617

 OTTOMAN CORSAIRS IN THE CENTRAL
MEDITERRANEAN AND THE SLAVE

This thesis aims to analyze the Ottoman corsairs and their role in the slave trade in the
16th century Mediterranean, and it concentrates on the corsair activity around the central
Mediterranean during Suleiman I's reign. The historiography chiefly emphasizes the corsairs
as an apparatus, a war-machine of the Imperial Navy (Donanma-yı Hümâyûn) against the
Habsburg Empire. Moreover, scholars have given their primary attention to the political
rivalry between the Habsburg and the Ottoman households, and the corsair concept lacks a
social and economic consideration. Therefore, this study predominantly reevaluates this
approach by focusing on the Ottoman corsairs' social and economic aspects, such as the slave
trade carried out for the Sublime Porte. The research investigates the Ottoman-Venetian
disputes due to the corsair activities through archival documents. Southern Italy and Sicily,
under Habsburg rule, were open to direct threats throughout the constant wars between Spain,
France, and the Ottoman Empire, and many people were reduced to slavery and sold in slave
markets. Although the corsair activity around the Iberian-peninsula and the North Africa have
been examined, the Adriatic coast should need more recognition by the researchers.
Keywords: Corsairing, Mediterranean, Slavery, The Ottoman Empire, Hayreddin Barbarossa
iv
ÖZET
ORTA AKDENĠZ‟DE OSMANLI KORSANLARI VE 16. YÜZYILDA KÖLE
TĠCARETĠ

Bu tez, 16. yüzyıl Akdeniz‟inde Osmanlı korsanlarını ve onların köle ticaretindeki yerini
analiz etmekte ve I. Süleyman döneminde Orta Akdeniz‟de geliĢen korsan faaliyetlerine
odaklanmaktadır. Tarih yazımı, korsanları esasen Habsburg Ġmparatorluğu‟na karĢı verilen
mücadelede Donanma-yı Hümâyûn‟a eklemlenmiĢ bir savaĢ makinesi olarak kabul etmiĢtir.
Dahası, araĢtırmacılar Osmanlı ve Habsburg hanedanları arasındaki mücadeleyi politik açıdan
değerlendirirken korsanlık kavramı araĢtırmaları sosyal ve ekonomik değerlendirmeden
yoksun kalmıĢtır. Bu nedenle, bu çalıĢma ağırlıklı olarak Osmanlı Devleti için yürütülen köle
ticareti bağlamında yeniden değerlendirmek üzere Osmanlı korsanlarını sosyal ve ekonomik
yönlerden incelemektedir. ÇalıĢmada korsan faaliyetlerinden kaynaklı Osmanlı-Venedik
anlaĢmazlıkları da arĢiv belgeleriyle incelenmektedir. Ġtalyan sahilleri ve adaları dönem
boyunca doğrudan tehditlere hedef olmuĢ ve bunun sonucu olarak da pek çok kiĢi
köleleĢtirilerek köle pazarlarında satılmıĢtır. Her ne kadar Ġber yarımadası ve Kuzey Afrika
sahillerindeki korsan faaliyetleri incelenmiĢ olsa da Adriyatik‟teki korsan varlığı
araĢtırmacıların daha fazla ilgisine muhtaçtır.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Korsanlık, Akdeniz, Kölelik, Osmanlı Ġmparatorluğu, Barbaros Hayreddin
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Even though the coronavirus pandemic made writing a thesis more complex than ever, I
would like to express my gratitude to my advisor Özer Ergenç who always supported me
throughout the process from my first day in the history department. Without his enthusiasm,
trust, and constant exhortation, this thesis would be incomplete.
Moreover, I would like to thank Paul Latimer, Luca Zavagno, David Thornton, and Kenneth
Weisbrode for their attention, Ġlker Aytürk and Norman Stone for their intriguing lectures
during my undergraduate years tempted me to become a historian and staff of Bilkent Library
for providing the materials.
My lifelong friends Ezgi Karaoğlu, Nazlı Kara, and Sinan Solgun deserve a big applause for
they always being supportive to me, especially during the most challenging times. I am also
grateful to Cansu Türk for her patience, consistent support, and efforts to provide an
environment to make this process more sufferable. I would like to thank my friends in the
department, Ahmet Zeybek and AyĢenur Çenesiz, whom I am delighted to spend time with
from the first moment I entered the department. Lastly, I am greatly indebted to my family for
their patience and guidance throughout my life.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT …………………………………………………………….………iii
ÖZET ………………………….………………………………………….…….iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…..………………………………………..………...v
TABLE OF CONTENTS……..…………………………………………………vii
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION………………………………………..……….1
1.1 Objectives of the Thesis……………………………………………………..1
1.2 Literature Review……………………………………………………………2
1.3 Sources and Methodology…………………………………………………...7
CHAPTER II (1505-1540): CORSAIRS ASSEMBLE………………………….9
2.1 First Impressions of the Ottoman Maritime Expansion……………………..9
2.2 Gazi Corsairs and the Transformation of the Maritime Policy…………….17
2.3 Reconquista and the Morisco Influx into North Africa……………………..19
2.4 Barbarossas Arriving at North Africa (1513)……………………………….21
2.5 Accession of Sultan Süleyman the Lawgiver and Hayreddin‟s Struggle (1520)…33
2.6 Barbaros Hayreddin: Kapudan Pasha of Donanma-yı Hümâyûn (1533)…..39
2.7 War with Venice and the Battle of Preveza (1537-1540)…………………..43
vii
CHAPTER III (1541-1571): DESPERATE TIMES CALL FOR DESPERATE
MEASURES…………………………………………………………………….49
3.1 Charles V Disembarking Algiers (1541)……………………………………49
3.2 Last Campaign of Hayreddin Pasha: Siege of Nice (1543)…………………52
3.3 Donanma-yı Hümâyûn After Hayreddin Pasha Deceased and Conquest of Tripoli
(1551)……………………………………………………………………………58
3.4 Donanma-yı Hümâyûn Presence in the Western Mediterranean (1551-1559)…61
3.5 Siege of Malta: The First Signs of Fatigue (1565)…………………………..65
3.6 Defeat at Lepanto: The Change in the Course (1571)……………………….71
3.7 Aftermath: Post-1571………………………………………………………..79
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION…………………………………………………83
REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………..88
I. Unpublished Primary Sources…………………………………………………88
II. Published primary Sources…………………………………………………...88
III. Secondary Sources…………………………………………………………..90
APPENDIX............................................................................................................96
1
CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Objectives of the Thesis
In this thesis, the Ottoman corsairs in the central Mediterranean and their role in the
slave trade in the 16th century will be examined. While the corsair literature put
extensive emphasis on political aspects, as well as the notorious European converts on
the Barbary shores such as John Ward and Siemen Danziger, there is little focus on the
slavery aspect. The image of the Ottoman corsairs has been embedded into „plunders‟,
„warriors of the faith-gazis‟, and these views are mostly built upon the captive reports
enslaved in the Barbary Coast, and thus, further romanticized by the western scholars.
Therefore, the idea that the corsair institution existed within the framework of slavery
has been understudied, and the diversity of the corsair concept is poorly illuminated. Our
hypothesis is that those engaged in corsairing in the central Mediterranean did not aim
only for maritime raiding or attacking the coastal countries, especially the Habsburg
Empire, and corsairing played an important role in establishing Ottoman dominance in
the region. In addition, there is the concern of creating extra human resources through
2
slavery, which was an important trade activity of the period. Despite the valuable
researches on corsairing, the studies analyzing this argument are scattered and very
limited. Thus, a literature review is essential in order to apprehend the situation and
understand the dynamics in this period.
1.2 Literature Review
The 16th century is the age when the Ottoman Empire established superiority in the
Mediterranean. The Ottomans had only acquired a navy after annexing the
Karesioğulları (positioned in western Anatolia) in 1345 and thus crossed into European
soil. Although the Ottoman Empire was a nomadic empire, it had come to a level that
could compete with the great maritime powers of the Mediterranean in a very short time.
Bayezid II especially has improved the naval organization to compete against the
Venetians in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the conquest of Greece was thus completed.
The recruitment of the freebooters into the state service formed the backbone of the
Ottoman naval force and thanks to seafarers like Piri Reis, the Ottomans obtained knowhow
in maritime technology. This knowledge reached its zenith when Barbaros
Hayreddin Pasha entered Ottoman service during the reign of Süleyman the Lawgiver.
With Hayreddin's initiatives, the Sublime Porte not only established superiority over its
rivals in the Mediterranean but also acquired slaves as booty.
3
The Ottoman maritime history is a subject that has not received the attention it deserves
within Ottoman historiography. In the 1930s, the first important work of Turkish
historiography in the modern sense examining the Ottoman corsairs was published by
Aziz Sami Ġlter.1 Using Turkish archival materials, Ġlter explored: the origins of the
Turkish presence in North Africa, the origin of the Barbarossa brothers, and how the
Ottoman administration gained momentum in the region. Another reason why Ġlter's
work is essential in corsair studies is that it is the first general objection to the sources
frequently used in western literature. For instance, Stanley Lane-Poole's Barbary
Corsairs mostly refers to Joseph Morgan's renowned work A Complete History of
Algiers, published in 1731.2 On the other hand, Morgan based his historical narrative
mostly on Diego Haedo's Topography, a first-person narrative describing the everyday
life of corsairs on the Barbary Coast. This was widely circulated amongst European
scholars in the early-modern period, and thus perpetuated a romanticized version of
corsair literature.3 Due to Haedo producing his work during his captivity in Algiers, it
became very popular, and in fact, the image of the Ottoman corsairs in western literature
was shaped around his work. However, Poole also referred to Kâtib Çelebi's History of
the Maritime Wars of the Turks,4 introducing the Turkish primary sources to the western
literature and addressing the subject from a broader perspective. As a result, it can be
1 Aziz Samih İlter, rkler (Istanbul: Vakit Matbaası, 1937).
2 Stanley Lane-Poole and Kelley J D Jerrold, The Barbary Corsairs, 4th ed. (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1890);
Joseph Morgan, A Complete History of Algiers (London: J. Bettenham, 1728).
3 a ie e, Histoire Des Rois D'Alger, trans. Grammont Henri Delmas de, 1881.
4 Kâtib Çelebi, “Tuhfetü’l-Kibâr fî Esfâri’l-Bihâr”, e . İ ris B stan, (Ankara: TÜBA, 2018).
4
said that Poole managed to produce the first western study that attempted to break this
vicious circle and, augmented the corsair studies to a comprehensive level.
Later, Braudel extensively investigates the corsairs and the role of the environment
within the framework of longue dureé in his study The Mediterranean and the
Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II.5 Although Braudel did not consciously
intend to contribute to corsair studies, he expanded it further by examining corsair
activities from a geographical perspective and examining the rise of corsairing in the
Mediterranean basin more like a geographer rather than a historian. Prior to his work,
historiography approached corsairs from an individual perspective, which categorized
the corsair literature between saints and vagabonds. This reductive categorization
underestimated the structural and environmental aspects of corsairing. However, after he
revealed the complicated functioning of the Mediterranean, corsairing could not be
investigated without considering the factors that created it. For instance in the
Mediterranean basin (a region ravaged by frequent famines), the negative image of
corsairs supplying the ports due to their ships bypassing the political authorities and
eliminating the complex merchant network, limits the investigation of them to a pure
„evil‟ narrative. On the other hand, Andrew Hess repeated Paul Wittek's „gaza thesis‟
5 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, vol. 1-2 (New
York: Harper & Row, 1972).
5
and evaluated the Ottoman maritime history within a religious motive.6 He considered
Hayreddin Pasha and his lieutenants as gazi warriors who spread Islam in North Africa
and rescued the Moriscos from the Spanish inquisition. However, Soucek discussed the
Ottoman maritime policy from a broader perspective.7 He concentrated on the maritime
wars and argued that the Ottoman administration failed to grasp the value of the
Mediterranean supremacy and could not make policies in this regard.
By the end of the 1960s, Tayyib Gökbilgin published the Ottoman documents he found
in the Venetian archives and a significant threshold in Ottoman maritime history studies
was crossed.8 Until then, Ottoman historians preoccupied themselves with the land
system and the imperial organization. Therefore, Gökbilgin introduced the Italian
archives to the Turkish researchers. Later, Salih Özbaran investigated the Portuguese
archives and focused on the Turkish maritime expansion in the Indian Ocean and the
Ottoman-Portuguese rivalry on the seas.9 However, the Ottoman Imperial Arsenal and
the organizational structure were examined by Ġdris Bostan in The Ottoman Naval
6 An rew ess, “The F r tten Fr ntier: A ist ry f the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Fr ntier”,
(University of Chicago Press; 2010).
7 Svat S ucek, “Ott man Maritime Wars, 1416-1700”, (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2015).
8 M. Tayyib Gökbil in, “Vene ik evlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Bel eler K leksiy nu ve Bizimle İl ili iğer
Belgeler”, Be ge e : h Be ge e De g s , V-VIII (1971); M. Tayyib Gökbil in, “Vene ik evlet
Arşivin eki Vesikalar Külliyatın a Kanuni Sultan Süleyman evri Bel eleri”, Be ge e : h Be ge e
Dergisi, I (1993).
9 zbaran Salih, Ottoman Expansion toward the Indian Ocean in the 16th Century (İstanbul: İstanbul Bil i
University Press, 2009).
6
Organization: Imperial Arsenal in the 17th century.10 Bostan not only focused on the
naval organization but also explained the Ottoman naval technology, questioned the
naval strategy that insisted on galleys rather than galleons, the sailing ships appeared in
the Mediterranean waters in the second half of the 16th century. Furthermore he
continued to investigate the Italian archives, as did Gökbilgin, and examined the
corsairing in the Adriatic shores.11
Turkish maritime historiography has started to receive the attention it deserves in the last
twenty years. Young historians such as Volkan Dökmeci, Serdar Tabakoğlu, and Emrah
Safa Gürkan produced comprehensive and important works on the history of Ottoman
corsairs and the imperial navy. Dökmeci examined the corsairing and maritime activities
during the reign of Bayezid II and Selim I, using Venetian archival materials.12 Gürkan,
on the other hand, evaluated the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the context of corsairs in
his Master‟s Thesis.13 Later, he also focused on corsairs‟ role in the Ottoman Empire by
examining several foreign archival documents.14 Finally, Tabakoğlu studied the Spanish-
10 B stan İ ris, s B h e e : e s e- e (Ankara: Türk tarih kurumu,
1992).
