Cannot Be Both Secular and Muslim].” Youtube. January 22, 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zJC-nUV4WrQ.
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Turkey are centered around the concept of national identity before and after the detachment of cultural elements, which reciprocally influence political discourse and polarize the contrast identity to the opposite ends of the spectrum. Political parties in these nations frequently exploit and emphasize certain identities (Chinese versus Taiwanese and Islamic versus secular) to garner votes and consolidate inner party identity, further exacerbating the division of societies. Liu (2005:133-134,167) stated that the advent of party politics within democracy has failed to eliminate cultural binary divisions; instead, it has amplified societal discord and fractures.
Presidential elections in both countries manifest people’s ideas and interpretations about their national identity, as the elected candidate would wield substantial influence over future cultural identity development. Nevertheless, it is imperative to recognize that the nuanced social, political, and cultural contexts exert an influence on voters’ choices and inclinations, thereby shaping the policy direction. The policies and values advocated by the elected leader have the potential to mold a cultural identity, either strengthening or diminishing the influence of specific cultural traits. For instance, the KMT aligns with Chinese culture, the DDP with Taiwanese culture, the CHP with secularism, and the AKP with Islamic culture. Ultimately, election outcomes reflect public stances on national identity and significantly shape cultural identity through the policy decisions of the elected leadership.
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION
National identity, often relegated to the recesses of collective consciousness, emerges as a latent yet potent force capable of forging profound unity among disparate individuals. When ignited, it possesses the unparalleled ability to unite strangers under a shared banner. In such instances, the emphasis on commonalities through nationalist rhetoric, rather than highlighting substantial disparities, catalyzes cohesion, rendering distinctions between us and woe. In this context, national identity lies dormant until it is awakened through nationalist rhetoric when circumstances demand its activation. It is the initiation of national identity formation, in general, and applicable to our case study.
Following the preceding notion, this comparative national identity study began with the theoretical presumption of modernism and constructivism in building a national identity as an aspect of nationalism realization; the constituents of nations are malleable to be imagined (Anderson 1983), invented (Hobsbawm 1983), or banal in daily activities (Billig 1995). Even ethnic distinctions can be the creations of social interactions and acceptances that maintain social integration with discrete categories (Barth 1969:9). Both Taiwan and Turkey tried to demonstrate controllability over their cultural characteristics by eliminating certain undesirable cultural traits. Following this, they endeavored to justify and make this claim believable by following a pattern akin to modernist approaches.
Modernist nationalists propounded different scenarios and concepts in (re) creating national identity; the two cases in this study suggest that even under significant influence and pressure, cultural making and creation in national identity construction are not without limitations. “The cultural materials, not just lots in the bags awaiting drawing, will constrain the framework for national identity construction (Cederman 2000:11).”
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On the other hand, the experiences from ‘detaching,’ or in sociological terms- deconstructing the historically embedded cultural elements for building national identity help to rediscover all other explicit or hidden factors in national identity formation with detailed information. The two cases offered an ‘elimination method’ to ascertain the essentiality of certain cultural elements. “The overturning is necessary for how people conceive things,” the method and ideas provided by Çalış’s analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy (Çalış 2021:10–11). This concept also applies to identity formation by removing specific attributes of essential cultural elements, people can truly understand and recognize who ‘we’ really are.
From a reverse layout in making a new national identity by eradicating historically embedded ethnic and cultural elements from national characteristics, it is much easier to investigate complex ideological backgrounds, ideas, and the motivation of the actors before and throughout the process by asking why they decided to discard the embedded cultural element. Taiwan’s international status, complex relationship with China, and intricate colonial experiences have made people aware of the incongruity between reality and their imagined Chineseness. The indigenous Taiwanese culture was suppressed in favor of the ‘other’ nationalist identity. It was only with the advent of democratization that the emergence of Taiwanese nationalism, fused with indigenous culture, became the predominant discourse shaping Taiwan’s identity in contrast to China. In Turkey, constructing national identity has involved deliberately removing cultural elements incompatible with the state’s vision of Turkishness. Republic under Atatürk embarked on a campaign of modernization and secularization; all-inclusive reforms such as Turkish language, history, dress, and customs were promoted as symbols of national unity.
Intellectuals and elites, representing diverse cultural and political ideas, sought endorsement for their respective identity narratives among the wider populace (Wu 2016:72). Ideally, they all aimed to have a harmonious and balanced convergence between societal and national identity concepts would ensure stability. However, their methods varied because their social-political status limited their capabilities to implement the changes. In our scenario, military elites with victorious military
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campaigns and local intellectuals promoting indigenous culture emerged prominently, shaping the national identity embraced passively or actively by the populace.
The de-Chineselization movement in Taiwan originated from the literary endeavors of intellectuals, precipitating a shift in identity amidst the dissonance between reality and ideology. The populace grappled with apprehensions stemming from China’s rise and threat, prompting a quest for alternative paths. De-Chineselization entailed overturning the authoritarian monolithic culture, while forming Taiwanese identity involved embracing pluralism and rediscovering indigenous culture.
Conversely, in Turkey, the process of de-Islamization took a different trajectory but carried its rationale. Spearheaded by the core elite in establishing the republic, they had the authority but not the publicity to implement a series of Westernization policies. This top-down cultural indoctrination overlooked the existence of internal cultural and ethnic diversity and people’s high allegiance to religion. The loosening of societal controls could easily provoke a backlash and societal division.
In addition, the new formula of national identity may be insufficient (Taiwanese culture as sui generis) or debatable (compatibility with Western modernization) to bond individuals as a solidary nation. In our case, offering compelling alternatives or redirecting people’s reliance on removed culture is essential. The prevailing mainstream often marginalized divergent identity groups, and these suppressed cultural identities did not vanish. Instead, they resurfaced during moments of historical upheaval, challenging the existing dominant identity within the structural fissures of time (Wu 2016:74).
The cliché inference on globalization and the development of information technologies will integrate the diversities, and ultimately, a homogenous culture will take over. Similar expectations for reconciliation and internalization of national identity are in conjunction with these circumstances. With the convenience of acquiring information, knowing and understanding ‘us’ and ‘others’ hidden algorithms and push notifications in social media and online videos. Also, technological developments provide opportunities to find diasporic cultural ties.
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However, the piled information shown to us presents who we are and what our inclinations create a virtual echo chamber; gather must be underlined that globalization and communication technologies do not lead to the assumption of cultural homogenization. Instead of gradual assimilation or acculturation within the nation-state territories, what usually appeared were antagonistic communities, each ideologically contradictory.
In terms of outcome, firstly, let us consider the most straightforward mathematical problem. The Turkish people have been practicing Islam for over a millennium. Turkish and Islamic cultures have influenced each other over time, leading to mutual influence or the localization of religion. In Taiwan, the identification with Chinese culture can be traced back to the immigrants from the southeastern coast of China in the 17th century, coupled with the education on the Greater China consciousness by the KMT after World War II. In relative comparison, the continuity required for shaping identity between these two cultures differs, with Islam having a deeper impact on the Turkish people.
The most pronounced duality in identity in present-day Taiwan and Turkey arises not from primordial ethnicities but from the deliberate manipulation of cultural narratives through detachment. This leads to the formation of distinct factions based on contrasting ideologies: the dichotomy between Taiwan and Great China consciousness and the divide between secularism and traditional Islam. Adherents of these divergent ideologies strategically exploit cultural and political issues to garner maximal support. The advancement of information dissemination has further solidified the insular nature of these ideological enclaves, inevitably resulting in clashes when they intersect.
Individualism has become more prominent than tradition in the case of identity perceptions. Competing camps can use the advantage of information transmission to touch on an individual’s preference for national identity. Even the potent implementations by dominant groups or institutions (re)making national identity, national identity is, as a matter of fact, the result of personalized choices (Pedersen
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2008:52). Personal preferences, thus, can be a robust belief to shake the ground of the existing national identity if united.
Taiwan can be considered quite successful in its de-Chineselization efforts in national identity; as demonstrated in the previous chapter, 62.8% of people identify as Taiwanese (Figure 3.4 1). What is more, ‘China’ has become a highly sensitive term among advocates of Taiwanese identity, where anything related to China is often seen as a compatriot of the Chinese Communist Party or a traitor of the country.
Apart from the fact that de-Chineselization originated from grassroots social movements with public consent, subsequent governments have broadly followed Taiwanization to garner voter support. China’s military threats reiteratedly foisted their grand Chinese nationalism on Taiwanese people. China and its hostile nationalism have been the significant other that have further reinforced the distinct consciousness and identity of the Taiwanese not to be the Chinese they used to be.
Taiwan’s identity is uncertain as it grapples with defining itself internally while asserting its de facto independence internationally. This ambiguity stems from its Chinese linguistic and cultural heritage. “Taiwan is the only society of Chinese descent that implements Western democratic systems. (Shih 1993:91)” This cliché highlights Taiwan’s paradoxical sense of pride in its democratic freedoms (contrasting the ‘real’ Chian) while embracing its identity as part of the Chinese cultural sphere. Taiwan must clarify its values and position within its distinct Chinese cultural context.
The DPP-nominated candidate won in the January 2024 presidential election, breaking the tradition of Taiwan’s elected presidents serving only one consecutive term under the same party. The DPP’s victory in the presidential election can be primarily attributed to its candidate’s clear stance on Taiwan’s independence, contrasting with the KMT and TPP’s intimate diplomatic policies with China. The cross-strait relationship, intertwined with national identity, emerged as the core issue of the election campaign. The DPP’s return to power signifies the triumph of Taiwanese consciousness over Chinese nationalism among voters.
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Turkish secularism has been weak in creating a secular social ethos strong enough to achieve subjective secularization due to the reductionist assumption that Islam can be cut off from the public sphere and private life (Keyman 2007:223,226). In contrast, Islam maintains a significant presence across various aspects of social, political, and group interactions; Islam sustains a moral and symbolic standard in shaping Turkish people’s identities. Religion remains a highly adhesive marker in the identity of Turkish people. Unlike Taiwan, which faces a clear external threat, interpretations of religion in Turkey are more contingent upon ideological debates among different groups. With the resurgence of Islam in Turkish identity, Kemalist secularism has gradually become a marginalized minority.
The pro-Islam political party grasps the expectation among people for their government to establish social justice based on the principles of ‘primitive Islam’ while also acknowledging the modern trends of nationalism and democratization. The broader society welcomes a creative reconciliation between secular and non-secular perspectives. The AKP, a pro-Islamist political party that has held power for two decades, strategically appeals to devout voters through religious rhetoric, morality, and the freedom to exercise religious activities, often criticizing secularists as lacking morality during AKP gatherings.
A recent Twitter video sought to unite Turkish people with fellow Muslims, initially aimed at tempering nationalist sentiments towards Arabic tourists in Turkey by emphasizing religious commonality under the banner of the Caliphate. However, the video’s proclamation of “We are one nation (Biz tek milletiz)” seeks to unite diverse Muslim ethnic groups- the very bondage that the Republic of Turkey had endeavored to emancipate itself from. Despite attempts to foster a unified identity based on shared religion, some people resist the idea of a unified nation predicated on historical Islamic religious affiliations82.
82 @Gercek_Hayat. “BİZ BİR MİLLETİZ. Türk gazetecilerden İslam alemine çağrı [WE ARE ONE NATION. Turkish news reporters’ calling to the Islamic World].” X post. 2023 Sep 22. (https://twitter.com/Gercek_Hayat/status/1705297167395561594?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1705297167395561594%7Ctwgr%5Ed77c6a6c823964ec001a2df0
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The rhetoric of multiculturalism has been the core of Taiwanese consciousness and national identity. The advocators attempt to fill the blank left by the Chinese culture by integrating and embracing diverse local cultures for a unique Taiwanese identity. Nevertheless, Islamic presence makes this a different journey in Turkey. A return of Islam was a populism urge juxtaposed with the secular elites and their ideas within an inner-multicultural perspective. Multiculturalism policies resting on a religious morality have been a staple of populist parties, such as Islam- root DP, RP, and AKP. “They are indeed a central lynchpin in the populist worldview. For them and their supporters, they distrust the secular elites to protect the core of the society (Kymlicka 2016).”
Despite gradually cultivating a unique cultural ethos and identity in Taiwan, its trajectory remains significantly influenced by the unresolved question of its relationship with China. The schism between Taiwan and Greater China consciousness has emerged as a pivotal fault line within Taiwanese society. On the other hand, since its inception, Turkey has grappled with the tension between secularization and Islamization. The secularist principles championed by Atatürk, the founding father, wrought significant changes in Turkey’s traditional cultural fabric. However, since the 1980s, Islamic influences have steadily gained prominence, with parties espousing religious orientations ascending to political power. The contestation between religious liberty and secularism has become a defining fault line in Turkish society.
Shedding ingrained cultural elements has engendered significant societal and political divisions in both countries. While there is a contemporary inclination towards embracing multicultural inclusivity as a concession of the suppressive mono-cultural implementation, multiculturalism has its own dilemmas. Certain supporter groups (if massive, they can organize into populist groups) of the eliminated cultural element may inevitably exploit the guise of multiculturalism to bolster their influence, potentially evolving into formidable separatist factions.
23ca05b2c21abc30%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.birgun.net%2Fhaber%2Fiktidara-yakin-gazetecilerden-arap-dunyasina-mesaj-biz-tek-milletiz-470659)
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Forming a shared identity through embracing diverse cultures requires the gradual accumulation of time and an environment where various cultures can coexist and prosper. It also provides an opportune space for the inclusion of different cultures. Besides, keeping different cultures in equilibrium is the essential precondition if one culture predominates over others; the pre-existing pattern of assimilation or independence can be foreseen.
Maintaining balance among all cultural elements and groups requires cooperation and supervision by institutions and civil societies. Due to the electoral nature of governments, they inevitably ingratiate their target supporters when devising policies, leading to a symbiotic relationship between populist tendencies and policy decisions that primarily cater to their supporters’ preferences. For instance, the AKP rose to office with its promising democratic and economic reforms. However, once they were steadfast in power, more austere, less tolerant policies were employed. Therefore, third-party oversight and advocacy are crucial in maintaining a balanced and diverse cultural landscape.
On the other hand, despite the ongoing contention between the secular and Islam in Turkey’s politics and society. Yet, in general, patriotism and Turkic affinity remain relatively robust among the Turkish populace, sometimes surpassing religion’s influence when urgent. This can be attributed to the success of nationalist education and the prevalence of symbols and icons of the nation and ethnicity in everyday life (martyrs, national flags, commemorations of wartime victories, portraits of Atatürk, etc.), which integrate the collective national identity of diverse cultural groups. When it comes to shaping Turkish nationalism, which centers on Turkic heritage, highlighting the uniqueness of Turkish civilization, history, and language, and embracing broad reforms by moving away from religious traditions and adopting specific ways of expressing ideas, all provide valuable insight that Taiwan could draw upon.
In Taiwan, national identity generally lacks deeply ingrained factors such as religion, ethnic ties, and other cultural traits that can create a foreground for collective identity. After shedding Chinese cultural influences, Taiwan’s identity remains relatively slim
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and weak in terms of the shared culture that creates a sense of nationhood. Confronting with PRC or Chinese people, only a modest institutional/ state identity can indicate Taiwanese. For some people who do not have empathy with Chinese culture, de-Chineselization would not matter or less matter; for others, de-Chineselization means losing their identity. The problem of identity in Taiwan, situated between the dilemma of de-Chineselization and Taiwanization, presents significant contradictions in determining the essential components of the national cultural community. Consequently, relying on multicultural pluralism becomes essential to counterbalance the influences of Great China-centric ideologies and the threat China poses.
Furthermore, resorting to coercive measures to eradicate entrenched cultural traits has indeed proven to be quite effective (such as the secularization under the Atatürk regime and the Chineselization during the KMT regime in Taiwan). However, a singular and authoritarian national cultural template usually disregards and suppresses different ethnicities and cultures within the borders of a nation. Once the government loosened its control, for example, under a democratic system, the previously imposed mono-national culture and identity can be overturned by popular will (as seen in Taiwan’s de-Chineselization and the rise of Islamic politics in Turkey). It also becomes susceptible to political parties making accommodating policies and narratives under the influence of populism.
The quest for a definitive national identity remains ongoing in both cases, reflecting a collective search for their respective identities’ core components and significance. Yet, reshaping these identities involves navigating the complexities of removing entrenched cultural elements, leading to ontological contradictions and practical conflicts. Achieving at least a nationally satisfying right national identity appears increasingly elusive amidst such challenges.
In short, removing historically embedded cultural elements to establish a new national identity aligns with contemporary nationalist discourse on nation-building. Because modern states are composed of diverse cultures and ethnicities, the original, singular cultural traits are often complex to uphold without modification to fit modern
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national identity constructs. A unified national identity emerged only when a prominent enemy, like the PRC, appeared in Taiwan.
The comparative analysis of the two countries shows that the cultural attributes shaping national identity can be adjusted to some extent but fail to achieve unity. Taking detaching embedded cultural elements as the exaggerated means of the modern national identity construction, even with the assistance of bureaucracy and modern communication equipment and systems is very difficult to achieve a homogenous national identity. As discussed earlier, employing more drastic measures like a top-down method to remove cultural elements would encounter backlashes or resistance. Primordial cultural ties, especially those embedded in defining national culture and groups, are not eligible at national elites’ disposal. It may resemble what Smith defines as a ‘national ethnic myth’; ethnic ties can be reshaped to conform to modernist claims of adaptability to fit national identity models. No matter what, there is a necessity for primordial cultures to some degree in constructing national identity. We should admit that no matter how modern the nation is, nations are communities with ethnic ties and shared traditions, and there must be continuity from the past to sustain solidarity.
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APPENDICES
A. CURRICULUM VITAE
PERSONAL INFORMATION
Surname, Name: Ting- Ya, Hsu
EDUCATION
Degree
Institution
Year of Graduation
Ph.D.
METU Area Studies
2024
MS
METU European Integration
2011
BA
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
Major: Turkish Culture and Language
Minor: Diplomacy
Honor English Program
2009
WORK EXPERIENCE
Year
Place
Enrollment
2019- Present
Various Translation Offices
Freelance Translator
2012 Aug
Taipei Taiwan District Court
Court Interpreter
2011 Feb
Taipei Economic and Culture Mission in Ankara
Intern
FOREIGN LANGUAGES
• Very Fluent in Turkish (CEF C1)) • Very Fluent in English
• Native Chinese and Taiwanese. • Beginner Korean
PUBLICATIONS
•Conference Paper: Social Cleavage After Remaking National Identity: Case of Un-Islamized Turkey and Un-Chineselized Taiwan, Published in 11. ICOPEC 2020: International Conference of Political Economy June 24-26, 2020
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B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZETI
Bu çalışmada, ulusal kimliğin bir kavram olarak teşkilinde, iki ülkenin mukayeseli olarak süreçleri yer almaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye’de, İslami ilkelere dayanan kanuni ve yönetimsel temellerden uzaklaşılıp cumhuriyetin kuruluş yıllarında laik, demokratik bir yapıyı seçmesi, ayrıca, Tayvan’da da Geleneksel Çin kültürünün unsurlarının,yeni temelenen milli kültürden uzaklaşması ve dönüşümünü konu almaktadır. Geçmiş İslami gelenekçi kültür ve geçmiş Geleneksel Çin kültürü, uzun vadede Türkler ve Tayvanlılar için ulusal kimlik, kültür ve günlük yaşam temelli bileşenleri içinde barındırır. Aynı zamanında farklı bireyleri bir gruba veya bir millete birleştirmekte en güçlü unsurdur. Hatta primordiyal bakışı destekleyen bilim insanlarına göre, bu kültürel unsurlar ulus devletin kuruluşda ve yaşamasında elzem temellerdir. İki uzak, farklı kültürden ülke örnekleri ele alınarak; cumhuriyet öncesi süre gelen baskın kültürel yapısını dönüştürmesinin sebepleri, sosyal ve politik arka planlardan oluşan ideolojik ve beşeri dönüşümünü karşılaştırarak orta menzilli teori kurmaya çalışmaktadır.