11 B stan İ ris, ' e Ko s : s , Us o , e e e , 1575-1620 (Timaş, 2009).
12 ökmeci V lkan, e e De e e e Ko s : e e K e B e e e
D e e e s De e Ko s (İstanbul: Babil Kita , 2019).
13 Emrah Safa Gürkan, “Ott man C rsairs in the Western Me iterranean an Their Place in the Ott man-
Habsburg Rivalry, 1505-1535”, Bilkent University, Un ublishe M.A. Thesis, 2006.
14 Gürkan Emrah Safa, u Ko s : s e ' e , Y e Es e , 1500-1700
(İstanbul: Kr nik, 2018),
7
Ottoman rivalry and the naval battles in the 16th century.15 Although these studies are
considered remarkable for Ottoman naval historiography, they should be evaluated
within the scope of military history. Therefore, Joshua White's latest work is essential in
understanding the legal boundaries of Ottoman corsairs and how these boundaries
shaped the legal space of the Mediterranean.
The literature on corsairing and slavery do not go hand in hand. Slavery studies in the
Mediterranean are lagging as studies on slavery are mainly focused on the Atlantic slave
trade. Therefore, Salvatore Bono's research is quite remarkable as he has proven that it is
not possible to separate the concept of corsairing from slavery and that these two aspects
must always be handled together. Also, Friedman and Davis touched upon the same
subject but from a different perspective.16 In a general context, both authors have
concentrated on the Christian slaves and handled the issue as if the corsairs were
exclusively members of Islamic faith. However, Bono's work is essential to understand
how Muslim slaves were captured by Christian corsairs and what practices the captives
were subjected to in Christian lands.17 The main difference here is that Bono does not
deal with corsairs and slavery from a Eurocentric perspective. Instead, Bono‟s studies
15 Tabak ğlu üseyin Ser ar, e ' e : s - s e es (İstanbul: Kr nik Kita ,
2019).
16 Ellen G. Friedman, Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age (Ann Arbor: University
Microfilms International, 1987); Robert C. Davis, Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the
Mediterranean, the Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500-1800 (Basingstoke (Hampshire): Palgrave Macmillan,
2003).
17 Salvatore Bono, Ye 's s e e h usu e ' o e , trans.
Parlak Betül (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003).
8
approached the relationship between corsairing and slavery on an individual basis and
understated the state initiative. With this in mind, this thesis aims to fill the gap within
the literature and demonstrates that the Ottomans supported and enlisted the corsair crew
not only for military purposes but also for the slave trade as well.
1.3 Methodology and Sources
The main methods used in this study are "content analysis" and "comparative analysis"
related to the sources and documents on slaves and corsairs, by extracting the data to
construct the historical narrative of the period and alter this data into historical data
through the inductive approach. The corsairing in the early-modern period provided
important primary sources in explaining and understanding the Ottoman Empire and
Mediterranean basin. These sources are either written by captives or written by clerks
sponsored by government officials. In this study, Ottoman archival materials and
chronicles written by Ottoman and European contemporaries were used. The records
that been sent from government officials, foreign witnesses, and envoys were found in
the Topkapı Palace Museum Archival Documents. These documents are also verifying
some episodes mentioned in different chronicles. Hayreddin Barbarossa's semibiographical
work contains detailed information about the arrival of the Ottoman
corsairs to North Africa and their ventures under Ottoman protection. The contemporary
chroniclers (such as Lütfi Pasha, Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, and Matrakçı Nasuh) also
9
compiled their own histories and thus these sources are valuable for 16th-century
Ottoman history research.
10
CHAPTER II (1505-1540):
CORSAIRS ASSEMBLE
2.1 First Impressions of the Ottoman Maritime Expansion
The Ottomans had seized Çimpe Castle in 1353 during Osman I's reign. Having
established in 1302, the Ottomans crossed to the European territories for the first time
and penetrated through the Balkan soils. This humble principality grew at the Byzantine
doorstep within half a century, annexing Christian dominions little by little. Eventually,
the Byzantines had lost wealthy towns to the Turks such as Bursa (1326), Ġznik (1331),
and Edirne (1361). Due to capturing Gallipoli (1390) and reconstructing the Byzantine
shipyard here by Bayezid I, the Ottomans seized a critical shipyard for the first time and
thus they began to counteract against the Venetian and Genoese navies.18 After the
Timurid invasion of Anatolia and a crucial defeat in Ankara in 1402, an interregnum
lasted for fourteen years. Thus, Constantinople was relieved for fifty years. Although the
political integrity of the Anatolia was inconsistent, the Ottoman state did not fracture
18 İ ris B stan, “İm arat rluk nanmasına ğru: Tersane-i Amire’nin Kuruluşu ve enizler e Açılım” in
De h , e . İ ris B stan an Salih zbaran (İstanbul, 2009), 121.
11
thanks to their istimâlet policy in the Balkans.19 Throughout the 14th century, the
Ottomans conquered the Balkans and implemented the timar system to consolidate their
presence. Defeating Crusader armies consecutively in Varna (1444) and Kosovo (1448),
the Ottoman expansion was secured in the Balkans. In 1453, Sultan Mehmed II
conquered Constantinople and the Ottomans captured the Eastern Roman Empire's last
stronghold. During these campaigns, the contemporaries mentioned the Ottoman land
forces respectfully but the Ottoman navy was not in the picture until the first Ottoman-
Venetian War (1463-1479). During the siege of Constantinople, the Ottoman navy could
not prevent a Genoese relief force from entering the Golden Horn, albeit their superior
numbers. Even though Bayezid II (1481-1512) is highly criticized because he could not
expand the land borders like his father, during his reign the corsairs such as Kemal Reis
entered into the Sultan's service. However, the Ottomans became a significant power on
both the land and sea during this time by taking a further step toward creating an
Imperial Navy. This step was taken due to the conquering of Eastern Anatolia, the
Levant, and Egypt as well as the building of the Tersâne-i Âmire (Imperial Arsenal) in
Konstantiniyye by Sultan Selim I.
Meanwhile in the Eastern Mediterranean, Italian maritime states were trying to hold on
to their precious colonies in the Levant, Aegean, and Black-Sea shores. Venice and
19 alil İnalcık, “Fatih evri Üzerin e Tetkikler ve Vesikalar”, (Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1987), 139-
185.
12
Genoa were anxious about the Ottoman expansion because they did not want to lose
their long-time privileges. The Byzantine Empire had been the most significant client of
these states. From the beginning of the 9th century the Byzantines granted commercial
charters and trade colonies, such as Galata, to the Italian merchants. During the 4th
Crusade, Venetians had played the leading part in Constantinople's sacking by the Latins
in 1204. The Latin Kingdom for fifty years had ruled the city, the Byzantine throne
moved to Nicea and thus the Venetians had replaced other Italian republics. The
Byzantines were only able to retake Constantinople in 1261 with the help of the
Genoese. According to the agreement, the Emperor would confiscate the Venetian
possessions, hire the Genoese navy and allow them to expand their colonies along the
Black Sea shores.
Despite Venice and Genoa abusing these concessions from time to time, the trilateral
relationship lasted until the fall of the Byzantine Empire. Rather than flourish due to the
overdependency on commerce, the Byzantine economy had weakened. Throughout the
11th century the Empire was under attack from multiple fronts, and the Anatolian
peninsula was lost to the Turkish principalities. Throughout the 11th century, the Empire
came under attack from multiple fronts and eventually, the Anatolian peninsula was
surrendered to the Turkish principalities. On the other hand, the rebellions in the Balkans
led to significant grain production losses whereas the civil wars interrupted a strong
counter-attack against external threats. Furthermore, Andronikos II had decided to
dissolve the navy in 1285 after an agreement concluded with Venice. Thus, as the
13
Empire did not maintain a navy in the 14th century, the Byzantine naval defense and sea
trade became dependent on Italian merchant vessels. As the struggle in trade dominance
increased in the Mediterranean, the two merchant cities had come to blows to increase
their shares, which was the case in the battle of Chioggia (1380).
Meanwhile, Turkish pirates, such as Umur Bey, had become notorious through their
raidings around the Aegean coast. From the 13th century onwards, perpetual assaults of
the pirates diminished the Byzantine and Italian trade posts and disrupted the sea trade,
which caused concern amongst Genoese and Venetians. Later, Pope Clement VI formed
an alliance against Umur Bey and a Christian navy defeated his army in Smyrna. Thus,
for the first time, the Turkish gazis had experienced the Holy War at sea,which was a
new concept for the steppe people.20
The Ottoman-Venetian rivalry started in 1416 with the naval war under the command of
Çalı Bey. In this struggle, the Ottomans had benefited from Genoese sailors, who started
friendly relations during the reign of Orhan Bey.21 However, the Ottomans not only
recruited non-Muslim sailors but also built ships inspired by the Venetians and
Spaniards.22 Towards the end of the 15th century, the Genoese gradually retreated from
the Eastern Mediterranean as the Turkish expansion grew, but the Venetians did not
abandon their colonial posts. Therefore, it was inevitable that as the Levantine sea trade
20 Andrew C. ess, “The Ev luti n f the Ott man Seab rne Em ire in the A e f the Oceanic
Discoveries, 1453–1525,” The American Historical Review, 1970, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/75.7.1892,
1898.
21 İ ris B stan, “ s e De ”, (İstanbul: Küre, 2007), 5.
22 B stan, “ s e De ”, 9.
14
volume increased gradually, the Eastern Mediterranean states began to fight to preserve
their shares. However, the first Ottoman-Venetian wars (1463-1479) unveiled that the
Ottoman navy was far from being a naval power.23 In the last years of his reign,
Mehmed II sent an expeditionary force to Otranto, situated in the southern part of Italy.
The Ottoman forces overran the defenses and Gedik Ahmed Pasha successfully
established an Ottoman offensive post in the Kingdom of Naples in 1481. At the same
time, the rest of the fleet was assisting the operations of the island of Rhodes. Even
though these military campaigns were promising for the navy's future, the struggle for
the throne of ġehzade Bayezid and Cem interrupted the Empire's ventures after Mehmed
II's death.24
Plagued by the fight for the throne, Bayezid II could not support the Italian campaign
and worked on the reorganization of the Donanma-yı Hümâyûn, for he understood the
need for a well-established fleet. Nevertheless, as Kissling indicates in his article,
finding experienced personnel in the navy made it challenging to establish a competent
fleet. Crew recruitment was largely possible with converts and even foreigners hired by
rent.25
23 İ ris B stan, “II. Bayezi önemin e Osmanlı enizciliği”, in De h , 111.
24 Svat S ucek, “Ottoman Maritime Wars, 1416-1700”, 29-30.
25 . J. Kisslin , “II. Bayezi ’in eniz P litikası Üzerine üşünceler: (1481-1512)”, K , VII/84,
895.
15
First of all, the Ottoman-Mameluke rivalry accentuated how inferior the Ottoman navy
was against her foes. Consecutively defeated by the Mamelukes, the Ottomans appealed
to the Venetians and asked for permission to use naval bases in Famagusta in order to
supply their army from the sea around the Cilicia region. By doing this, the Ottoman
navy could reach Syrian shores within a day and attack the Mamelukes from the rear.
Unsurprisingly, this request was rejected because the Venetians had never wanted to
jeopardize their trade with the Mamelukes.26 For the most part, the navy was considered
an auxiliary part of the land forces in ground wars as it wasprimarily used in amphibious
operations (such as its use during the Otranto campaign). However, the Mameluke
conflict demonstrated that the galley fleets could be used not only against the sea vessels
but utilized against the land units.27 Another reason for Bayezid's desire to dominate the
Çukurova basin was that the rich timber resources in this region were necessary for the
new navy to be built.28
Second of all, without a powerful navy, the Ottoman sphere of influence was unlikely to
be stretched towards the central and western Mediterranean. For instance, when the
Nasrid rulers of Granada and Andalusian Muslims requested Ottoman support against
the Spanish conquistadors as they were about to expel from the Iberian peninsula, only
the corsairs were able to help the Muslim population escape from the Spanish
Inquisition. That is to say, due to logistical incapabilities and geographical distance, the
26 B stan, “II. Bayezi ”, 114.
27 Bostan, 113-115.
28 Kissling, 896-897.
16
Ottoman involvement in the western Mediterranean remained minimal until the
establishment of the North African regencies (Cezâyir-i Garb Ocakları). Furthermore,
the Ottomans gave priority to the security of the inner seas rather than jumping into the
distant territories. In this sense, the Venetian bases scattered through the Morea
peninsula's strategic positions evoked that the inner seas had to be protected first. Thus,
the Ottomans prepared for their next conquest in the Peloponnese by increasing the
imperial arsenal capacity and hiring expert skippers such as Kemal Reis. As Dökmeci
affirms, Bayezid taking Kemal Reis under his aegis in 1495 is important because this
wasthe first time a pirate enjoyed state protection in the Ottoman Empire. This
preference foreshadowed the Sultan's maritime policy conducted throughout his reign.29
This demonstrates how the corsairs had integrated into the Ottoman naval organization.
However, the Venetians abstained from engaging in a full-scale war with the Ottomans.
Although the Venetians were superior to the Ottomans on the seas, the latter was
unrivaled in terms of materials and manpower. The navy composed of 300 sails travelled
to Inebahtı with two cog-type ships which sheds light on the progress of the imperial
arsenal during the reign of Bayezid II.30 Conquering Modon, Koron, Navarin, Inebahtı,
and Midilli by 1501 consolidated the Ottoman supremacy in the Aegean and the
29 ökmeci V lkan, “ e e De e e e Ko s ”, 239.
30 Kâtib Çelebi, “ uh e ’ -K b î Es ’ -B h ”, 96. This account is contradicted by Soucek, see. Svat,
S ucek, “Stu ies in Ott man Naval ist ry an Maritime Ge ra hy”, (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2008),
185-186.
17
Peloponnese.31 After losing important trade colonies to the Turks, Venetians sought to
establish a Holy League under the leadership of Pope Alexander VI with the King of
France Louis XII and Ferdinand of Aragon. The initiative looked promising but it
remained inconclusive. Therefore, both parties agreed that the extension of war would
be hazardous for sea trade and concluded a peace treaty on December 14, 1502.
However, the Ottomans managed to keep all the possessions they had seized. Plus,
Venice was sentenced to pay an annual tribute, including 300.000 gold ducats as
compensation.32 That was the first major Turkish naval victory against Venice.
According to Ġdris Bostan, the naval policy conducted from the second half of the 15th
century had laid the foundations of the Ottoman naval dominance in the Eastern
Mediterranean:“It is possible to say the following about the results of the sea policies
implemented by the Ottomans at the end of the 15th century: The Conqueror (Mehmed
II) and Bayezid II era navies dislodged Genoese colonies from the Black Sea region.
Also, it dealt a great blow to the Venetian and Genoese power in the Eastern
Mediterranean and Aegean. At the end of these wars, the victorious Ottoman navy
managed to transfer the traditional naval technology in the Mediterranean from its
previous owners to their own sphere and started to show up in the struggle for
domination in the Mediterranean".33
31 Kâtib Çelebi, “ uh e ’ -K b ”, 100-102.
32 S ucek, “Ottoman Maritime Wars”, 36-37.
33 B stan, “ s e Deniz”, 9.
18
Nonetheless, the Ottomans had evicted the Venetian garrison from Greece, which
enabled them to use excellent naval bases such as Modon, Navarin, and Inebahtı. The
full-scale conquer of Greece contributed to the ability of the Ottomans to expand their
influence over the Adriatic and Italy by challenging the Venetian sea trade and Habsburg
possessions in Naples and Sicily. As a result, the role of gazi corsairs had increased
within the Ottoman state. Kemal Reis and his comrades journeyed in the central and
western Mediterranean. This led to them becoming acquainted with the situations of the
region, and hence, this formed the logistical and technological basis for the future
expeditions of Donanma-yı Hümâyûn.34
Moreover "maritime gaza", which was a new concept for the Ottomans who relied upon
its territorial expansion through land warfare, had been introduced by the corsairs to the
Empire. As Soucek pointed out: “On the international scale, what seaborne trade,
exploration and colonization were to Italian city-states and, increasingly, to the
kingdoms of Atlantic Europe, maritime gaza was to the Ottoman Empire … Turkish
gazi-corsairs became a distinctive and indispensable component of Ottoman sea power
… the growth of the Ottoman maritime gaza was tantamount to providing the empire
34 Svat Soucek, Studies in Ottoman Naval History and Maritime Geography (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2008), 10.
F r instance, Pîrî Reis, ne hew f Kemâl Reis, had accompanied his uncle during which the voyages and
compiled his observations into one of the most valuable navigation books of all time, Kitâb-ı Bahriye
(Book of Navigation). Also, as was the case with voyage of Columbus to the Americas, the corsair
expeditions can be evaluated as exploratory voyages sponsored by the Sultan. After all, the corsairs
needed patronage in order to set sail.
19
with a splendid, permanent and self-supporting … naval academy training officers and
men”.35
2.2 Gazi Corsairs and the Transformation of the Maritime Policy
When Vasco de Gama circumnavigated the Cape of Good Hope in 1498 in order to
divert the spice trade route, the news had alarmed the beneficiary states such as
Venetians, Mamelukes, and the Ottomans. The Portuguese not only deflected the spice
trade from India, but also their navies had begun to enter the Red Sea and threaten the
Holy Cities as they tried to establish trade colonies in specific ports. However, the
Mamelukes fell short in intervening in these initiatives taken by the Christians since the
Portuguese carrack proved its superiority over the galley fleet. Therefore, the Egyptian
Sultan appealed to Bayezid II for help building a competitive navy. As a result, Kemal
and Selman Reis were sent to Egypt and came under the service of the Mamelukes.
Although the Turkish sailors fought hard against the Portuguese, they could not deter
them from the Red Sea.36
Meanwhile, Selim I had dethroned his father in 1512 and challenged the Shia-Safavid
dynasty in eastern Anatolia. After defeating Shah Ismail in Çaldıran, he embarked on an
35 S ucek, “Maritime Wars”, 33.
36 S ucek, “Ott man Maritime”, 41.
20
expedition against the Mamelukes the following year. Conquering Syria and Egypt in
1516-1517, he opened a gateway through the Indian Ocean from the Mediterranean
coasts. Moreover, now that Selim had become the servant of the two holy cities
(hâdimü'l-Haremeyn), the Ottomans had to protect the holy sites against the Portuguese
aggression. Fortunately, Selim's conquests indirectly fertilized the Turkish expansion
toward the western Mediterranean. Within half a century, the corsairs who served under
the Ottoman and Mameluke Sultans would have established Ottoman domination over
the North African regions.
2.3 Reconquista and the Morisco Influx into North Africa
The unification of the Iberian-peninsula concluded in 1492 after the last stronghold of
the Muslim state fall to the Catholic kings, Isabella and Ferdinand. After the reconquest,
the Spanish tried to establish a unified Christian Kingdom by implementing a
forced conversion or expulsion policy. Yet, the Morisco expulsion seemed problematic
because of their economic importance and large quantities among the population.
Therefore, the Muslim community was granted religious freedom on the contrary of the
Jews since “isolated and immobilized in the middle of a solidly Christian population, it
was believed the Muslims would soon come to the faith through the good works and
21
suitable preaching of the church”.37 However, in Cervantes' words, the unhappy "nation
of the Moriscos"38 did not give up on their cultures, and thus the assimilation policy had
failed. Therefore, the Spanish Church, especially Cardinal Ximenez de Cisneros,
introduced the forced conversion policy to the Moriscos. This act caused a full-scale
revolt, which was the first chain of many rebellions. However, the Spanish government
defeated the rebels and the Muslim population in the Iberian-peninsula eventually
vanished.39
The size of the Morisco refugee community in North Africa had expanded with the
Christianisation of Spain. From 1493, the Moriscos had already started to cross Gibraltar
and settled on the North African towns. Consequently, the antecedents prepared the
ground for waging a Holy War against the Spanish crown. The Morisco population
consisted of: artisans, traders, farmers, skilled sailors. Due to these being the prominent
trades of the Morisco population in North Africa, the experienced shipwrights had
engaged in the shipbuilding business where the migrants rallied in large numbers. 40
Their nautical knowledge about the Iberian coast gave them an immense opportunity for
ravaging the Spanish towns as pirates. Although the division between Europe and Africa
aided the Spanish in defending the peninsula, this did not prevent the human transitions
37 An rew ess, “The Forgotten Frontier”, 131.
38 Emili S la, “The C rsairs in the Service f the Gran Turk: Men f the Fr ntier”, in Seapower,
Technology and Trade, 254.
39 An rew ess, “The M risc s: An Ott man Fifth C lumn in Sixteenth-Century S ain”, The American
Historical Review, LXXIV/1, 3-4.
40 ess, “The M risc s”, 7.
22
because it was a transparent boundary.41 Moreover, the political instability in the
Maghreb and the inflow of newcomers further amplified the existing social and
economic problems. Meanwhile, the Barbarossa Brothers had left the Ottoman lands to
ensure their security when their protector ġehzade Korkud lost the throne to Selim. As
Hess indicated, this political vacuum had brought corsairs, amongst whom were Oruç
and Hayreddin Barbarossa, to the western Mediterranean42 and led them to establish a
corsair hub in there. Thus, their occupation combined with the vengeful community in
the region had yielded suitable conditions for changing Mediterranean history.
2.4 Barbarossas Arriving at North Africa (1513)
Turkish sailors had already traveled and acquainted with the North African region
before. 43 It may well have been this acquaintance that catalyzed the venture of the
Barbarossa brothers in the North African shores. However, before this discussion it is
first necessary to examine a piece of background information about the brothers to
41 Hess, 7.
42 Hess, 8.
43 Svat S ucek, “The Rise f the Barbar ssas”, in Studies in Ottoman Naval History and Maritime
Geography, 78. Kemal Reis, for example, was hunting down Christian ships across Corsica and Sardinia,
clashing with the Spanish navy along western Italy, and embracing by the Tunisian Sultan, for he
returned with booty and prizes. However, he was also embraced by Bayezid II, for he reduced Italian
nobles to slavery and brought them to the Sublime Porte. See the petition from governor of Bosna to
Sultan Bayezi II: Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), o es E [ e], No: 6082/1.
23
investigate their origins and early years under the aegis of ġehzade Korkud as petty
corsairs.
Born in Lesbos as the son of a sipahi and a Greek widow, the exact date of birth of the
brothers is still unknown. Their father, Yakub, settled on the island during Mehmed II's
reign. The name Barbarossa was first used for Oruç Reis, but after his death Hayreddin
took that title. Although the standard agreement that the name means "Red Beard"
(Barba Rossa), it might also be derived from "Baba Oruç".44 The brothers were natives
of an Aegean island and, because of this, they mainly occupied sea trade under the
sponsorship of ġehzade Korkud.45
However, there are speculations about the intentions of their venture in North Africa.46
Although the popular view had portrayed them within a gazi framework, this view
cannot go beyond a copy of Paul Wittek's famous “gazi thesis”.47 In Gazavat,
Hayreddin Pasha's semi-biographical work written by Seyyid Murâdî, he explicitly
states that the Barbarossa brothers arrived on North African shores because they were
escaping from Selim I, who overtook ġehzade Korkud in the throne succession rather
44 Gürkan, “Ott man C rsairs in the Western Me iterranean an Their Place in the Ott man-Habsburg
Rivalry (1505-1535).”
45 Stanley Lane-P le, “ he B b Co s s”, 36-39. İlter states that this is m re lausible. Aziz Samih
İlter, “ e ”, 71.
46 Murphey, Rhoads. "Seyyi Mura î's Pr se Bi ra hy f Hizir Ibn Yakub, Alias Hayreddin Barbarossa:
Ottoman Folk Narrative as an Under-Exploited Source for Historical Reconstruction." Acta Orientalia
Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 54, no. 4 (2001): 519-32. Accessed May 11, 2021.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23658320.
47 Paul Wittek, “The Rise f the Ott man Em ire,” in The Rise of the Ottoman Empire: Studies in the
History of Turkey, Thirteenth–Fifteenth Centuries, ed. Colin Heywood (Routledge, 2012), pp. 31-69.
24
than launching a jihad against the Spanish infidels.48 Following his brother's advice,
Oruç Reis left the Aegean for Alexandria and wintered there before heading towards the
Tunisian shores. Since Selim was pursuing Korkud, sailing around the Aegean Sea was
not secure.49 The question raised then is: „why did they not sail to Tunis before
wintering at Alexandria?‟. First of all, they potentially were waiting until Korkud's next
move and thinking about how to act upon this, since the throne struggle had continued
until 1514.50 Secondly, Egypt was a haven for Turkish corsairs, and in fact, Oruç had
previously served in Mameluke navy through Korkud's connections.51 He may have
sought protection under the Mamelukes, but the war with the Ottomans may have caused
him to reevaluate this policy and eventually brought him to Tunis. Therefore, Oruç left
Alexandria prior to the Ottoman invasion of Egypt and appeared in Tunis, embarking on
raidings under the aegis of the Hafsid Sultan Abu Abdullah Muhammed V.52
48 “… Sultân Selim ân ‘aleyhi-r-rahmet ve-l- ufran hazretleri tahta cülûs eylemiş ve karın aşı Sultân
K rku ile hasm lmağın Sultân K rku ur ahî ziyâ e k rkuya üşüb firâr eylemiş. Bu kerre Oruç Re’is
bu ahvâl içün vâfir ıztırâba üş i. Ve büyük karın aşı İshâk ve ayre in Re’is eyt iler: ‘Var im i karın aş
Oruç Re’is şim iki hâl e buralar a turmak sana re ‘ayn-ı hata ur, var bu kışı İsken eriyye e kışla,
bakalım ne lur ne lmaz. Ana re biz seni yine habersiz k mayuz, zîrâ kim bilür bu tekne Sultân
K rku un imiş eyü tekneyi ve kazan uğını elin en alurlar a ahî kazanacağına bile kefil isterler’ i iler”
Seyyi Murâ î an Mustafa Yıl ız, - e î 2 3 U e s sb b o he s bul) ;
Kommentierte Edition Mit Deutscher Zusammenfassung (Aachen: Shaker, 1993), 58.
49 Murâ î, “Gazavat”, 60.
50 Korkud was strangled in 13th March 1513.
51İsmail akkı Uzunçarşılı, “II. Bayezi Oğulların an Sultan K rku ”, Belleten XXX (1966), 549-558. Murâ î
also states that Oruç Reis entere the Mamluk service on the eve of the annexation of Egypt by the
Ottomans in 1517. Murâ î, 58-59.
52 Murphey, 522.
25
According to Lane-Poole, Oruç Reis arrived on the Barbary Coast around 1504,53 but his
arrival on the North African shores should be right after Selim I's accession around the
spring of 1513.54 Later, Hayreddin joined his brother due to Sultan Selim's ongoing
persecution against Korkud supporters.55Arriving at the island of Djerba, Oruç began to
search for a sponsor who would allow him to carry out corsair activities. Presenting their
gifts to the Tunisian Sultan Muhammed V, Oruç was authorized to use the country's
ports, and thus he acquired a corsair license. As a custom, he had to share one-eighth of
the booty with the sultan and pay the port fee of two percent.56 However, it may well
have been that the ruler of Tunis was quite impressed by the corsairs' success and
offered them a lower tax rate. Therefore La Goletta (Halkulvad) then became the
headquarters of the Barbarossa brothers in their quest against the infidels. Muhammed
had granted them a corsair nest and protection from any prosecution from the Ottoman
realm. Hence, having secured themselves, they were able to accelerate their movement
around the Italian shores, plundering the Christian vessels across Sardinia and Corsica.
Indeed, Oruç did not fall short of the mark and earned a reputation by plundering tworoyal
galleys belonging to the Pope and rowing them back to La Goletta.57 When
Hayreddin entered the port, where the food shortage was at an extreme, they distributed
53 Stanley Lane-Poole, “The B b Co s s”, 32.
54 Svat S ucek, see. “The rise of the Barbarossas”, 67-78. Aziz Samih İlter also brought the matter to the
table, but Soucek speculated further on the issue by analyzing and comparing the western resources
with the Turkish resources. See Aziz Samih İlter, “Ş e ”, 70.
55 S ucek, “The Rise of the Barbarossas”, 74.
56 Murâ î, 61. Acc r in t Islamic Law (Khums), the common share should be one-fifth of the acquired
booty. The tax rate generally differed at the ruler's initiative between one-fifth and one-eighth. See
Gürkan Emrah Safa, “ u Ko s ”, 407.