Ulusal kimlik soyut bir kavram değildir; aksine, güçlü bir eksende, bireylerin sosyal konumu, iç politik kimliği ve dünyada kim olduklarına dair yorumları gibi karmaşık unsurları içerir. Ulusal kimlik açısından kim olduğumuzu söylemek için kendi farkındalığ ına sahip olmaktır; bunu belirlemenin en basit yolu, ait olduğu grup üyeleri arasında paylaşılan ortak özellikleri vurgulamaktır. Ama bu özellikler karşılıklı olarak belirlenir, tek başına var olsalar da kimlik oluşturmaz. İnsanların kendilerini algılama şekillerini ve birbirlerini nasıl gördüklerini ve bunun tersini nasıl yansıttıklarını gösterir. Bu bakış açısından, kimlik gerçek ve etkindir, çünkü bireylerin toplumsal konumları ve dünya görüşleri sürekli bir değişim,dönüşüm içindedir.
Ayrıca, ulusal kimlik ile sivil vatandaşlık kavramlarının aynı olmadığını belirtmek gerekmektedir. Örneğin aynı pasaporta veya kimliğe sahip olan insanlar kültürel köklerinden dolayı farklı ulusal kimlik veya anlayışa sahip olabilirler. Bunun dışında
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çoğu modern ulus devleti aslında çok ulusludur. Devlet toprakları içinde tek bir etnisitenin bulunması çok nadirdir. Gel gelelim, tek etnik unsurdan oluşan bir ulus olsa bile, ulusal kimlik anlayışı hakkında farklı hatta çelişkili bir yapıda olabilirler. Bu tür bilişsel farklılıklar toplumsal bölünmelere yol açabildiği gibi yalnızca etnik kökenli düşünce farklılıkları da yalın anlamda gözlemlenebilir.
Kapsamlı bir anlayış için belirlenen zaman çerçevesinde tarihsel, siyasi ve sosyal bağlamların derinlemesine analizi merkezinden, ulusal kimlik oluşturmanın içinden yayılacaktır. Her bir durumu belirli bir zaman dilimiyle sınırlamak önemlidir. Türkiye için, çalışmanın zaman çerçevesi erken Cumhuriyet dönemleri ve sonrasında görülen etkileri inceleyen dönemleri ele alcaktır. (1923-1938 arasında), ki bu dönemde Kemalizmin, ideolojik etkisi ile cuhmuriyet öncesi anlayışlardan uzaklaşılması anlamında en baskın dönemdir. Tayvan’daki Etnik Çinleştirilmeme sürecinde ise zaman aralığı, demokratikleşme ile Tayvan bilincinin doruğu olan dönemi (1980-2000 arasında) ele alarak belirlenmiştir.
Weber’ın ideal tipleri, karşılaştırmalı analizinin araştırma sorusu, yapıların oluşturulmasına yardımcı olabilir ve ayrıca farklı olayları ve durumları ortak belirli özelliklerde tutarak Tayvan’ın ve Türkiye’nin durumlarını karşılaştırılabilir ayarlara getirebilir. İdeal tip kavramı, ulusal kimlik inşasından çıkarımlar yapabilir ve gerçekleri ilişkilendirebilir. Bu ideal tip, farklı durumlardaki nedensel değişkenleri anlamak için ulusal kimlik oluşturan paylaşılan kültürel işaretlere dayanmaktadır. Ulusal kimliklerini belirleme konusundaki sınırsız olasılıklardan bir çıkış yolu bulmak için, yapısalcı ve sembolik etkileşimci sosyoloji etkisi altındaki milliyetçilik ve kapsamlı yapıcı yaklaşım, karşılaştırmalı analizin gerçekleştirilebileceği ortak zeminde ulus-devletleri, ulusal kimlikleri ve sahiplerini bağlamak için sağlam bir teorik araç olacaktır.
Bu nedenle, bu çalışma ulusu ve bireyi ulusal kimliğin işlevsel alanı olarak bir araya getirecek, ulus kavramını, tekrarlanan günlük aktiviterler ve rutinler aracılığıyla milli iradece doğrulanan ve içselleştirilen bir yapı ile açıklayabilir. Ulusal kimliğin analizini çağdaş veya geleneksel milliyetçilik sınırlarının ötesinde genişletmek gerekmektedir; çünkü bu iki düzey arasındaki etkileşim, aktörlerin kararlarını ve
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(yeniden) oluşturulan yapıları belirler. Ulusal kimlik, temel olarak bireylerin kabul etmesini gerektiren bir yapıya sahiptir. Bu bağlamda, yapı ve birey, ulusal kimlik oluşumunda birbirleriyle karşılıklı etkileşim halindedir. Bu çalışmadaki kimlik sorusu evrensel bir yapısal genelleme iddiasında bulunmaz; bunun yerine, mevcut teoriyi genişletebilecek alternatif kavramlar ve modeller sunma amacındadır. Tayvan’da ve Türkiye’de ulusal kimliğin karşılaştırmalı bir analizi, geleneksel batı modelini test etmek için derin tarihsel ve kültürel bilgiler temelinde yapılacaktır.
Kimlik sorusunun özü, ulusal kimliği tanımlamak ve bireyler ile ulusal çerçeve arasındaki karmaşık ilişkiyi anlamaktır. Ulusal kimlik, bireyler ve gruplar tarafından sayısız kombinasyonların ve etkileşimlerin bir koleksiyonudur. Bireysel ve kolektif olarak farklı ideolojilere ve kültürlere verilen tanım ve tepkiler, toplumsal yapıları ya dirençle karşılayabilir ya da dönüştürebilir. Dolayısıyla, ulusal kimliğe erişmenin en iyi yolu, bireyi ulusun bir vasatı değil, aktif bir ferdi olarak değerlendirmemiz gerekmekterdir.
Tabii ki, biyolojik genetik özellikler insanların ulusa olan bağlılığını yeterince tanımlayamaz. Etnik bağlar, modern ulusu oluşturan unsurlardan sadece biridir; ulusal kültür, etnik ve tarihi bağlar ile toprak, ortak yasal haklar ve tüm üyeler için ortak görevler gibi sivil unsurlar içerir. Ayrıca, grup farklılıkları, hatta toplumsal anlam yüklenmiş fiziksel farklılıklar bile, kültürel olarak, genetik olarak aktarılmazlar. Dil, kültürel miraslar, vatan ve tarih gibi etnik unsurlar, elitlerin ve otoritelerin insanlara yeniden üretmek için bir şablon oluşturmak için kullandıkları bir alet kutusu ve hammadde haline gelmiştir. Bu bağlamda kan bağı, akrabalık yoluyla olan biyolojik bağ, önemli değildir. Amaç, muhteşem geçmişi yeniden oluşturmaktır ve soy, belirgin kültürel nitelikler ve erdemlerle tasvir edilecektir.
Birbirini neredeyse hiç tanımayan insanlar arasında bir birlik yaratabilmek için, bilim adamları, grup kimliğinin üç aşamasını belirtmişlerdir. İlk aşamada, seçim- elitlerin/bireylerin kendilerini diğer gruplardan ayıran bir kimlik oluşturmaları için mevcut kültürel kaynak havuzundan uygun olan kültürel unsurları seçebilmektedir. İkinci aşamada, asimilasyon- bireyler, eğitim veya günlük uygulamalar aracılığıyla kimlikle ilgili normları ve paradigmaları gönüllü veya zorla öğrenmeye
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başlayabilirler. Son olarak, üçüncü aşamada, çoğaltma, bireyler kimliğe yanıt verir ve aidiyet duygusu belirgin hale gelir. Bu duyguyu içselleştikten sonra, bireylerin bilinç altında ulusal faaliyetleri uygulama şeklini yönlendiren ulusal bir fikri oluşturabilirler. Bu üç aşama genellikle milliyetçi yaklaşımlar tarafından gerçekleştirilen ulusal kimlik inşa sürecini özetler.
Hem Tayvan’daki hem de Türkiye’deki cumhuriyet dönemi hükümetleri veya güç kazanan politik grublar, geçmiş dönem kültür yapıdan sıyrılarak, yeni ulusal kimliklerin yeniden inşası için farklı takım unsurları seçmiş ve sonra benimsemişlerdir. Ayrıca, ulusal kültürlerini stratejik olarak şekilendirmiş ve tarih kaynaklarını yeniden düzenleyerek ulusal birliği aşılamış ve yeniden üretmişlerdir. Eğitim sistemi, kamu medyası ve sair sosyal kurumlar, ‘asimilasyon’ yeni ulusal kimlik kazanımı programını uygulamak için etkili kanallardır. Bu çalışmanın vakalarında, iktidardaki savunucular, kurumlar ve sistemler aracılığıyla ayrılmış kültürel unsurları yaymak için yetkilerini kullanmışlardır.
Tayvan’ın nüfusu dört farklı etnik-kültürel grup insandan oluşur: çoğunlukla Han Çinlileri (%95 civarı), adanın ilk sakinleri olan az sayıda Austronezya yerli halkı (%2,5) ve yeni göçmenler (%2,4). Çoğunluk olan Han nüfusu, kökenlere ve dillere dayalı olarak Hoklo, Hakka ve Sonradan Gelen Çinliler (iç savaşında kaybeden KMT’le birlikte gelenler) olarak üçe ayrılabilir. Homojen bir kültür olan çoğunluk Han etnik bağları üzerine sağlam ulusal dayanışma inşa edilebilir, ki bu etnik ve kültürel bağlar aslında çoğu Tayvanlı tarafından paylaşılır. Bununla birlikte, Tayvan’da büyümüş ve yetiştirilmiş olan Tayvanlılar, Kıta Çin’den uzakta, etnik ve kültürel farklılıkları ile dönüşmüş bir yapıya sahiptir.