57 Lane-P le, “Barbary”, 35.
26
half of the seized wheat to the poor out of charity. In this episode, the Barbarossas and
their corsair comrades were portrayed as saviors who saved the poor from hunger.58
On the other hand, during their first years under the Hafsid patronage, Oruç and
Hayreddin worked in accordance with the gaza spirit by attacking Christian vessels as
well as fighting against the Spanish presidios along the North African coast. Presidios
were strategic garrison posts established in an attempt to control the Maghrib coast while
leaving the interior to local chieftains. Even though the Spaniards had secured
themselves in key positions such as Oran and Bougie, the presidios were excessively
dependent on the mainland because they could not supply ammunition or food from the
hinterland. Moreover, the presence of Spanish troops disturbed the Muslims within the
region and inflamed the gaza spirit, more people supported the Muslim corsairs since the
local rulers were unable to fight back against the infidels. 59 Therefore, Oruç had the
opportunity to enlarge his influence in Tunis after the expelled ruler of Bougie
demanded support for his restoration.60 The operation had failed, however, and a
cannonball took Oruç's arm off. On the way back to Goletta, the corsairs ambushed a
Genoese galleot laden with prizes. This act provoked the Genoese Senate and they sent
Admiral Andrea Doria, who would be the arch-rival of Hayreddin Reis in the future.
Doria sacked the castle of La Goletta and took many of Hayreddin's vessels with him to
58 “Ve l buğ ayun nısfını tekneler için beksimetlik alak y ılar ve nısfını fakîr fukaraya tasa uk eyle iler.
Şöyle ki Tunusun fakîr fukarâsı ‘Allâh yansurakum yâ mucâhi în!’ eyü alkış i üb ‘Allâh Te’âlâ bu âzîleri
rahmet ön er i. Ku ûm-ı mübârekelerin e bele imüze bereket hâsıl l ı’ irler i i.” Murâ î, 63.
59 Jamil Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period (Cambridge, 1975), 162.
60 Abun-Nasr, “A ist ry f the Ma hrib”, 163.
27
Genoa.61 Following this Hayreddin moved his operations to Djidjelli, where he spent his
time building new ships.62
Meanwhile, Hayreddin made his first diplomatic contact with Sultan Selim I by
despatching Pîrî Reis with valuable items to Istanbul.63 It should be noted that
Hayreddin had appealed to the Sultan when he was in dire straits, as Murphey
underlined.64 Up until then, the brothers had never turned towards the Ottomans,
worrying that the Sultan might still be upset about their political views in the past.
Nevertheless, Selim putting away the past, had welcomed this sign of obedience.
Furthermore, the Sultan had furnished two firkates65 for Hayreddin and Oruç and sent
the envoy back to Tunis with all his blessings and precious gifts.66The second siege of
Bougie should have occurred around 1514.67 The Arab tribe sheiks, who lived in the
castle, requested assistance from the corsairs to capture Bougie because they were living
under Spanish oppression and could not practice Islam freely. This was a call for Holy
61 Lane-Poole, 43.
62 Lane-Poole, 44.
63 Pîrî Reis was als menti ne as Muhiyi în Reis in ifferent res urces.
64 Murphey, 522.
65 Alth u h Seyyi Murâ î menti ne the shi s as “firkata”, they sh ul be bi alleys (baştar a) fr m
his escri ti ns, see. İ ris B stan, “Osmanlılar ve eniz: eniz P litikaları, Teşkilat, Gemiler”, (İstanbul:
Küre Yayınları, 2007), 108.
66 “Benüm lâlâlarum re’îsü-l-mücâhi înler, husrev-i â işâhâneme ön erilen he âyâ u eşkeşlerinüz
elüb vusûl lub makbûle eç i, berekât-ı alîl birle ak celle ve ‘âlâ sizleri her hâl e a’ âlarınuza
mansûr eylesün!”, Murâ î, 78.
67 There are contradictions about the exact date of the siege. Lane-Poole claims that the first attempt
occurred in 1512 while the Barbarossa brothers did not arrive North Africa before 1513, see. Lane-Poole,
40-44. It may well have been that there is a short time period between the first and second Bougie
campaigns.
28
War. 68 In the first phase, the siege continued successfully but the Spanish garrison
within the inner castle maintained its resistance and repulsed the attackers. As the
gunpowder reserves thinned day by day, the corsairs asked for gunpowder from the
Hafsid sultan. However, the help never arrived. Therefore, the corsairs had withdrawn
from Bougie because the desertion rates became intolerable and a relief force despatched
from Spain had arrived before the town. The siege of Bougie was a notable failure which
resulted in Hayreddin setting "fire to his ships that they might not fall into the hands of
the Spaniards".69
However, it seems that Muhammed was displeased by Sultan Selim‟s open support to
the corsairs under his patronage. Hess also supports this view and adds that the
aggressive policy conducted by Sultan Selim against the Mamelukes created unrest
between the Islamic states, so Muhammed may have opposed Selim fearing that the next
target would be his realm.70 In fact, Selim had not intended to expand his borders
towards the western Mediterranean. Conquest of Egypt and Syria had already given
strategic positions to the Ottomans to curb the Portuguese ambitions in the Indian Ocean
68 “… bu enlü cevr ü cefâların çeküb âşkâra namâz kılmağa ve evlâ larımuza Kur’ân ta’lîm itmeğe bir
veçhile kâ ir e üllerüz, yiraltın a köstebek ibi biribirlerümüzi öze erek mahfî namâz kılaruz, hemân
hâlimüz bir erhamu-r-râhimîne kalmış ır. Yâ ne var el-hamdu li-llâh ku üm-ı mübâreklerinüz teşrifatıyla
elüb buraların islâm nûrîle müşerref eylesenüz lmaz mı?” Murâ î, 78-79.
69 Lane-Poole, 44.
70 Hess, 63.
29
and protect the two Holy cities.71 Sultan Selim had succeeded in restoring the Indian
Ocean trade, which the Portuguese deflected in the late 15th century.72
However, the main threat to Muhammed would not come from the Ottoman Sultan but
the corsairs, especially Oruç. When the corsairs had taken shelter in Djijelli port
positioned 60 miles east of Bougie73, Oruç and Hayreddin had begun to carry out
plunder missions independent from the Hafsid patronage. To consolidate their position,
they had always maintained good relations with the local people and supplied the ports
with food,74 which was crucial task in the Mediterranean basin where the cities are
mostly suffering famine due to uneven precipitations. Thus, Morgan particularly
underlines the affection shown to the corsairs by the local people.75 The political
vacuum within the region had created such a suitable environment for the advent of
Barbarossa brothers that their reputation rapidly spread across the Mediterranean.
Therefore, they were invited to Algiers, where the Andalusian immigrants constituted a
significant portion of the population.76
71 Svat S ucek, “The P rtu uese an the Turks in the Persian Gulf”, in Studies in Ottoman Naval History
and Maritime Geography, 86.
72 Giancarlo Casale, The Ottoman Age of Exploration, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 33. See
als , Mur hey, “Seyyi Mura î”, 525.
73 Piri Reis vividly portrayed Bougie and Djijelli in his Book of Navigation. see. Reis Pirî, Kitab- B h e, e .
Arı Bülent (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık enizcilik Müsteşarlığı, 2002), 480-482. He stated that the distance
between tw rts as 80 miles, h wever it sh ul be 60 miles, see. Kâtib Çelebi, “Tuhfetü’l-Kibâr”, 108.
74 Lane-Poole, 44.
75 J se h M r an, “A Complete History of g e s”, 231.
76 Abun-Nasr, 163. It should be noted that both enterprises (Bougie and Algiers) were conducted through
the appeals made by the residents, and their motivation was ejecting the Spanish presidios in the region.
30
The Spaniards heavily fortified an islet off the Algiers (Penon), and Oruç was requested
to displace the infidels from their fortress. First, he captured Cherchell on the road, then
moved to Algiers and blockaded the harbor. After twenty days of bombardment, the
light cannons could not even make a scratch on the walls. Meanwhile Nicolao Quint, the
presidio commander, had requested immediate assistance and complained that the ships
could not provide the necessary supplies due to the blockade.77 In fact, the Spaniards
were already preparing a counter-attack against the Barbarossa brothers as their advance
aroused concerns in Spain. Yet, the aid was interrupted by the uprisings in Malaga.78
The events had increased the anxiety that the Sultan's fleet will arrive at the Spanish
coasts to help the Moriscos.79
The corsairs arrived in Algiers as guests, yet Oruç wanted to seize the power. He
murdered Sheykh Salim al-Tumi, the political leader of the city who was flirting with
the Spaniards and planning a plot against the Barbarossa brothers.80 However, Salim's
son Yahya, continued his father‟s policy and moved to Oran, where he was received by
the captain-general Marquis De Comares. Yahya was already exchanging letters with the
Spanish cardinal Ximenes and Diego de Vera after his father got killed by Oruç
77 Muzaffer Arıkan an Paulin Toledo, - - s o e e De
h e g s o Be ge e s e o es u o-Es o s E os g os Do u e os
Es o es e os s o o (Ankara: Deniz Kuvvetleri K mutanlığı Karar ah
basımevi, 1995), 144.
78 Arıkan an T le , 170. See als , avi C leman, “Bef re the C muner s: Castilian an Gen ese
Tra iti ns f ‘Liberty’ in the 1516 Mála a Rebelli n,” Mediterranean Studies 21, no. 1 (2013): pp. 1-26,
https://doi.org/10.5325/mediterraneanstu.21.1.0001.
79 Arıkan an T le , 182.
80 Morgan, 240.
31
Barbarossa. The Spaniards had been looking for local support in their expedition against
the corsairs, so they assured Yahya that his father's vengeance would be taken.81
Furthermore, the Spaniards not only intended to drive the corsairs out of Algiers but also
mentioned a campaign against Djerba.82 In the light of these developments, Oruç had to
strengthen his position by repairing the citadel and granting certain privileges to the
citizens, such as exemption from tribute.83
Eventually, the Spanish navy arrived in Algiers on September 30, 1516. 84 After a
successful counter-attack, Oruç defeated the Spanish troops and took 2700 captives.85 It
should be noted that, albeit the Spanish effort to lure the local population to their side,
they fought against the Spanish garrison. The strong opposition against the Spaniards
proves how potent the Morisco population in the city was at that time.
After fending off the Spanish threat in Algiers, Oruç seized Tilemsen in 1518 without
difficulty. He then divided his forces to send them back to Algiers, not knowing that it
would be a vital mistake. In the meantime, as the kingdom of corsairs was steadily
growing, the young Emperor Charles V was making preparations. Later, he dispatched
his forces in Oran to stop Oruç once and for all.86 After six months of siege, the Turkish
garrison decided to leave the castle but they had been compromised and most of them
81 Arıkan an T le , 146.
82 Arıkan an T le , 175.
83 Morgan, 240.
84 Mouloud Gaid, e es e Ce , trans. Faik Melek (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basım Evi, 1996),
23.
85 Murâ î, 90.
86 Lane-Poole, 51.
32
got killed, including Oruç and his brother Ġshak.87 In the letter sent by the Emperor
Charles V, the incident is described elaborately. According to the document, due to the
great damage and casualties, Oruç and his men abandoned the castle so to not to be
killed by the soldiers that surrounded them. Although the Gazavat portrayed a different
picture, the Emperor's letter far outweighs the narrations.88
While the Spaniards trapped Oruç in Tilemsen, Hayreddin did not abandon Algiers,
fearing that the corsairs could also lose this critical bastion. Hayreddin, as a foreigner to
the Maghrib lands, had acknowledged that he was weak against the Arabs and the
Spaniards. Also, Hayreddin could not rely on the locals either, considering the fact that
he was betrayed before. Although the Spanish garrisons were vulnerable without
assistance from the Habsburg lands, the corsairs likewise could not hold on in Algiers
without the Ottoman assistance. Being the beylerbey of Algiers, under the wings of
Sultan Selim, who had become the servant of the two holy cities (hâdimü'l-Haremeyn),
could render Hayreddin the legitimacy he needed in the eyes of the locals and provide
men and ammunition to fight against the infidels. Thus, Hayreddin first mentioned his
intention and he got support from the notables.89 Later, he sent Hacı Hüseyin Agha as an
envoy to Konstantiniyye and officially declared his submission by rendering 25
87 Abun-Nasr, 164.
88 Arıkan an T le , 185-187. According to Gazavat, the Spaniards offered a safe passage if the Turkish
arris n aban n the castle. Oruç acce te these terms an left it f r Al iers, yet, the S aniar s
infringed the agreement and then killed the corsairs. Murâ î, 101.
89 A letter date 10 Zilka e 925 (3 N vember 1519) was sent by the n tables f Al iers statin that Oruç
Reis was killed and replaced by his brother, Hayreddin Reis, and that they are still loyal to the Sublime
P rte. “ve hâliyân u’â-yı evâm-ı evlet-i Pâ işâhîyeye mü âvemet eyle iklerini î’lâm eylemiş” Osmanlı
Arşivi (BOA), o es E [ e], No. 6456/1.
33
Christian slaves as “peşkeş” unto the Ottoman sultan.90 It should be noted that this act
was performed to symbolize the commitment between the sovereign and the vassal in
the Ottoman Empire, where in return, the ruler offers expensive gifts such as: a robe, a
horse with a saddle, or a sword as a sign of delegation.91 Sultan Selim too offered a robe
to Hacı Hüseyin Agha and a sword to Hayreddin. Thus, Hayreddin had become the
Beylerbey of Algiers.92 Moreover, receiving a berat from the Sultan93, Hayreddin could
now enjoy certain privileges as a licensed Ottoman corsair, such as to sail without being
harassed by the Venetian vessels, according to the peace treaty between the Ottoman
Empire and Venice.94 More importantly, the Sultan had sent him 2.000 janissaries and
permission to recruit volunteers from Anatolia.95
The integration of Algiers into the Ottoman Empire coincided with the Ottoman
expansion in the Middle East. When Sultan Selim left the throne to his son ġehzade
Süleyman, the Ottoman Empire had secured the Indian spice trade and maintained a
peaceful relationship with the Venetians. Hayreddin and Oruç Barbarossa, as individual
entrepreneurs, extended the Ottoman realm into the central and western Mediterranean
by fighting against the Spanish Habsburgs, keeping the Ottomans out of the war.
Reinforced by the Ottoman sultan, Hayreddin had rebounded from the loss of Tilemsen
90 Murâ î, 114.
91 alil İnalcık, “V. OTTOMAN ARC IVAL MATERIALS ON MILLETS,” From Empire to Republic, 2010, pp.
91-104, https://doi.org/10.31826/9781463230098-006, 447.
92 Gaid, 27-28.
93 “BERAT - T V İslâm Ansikl e isi,” T V İslam Ansikl e isi, accesse A ril 2, 2021,
https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/berat--belge.