Tayvan’ın toplam nüfusunun %2’si Austronezya aborjin azınlıklar, aslında adanın ilk Tayvanlılarıdır. Temelde, yerleştiklerin coğrafya’ya göre ovalı ve dağlı aborjinler olarak iki grubu ayrılmaktadırlar. Ancak, onların öz kültürleri ve dilleri, çoğunlukla Han Çinlilerinin nüfusu ve kültürü nedeniyle marjinalleştirilmiş ve asimile edilmiştir. Bu durumda, azınlık nüfusunun %2’si, hatta azalan bir nüfus bile, Tayvan’ın kimliğini oluşturmada neden önemli olabilir sorusu önem kazanmaktadır. Son
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zamanlarda çok kültürlülüğün ve Çinlileştirmemenin yükselişiyle, aborjin kültürü, Tayvan kültürü için gerekli bir ek veya güçlendirici olarak kabul edilir.
Yirminci yüzyılın başlarında, Tayvan’ın güneydoğu sahil eyaletlerinden gelen Han Çinli göçmenler, adanın güneybatısında, 1624-1661 yılları arasında Hollanda’nın hakimiyeti altındayken kalıcı bir yerleşim yeri olarak kurmuşlardır. Çin göçmenleri, tarımsal faaliyetler için temel taşlardır ve yüzyıllar boyunca Tayvan’ın tarım sektörüne temel oluşturmuşlardır. Hollanda yönetimi aynı zamanda Tayvan’ın demo-kültürel dokusunu da değiştirdi, çünkü erkek Çin göçmenleri genellikle yerli aborjin kadınlarla evleniyordu. Hollanda Doğu Hindistan Şirketi’nin vergi kayıtlarına göre, sömürgeci yönetimlerinin sonunda, 1661’de Tayvan’da yaklaşık 25.000 ila 30.000 Han Çinli nüfus bulunmaktaydı. Günümüz Tayvan milliyetçileri, genellikle eski dönem Hollanda yönetimindeki döneme de atıfta bulunmuşlar ve Tayvan’ın Çin mirasıinı küçümsemişlerdir.
Muhalif Han Çinlilerinin ikinci dalgası, Ming hanedanının 1644’te düşmesi ve Mançu (Qing) Hanedanın gelişiyle Tayvan’a kısım kısım göç etmeye başladı. Tayvan, Qing Hanedanı’na karşı bir askeri üs haline geldi ve eski Ming destekçisi general Zheng, Çin’i yeniden fethetmeyi umuyordu. Zheng, 1662’de Hollandalıları Tayvan’dan sürdükten sonra, o ve ordusu Tayvan’da ilk Han-Çinli rejimini kurdu. Batı sömürgeciliğinin sonuna ve Tayvan’daki Çin varlığının başlangıcına böylelikle adım atıldı. Bu dönemde, Han nüfusunun yerli nüfusu aştığı ilk dönem olduğu varsayılmaktadır. General Zheng’in torunları 1683’te Qing Hanedanı’na teslim oldular. Tayvan, tarihinde ilk defa Çin’in bir parçası oldu. Bununla birlikte, göçmen akışı devam etti. Sonrasında Tayvan, İmparatorluk Japonyasına teslim edilmeden önce, yerel soy ve inanç topluluklarının gelişmesiyle anavatan Çin’den farklı bir yerleşik toplum haline dönüşmüştü.
Tayvan’daki çoğunluk Han nüfusu hiç homojen değildir. Farklı kökenlerden gelirler ve farklı lehçelere sahiptirler. Ve yakın zamandaki ‘Dört Etnik Grup’ söylenim aslında Tayvan milliyetçileri’nin hayal ürünüdür ve sübjektif bir sınıflandırmasıdır. Kültürel farklılıklar, karşılaşmalar hatta çatışmalar, grup sınırlarını belirleme kriterinden biridir. Yüzyıllar boyunca evlilikler ve temaslar sonucunda, Han Çinlileri arasındaki
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ayrımı belirlemek artık çok zordur. İç grup kimlikleri, bireylerin öznel tutumlarına ve yaşam tarzlarına dayanarak algıladıkları etnik kimlik anlamına erişme üzerine kurulmuştur. Tayvan’ın etnik çoğunluğunu oluşturan Han Çinli grubu, kökenlerini anladıktan sonra, bir sonraki adım olarak, eski yerleşik Tayvan Han Çinlilerinin içindeki kültürel ve dilsel farklılıkları neden yok ettiğini, neden daha birleştirici bir Çin kimliği oluşturmadıklarını, aksine farklı tarihî koşullarında Tayvan kimliğini nasıl oluşturduklarını konu olarak ele alacağız.
Sömürgeleşme dönemi acı deneyimleri ve altyapılarının modernleşmeleri, Tayvan kimliğinin oluşumuna katkıda bulunur. Japon eğitimi, bir kolonyal siyasi aygıt, yeni neslin düşünme, eylem ve tarihsel bilincini sivil değerler ve milliyetçiliğin yükselişiyle şekillendirdi ve yönlendirdi. Tayvanlı entelektüeller, kültürel ve etnik olarak Tayvanlı bir kimlik çağrısında bulundular. Bazı akademisyenler, Tayvan öznelliklerinin, Tayvan ulusal kimliğinin prototipi ve Çinlileştirmeme sürecinin başlangıcı noktası olarak sömürgecilik döneminden kaynaklandığına inanmaktadır.
Elli yıl aşkın süren sömürgecilik ve asimilasyon politikalarıyla, modern eğitim sistemleriyle, Tayvanlılar o dönemde Japonlaştırıldı, ancak zihinlerinin içinde bir şekilde atalarının geldiği ülkenin vatandaşı olmaktan mutlu oldular. Ancak, yozlaşmış KMT Hükümeti Tayvanlıların Çin’in vatanseverliğini bir nebze söndürdü. Sonrasında ana kıtadan gelen KMT Hükümetinin Tayvan’a komple çekilmesi ve Tayvanlı yerel halka ekonomik ve sosyal açıdan eşitsiz muameleler uygulaması, dayatılan Çin kültürü ve zorla Çinli olmaya zorlanması, toplumsal hareketlilik ve tepkilere neden oldu. Ancak, hükümetin baskıcı politikaları altında, Çinleştirme eğitimi oldukça başarılı oldu ve Tayvan’ın bilinçli destekçileri yeraltına çekilerek fırsat kollamaya başladı.
KMT hükümeti, milli birliği pekiştirmek için tek kültürlülüğü benimsemiş olsa da, diğer tarafta yerel kültür, dil ve tarih göz ardı edilmiş ve ayrımcılığa uğramış, başka bir deyişle Çinlileşmek iç kolonyalizm tasvir edilmiştir. Çinlileştirme politikaları, antropolog Keesing’in ‘kültürün fetişleştirilmesi’ olarak tanımladığı gibi, yerel kültürelde geleneklerin kaybolurken fetişleştirilmiş kültürel geleneğin kutsanmasını dramatize eder. Çin kültürünün canlanması, geçmişin anılarından ziyade siyasi alan
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altında kültürel inşanın bir ürünüdür. Japonlaşma ve Çinlileşme süresinde, yerli Tayvan kültürüne hep baskı yapılmıştır. Baskı altındaki Tayvanlıların yakın bir gelecekte uynanarak kendi kültürel benzersizliğini takdir etmelerine ve Tayvan milli kimliği prototipi oluşturmalarına olanak tanımıştır.
Yurt içinde, uluslararası baskı ve köklü değişiklikler altında, KMT’nin yöneticileri siyasi ve sosyal reformlara girişerek Tayvanlı bilincin ortaya çıkması için alanlar açtılar. 1990’larda, daha sivil anlayışlı bir kimlik politikası doğrultusunda Çinliliştirmemenin ve Tayvanlı kültürünün benimsemesine bir çağrı daha oldu. Demokratikleşme ve normalleşme, Tayvan bilincinin toplu uyanışına öncülük etti. Bunun yansımalarını Tayvan yerel edebiyatında da görebiliriz. Daha sonra, bağımsızlık yanlısı DDP, 2000’de ilk başkanlık seçimini kazandı. O zamandan beri, Tayvanlı bilincindeki taban hareketlerinin gücü resmi bürokrasiye devredilmiştir.
Diğer vakamız, Türkiye’ye bakıldığında, eski gelenekçi İslami bakış Türk halkının ulusal kimliğini oluşturmada önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Türkiye’nin dini toplumsal bakışını, kültürünü ve siyasetini kontrol etmede en etkili görünmez el oldu. Türklerin İ slam’a dönüşü bin yıldan fazla bir süredir devam etmektedir. İslam, modern Türk ulusal kimliğinin oluşumunda, diğerlerine göre daha kalıcı bir kültürel unsurdur. Türklerin İslam’a dönüşü, uzun süreçler sonucunda gerçekleşmiş bir kültürlenme sürecinden kaynaklanmış olup, İslam’ın statüsünü kuşku götürmez hale getirmiştir. Ayrıca, İslam sadece metafizik bir teoloji değil, aynı zamanda yaşam kılavuzu olup farklı etnik Müslümanları birleştiren bir yönlendirmedir. Birçok Türk bireyi için Müslüman olmak kimliğin doğal bir parçası olarak görülür.