94 M. Tayyib Gökbil in, “ e e De e e e Be ge e ”, 50.
95 Abun-Nasr, 164.
34
and continued his expeditions against the Hafsids and Kabylia tribe. However, Hayrettin
could not secure his position and decided to leave Algiers for Djerba. It should be
underlined that the ill-disciplined behavior of the janissary corps also played a role in
making this decision since they had inflamed the sense of hostility towards the
corsairs.96
2.5 Accession of Süleyman the Lawgiver and Hayreddin’s Struggle (1520)
The incorporation of Algiers into the Ottoman Empire did not happen overnight as the
Sublime Porte had to focus on its own agenda. Süleyman I had ascended to the throne in
1520. He concentrated on consolidating his power by conquering Belgrade in 1521, and
demonstrated what policy the Ottomans would pursue in the future against the
Habsburgs. The following year he set forth to Rhodes, which has been threatening the
Konstantiniyye-Egypt trade route for a long time under the rule of St. John Knights.97
Ottomans had previously besieged the island in 1480 but could not overwhelm the inner
castle. However, within six months, the Ottomans had captured the entire island with a
successful operation and consolidated their dominance in Eastern-Mediterranean.98
96 Gaid, 30.
97 İnalcık alil, De e - e: s o u u e e (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası
Kültür Yayınları, 2014), 149.
98 Mahmut Şakir ğlu, “R s A ası'nın Fethin en 1540 Tarihli Türk-Vene ik Antlaşmasına,” in
B g o u K De h 1, e . İ ris B stan an alil Sahilli ğlu
(İstanbul: eniz Basım Mü ürlüğü, 2009), 133-134..
35
On the other hand, Emperor Charles V laid upon a crushing defeat to French Emperor
François I and took him as a prisoner in Pavia, 1525.99 Later, François was released on
the condition that he would abandon his ambitions in Italy. Seeking an ally against the
Habsburgs, François applied to Sultan Süleyman. On behalf of his request, the Sultan
had decided to launch an expedition on Hungary in 1526 and in the battle of Mohacs, the
Ottomans destroyed the Hungarian army. Hence, Sultan Süleyman not only claimed the
Hungarian crown but also claimed the Roman crown since King Louis was one of the
heirs claiming the Holy-Roman Empire crown. Therefore, Süleyman had inherited the
Roman crown by the sword. 100 Since Mehmed the Conqueror's time, the Ottoman
sultans had already pointed out their desire of conquering Rome by symbolizing it as the
Red Apple (Kızıl Elma).101 After the conquest of Konstantiniyye in 1453, Mehmed the
Conqueror had called himself Kayzer-i Rûm (Ceasar of Rome) and that had been an
epithet used by the Ottoman sultans since then.102
As the Ottomans were busy dealing with the war in central Europe, Hayreddin could not
receive further assistance from the Sultan to solidify his corsair kingdom and waited
until 1525 to return to Algiers. Until that time, the corsairs, taking advantage of the war
between the Habsburgs and France, engaged in large-scale plunders off the coast of Italy
99 İnalcık, 151.
100 İnalcık, 153.
101 İnalcık alil, “State S verei nty an Law urin the Rei n f Süleymân,” in e he e o
His Time (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1993), 68.
102 İnalcık alil, K u , De , K se - û , F h u ehe e , ed.
Tayfun Ulaş (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2019), 214.
36
and Spain, expanding their fleet day by day.103 It may well have been that Hayreddin
Reis had found trust in himself to strike against the Algiers after he had captured Collo,
Bona, and Constantine with Banu Abbas assistance. Meanwhile, he got acquainted with
reliable allies during his exile in Djijelli, surrounded by talented sailors such as: Turgut,
Salih, Aydın, and Sinan the Jew.104 They helped Hayreddin build a "slave army" and
provided oarsmen to row his galleys during the raids. Thus, when Hayreddin finally
entered the gates of Algiers, he had immediately executed local chiefs who collaborated
with the Spaniards.
Nevertheless, the Spanish garrison was still resisting in the Penon, threatening
Hayreddin's political future within the region. Hayreddin had offered peaceful terms for
surrender but, presumably, the Spaniards refused him since they expected a relief force.
Eventually, they were ejected from the Penon after a successful attack of Hayreddin's
army in 1529. When the Spanish relief fleet finally arrived before Algiers, it was already
too late. Plus, the corsairs pursued the fleet on its way back and captured them with its
two thousand men.105 Hayreddin‟s first project following the conquest to establish a
sheltered anchor point was to build "an earth platform to connect the town with the four
rocky isles facing it”.106 Having secured his position, he could finally station his navy in
103 Lane-Poole, 56.
104 Lane-Poole, 56.
105 Gaid, 32.
106 Abun-Nasr, 164. Sosa also explains in detail the function of the structure, see. Antonio de Sosa, Early
Modern Dialogue with Islam: Antonio De Sosa's Topography of Algiers (1612), e . María Ant nia Garcés,
trans. Diana de Armas Wilson (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011), 104-105.
37
a protected harbor and plunder the Spanish coast. Furthermore, the corsairs not only
ravaged the Christian towns but also initiated rescue missions transporting the Moriscos
to North Africa from Andalusia.107 In one of these operations, six imperial galleys were
captured and a portion of the revenue obtained was sent to Sublime Porte.108
Meanwhile, King François I had concluded the treaty of Cambrai (1529) with Emperor
Charles V, which prompted the Spanish attention on the North African frontier once
again. However, the Ottomans had not given up on their cause in Hungary. In 1529,
Sultan Süleyman entered Hungary and appointed John Zapolya to the Hungarian throne.
Although the Sultan advanced his armies westward and besieged Vienna, he had to
retreat after a while since the campaign season had come to an end. Yet, Süleyman's
policy based on squeezing the Habsburgs together with France on two fronts did not
yield since François signed a peace treaty with the Habsburgs on his own.
Notwithstanding, the Ottoman armies continued their expeditions to Austria until the
peace treaty of Constantinople (1533).109
It may well have been that the Habsburgs, knowing that they were still superior to the
Ottomans, were willing to open a new front in their struggle. Therefore Charles V had
planned to eradicate the corsair bases, which were pillaging the Habsburg towns and
enslaving the Christian population on behalf of the Ottoman sultan. The Spanish
107 ess, “The F r tten Fr ntier”, 68.
108 Gaid, 33.
109 İnalcık alil, “ evlet-i ‘Aliyye”, 154-156.
38
presence in Maghrib was reduced to only Oran and Bougie because of the corsair
activities. Therefore, to stop the everlasting and financially destructive corsair raids, the
counter-attack of the Spanish navy took place in Cherchell. Admiral Doria, a Genoese
nobleman fighting against the Habsburg Empire under the aegis of King François, had
been disturbed by the French-Ottoman rapprochement and decided to fight for the
Habsburg cause. His first attack caught the corsairs by surprise and cost them seven
hundred Christian slaves. However, as the Spaniards lingered too much during the
pillage, they did not hear the return signal and were driven out by the Turks and
Moriscos. The result was a disaster. Nine hundred were killed and six hundred were
reduced to slavery.110 The following year Charles' fleet had seized Koron, a vital port for
the Ottoman navy in the Peloponnese, urging the Ottomans to call Hayreddin Reis to
Konstantiniyye.111 That was a successful move for Charles since Sultan Süleyman had to
withdraw from the European campaign while leading his armies towards the gates of
Vienna. The Sultan returned to Konstantiniyye, leaving his army in Belgrad and
arranged a fleet on Koron.112 Although the Ottoman army was quite superior in terms of
military technology, organization and discipline, the navy was far from competitive
against its European adversaries. For instance, KemankeĢ Ahmet Bey's defeat against
Andrea Doria on his way to reclaim Koron had revealed the deficits of the naval
110 Lane-Poole, 78.
111 İnalcık, 156.
112 “An an Rûm Şâhı Sultan Süleyman öçüb Bel ra ’ an ‘azm i üb İslâmb l’a elüb karar it i. Ve târih
hicretin kuzyüz tuz kuzu Pâ işâh-ı ‘Âlem- enâh evvel bahâr lıcak nice âre emi nanmasın i üb
ahî K r n üstüne ön er i.” Lütfi Paşa, e h- sman (Istanbul: Matbaa-yi Âmire, 1925), 343.
39
organization. 113 The reports of the Venetian observers on this subject are salient.
According to this report, the admiral had no experience, the equipment was absent, and
the sailors still used arrows instead of the arquebus. 114 Ġbrahim Pasha, the grand vizier
of the period, was aware of the shortcomings of the navy and had been working to
overcome them since the Egypt expedition of 1524. Compared to other Ottoman
bureaucrats, Ibrahim also closely followed the developments in the Indian Ocean and
took the first steps of the Ottoman administration to be established on the Red Sea. 115
Moreover, as the Portuguese tried to shift the spice trade to the Indian Ocean, the
Venetians and Ottomans had cooperated to eliminate the Portuguese, as customs
revenues dwindled and trade was negatively affected. In this respect, a shipwright was
requested from Venice who could build ships suitable for sailing in the ocean.116 Yet,
this plan had never been implemented.
The execution of Ġbrahim Pasha in 1536 and Hayreddin Pasha's insistence on using
galley-type ships in the Mediterranean117 postponed the transition of the Ottoman navy
to galleon-type ships until the second half of the 17th century.118 Indeed, Hayreddin had
113 Hess, 72.
114 Alain Servante, “Gi van-Francesc Giustinian: Osmanlı nanmasına Vene ik Teknik Yar ımı (1531-
1534),” in e e De , e . Kumrular zlem (Bey ğlu, İstanbul: Kita Yayınevi, 2007), 150-151.
115 Giancarl Casale, “ he o ge o Ex o o ”, 40.
116 Servante, 151.
117 Servante, 154-155.
118 The period when the Ottoman navy started the galleon construction corresponds to the beginning of
the Cretan War (1645-1669). The Venetian navy blockaded the Dardanelles, cut aid to Crete, and later
occupied Bozcaada, which paved the way for the Ottomans to turn to galleon-type ships in order to
prevail over Venice. The Venetian navy generally used galleon type ships during this expedition. See,
B stan İ ris, “Osmanlılar Ve eniz”, 41-51.
40
fit like a glove for the Ottoman Empire, who could not set sail on the ocean in the age of
discoveries and spent all its resources to establish its supremacy in the Mediterranean.
2.6 Barbaros Hayreddin: Kapudan Pasha of Donanma-yı Hümâyûn (1533)
Hayreddin Reis had been called to Konstantiniyye by Sultan Süleyman's decree in 1533.
During his absence in Algiers, he left Hasan Agha (a Sardinian renegade) as his viceroy.
En route to the capital, he sacked Elba and captured some Genoese corn ships as looking
for Andrea Doria.119 According to a Papal letter, Hayreddin's arrival should be dated
November 9- December 15, 1533. 120 A flamboyant ceremony was held in his honor in
which he offered "21 male slaves, 2 tavashish, silver artefacts such as decanters and
mugs, coloured clothes, a crown of coral, two clocks, and velvet, satin, woollen, and
brocade clothes to the Sultan".121 He was accompanied by Rashid, who took the
Ottoman‟s side against his brother Mullay Hasan of Tunis.122 Bostan indicates that
Hayreddin might have been appointed in January 1534 as the Beylerbey of the Aegean
islands (Cezâyir-i Bahr-i Sefid) after he met Ġbrahim Pasha in Aleppo. Furthermore, he
119 Lane-Poole, 81-82.
120 “Barbarr ssa arrive at Istanbul with 18 shi s an many ca tives…” Arıkan an T le , 265.
121 İ ris B stan, “The Establishment f the Pr vince f Cezayir-i Bahr-ı Sefi ,” in The Kapudan Pasha: His
Office and His Domain, ed. Elizabeth A. Zachariadou (Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 2002), 244.
122 İ ris B stan, “The Establishment”, 244.
41
was officially recognized as a "pasha"123 when he received two gowns (hil'at) by the
Sultan, a symbol of gratification. 124 Typically, the admirals were appointed from the
sancakbeyi of Gallipoli since it was the most significant naval base until Sultan Selim I's
time. However, the province of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid was formed after his appointment
and Hayreddin Pasha was titled as Vizier, rewarded with a beylerbeylik status.125 Still,
some Ottoman bureaucrats were not delighted with his promotion since the navy will be
commanded by a vulgar corsair who was not raised within the palace school.126
However, according to Gazavat, some Ottoman bureaucrats were not delighted with his
promotion since they thought the navy would be commanded by a vulgar corsair who
was not raised within the palace school.127 Therefore in Gazavat, the close relationship
between Hayreddin and Ibrahim Pasha was emphasized even more, drawing an analogy
between those career paths to legitimize Hayreddin's appointment. Ġbrahim had also
climbed to the rank of Grand Vizier thanks to his close relationship with Sultan
Süleyman without being subject to the ordinary Kul system. Indeed, as a universal state,
the Ottoman Empire had always been elastic in integrating talented bureaucrats within
its body.
123 “ ayre in Paşa Mağrib' en İslâmb l'a elüb Pâ işâh-ı İslâm'ın elin ö üb 'âli işkeşler çık ı ve
Pâ işâh-ı 'âlem enâh na erya beylerbe iliğin virüb ve a ı ayre in Reis iken ayre in aşa l u”
Lütfi Paşa, 344.
124 Bostan, 245.
125 C lin Imber an C lin Imber, “The Navy f Süleyman the Ma nificent,” in Studies in Ottoman History
and Law (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996), 35.
126 “Zîrâ ba’zı münâfıkân hase yüzin en ayre în Paşanun hakkın a söylemişler i i ki: ‘Şevketlü
â işâhımuz bu bâb a ayet tizlik eyle i, bir izban u i isine nanma virüb ka u an aşa eyle i.’”
Murâ î, 204.
127 Murâ î, 202-203.
42
Upon his arrival to the capital, Hayreddin Pasha started to work on reorganizing the
navy and shipbuilding process.128 He wintered in the imperial dockyards preparing for
the naval season and left Konstantiniyye for Tunis with one hundred vessels in May
1534.129 The brother of the ruler of Tunis, Rashid, had already paid homage to Sultan
Süleyman in the Sublime Porte. During the talks, it was concluded that the pro-Habsburg
Mullay Hasan of Tunis should be ousted, and thus, Tunis would be joined into the
Ottoman realm by Hayreddin Pasha.130 So, prior to the Tunis expedition, the Ottoman
navy ravaged the Italian coasts so as to distract the Hafsids and not give a chance Mullay
Hasan to organize its defenses.131 Hayreddin Pasha sacked both Reggio and San Lucido,
took hundreds of slaves to the ships, and sent booty to Konstantiniyye.132 Following
plunders, Ottoman soldiers with their arquebuses and artillery landed in Bizerte,
positioned on the northeastern part of Tunis.