İ slam sadece bireysel veya özel hayatta hüküm sürmekle kalmaz, aynı zamanda politikalarla da ilişkilendirilir ve iddia edildiğine göre diğer Müslümanlar arasındaki sadakati veya bağlılığı artırır. İslam’ın neden böyle bir çekiciliği veya bağlılığı sürdürdüğ üüne dair Bernard Lewis (1988:4–5) iki açıklama sunmuştur; birincisi, çoğu Müslüman ülkede İslam kimliği ve bağlılığı başlıca belirleyici bir unsur olarak hizmet eder. İkincisi, İslam yönetim için bir meşruiyet kaynağı sunar. Burada yöneticinin otoritesi yalnızca milliyetçiliğe güvenmek yerine İslam’dan meşruiyet
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alarak sürdürülebilirlik kazanımı anlamına da gelir. Ayrıca, klasik İslam’da dinî kurumlar ile devlet arasında bir ayrım yoktu. Bu nedenle, İslam’ın dinî ve hukukî prensipleri birleştirmesi sosyal ve siyasi sistemleri büyük ölçüde etkilemiştir.
Batı’nın güçlenmesi ve modernleşmesiyle yüzleşen Türk Müslümanlar, İslami gelenekleri ile medeniyet güçleri arasındaki uzlaşmazlıkla karşı karşıya kaldılar ve hangi medeniyete uyum sağlamaları gerektiği sorusu ortaya çıktı. Tarih boyunca Türk halkı, İslam topluluğunda önemli bir rol oynamış ve kültürlerini din, siyaset, hukuk, sanat, toplum ve yönetim dahil olmak üzere çeşitli yönlerde şekillendirmişlerdir. Bu kültürel unsurlar, paylaşılan bir İslam mirasının kalıcı izlerini taşımaktadır. Müslüman Türkler, kültürel miraslarını ve bununla birlikte kültürel gelişmenin hızını nasıl dengeleyebilirler sorusu burada önem kazanır.
Osmanlının son yılarındaki reformlar, fiziksel modernleşme ile imparatorluğu canlandırma çabalarını ortaya koydu. Tanzimat ve Genç Osmanlıların anayasa reformları, modern devlet sistemi ve ordunun temelini attı. Tanzimat reformu, gayrimüslimlere modern sivil vatandaşlığı verip İmparatorluğa entegre etmeyi, gayrimüslim toplulukların milliyetçi duygularını ve etnik bir kimliğe kavuşmalarını azaltmayı amaçladı. Tanzimat dahil olmak üzere reformlar, Batı sistemleri benimsemeyi, laik okullar kurmayı ve hukukun üstünlüğünü teşvik etmeyi amaçladı.
Modern Türkiye’nin kurucusu Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, seküler kurumlarda eğitim aldı. Onun ilkeleri - Kemalizm olarak bilinen, pozitivist ideoloji ve yaşamın nihai doktrini, sosyal alanda dini etkiyi azaltmayı ile bilimsel kuralları önceliklendirmeyi amaçladı. Metafiziği ve dini dogmaları göz ardı ederek, Türk toplumunda laik ve bilimsel değerlere dayalı bir yapıyı kurmaya ve geliştirmeye çalıştı. Atatürk, pozitivizmi benimseyerek, deneysel kanıtların, mantıksal düşüncenin ve eleştirel düşüncenin önemini vurgulayarak, batıl inançları, dogmaları ve çağdışı inanç sistemlerini benimsemedi. Böylece, bilim, temelsiz dini ideolojinin üstesinden gelecek ve insanlık tarihinde yeni,modern bir dini bakış olacaktı. Onun vizyonu, laik ve modern bir Cumhuriyet ve Türk milleti kurulması esasına dayandı.
Atatürk, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin kuruluşu sırasında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’ndan gelen, geleneksel İslamî yönetim yapısını değiştirmek amacıyla çeşitli reformlar
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gerçekleştirdi. 1924 yılında, Osmanlı Hanedanı’nın siyasi ve dini liderliğini temsil eden halifelik makamı resmen kaldırıldı. Ayrıca, hukuk alanında da reformlar gerçekleştirdi ve İsviçre Medeni Kanunu model alınarak, modern bir medeni kanun kabul edildi. Bu, Türkiye’nin artık laik bir cumhuriyet olarak yönetileceğini ve din ile devlet işlerinin tamamen ayrılacağını gösteren önemli bir adımdı. Onun dışında iki ek yasa uygulandı. Şer’iye ve Evkaf Vekâleti kapatıldı. Dini eğitim veren okullar (medreseler), tarikatlar yapılı kurumlar ve dervişhaneler kapatıldı. Dini eğitim veren liseler, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı’nın yetkisi altına alındı.
Sekülerleşme süreci, dönemin CHP’sinin diğer politikalarından daha radikal olarak uygulandı. Din faktörü, önceki dönemde birleştirici bir inanç ve uygulama sistemi sunuyordu. 1920’lerdeki hukuki ve sistemsel reformlar, 1930’lara gelindiğinde, daha derin toplumsal ve kişisel özgürlük alanları oluşturup, modernleşmenin tanımlnmasında önemli bir temel oluşturdu. Sekülerleşme reformu 1930’larda doruğa ulaştı. Bu dönemde yaşam tarzı özelinde ve günlük uygulamalarda daha kapsamlı bir modernleşme sağlandı. Reform kavramı, toplumsal ve kültürel reformlar ile ekonomik kalkınmayı içerecek şekilde genişledi.
Tercih edilen bu yeni modernite, laik Türk ulusal, kültürel oluşumunu daha kalıcı kılmalıydı. Modern bir ulus yalnızca laik bir devlet sistemiyle sürdürülemezdi; bu nedenle modernleştirilmiş bir nüfus içeren laik bir toplumu, kalıcı temellere oturmak gerekmekteydi. Bu amaçla, dini tarikatlar, tekke, manastırlar ve dini figürler olan ayrıksı cemaat türbelerinin kapatılması, toplumda ve insanların yaşamlarında daha ziyade devletçi anlayışta dini etkinin azaltılması amaçlanmıştı.
1928’de Osmanlı Arap alfabesi, Latin harfleri temeline dayanan alfabeyle değiştirildi. Harf İnkılâbı, Türkçe’yi batılı gelişmiş medeniyetler seviyesine yaklaştırarak modernleşmeyi kolaylaştırmak ve daha laik ve Batı odaklı bir ulusal kimliği teşvik etmek açısından etkili bir sembolik anlama sahipti. 1932’de kurulan Türk Dil Kurumu, Türk dilindeki Arapça ve Farsça etkileri azaltarak sadeleştirmek ve Türkçeyi daha öz bir hale dönüştürmeyi temel bir misyon olarak hedeflemekteydi. Belirli günlük dil ifadeleri, daha öz bir Türkçe bir yapıyı özümseyerek, eski dini
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gelenekçi etkilerinden uzaklaştı. Dil reformu Türk halkının gelecek nesillerini derinden etkiledi.
Kılık kıyafet reformu ise toplumsal modernleşmede bir diğer önemli etmendi. Cumhuriyet öncesi kılık kıyafet kültürü, dini tarikatlare bağlılık ile kazanılan ayrıcalıkların işaretlerini de içeriğinde barındırıyordu. Detaylar ve aksesuarlarda değişiklikler olmasına rağmen, insanların giyim kuşamları aynı zamanda kimliklerini ve belirli bir topluluğa aidiyetlerinide ifade ediyordu. Erkekler için Fes, sarık kullanımı, kadınlar için türbanlar, Müslüman olmanın ve kutsallığın sembolüydü. Tüm bu sembolik anlamlara sahip giyisiler, yapılan reformlarla bir dönüşüme uğramış ve modernleşmede önemli bir adım daha atılmıştı.
Günlük yaşamın rutinlerini, modern batı normlarına uydurmak için yapılan diğer değişiklikler arasında haftanın dinlenme gününün Cuma’dan Pazar’a değiştirilmesi, Gregoryen takvim ve güneş saatinin benimsenmesi ve metrik sisteme geçiş yapılması bulunmaktaydı. Soyadı kanunu ile bir soyad alınması teşvik edildi. Bu da insanların Türk ulusal kimliği algısını şekillendiren bir diğer faktör oldu. Bu dönüşüm süreci, modern ulus-devletlerde yaygın olan çağdaş milliyetçilik kavramlarıyla bir Türk kimliğinin oluşturulmasında derin bir rol oynamıştır.
Modern, laik bir ulus-devlet inşa etmenin yanı sıra yeni bir ulusal kimlik oluşturmak ve Türk nüfusu arasında paylaşılan bir kültürel çerçeve oluşturmak süphesiz, temel amacı teşkil etmekteydi . Osmanlı döneminde İslami kültürün baskın etkileri nedeniyle Türkler, avrupa aleminde eski tabirle barbar olarak görülüyordu. Eski dönemlerde, toplum baskn bir kader inancına sahipti ve toprak sahiplerine veya liderlerine sadık kalmaktan başka seçenekleri olmadığına inanılıyorlardı. Ancak, bu eski gelenekçi düşünceler, toplum kitlelerinde kısmen değişti ve Türk kelimesi yeni ve farklı bir anlam kazandı. Bu reformlar, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun ve son osmanlı dönemi İslami toplumsal bakışın, tarihsel miraslarından bağımsız yeni bir kimlik duygusu oluşturmayı amaçlıyordu. Böylece süreç modern ve birleşik bir Türk toplumunun yolunu açıyordu.
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Modernleşme sürecinde batıcılar, Batılılaşmanın hayatta kalmak için gerekli olduğunu savundular, ancak muhafazakârlar kesimlerce bu durum tepki ile karşılandı. Reformları, hem yakın düşüncedeki meclis üyelerinden ve hem de muhalefet kanadından karşı çıkışlar oldu. Cumhuriyet öncesi eski İslami öğeleri modernleştiren reformlara karşı çıkan muhalefet en belirgin olanıydı. Kadıoğlu’na göre Türkiye’nin ulusal kimliğinde dini egemenliği azalma çabasının yetersiz ve yüzeysel olduğunu iddia etti. Farklı kimlik anlayışından Kemalist elitler ile halklar arasında uçurum yaratıldı, bunu merkez-çevre, egemen-yabancılaşmış, modern ve İslam gelenekçilerin ilişkilerini gösteriyor. Kent elitleri ve entelektüeller, Batı medeniyetine yakın reformist fikirlere maruz kaldılar ve süreçte adapte oldular. Ancak, kırsal Anadolu’daki kitle nüfusu, ulemanın aile ve kişisel konularda hakim olduğu İslam geleneği ile yakın ilişki içinde kaldı. Ulusal kültür ve kimlikteki belirsizlikler, modern laik bir vatandaş kimliği oluşturmak düşüncesi, halk arasında ve politik arenada karşı kampların polemik tartışmalarına neden oldu. Bireysel düzeyde, Türk vatadaşları dünyevi olarak yeni modern reformlara hazır olmasalarda, zihinsel ve manevi olarak hala eski dönem osmalı islami geleneklerini düşünsel olarak yapılarında taşımaktadırlar.
Türkiye’nin, cumhuriyetin kuruluşuyla birlikte modern batılı bir kimliğe kavuşması ve Tayvan’ın yenilikçi modern bir kimleğe erişmesi tarihsel olaylar ve ideolojik arka planda incelendiğinde, her iki sürecin de ulusal kimliği yeniden tanımlama ihtiyacıyla dış baskılara ve içsel değişimlere tepki olarak ortaya çıktığını görüyoruz. Türkiye’nin modernleşmesi, öncelikle Cumhuriyet’in ilk yıllarında Atatürk’ün liderliğinde gerçekleşmiş olup, toplumun çeşitli alanlarında eski osmanlı gelenekçi İslami etkiyi azaltarak ülkeyi modernleştirmeyi ve laikleştirmeyi amaçlamıştır. Bu süreç, daha modern ve milliyetçi bir Türk kimliği oluşturmak için yönetimi, eğitim, dil ve kültürel uygulamalarda kapsamlı reformları içermiştir. Buna karşılık, Tayvan’ın yeni bir kültürel kimlik kazanması sürecinde, 1980’ler sonrası meydana gelen uluslararası dışlanma ve içi dönük siyasette demokratikleşme çabaları arasında yaşanmış olup, KMT’nin Çin’i temsil etme iddiasına meydan okuyarak ayrı bir Tayvan kimliğini savunmuştur. Temelde, yerel seviyedeki hareketler ve entelektüel tartışma, halkın yerelleşme ve Tayvan kültürünün korunması yolunda duygusal bağlantısını harekete
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geçirmekte kritik bir rol oynamıştır. Sonuç olarak Çin kültürü dışında değişik bir Tayvan ulusal kimliğinin ana fikrinin ortaya çıkmasına yol açmıştır.
Her iki vakada da, Türkiye ve Tayvan güçlü ‘diğer’ aktörlerle uluslararası arenada etkileşimler sırasında ulusal kimlik inşasının karmaşıklığıyla mücadele etmiştir. PCR’in Çin’i tek temsilci olarak tanıyan BM kararları ve Türkiye’nin toprak sınırlarını ve egemenliğini tanımlayan Lozan Antlaşması, ilgili ulusal kimliklerin seyrini şekillendiren önemli unsurlar olmuştur. Türkiye’nin Avrupa’ya karşı devam eden ‘diğer’ algısı, dini ve kültürel farklılıklarla pekiştirilmiş olup, batı önyargıları çerçevesinde kimlik yönlendirme sürecinde yaşanan sürekli zorlukları vurgulamaktadır. Benzer şekilde, Tayvan’ın Çin yönetim ve ideolojik baskısına karşı belirgin bir ulusal kimlik iddiasını ileri sürme mücadelesi, kimlik oluşumunu şekillendirmede dış algıların ve jeopolitik dinamiklerin önemini vurgulamaktadır. Genel olarak, her iki durum da, tarihsel miraslar, dış baskılar ve iç dinamikler tarafından etkilenen ulusal kimlik inşasının dinamik ve çok yönlü doğasını göstermektedir.
Vatandaşlık kavramı, bireyler ve devlet arasındaki karşılıklı hak ve sorumluluklarla şekillenen bir aidiyet anlayışıyla örtüşmektedir. Tarihsel ve kültürel çeşitliliğe rağmen, modern devletler, vatandaşları diğerlerinden ayıran kriterlere dayalı olarak vatandaşlığı tanımlamaya çalışırlar. Genellikle demokrasi ve insan hakları gibi değerleri vurgularlar. Ancak, bu yaklaşım kültürel karmaşıklıkları göz ardı edebilir. Atatürk döneminde Türkiye’nin laikleştirme çabaları ve yeni şekillenen Türk ulusal kimliği üzerine yapılan tartışmalarda olduğu gibi. Bilim insanları, çeşitli etnik ve dini sınırları aşan daha kapsayıcı bir "Türkiyeli" vatandaşlık için çağrıda bulunurken, farklı grupları ulus-devlet içinde entegre etmek için çokkültürlü vatandaşlık çağrılarına yankılanmaktadır.
Benzer şekilde, Tayvanda, Japon ve Çin asimilasyon politikalarının tarihsel etkileriyle birlikte kimlik inşasıyla mücadele etmektedir. Demokratikleşmenin ardından, Tayvanlılaştırma çabaları, Tayvan vatandaşlığını paylaşılan değerler etrafında yeniden tanımlamayı amaçlamakta, aynı zamanda ülkenin çokkültürlü mirasını da kabul etmektedir. Ancak, farklı kültürel bağlantıları uzlaştırma ve
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birleştirici bir ulusal kimlik geliştirmek konusunda zorluklar devam etmektedir. Çokkültürlü vatandaşlık yolculuğu, yerli ve bölgesel kültürlerin tanınması ve korunması ile sosyal uyum ve kapsayıcılığa doğru bir yol sunar, ulusal kimlik ve entegrasyonun karmaşıklıklarını yönetirken.
Türkiye ve Tayvan’da üstten aşağı ve alttan yukarı yaklaşımlarının karşılaştırılması, farklı stratejileri ve sonuçları ortaya koymaktadır. Türkiye’de, Kemalist elitlerin öncülüğündeki üstten aşağı yaklaşım, devlet destekli reformlar aracılığıyla laikleşmeyi ve modernleşmeyi hedeflemiştir. Bu yöntem, hükümet düzeyinden yayılarak toplumsal değişikliklerin dayatılmasını içerir ve bazen halkın duygularını göz ardı eder. Uygulamada etkin olmasına rağmen, toplum arasında özellikle kentsel modernistler ile kırsal gelenekçiler arasında sosyal gerginliklere neden oldu. Doğu ile Batı arasındaki bir ayrımı yansıtarak. Güç merkezinin Atatürk liderliğindeki merkezileştirilmesi hızlı reformu kolaylaştırdı ancak muhalif sesleri marjinalleştirdi.
Buna karşılık, Tayvan daha alttan yukarı bir yaklaşım benimsedi. Özellikle demokratikleşmenin başlangıç aşamalarında. Yerel aydınlar ve onların sosyal eylemleri, Tayvanlılık kültürel bilincinin teşvik edilmesinde ve KMT’nin Çin merkezli politikalarına meydan okunmasında kilit roller oynadı. Yetkili üstten aşağı yaklaşımın aksine, Tayvanlılaşma kavramı toplumun hareketlendirmesi ve demokratik süreçler aracılığıyla kademeli olarak ortaya çıktı. Bu yaklaşım, yerel kültür ve tarihle kök salmış daha güçlü bir kimlik duygusu geliştirdi ve dayatılan Çin etkilerine karşı çıktı.
Bu süreçler, her bir yaklaşımın etkinliğini ve sınırlarını ortaya koymaktadır. Üstten aşağı yöntemler hızlı sonuçlar verebilirken, toplumun bazı kesimlerini yabancılaştırma ve direniş üretme riski taşır. Buna karşılık, alttan yukarı yaklaşımlar kapsayıcılığı ve tabandan katılımı teşvik eder, ancak etki kazanmak için daha fazla zaman ister ve var olan güç yapılarında zorluklarla karşılaşılabilir. Ayrıca, politik elitler, aydınlar ve sivil toplum grupları gibi aktörlerin rolleri, benimsenen yaklaşıma bağlı olarak ulusal kimliği şekillendirmede farklı derecelerde etki eder.
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Türkiye ve Tayvan’ın tarihsel karmaşıklıkları, ulusal kimliklerinin entegrasyonu ve çeşitli etnik gruplarla toplumların bütünleştirilmesiyle ilgili zorluklara neden oldu. Mevcut ulusal kimlik kültürel dönüşüme eklemeler yapmış olsada, yeni kimlik en az yarısı kadar derinlemesine nüfusa nüfuz edemezdi ve toplumun birbirine karşı karşıt bölümlerine karşı bir denge yaratamazdı. Yeni bir ulusal kimlik inşaa ederken Yeni Tayvanlı kimliği ve Türk modernleşmesi nedeniyle, her iki ülke de kimlik karmaşası ve toplumsal gerilimler yaşadı. Bunun kısmen kuruluş aşaması otoriter yönetim dönemlerinde kısmen dayatılan devlet destekli kültürel eğitimlerin ve sıkıyönetimlerin, muhalif sesleri bastırdığı ve ifade özgürlüğünü kısıtladığı geçmiş dönemlere atfedilmesi gerekiyor.
Milliyetçilik, yeni bir ulusal kimliği şekillendirmek için genellikle tarih ve tarihçilikle derinlemesine bağlantılıdır. Yazılı ulusal tarih, milliyetçiliğin temelini oluştururken, eğitim politikalarıyla ilgili tarihî anlatılar ulusal siyasetten ayrı düşünülemez. Bu anlatılar zamanla kolektif bellekte yer edinirken, önemli anlarda vatanseverliği pekiştirir. Ayrıca, bu anlatılar toplumsal kimliği tanımlamada önemli bir rol oynar. ‘Biz’ ve ‘onlar’ arasında ayrım yapar ve olumlu bir ulusal kimlik duygusu geliştirir. Ancak, tarihçilikteki seçici yapı, tarihçilerin genellikle iktidardakilerle uyumlu bir şekilde perspektiflerini belirlediğini ve bunun sonucunda tarihî anlatıların oluşturulduğunu gösterir.