128 Bostan, 246.
129 “… ve yüz âre ka ır a na ub sene-i mezkûre [940] zilkadesinin evâsıtın a eryaya ön er i”, Lütfi
Paşa, 344.
130 The narrative about the Tunis expedition in Gazavat should be worth mentioning. The Ottoman navy,
which weighed anchor from the Sublime Porte for Italy, had to anchor off Tunis due to an adverse wind,
and thus, Tunis was conquered with the sign of God. Since the Sharia Law prohibits an Islamic state from
fighting another Islamic state without a just cause, the book legitimized this conquest by referring to
persecuted people under Mullay Hasan, for an Islamic ruler should be just or else he is unlawful. See Halil
Inalcik, “The Ott man C nce t f State an the Class System,” in The Ottoman Empire: the Classical Age
1300-1600 (L n n: Ph enix, 2000) an zer Er enç, “Osmanlı Klasik üzeni Ve zellikleri Üzerine Bazı
Açıklamalar,” accesse March 26, 2021,
htt ://re sit ry.bilkent.e u.tr/bitstream/han le/11693/48008/ zer%20Er enç%2C%20Osmanlı%20kla
sik%20 üzeni%20ve%20özellikleri.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y, 34.
131 a ie e, “Histoire Des Rois D'Alger”, 47.
132 Lane-Poole, 84. Gazavat estimated sixteen thousand captives and four hundred twenty-five boxes of
akça, yet that sh ul be an exa erati n. See Murâ î, 203.
43
Meanwhile, having heard Hayreddin landed his soldiers, Mullay Hasan fled the city to
prepare a counter-attack. However, he was ultimately defeated. The Ottoman victory did
not last long after Hasan informed Charles V about the Turkish presence in Tunis as it
was unacceptable to the Spaniards that an Ottoman garrison was positioned so close to
Sicily and Naples.133 Being informed that Sultan Süleyman was busy with the Safavids
in the east,134 the Emperor departed from Barcelona in the summer of 1535 to expel
Hayreddin from Tunis and reinstate Hasan to the throne.135 When Hayreddin learned that
the Emperor was advancing on to Tunis with a large squadron, he sent some of his ships
to Bône, a town located three hundred miles west of Tunis, and the same distance east of
Algiers because the distance from this place made him think that his navy would be less
exposed to attacks and that his vessels would be more secure. Plus, if the Emperor drove
him out of Tunis (which he considered inevitable), Hayreddin would find refuge in
Bône.136 Even though Hayreddin Pasha strengthened the fortifications and took
additional measures to stop the Christian army, he had to abandon the city after a fierce
fight. Before leaving Tunis, Emperor Charles stationed a garrison at La Goletta that
133 A letter t the Em er r is rawin his attenti n the situati n in Tunis. Arıkan an T le , 218-219.
134 Arıkan an T le , 267.
135 In a letter fr m Charles V t Mullay asan: “Since you are neighbors of our kingdoms of Sicily and
Sardinia, and in particular, I want to help you to protect you and your kingdoms from injustice.” Arıkan
and Toledo 220.
136 a , 50.
44
would remain until 1574. On the other hand, Hayreddin Pasha had sacked Minorca
Island to compensate his damages before sailing to Algiers.137
2.7 War with Venice and the Battle of Preveza (1537-1540)
The foundations of friendly relations between the Ottomans and France had been laid in
1525 but the alliance had sealed after Jean de La Foret, the French envoy, arrived in
Konstantiniyye in February 1536. The Ottomans had expected to get their share of
southern Italy, as they had previously attempted in 1480. According to the plan, the
French would penetrate Lombardy (Milan), while the Ottomans would invade Naples
(Apulia). In a letter from François to Sultan Süleyman, the French King calls himself a
loyal friend of the Sultan and after referring to the Habsburg threat, he asks the Ottoman
navy to attack Naples, promising that the French navy would support the expedition with
approximately 40-50 ships.138 Therefore, the Ottoman navy, under Lütfi Pasha's
command, dispatched from the Sublime Porte to rendezvous with the French navy in the
Adriatic. The Turkish forces stormed Otranto, ravaged the surrounding settlements, and
137 a , 51.
138 “İslâm Pâ işâhı Sultân Süleyman’ an temennâ bu ur ki bu muhib-i berâyânızı İs anya *kralı+ enen
mel’ûn hayli bî-huzûr i üb incit i şöyle kim eniz en nanma-i hümâyûn Pâ işâh-ı İslâm-ı sa’â etle
kara an Avl nya iskelesine elüb ahi Pulya vilâyetine ve eniz en ahi kırk-elli âre ka ır alarımız
elmek mukarrer ir” Lütfi Paşa, 358.
45
many captives were taken.139 Meanwhile, the Sultan was heading to Valona, the
Albanian side of the straits of Otranto, to put down Albanian revolts. Later, Hayreddin
Pasha joined the Donanma-yı Hümâyûn. However François broke the deal and did not
show up, alleging that the situation in Flanders was worsening.140
As the events unfolded in this direction, Süleyman decided to attack Corfu, a Venetian
dominion. Kemal Reis had previously defined the island as the eye of the Adriatic 141
but, at that time, the operational scale of the Ottoman navy was limited and an
expedition to Corfu was unlikely. Then this provokes the following questions: „why did
the Ottomans and Venetians cut each other's throats while enjoying a mutual
friendship?‟ and „had they not maintained a peaceful relationship during the period of
Ibrahim Pasha?‟. Ibrahim was of a Venetian origin and understood that preserving
friendly relations with Venice would benefit both states; also, trade was secured with
previous ahidnâmes.
On the other hand, Venice had to get along with the Ottomans since the previous wars
cost Venice dearly. They were not involved in the Habsburg-Ottoman rivalry in order to
remain neutral, and avoid provoking both sides, during Hayreddin Pasha's Italian
139 Lütfi Paşa, 359-360.
140 S ucek, “Ottoman Maritime Wars”, 58.
141 “Ammâ mezkûr cezîrenün hakkın a merhûm Kemâl Reis’ün âyim cevâbı bu i i kim Vene ik’ün iki
özü var ur s l özü M t n kal’ası ur ve sağ özü mezbûr K rfuz a ası ur iyüb” Reis Pîrî, 263.
46
campaign in 1534.142 However, the situation started to change, as can be seen in the
letter by Ibrahim Pasha dated 1535. He complains that Venice did not convey the news
that Charles arrived in Austria to Istanbul as required by the ahidnâme terms.143
Furthermore, Ġbrahim Pasha also remonstrates that the Venetians did not help when
Hayreddin Pasha was attacked by his enemies.144 Not only had Venice turned a cold
shoulder to Hayreddin Pasha, but they had informed the Spaniards about every
movement the Ottoman navy made during the Italian campaign.145 Also Ayas Pasha,
appointed as the grand vizier after Ibrahim's execution, had paid attention to preserving
the friendship between the two states. 146
It may well have been that the violation of the ahidnâmes hampered the sea trade, and
the corsair raids performed by both sides pushed Ottoman and Venetian administrations
into the war. A petition sent to the Sultan regarding some corsairs violated the ahidnâme
142 zlem Kumrular, “İs any l Ve İtalyan Arşiv Kaynakları Ve Kr niklerinin Işığın a Barbar s’un 1534
Seferi”, in e e De , e . Kumrular zlem (Bey ğlu, İstanbul: Kita Yayınevi, 2007), 192-193.
143 “Şim iki hal e vilayet-i İs anya kralı lan müfsi yerin en kalkub cemiyet ile Alman vilayetine elüb l
cânibler e irü fitne ve fesâ a mübâşeret eylemek murâ e inir imiş eğer ki bu haber bize el i işittik
ama bunun ibi hâl lsa sizin evletlü a işah-ı alem enah hazretlerine lan ğruluk ile muhabbet öz
ve sa akat üzere stluğunuz muktezasınca erçek ve sahih haber siz en elir i i (…) imdi sizin bizim ulu
ve sa’a etlü a işahımıza lan kemâl-i muhabbetiniz en ve ah nâme-i muktezasınca lan
stluğunuz an umulan bu ur ki eğer l müfsi in hareketi sahih ise kan ı cânibe gitmek murâ
e inmiş ir ve fikr-i te bîri ne ir sıhhati üzere mufassalan i’lâm eyleyesin erçek haber ve sahih sözleri
siz en umarız.” M. Tayyib Gökbil in, “ e e De e e es ”, 156-157.
144 “sizin ka imî sa akatiniz en stluğunuz an böyle mi umulmalıy ı hakiki stluk buy u ki bunun ibi
haber malumunuz l uk a kat’an tahîr etmeyüb evletlü a işah-ı ‘âlem enâh hazretlerinin uğrun a
kemâl-i mak ûrunuzu iriğ etmeyüb ereği ibi mu’avenet ve mezaherette buluna i iniz y ksa mücerre
haber ile stluk ma’lum lmaz yüce er âhlarına her taraf an haber eksik mi lur” , M. Tayyib
Gökbil in, “ e e De e e es ”, 162-163.
145 zlem Kumrular, 194.
146 Joseph Hammer-Purgstall, s h , trans. Mehmet Ata (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1990),
492.
47
by seizing the goods and killing the ship captains. This violation indicates that the
Venetian vessels were not immune to the corsair raids.147 However, Kâtib Çelebi claims
that after the Venetian navy sank the galley carrying the shipyard's kethüda, the war was
declared on Venice.148
The Sultan was present at the war scene to watch the operation and boost his army's
morale. However even after a few weeks, the Ottoman army could not overwhelm the
Venetian garrison, which was very well fortified and updated with the latest
technology.149 The Sultan then gave the order to lift the siege due to the heavy
casualties. Moreover, the campaign season was coming to an end,150 and the Pope and
the Habsburgs could reinforce the Venetian garrison. After Barbarossa left with his fleet,
he captured many islands in the Aegean Sea, took a large amount of booty and sent them
to the Sublime Porte. As Hayreddin Pasha had previously done while retreating from
Tunis, he had embarked on a plundering operation to compensate his losses and distract
his enemy from the war scene. Although the Pulya campaign was a setback, sweeping
147 “Kulaksız Ahme nâm re’îs ki M t n’un ka u ânı i i nice emilerimizi nâbe î i üb ve iki âre büyük
ökelerimizi M t n yöresin e zâhire ve sâir metâ’alarla Vene ik’e i erken tutub (…) Na alin nâm re’îsin
başın kesüb ve âhi emi yazıcısının ve ye i nefer rençberlerin bile başların kesüb” M. Tayyib Gökbil in,
“ e e De e e e Be ge e Ko e s o u”, 143.
148 Kâtib Çelebi, 129. There are ther s urces narratin the inci ents. F r exam le, Lütfi Pasha states that
while attacking the fortresses around Pulya, Venetian galleys suddenly attacked his navy, and then he
received the Sultan's orders imposing that the Venetians violated the agreement. Therefore, no Venetian
vessels would be allowed to leave the straits, “Bu yaka an Vene iklü ‘âsi lub ah lerini b z ular
donanma-i hümâyûnu irmesin” Lütfi Paşa, 360. Matrakçı Nasuh als narrates this event fr m a ifferent
perspective, see. Matrakçı Nasuh, s e h B e îh- - s s Tarihi
699-968/1299-1561), e . Göker İnan (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2019), 376.
149 John Francis Guilmartin, Galleons and Galleys, ed. John Keegan (London: Cassell, 2002), 130.
150 Kâtib Çelebi re rts that the Sultan r ere with raw because he was deplored after a cannonball
kille f ur f his s l iers. “Bir mücâhi kulumu böyle hezâr kal’aya be el kılmam” Kâtib Çelebi, 130.
48
through the last Venetian holdings in the Aegean and presenting thousands of captives to
the Sultan had covered up this failure. In a dynamic capital like Konstantiniyye, where
cheap labor is needed, the price drop in slave markets was very important. The
importance of naval expeditions and corsairs for the Ottoman Empire becomes apparent
on such occasions. Therefore, Hayreddin Pasha had received compliments from the
Sultan. 151
Meanwhile, the Holy League was formed under Pope Paul III with an alliance of: Papal
States, Venice, Genoa, Malta, Portugal, and the Habsburg Empire. The alliance was not
reliable though, primarily because of Charles' suspicious attitude against Venice. There
were disputes on who would be the admiral, what the aim of the war was, and the
allocation of expenses and plunder. While Charles insisted on an operation in Algiers to
exterminate the corsair bases for the security of southern Italy and Spain, Venice argued
that the Turkish navy should be destroyed in order to protect its colonies in the Aegean.
Nevertheless, a consensus was reached that it was necessary to destroy the Turkish
navy.152 The enemy fleets met at Preveza strait on September 28, 1538. Although the
allied fleet outnumbered the Ottomans, Hayreddin Pasha ordered a surprise attack which
caused his foes to panic and the allied navy withdrew from the battlefield, moving
towards Corfu.
151 Kâtib Çelebi, 131.
152 Büyüktuğrul Afif, s De h e Cu hu e Do s , v l. 1 (İstanbul: T.C. Deniz
Basımevi, 1982), 277-278.
49
As Soucek indicates, Emperor Charles considered the enterprise as his own rather than
Pope's and Venice's, as he desired to launch a crusade to Constantinople and save the
city from the Ottoman Sultan.153 While this claim is somewhat exaggerated, it is more
plausible to suggest that Charles wanted to use the allied navy to conquer Algiers, for
Charles would organize an expedition in 1541 to realize his project. According to the
Emperor, the Ottoman navy could dominate the eastern Mediterranean and tussle with
the Venetians as long as they would not threaten the Habsburg dominions around
Naples. Algiers, however, was a different case. The Ottoman corsairs based in Algiers
had become a thorn in Spain's flesh after cooperating with the Sublime Porte. Moreover
the defeat at Preveza had proved that the Ottomans would be a menace not only in the
eastern, but also in the central and western Mediterranean with the corsair support. In
addition, Charles had also turned out to be right about distrusting the Venetians, as they
came to terms with the Sublime Porte in secret and abandoned the Holy League in 1540.