Tarih kitapları, bilginin güç üzerindeki egemenliğinin bir diğer örneğini teşkil eder. Tarihî ideolojilerin anlayışı şekillendirdiği bir sosyal sistem oluşturur. Eğitim, ulusal tarih ve kültürün yayılmasında kritik bir araç olarak hizmet eder; kitaplar ise sosyal, siyasal ve kültürel güçler arasındaki rekabetlerin ve uzlaşmaların bir yansımasıdır. Siyasi liderlik değişiklikleri sıklıkla tarihî bakış açılarında değişikliklere yol açar, yeni yorumlar ulusal kimliği yeniden inşa etmeyi ve önceden marjinalleştirilmiş kültürleri yüceltmeyi amaçlar. Tarih kitaplarını incelemek, yeni nesillerde kimlik geçişine ilişkin içgörüler sunar ve tarihçiliğe siyasi iktidarların etkisini ve geçmişten kültürel unsurların kasıtlı seçimini ve dışlanmasını kabul eder.
Erken Kemalizm Döneminde Lise Tarih Ders Kitabı, Türk Cumhuriyeti’nin önemini pekiştiren ve imparatorluk geçmişininin son dönemini yargılayan tutarlı bir anlatı
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oluşturma çabasının bir yansımasıdır. Önceki ve sonraki ders kitaplarından farklı olarak, 1931’de yayımlanan kitaplar, Türk milli kimliğindeki İslam ve kozmopolit Osmanlı kültürünün etkisini azaltmaya yönelik çaba harcadı. Atatürk tarafından öğretilen Türk Tarih Tezi’ne dayanan ve 1931’den 1941’e kadar kullanılan bu ders kitapları, laik Türk tarih yazımını temsil eder ve Kemalist devrimin ideolojisini somutlaştırır. Bu versiyon, laiklik, modernlik ve bilimcilik kavramlarını Türk milliyetçiliği ve ulusal kimlikle sentezleyen Cumhuriyet’in ideolojisinin en açık temsilidir. Bilimcilik, Kemalizm’in ana ideolojisi olup, dinci bakış ve yönelime karşı irrasyonel bir tutumu benimser. Bir de insanlık kökenlerini dini açıklamalar yerine bilimsel bakış ile açıklar ve bu bakış açısının, geleneksel dini yaratılışçılığı ikinci plana atarak, insanların dünya görüşünü daha bilimsel bir anlayışa dönüştürmeyi vurgular.
Cumhuriyetin ilk dönemindeki ders kitapları, tarih anlatısını dini etkiden bağımsız olarak Türklüğü işleyerek, Afet İnan’ın “Türk medeniyettir, Türk tarihdir” retoriğine uyum sağlar ve Cumhuriyetin temelini atar. Türk milliyetçiliğindeki eski osmanlı islami etkisini en aza indirmek ve Türklüğe odaklı bir tarih anlatısı oluşturma çabalarında belirgin bir şekilde vurgulanır. Türk tarih ders kitabının içerik dağılımı ise Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun 600 yıldan fazla süren gurur duyulacak varlığının Kemalist tarih kitabında, antik medeniyetler, kökenler ve Cumhuriyetin kuruluşuna öncülük eden kurtuluş savaşlarına göre görece arka planda olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu içerik, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun (aynı zamanda tüm Müslümanlar için sembolik olan) çöküşünün kaçınılmazlığına işaret ederek, Cumhuriyet’in kurulmasının meşruiyetine işaret eder.
1987’de sıkıyönetimin kaldırılmasından sonra, Tayvan’daki tarihi eğitimde ve bakış açılarında yansıtıcı benzer bir değişim yaşanmıştır. Çin merkezci tarihsel yorumun monopolü sona ermiştir. Tayvan’da çeşitli kültürlerin bir araya gelmesi ve etkileşimi, uzun süredir egemen hükümdarlarının otoritesi altında bastırılmış ve marjinalleştirilmiş bir Tayvan kültürü yeniden doğmuştur. Yerel kültür ve dil (lehçesi), eski ulusal kültür bakış açısında sıklıkla kaba ve değersiz görülüyordu. Ancak politik-sosyal ortam gevşedikçe, Tayvan yerli kültürü, tarhi ve dili kaybetmenin endişesi, yerel kültür eğitim reformunun başlangıcı olmuştur.
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Tayvanlılık odaklı yeni bir ulusal kimlik oluşumunda, yerel kültür ve dilin önemine vurgu yapılıyor ve de koruma ve teşvik etme çabası olarak görülüyor. Demokratikleşme sürecinde, yerel kimliğin ve tarihin önemi arttı ve Çin merkezci bakış açısının aşılmasıyla Tayvanlıların kendi benliklerini ve toplumsal kimliklerini yeniden keşfetme isteği belirdi. Çünkü, Yerel kültür, insanların günlük olarak kültürel yapıda uyguladığı ve ürettiği soyut bir yaşam alanı oldu. Bu da insanlarda bir kimlik ve yaşam alanı aidiyeti duygusunu oluşturdu. Bu yeni yaklaşım, Tayvan’ın tarihi ve kültürel mirasının daha geniş bir yelpazesini kucaklamayı amaçlıyordu ve Tayvan halkının bağımsız ve çeşitlilik içeren bir kimlik geliştirmesine olanak tanıyordu.
Understanding Taiwan ders kitabı serisi, ideolojik tartışmalara yol açtı; eleştirmenler, Çin kültürü ile bağlarını ayrıştırması sürecinde kültürel olarak kendini sakatlamaya ve tarihsel sürekliliği bozmaya yol açacağını savunurken, bu savunucular, müfredatta Çin tarihini korumanın gerekliliğini vurguladılar. 1997’deki yeni ders kitap serisinin başlatılması, Tayvanlılaşma kimliğinin kurulması konusunda önemli bir adımı temsil etti. Ancak birleşik Çin hayali ve büyük Çin söyleminin etkisi altındaki öğrenciler arasında, anlamsal karmaşa ve zorluklar devam etti.
Son 50 yılda, Çin Komünist Partisi’nin tehdidiyle birlikte, Tayvanlılar farklı bir ulusal kimliğe olan ihtiyaç ortaya çıktı. Benzer şekilde, Türkiye’de, çoğunlukla Müslüman olan Türklerin kültürel gelenekçi İslami etkisi olmayan ulusal kimliklerini pekiştirmenin zorlukları, diğer eski bağları eklemlemeye çalıştılar. Mevcut ihtiyaçlarla uyumlu bir ulusal kimlik inşa etme çabası, aslında tarihin yapımının, hükümetin belirlediği kimlik şablonu ile insanların kimliksel çeşitlilikleri arasındaki farkı genişlettiği olgusu bir sorun olarak ortaya çıktı.
Ulusal kimlikle ilgili kaygılar, önemli bir zamansal ve mekansal uzaklık duygusuyla sonuçlanır. Tayvanlılar, Çin kültürüne, değerlerine ve ana vatanlarına duydukları özleme dalmışlardı. Türkler, Cumhuriyet öncesi hakim olan eski İslam kültürel kimlik yapısının kaldırılmasından sonra bir kültürel yabancılaşma yaşamaktadır. Bu yabancılaşma, eskiye olan özlemle psikolojik ve duygusal bağlantılarını kaybetmekten kaynaklandı. Kültürel boşluğu doldurmanın gerekliliğini kabul ettikten sonra, yetkililer yerli kültürleri yeniden keşfetmeye ve yeniden tanımlamaya
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çalıştılar. Bu bakış açısından, bir ulusun kökenleri tarafsız ve ya gerçek bir kültürel koleksiyonundan uzaktır ve sonraki politik ve tarihsel sonuçları da aynı şekilde tarafsız değildir. Belirtilen kökeni kurmak için, ders kitapları, yetkililerin geçmişle ve bugün arasındaki farkı kapatma çabalarının arkasındaki mantığı ve ideolojileri açıklar. Ancak, kültürel boşluğu doldurma çabası, devamsızlaşmaya ve basitleştirilmiş tarihsel sürekliliğe yol açabilir. Farklı yorumları ve toplumsal ayrılıkları teşvik edebilir.
Yeni kimliklerin oluşumu, kültürel unsurların değiştirilmesi ve farklı yaklaşımların kullanılması nedeniyle çelişkilere yol açar, bu da bazı grup mensupların direncine veya kafa karışıklığına neden olur. Hükümetler geniş kapsamlı ama yüzeysel tanıtım yapar, ancak kökten girişimler daha derin ama göz ardı edilebilir ve sonuçsuz kalabilir. Belirli zaman koşullarına dayalı olarak ulusal kimliği şekillendirme çabalarına rağmen, derinlemesine yerleşmiş ana bağları genellikle değişimeye direçlidir. Kültürel süreklilikte kopukluk oluşu toplumsal ayrılığa ve belirsiz kaygılara yol açar. Ulusal kimlik paradoksu, homojen bir kimliğin oluşturulmasında kültürel manipülasyonun sınırlarını vurgular ve çelişkili geçmişler ve karakterler arasında bocalayan bireyler arasında kafa karışıklığı ve muhalefete yol açar. Tayvan ve Türkiye’de, Çinlileşmeme ve modenleşme yeni kimliklerin oluşturulmasını amaçladı, ancak eski ve yeni kimlikler arasındaki örtüşme, kopukluğu veya eksik kabulü gösterir, bu da yeni kimlikte eksikliklere ve toplumsal kafa karışıklığına yol açar.