153 Soucek, 62-66.
50
CHAPTER III (1541-1571):
DESPERATE TIMES CALL FOR DESPERATE MEASURES
3.1 Charles V Disembarking Algiers (1541)
Emperor Charles was eager to put an end to the corsair ventures that took a toll on the
Christian shipping along the western Mediterranean. He had already thought of
capturing Algiers before the battle of Preveza but although it remained inconclusive, he
tried to achieve it through diplomatic talks between 1537 and 1540 with Hayreddin
Pasha and his viceroy in Algiers, Kara Hasan Agha. 154 Charles hoped that the
conversations with Barbarossa would turn out to be positive, just as his negotiations with
Andrea Doria in 1528 had yielded results. From the diplomatic correspondence, it seems
that the Spaniards tried to come to an agreement with Hayreddin Pasha during the siege
of Castelnuovo, and Hayreddin welcomed this proposal and conveyed his terms in later
meetings.155 Later, Andrea Doria met with Hayreddin Pasha and guaranteed that
154 Abun-Nasr, 169.
155 Arıkan an T le , 246-247.
51
Hayreddin aspired to serve the Emperor, and thus, his demands should not be rejected.156
However, in a letter dated 22 September 1539, the Spaniards began to hesitate as
Hayreddin constantly delayed the negotiations.157 Nevertheless, the bilateral talks were
part of his plan to keep the Spaniards busy; meanwhile, he had enabled Hasan Agha to
gain enough time to prepare a defense for a large-scale landing operation. Thanks to the
French envoy, Jean de la Forest,158 Hayreddin knew that Charles had been planning an
expedition on Algiers ever since the defeat of Preveza.159
When Emperor Charles realized that the diplomatic channels had clogged, he landed in
Algiers on 20 October 1541.160 However, the sailing season had already passed,161 and
Algiers was famous for its strong breezes, making things difficult for the vessels. 162
Moreover, as Admiral Jurien de la Gravière pointed out, "the climate of Africa was
evidently unsuited to deeds of chivalry".163 There was no obstacle during the
disembarkation, but then it became impossible to unload supplies and ammunition from
the ships due to a sudden storm. While many ships sank in the storm, Muslim galley
slaves in the ships had been rescued by the local people.164 Also, Hasan Agha harassed
156 According to the letter dated 2 September 1539. Arıkan an T le , 249.
157 Arıkan an T le , 253.
158 Christine Isom-Verhaaren, Allies with the Infidel: the Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth
Century (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 117.
159 These arts are absent in n : 2639 c y f Gazavat, ublishe by Mustafa Yıl ız. The events
mentioned above were copied by Yılmaz ztuna from manuscript no: 2459. ztuna Yılmaz, B b os
e ' (İstanbul: B ğaziçi Yayınları, 1989), 96-97.
160 Hammer-Purgstall, 511.
161 S ucek, “Maritime Wars”, 74.
162 Emrah Safa Gürkan, “ u Ko s ”, 275-276.
163 Jurien e la Gravière quoted in Stanley Lane-Poole, “The Barbary Corsairs”, 123.
164 “ve emiler için e ne ka arı Müslümanlar bulunub nları ahi halâs it iler”. Lütfi Paşa, 416.
52
his enemy and disrupted the Habsburg army making forays to their encampments during
the nighttime.165 Eventually, Charles ordered a retreat on November 1 because the
hunger combined with the cold and rainy weather left no other option. The Emperor
could only return to Spain after two months due to the weather conditions. While Hasan
Agha presented one thousand slaves to the Sultan as a peşkeş of his victory, the Sultan
rewarded him with the beylerbeylik of Algiers.166
It may well have been that the Emperor had thought that he could easily conquer Algiers
as the Spaniard army had outnumbered the corsairs, and also Hayreddin Pasha was
supporting the Ottomans at the Austrian front. There were two main reasons for his
failure. First of all, Algiers was not a topographically convenient port to unload the men
and munitions, and for this reason, Hayreddin Pasha had built a mole in the harbor to
make it suitable for dropping anchor. Thus, a sudden storm hurled the Spaniard vessels
and made it impossible to landing. Secondly, despite his small contingent, Hasan Agha
led his forces in discipline and used its tactical maneuverability thanks to his Arabic
horsemen against unwieldy Habsburg troops. Also, it should be underlined that the
corsairs managed to defeat the core of the Habsburg army without Hayreddin Pasha or
Ottoman support. Thus, at the beginning of the 16th century, Algiers (no more than a
tributary port city in which a Spanish presidio garrison stationed) had transformed into
an Ottoman regency that could repulse the Habsburg army. The victory clinched the
corsair presence in North Africa. It had proven that the corsairs were not only sea
165 ztuna, 100-101.
166 Murâ î, 240-241.
53
thieves who disrupted Christian shipping but also a political power capable of
commanding armies, forming alliances with the local population, and constantly
terrorizing the Christian shores. Identically, this transformation can be found within the
Ottoman maritime policy.
3.2 Last Campaign of Hayreddin Pasha: Siege of Nice (1543)
The death of King Zapolya of Hungary in 1540 had reinaugurated the Ottoman-
Habsburg rivalry over Hungary. Sultan Süleyman, who received the news that Archduke
Ferdinand had besieged Budin, immediately departed from the Sublime Porte and
defeated Ferdinand and annexed Budin.167 While the Sultan was advancing to Hungary
with his armies, Hayreddin Pasha sailed to the Mediterranean with Donanma-yı
Hümâyûn to support French navy against the Habsburgs.168 The request for naval
assistance had been conveyed by Captain Poulin (Baron de la Garde), French
ambassador to Ottoman Empire.169 The ambassador succeeded in drawing the Ottomans
into the war, convincing them this campaign would also be rewarding for the Sublime
167 İnalcık alil, “Devlet- ‘ e”, 159.
168 İnalcık, 158.
169 “Ve an an Françe elçisi ahi elü â işâhun elin ö ük e â işâh an mu’âvenet içün nanma
iste i” Matrakçı Nasuh, 391.
54
Porte.170Originally, it was decided that the Ottoman navy would attack in the same year
but it was only in 1543 that the navy could join the ally troops. Relying on the Ottoman
support, King François had declared war on the Habsburg Empire in 1542, breaking the
Truce of Nice signed in 1538. However, the French expeditions remained inconclusive
as they could not make a coordinated offense with the Ottomans.171
France's policy during this period was purposed for weakening the Habsburgs by
providing the support of Lutheran German princes. On the other hand, Charles V
provoked the Christians that France collaborated with Muslims and thus betrayed
Christians. Once drawing the German princes to his side, Charles was going to lunge at
the Turks. Although France seemed to be allied with the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan
knew that the French were hypocrites, as France intermittently made ceasefires with the
Habsburgs and promised to join a crusade against the Turks. As Halil Ġnalcık stated,
these deeds were done in order to achieve political domination over Europe.172
Among all the complex diplomatic relations, Venice's position is also worth mentioning.
Faced with economic crisis and famine due to bad harvests for consecutive years,
170 Hammer-Purgstall, 512.
171 Verhaaren, 122-123.
172 İnalcık, 158.
55
Venice was torn between Charles and Ferdinand as well as François and Süleyman.173
The Habsburg, French, and Ottoman diplomats made great efforts to pull Venice into
their coalitions. Charles worried that the Venetian fleet would cooperate with the
Ottoman navy, so he wished Venice to remain neutral, even if they would not fight on
his side. That may well have been the reason the Habsburgs provided grain to Venetians
to overcome the famine.
As the peace treaty concluded with the Ottomans in 1540, Venice had recovered the
Levant trade but were obliged to pay a costly war indemnity amount of 300,000 gold
pieces in addition to the islands surrendered in the Aegean. Sultan Süleyman on the
other hand, exhorted Venice to strengthen the ties between France174and to help the
French ambassador when he came to their country.175 He also encouraged them to not
assist Spain and Austria.176 However, the Venetians were cautious about not offending
the Sultan so they did not hesitate to provide food to the Ottoman navy en route to
173 Mi el An el e Bunes Ibarra, “V. Carl s, Vene ik Ve Babıâli: ie urta e Men za'nın
Vene ik'teki Büyükelçiliği,” in uh e e e (Kâğıthane, İstanbul: Kita Yayınevi, 2007), 144.
174 “Françe Pâ işâhı ile 'alâkayı kesmeyib l an i e el iğin en âhi ziyâ e stluk i üb” Tayyib
Gökbil in, “Vene ik evlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Bel eler”, 146.
175 “memleketine ‘arz it iklerin e her vechile mu’âvenet i üb”, Gökbil in, 133-134.
176 “İs anya Kralı Karl (Charles) ve Beç Kralı lan karın aşı Fernan ş (Ferdinand) câniblerine mu'avenet
itmek münâsib eğil ir lmayasız” Gökbil in, 153.
56
France. 177 Eventually, Venice managed to evade all these summonses by successful
diplomatic maneuvers and remained out of the war.178
Hayreddin Pasha left Konstantiniyye with 150 pieces of navy on May 28, 1543. His fleet
invaded Messina and Reggio, with other positions in Sicily and Italy. On the contrary to
what the western sources narrated,179 the navy never intended to harm Papal territories
and even Hayreddin paid for the provisions.180 According to the agreement between the
Sultan and François, provisions necessary for the Ottoman squadron would be provided
by the King when the Ottoman navy arrived in France. 181 Furthermore, Donanma-yı
Hümâyûn was reinforced with 22 corsair galleots, including five vessels dispatched from
Jerba.182 After their arrival, the King wanted Hayreddin's support to capture Nice, which
was occupied by the Duke of Savoy, under Charles's auspices. The combined navies left
Marseilles for Nice and besieged the city, but the allies could not seize the citadel
despite their success in occupying the outer fortresses.
177 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), o es E [ e], No. 635/1.
178 An imperial letter indicates that by obeying the Sultan's order, Venice would suspend military and
commodity aid to Spain and improve their relations with France. However, because Spain is a
neighboring country, they had to maintain a friendly relationship. “Françe Pâ işâhıyla âhi stluk üzere
lmağı kabul eyle iğimizi î’lâm i üb ve İs anya memleketine vilâyetimiz muttasıl lmağla anın
mazeretin en havf i eriz anınla âhi stluk üzereyiz” Gökbil in, 132-133.
179 Verhaaren asserts that Setton, in his Papacy and the Levant, omitted the section from the letter
where Sultan Süleyman r ere Barbar ssa n t t harm Papal territories in order to reinforce the view
that the Ottomans ravaged all the lands without discrimination. Verhaaren, 125.
180 İnalcık, 159.
181 “ l cânibler e l ukları zamânlar a lâzım lan hususlar a mu âyaka çek irmeyesin” Gökbil in, 119.
182 “ nanma-yı ümâyûna leven tâ’ifesin en hiç emiler el i mi enil ik e leven kayıkların an ve
kalyete en cümle yirmi iki kıt'a leven emisi el i eyü cevab vir i, (…) amma Cerbe' en beş are
leven kayıkları el iği zikr lunan yirmi iki are leven emisinin beş kıt'ası anlar ır eyü cevab vir i”
BOA, TS.MA.e, No. 635/1.
57
As the sea season was coming to an end due to the delays during the siege, the navy
could not effectively support land operations. Furthermore, Hayreddin could not rely on
Nice's harbor because it was inadequate to drop anchor when a storm breaks out. 183
Thus, he sailed to Toulon. The fact that the Sultan wanted the navy to return to the
Sublime Porte without harm, and gave orders in this regard, explains Hayreddin's
caution.184 Since the realization that wintering in Toulon was necessary, Hayreddin
aimed to meet the basic needs of the soldiers (such as shelter and food). Besides, the
soldiers had to be paid. That is why Captain Polin made efforts to find the necessary
funds; keeping the Ottoman navy in France was crucial to defending the southern coast
against Andrea Doria's navy. In addition to the provisions supplied by the French
consuls, Hayreddin Pasha had also purchased provisions from Corsica, Sardinia, and
Genoa, which were ruled by the Habsburg allies, ensuring that his soldiers did not suffer
from food shortages.185 It was already standard for the Ottoman army to pay for supplies
during campaigns and Hayreddin Pasha, not as the corsair reis but as the Kapudan Pasha
of the Ottoman navy, maintained this pattern. Therefore, 30,000 Ottoman soldiers
wintered in Toulon without any major problems. However, the following campaign
season did not yield a beneficial outcome for both sides.
The Ottoman navy continued to protect the French coast, ravaging the Spanish
183 Verhaaren, 131.
184 Verhaaren, 129.
185 Verhaaren, 135.
58
archipelago and the Tyrrhenian Sea and preventing the Habsburg armies from crossing
to Italy, but a joint operation with the French navy had never occurred before. As a
result, François could not decide where to attack even though they had made
preparations for an expedition to Genoa. Meanwhile, Hayreddin had received letters
from Tunis reporting that Mullay Hasan was deposed and exiled by his son Ahmed for
collaborating with the Habsburgs.186 Therefore, Ahmed had requested military support
from Hayreddin and Hasan and considered himself the son of Sultan Süleyman.187
However, when Hayreddin asked the Sultan's orders, Süleyman ordered his return to the
Sublime Porte.
Soucek indicates three crucial aspects of the campaign for Donanma-yı Hümâyûn. First,
the Ottoman navy had proved that its operational scale reached into the western
Mediterranean for the first time, with the expection of the individual corsair incursions.
Secondly, despite the financial hardships, the captives and booties taken on this
expedition were satisfactory in every respect.188 Lastly, Ġnalcık also highlights that the
Ottoman-French alliance prevented a Holy League, mangling the Latin Christendom in
which the Pope and Emperor Charles envisaged.189
In contrast to this, in the wars that lasted for years(from the Danube to Iran and North
186 Matrakçı, 406.
187 İ ris B stan, “Kanuni Ve Ak eniz Siyaseti 1530-1550,” in uh e e e (Kâğıthane, İstanbul:
Kita Yayınevi, 2007), 35.
188 Soucek, 77.
189 İnalcık, 163.
59
Africa to India), the human resource had exhausted in the Ottoman Empire. In this
context, the Empire was having difficulties filling the ranks, especially obtaining the
oarsman needed for its navy. Ibarra asserted that Hayreddin Pasha might have been
considered enriching the slave markets in the Sublime Porte before sailing for France.190
Moreover, the request from Kapı Ağası Mahmud to which palace the boys and
concubines sent by Hayreddin Pasha will be transferred confirms that the Ottoman navy
had not only operated within conventional means but also performed within a
framework that provided captives to the slave market with its plundering operations
through the corsairs who filled the ranks.191 Hakan Erdem also highlights that the pirates
were one of the leading slave suppliers to the slave markets.192
François and Charles came to terms and signed the Treaty of Crépy on September 18,
1544. Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha had begun to prepare Donanma-yı Hümâyûn for the
next year soon after he arrived in Konstantiniyye,193 but he died in his residence at 1546.