Türkiye’de çağdaş siyasi İslam’ın yükselişi, Batı modernleşmesine duyulan hayal kırıklığından kaynaklanmaktadır ve bu hayal kırıklıkları ardındaki hoşnutsuzluklardan kaynaklanır. Bu hayal kırıklıkları ve hoşnutsuzluklar, otoriter rejimin radikal önlemlerinden kaynaklanan Batılılaşma reformlarından kaynaklanmaktadır ve bu reformlar, birçok insanı İslami köklerinden uzaklaştırmıştır. Modernleşme süreci, toplumsal sarsıntılara neden oldu ve geleneksel ve modern değerler arasındaki uçurumu derinleştirdi. Kentsel elitler Batı laikliğini benimserken, kırsal nüfusun çoğu İslami geleneklere bağlı kaldı ve bu da toplumsal bir ayrılığa yol açtı. Bu ikilem, politik İslam’ın yeniden canlanmasının temelini oluşturdu, çünkü hayal kırıklığına uğramış gruplar, Batılılaşmanın başarısızlık olarak algılanan yönlerine yanıt olarak kültürel ve dini kimliklerini geri kazanmaya çalıştılar.
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Sekülerlik ile siyasal İslami bakış arasındaki çatışma, politik İslam’ın kökleşmiş laik ideolojiyi sorgulamasıyla arttı. 2002’den bu yana Türkiye’nin iktidardaki partisi olan AKP, dini duyguları kullanarak, devlet ile din arasındaki sınırları bulandıran reformları hayata geçirdi. Bu değişim, laiklerden gelen direnişi tetikledi ve İslam’ın kamusal yaşama sızmasını Türkiye’nin laik kimliğine bir tehdit olarak görenleri tetikledi. Sekülerlerle siysal islamcı bakış arasındaki kutuplaşma, toplumsal ayrılıkları derinleştirdi ve geniş çapta protesto ve siyasi huzursuzluğa neden oldu. Seküler ve siyasal islami bakış, değerleri uzlaştırmaya yönelik girişimlere rağmen, Türkiye, rekabet eden ideolojiler karşısında kültürel kimlik ve yönetim karmaşıklıklarıyla başa çıkmaya devam ediyor.
Tayvanlıların kimliği ulus-toplum yapısındaki bozulmalar nedeniyle radikal değişimler yaşandı, bu da insanların kendilerini nasıl tanımladıklarında değişikliklere yol açtı. İlk Tayvanlı kimliği, Japon sömürgeciliğinin son döneminde oluştu, ancak savaş sonrasında egemenlik Cumhuriyetçi Çin’e devredildikten sonra bir Çin kimliğine dönüştü. KMT’nin iç sömürgeci döneme benzeyen yönetimi, Tayvanlıları rahatsız ettti. Ancak, sıkı sıkıya bastırılan kolektif anılar tarih içinde yeniden belirginleşince, kimlik üzerinde yeniden odaklanma meydana geldi. Tayvan’daki toplumsal bölünme zorunlu rejim değişikliklerine dayanmaktadır.
KMT’nin otoriter rejimi, büyük Çin ideolojisini ve geleneksel Çin kültürünü benimsemiş, Tayvan yerli kültürünün benzersizliğini görünmez ve var olmayan hale getirmiştir. Çoğu yerel Tayvanlı için, sosyal ve ekonomik statü elde etmek Çin kültürünü benimsemeyi, Mandarin konuşmayı ve Çinli olarak kimliği kabul etmeyi gerektiriyordu. KMT askeriyle birlikte Tayvan’a göç eden anakaralılar dışında, Büyük Çin ideolojisi, Çin kültürüyle güçlü bir bağ kuran bir nesil (50-60 yaş ve üstü) yetiştirdi. Bu kişiler, inançlarına derinden işlenmiş olan, kendilerini Çinli olarak görürken Tayvan’ı Çin’in bir parçası olarak da görürler. Son zamanlarda, Tayvan’daki derinleşen toplumsal ayrım sadece nesiller arasındaki boşluklardan öteye geçmiştir; önemli ölçüde kimlik ve kültürün politikleştirilmesi tarafından güçlendirilmiştir.
Toplumsal bölünmesinin zirvesi, seçimler sırasında net bir şekilde görülür; siyasi partiler sağlam konuları kullanarak politik gündemlerini oluştururken, siyasi
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tanımlama, bir grupun diğerinden ayrılan sosyal kimlik belirteçlerine dönüşür. Toplumsal kimlik, politik ideolojilerden ziyade, bireylerin siyasi partilere destek veya reddini belirlemede önemli bir rol oynar, toplu siyasi kutuplaşmayı yansıtır. Seçim kampanyaları sırasında, partiler, duygusal çağrılar ve kimlik üzerinde odaklanarak halkın duygusunu manipüle eder, böylece toplumsal kutuplaşmayı daha da derinleştirir. Türk ve Tayvanlı seçmenlerin, çatışan kimlikler arasında yaptığı oy verme tercihleri, kültürel kimliğin siyasi ilişkileri nasıl şekillendirdiğini ve seçim sonuçlarını nasıl etkilediğini göstermektedir. Başka bir bakışla seçim sonuçları ulusal kimlik üzerindeki duruşunu yansıtır ve seçilen liderliğin politika kararları aracılığıyla kültürel kimliği önemli ölçüde şekillendirir.
Dahası, yerleşmiş kültürel özellikleri ortadan kaldırmak için zorlayıcı önlemlere başvurmanın oldukça etkili olduğu da kanıtlanmıştır (Atatürk rejimi altındaki laikleştirme ve Tayvan’daki KMT rejimi sırasındaki Çinlileştirme gibi). Ancak, tekil ve otoriter bir ulusal kültür şablonu genellikle bir ulusun sınırları içindeki farklı etnik kökenleri ve kültürleri göz ardı eder ve bastırır. Hükümet kontrolünü gevşettiğinde, örneğin demokratik ya da partili bir siyasi sistemde, önceden dayatılan tek uluslu kültür ve kimlik halk iradesiyle alaşağı edilebilir (Tayvan’ın Çinlileştirilmesinde ve Türkiye’de İslami siyasetin yükselişinde görüldüğü gibi). Ayrıca siyasi partilerin, popülizmin etkisi altında uzlaşmacı politikalar ve söylemler geliştirmesine de açık hale gelir.
Türkiye’nin devam eden seküler ve İslam kimliğin çatışmasıyla birlikte, milliyetçilik ve Türk ırkına bağlılık güçlü kalırken, yine kolektif bir Türk ulusal kimliğe entegre olmuştur. Buna karşılık, Tayvan’ın kimliği derinlemesine köklü faktörlerden yoksundur ve esas kültürlere etkilere karşı savunmasızdır. Çinlieştirmeme ve Tayvanlaştırma arasında denge kurmak önemli zorluklar doğurur. Çok kültürlülüğü, Çin merkezli ideolojilerine karşı bir mucadele hem öz kültürü zayıflamasına ve birleştirici gücünün azalmasına neden olabilir. Hem Tayvan hem de Türkiye, kesin ulusal bir kimlik arayışında, kökleşmiş kültürel unsurları kaldırmanın karmaşıklıklarının ontolojik çelişkiler ve pratik çatışmaları ortaya çıkardığı bir süreçte ulusal olarak tatmin edici bir kimliğe ulaşma çabası içindedir.
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Özetle, tarihsel olarak yerleşik kültürel unsurların kaldırılarak, yeni bir ulusal kimlik oluşturmak için modern milliyetçinin söyleme uyar. Ulusal kimlik, milliyetçilik oluşumun önemli öğesi olarak, günlük yaşamda rutin hareketleri şeklinde (Billig) veya tarihî anlatıların yeniden icat edilmesi şeklinde (Hobsbawm) ortaya çıkabilir. Ayrıca, hayali bir topluluk (Anderson) veya insanların bir ulus içinde birlikte yaşama iradesine dayalı daha geniş kapsamlı ve sivil vatandaşlık bilinci olarak da tasvir edilebilir (Renan). Modern devletlerin çeşitli kültürler ve etnisitelerden oluşması nedeniyle, orijinal, tekil kültürel özellikler sıklıkla modern ulusal kimlik yapılarının uygun hale getirilmesi için değiştirilebilmektedir yada şekillendirebilmektedir. Ancak, farklı ülkelerin karşılaştırmalı analizi yoluyla, ulusal kimliği şekillendiren kültürel özelliklerin ayarlanabileceği açıktır. Bununla birlikte, kültürel unsurları kaldırmak için daha radikal önlemlerin kullanılması, özellikle bir ulusun kültürünü tanımlayanları, primordial kültürel bağların, modernist iddiaların ulusal kimlik modellerine uygun bir şekilde uyarlanabilirliği konusundaki iddiaların kolayca yeniden şekillendirilemeyeceğini vurgular.
Sonuç olarak bu çalışma, iki farklı vakayı karşılaştırarak, modernist milliyetçilik perspektifinden, özgün kültürleri değişime yönlendirerek, ulusal kimliği şekillendirmenin içsel sınırlamalarını ortaya koymaktadır. Karşılaştırmalı analiz yoluyla, ulusal kültür ve kimliğin insanlar arasında birleştirici güçler olarak şekillendirilip içselleştirilebileceği, ancak bu yaklaşımın kısıtlamalarının olduğu ortaya çıkmaktadır. Örneklerimizde ulusal kimliğin yeniden inşasında eski kültürel tutumların dönüşümü, devlet kimliğine uygun tam ya da homojen bir ulusal kimlik elde edilmesini sağlayamamıştır. Diğer önemsiz faktörlerle birlikte, ulusal kimlik belirli bir derecede etnik/ilkel bağların devrede olmasını gerektirir. Bu durum Smith’in ulusal etnik mit ya da etnosembolik yaklaşım olarak tanımladığı ve ulusal kimlik oluşturmada ilkel kültürel unsurların gerekliliğine işaret eden yaklaşıma benzemektedir.
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C. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU
ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE
Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics
Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences

Identity Disassociation from Historically Embedded Culture and Identity- A Comparison Between De- Chineselized Taiwanese Identity and De-Islamized Turkish Identity

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