Meanwhile, Süleyman conquered key cities and inflicted a devastating blow to the
Habsburg armies in Hungary. This loss compelled Charles and Ferdinand to make peace
190 Ibarra, 157.
191 Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), o es E [ e], No. 6590/1. and Cariye are
different from Kuls. See, Ehud R. Toledano, Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1997), 20-53.
192 Y. Hakan Erdem, Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise, 1800-1909 (Basingstoke, Hampshire
England: Palgrave, 1996), 24.
193 Hayreddin Pasha was preparing one-hundred piece of navy for the following campaign season.
Sahilli ğlu alil an İhsan ğlu Ekmele in, o 51- 52 h e E-12321 u
h e De e (İstanbul: İslâm Tarih, Sanat ve Kültür Araştırma Merkezi, IRCICA, 2002), 68.
60
with the Ottomans. Valid for five years, they signed the Treaty of Constantinople on
October 8, 1547.194
3.3 Donanma-yı Hümâyûn After Hayredin Pasha Deceased and Conquest of Tripoli
(1551)
Hayreddin Pasha's departure did not cause any disruption in the Ottoman navy. On the
contrary, shipbuilding continued in Tersane-i Amire, which gradually turned into a solid
structure during Hayreddin's presence. Also Mehmed Pasha, who raised from the
Enderûn (palace school), was appointed to the Kapudan-ı Derya post. However, this
assignment indicates that the Enderunites reduced the corsair influence in the Sublime
Porte. As previously mentioned, there was a strong resentment among the palace
bureaucrats when Hayreddin Pasha became the kapudan pasha. According to them,
Hayreddin was a vulgar pirate who was not raised in Enderûn, and thus the navy should
not be handed over to him. Moreover, Lütfi Pasha's criticism against Hayreddin is
striking.195
194 Süleyman warns b th Charles an Fer inan n t t attack Al iers an Ma hrib as er the a reement.
Anton C. Schaendlinger, D e h e be e s Des h ge K , Fe U x
II., v l. 2 (Wien: Verla er sterreichischen Aka emie er Wissenschaften, 1983), 11-18.
195 “Hayreddin Paşa Müslümanlara bu ka ar zûlm ve bu ka ar katl-i nefs itmiş iken Mağrib’e â işâh
l um eyü urûr ile içi ve tâşı lu lmuş iken l urûrun ve l Müslümanlara et iği zûlmün belâsı
y luna elüb bu tarîkle yine zelîl l u ki il *ile+ şerh lunmaz” Lütfi Paşa, 356.
61
It was thought that Turgut would take Kapudan Pasha's post, as he was a corsair who
tormented Christians throughout his career and deserved the title both in terms of career
and talent. In 1540, Giannettino Doria of Genoa had captured Turgut, but Hayreddin
later paid the ransom to release him.196 Rüstem Pasha, who knew well how to eliminate
his opponents in palace intrigues, secured the position for his brother Sinan Pasha in
1550. Rüstem openly expressed his discontent with Turgut since he frequently violated
the agreement terms signed with the Habsburgs in 1547. His attack on Mahdia, and the
later burning a Venetian ship, increased the distress Turgut created.197 Although he was
called to the Sublime Porte, he ignored the invitation and lived as a fugitive for two
years as he feared that he would be executed.198
However, raids initiated by Turgut Reis had put an end to the Ottoman-Habsburg peace.
Andrea Doria had recaptured Mahdia, but it deeply disturbed Süleyman, and a 120 piece
fleet with Sinan Pasha had left the Sublime Porte.199 Then, he assembled with Turgut
Reis and exchanged ideas regarding the possible targets of the navy. First, Malta and the
196 Lane-Poole, 127.
197 Gürkan, 475. This provocation obliged the Habsburg navy to show up and recapture the fortress. In a
letter sent by Emper r Charles t Rüstem Pasha, he demanded to discuss the issue as Turgut violated the
terms and encroached the Spanish territory. İ ris B stan, “Kanuni ve Ak eniz Siyaseti”, 39.
198 Kâtib Çelebi, 148.
199 Lane-Poole, 134.
62
island of Gozo were swamped, and a vast amount of booty was collected.200 Then they
moved to Tripoli, where Piri Reis praised the beauty of its castle.201 Despite being a
Spanish garrison since 1510, Tripoli had been ceded to Knights of St. John by Emperor
Charles in 1530. The stubborn and determined resistance commanded by a French
knight, Gaspard de Vallier, had turned the siege into a long haul. Finally with the
intervention of D'aramont (the French envoy), the knights were allowed to go to Malta
and they surrendered the castle as they had no other option.202 NakkaĢ Nigârî narrates
that the booty collected from the fortress had overflowed from the ships.203
It should be noted that the conquest of Tripoli had recovered the loss of Tunisia in 1535.
Moreover, Tripoli's vicinity to Sicily and Malta provided an advantageous situation in
the future expeditions of the Ottoman navy. On the other hand, while Turgut Reis
expected to become the Beylerbey of Tripoli, Murad Agha was appointed to the post.
Later, Turgut was assigned to the Karlı-ili sancakbeyliği and became responsible for
patrolling the Aegean Sea.204 Meanwhile Salih Reis, another protégé of Hayreddin
Pasha, had been assigned as the Beylerbey of Algiers.205
200 E üz Esra, g î' K - De es (K nya: Palet Yayınları, 2020),
130.
201 But the Spaniards had ruined it after they settled down since the castle was huge. Reis Pîrî, 506.
202 Soucek, 80.
203 E üz, “ g î”, 142.
204 Arıkan an T le , 288.
205 Joseph Hammer-Purgstall, s h , trans. Mehmet Ata, v l. 2 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı,
1990), 65.
63
3.4 Donanma-yı Hümâyûn Presence in the Western Mediterranean (1551-1559)
King Henri II, who succeeded François I, had decided to maintain the alliance with the
Ottoman Empire. By cooperating with the Ottomans, the Pope, and the German princes,
the new king had insisted on his claims regarding Italy. This insistance demonstrated
that he was seeking to undermine the Habsburg domination in Europe. The Sultan also
encouraged the German princes to ally with France, affirming that French allies would
never be harmed and warned them not to trust the Habsburgs.206 Besides, the Pope had
suggested a French-Ottoman attack on Naples and Sicily, as he had expressed his
discomfort towards Emperor Charles and his son (Philip II) to the Venetian ambassador
and obviously could not forget the Sack of Rome 1527.207 Furthermore, the Pope had
even announced that he would launch a Crusade against the Habsburgs in unison with
the Turks.208 Therefore, once again, the French-Habsburg struggle commenced in Italy.
The French envoy (D'Aramont) had urged Sultan Süleyman to undertake a joint naval
operation, and he was successful in that. After the French navy wintered in the island of
Chios, it was planned to conduct a naval expedition in the western Mediterranean in a
206 Feridun Ahmet Bey, e û - e - 's e Fe î û Be (Istanbul: Takvimhane-i Amire, 1848),
503-504.
207 Verhaaren, 43. Charles V abdicated the throne in 1556 due to health issues, and was replaced by his
son, Philip II.
208 Verhaaren, 44.
64
coordinated manner.209 In the operations carried out by Turgut Reis and the Kapudan-ı
Derya Piyale Pasha, Southern Italy was raided, the city of Reggio was taken, and the
residents were reduced to slavery.210
However, the operations projected for the summer of 1558 did not occur in accordance
with the plan since the allied navies could not assemble. Matrakçı Nasuh reports that the
Ottoman navy had to sail towards Majorca due to the bad weather conditions.211 Yet,
Henri blames Turgut Reis and states that he had turned his course for no reason; thus, a
great opportunity was missed. The Sultan, on the other hand, appeased Henri and said
that the navy was sent with a sufficient number of soldiers and that they would defeat
the enemy just like before. 212 However instead of meeting with the French fleet, Turgut
had changed his course to the Balearic Islands and enslaved around 4,000 people in the
raids.213 Presumably taking advantage of the unfavorable circumstances, he had made
such an attempt and organized a highly profitable plunder campaign. Finally, the
projects did not occur as expected, and with the Peace of Cateau-Cambrèsis (1559), the
struggle between France and Spain came to an end.
209 Verhaaren, 42.
210 Hammer-Purgstall, 71.
211 “Lâkin rüz âr el virmeyü havâ muhâlif lıcak l hevâ an eçilü ört ün ice ve ün üz i ilü
May rka nâm bir cezireye el iler.” Matrakçı, 474.
212 Feridun, 407. See also, Verhaaren, 45.
213 Matthew Carr, Blood and Faith: The Purging of Muslim Spain (New York: The New Press, 2011), 140.
Further rea in escribin the extent f the ama e, see. akan Kılınç, “Osmanlıların Min rka A ası’Na
Sal ırısı Ve Ciuta ella’nın İş ali (1558),” e De g s 44 (2020): pp. 219-238,
https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/1362391.
65
On the other hand, the war continued at full speed for the Ottomans, for the theatre of
war had already glided into North Africa when the Spanish presidios were raided by
Salih Pasha. He had managed to capture Bougie, Fez, and Oran, yet, these attempts
remained short-term gains. Then the Ottoman advance ultimately came to a stall with
Salih Pasha's death. The Janissary corps in Algiers did not obey the new Beylerbey,
Mehmed Pasha (appointed from the Sublime Porte) and killed him.214 The political
integrity at Algiers was achieved after Hasan Pasha's installment. While the Ottoman
navy was ravaging the Balearics, Hasan Pasha had severely defeated the Spanish forces
in Mostaganim.215
Turkish advances in North Africa had posed a catastrophic threat to the Spanish defenses
on the southern coast. Having secured his lands in Italy by eliminating France with the
Cateau-Cambrèsis peace, Philip II had decided to recapture Tripoli as it was requested
from the Knights of St. John and his viceroy in Sicily. The scale of the terror created by
Turgut had become unbearable.216 Soucek states that the operation was delayed because
the Sicilian viceroy, Juan de la Cerda, lingered with recruiting troops.217 On the other
hand, despite the fact that the Sublime Porte was alerted in advance, Piyale Pasha had to
214 Hess, 77. The Janissaries, who were paid by the treasury, could not take a share from the booty as
they were not authorized to participate in the plundering operations. This tension was resolved only by
allowing the janissaries to board the corsair ships at the end of the century.
215 Hess, 78.
216 Salvatore Bono, Co s e e e eo: C s e usu F ue , s h e Co e o
(Milano: Mondadori, 1993), 18-19.
217 Soucek, 82.
66
return Konstantiniyye because the campaign season had passed. The Christian fleet,
which had only completed its preparations in late October, was despatched from
Messina. However, when it was realized that the storms would not let them reach
Tripoli, they took refuge in Djerba.218
Turgut Reis had been informed regarding every movement of the Christian navy. Thus,
he notified Piyale Pasha that the Christians had seized Djerba and were constructing the
fortifications there, and upon hearing this, Piyale Pasha immediately moved to the
island.219 On the other hand, the Christians thought that the Donanma-yı Hümâyûn could
not reach Djerba until the summer, and so they caught by surprise. After two months of
siege, the fortress was overwhelmed, half of the troops were slaughtered, and the
garrison commander was taken prisoner by the Ottomans. 220 Kâtib Çelebi states that
about four thousand prisoners, including the commanders, were presented to the
Sultan.221 Although the battle of Djerba was not as violent as the Preveza, the losses of
the Spaniards were irreparable. In addition to the losses of their ships, the Spanish navy
had also lost many experienced sailors in the battle.222 Therefore, Spain could not send
its navy on a large-scale expedition in the Mediterranean until 1571 so as to compensate
for its losses.
218 Soucek, 83.
219 Soucek, 84.
220 Soucek, 85-86. “küffâr-ı hâksâr nanması Cezîre-i Cerbe kurbün e lu Trablus’a üşmeğe
müterakkıbeler ir” Kâtib Çelebi, 153.
221 Kâtib Çelebi, 158.
222 Guilmartin asserts that the main incident that bent the Spanish navy's back at Djerba was the loss of
experienced sailors. Guilmartin, 133.
67
3.5 Siege of Malta: The First Signs of Fatigue (1565)
Consecutive defeats on the North African coast forced Philip II to take action against the
corsairs, and securing the southern shores of Iberia had become one of his principal
policies. Until 1565, Philip and his advisors had worried that the Turks would invade
Spain.223 Moreover, the Austrian-Ottoman peace concluded in 1563 and it had been
declared that there were flourishing Ottoman activities in the Mediterranean.224 After
Djerba, the corsairs had gotten a free hand off the Spanish coast and began embarking
on plundering operations with Morisco support, who were under constant persecution by
the Spanish Inquisition.225 Furthermore Turgut Reis constantly terrorized Naples and
Sicily and, during one of his raids, he captured the bishop of Catania (Caracciolo) who
was heading to the Council of Trent.226 Although some measures had been taken to
ensure coastal security, the primary measure was to destroy the corsair bases from which
the attacks were launched. In this context, protecting the North African Presidios against
the Turkish advance had become a primary object. In 1562, Hasan Pasha had been
repulsed in Oran, thanks to the well-fortified garrison and the quick response of the
223 Carr, 140.
224 Guilmartin, 133.
225 Carr, 142.
226 The bishop was ransomed after ten months of captivity in Tripoli. B n ,”C rsari nel Me iterrane ”,
133.
68
Spanish navy.227 During that period, the royal fleet was only used in amphibious
operations. Philip was cautious about avoiding the Ottoman navy until they build a fullfledged
fleet.228
Furthermore in 1564 Penon de Velez, in which a Turkish garrison was stationed, was
stormed. Penon was the westernmost settlement of the Ottoman Empire, and in those last
couple of years, it had become seen as holding a threatening position as the corsairs
frequently used its small harbor to launch raidings over the Spanish coast. Even though
the Spaniards did not intend to draw his reaction, the Sultan could not ignore this act of
aggression. Prior to this, the seizure of Mahdia by the imperial fleet had prompted the
Sultan and that resulted in the conquest of Tripoli by the Ottomans. It should be asserted
that the Sultan did not afford the slightest loss of land against Spain in the
Mediterranean. Furthermore, Spanish assaults on the corsair nests had never been
legitimate in the eyes of the Sultan since the corsairs were under his protection. In this
respect, the Ottomans had intended to capture a strategic point as a response to the
Spanish aggression and Malta (which was positioned in a highly strategic location in the
central Mediterranean) had long been on Süleyman's agenda as it posed a significant
227 Hess, 82.
228 üseyin Ser ar Tabak ğlu, “The 1565 Malta Cam ai n Acc r in t S anish Archival cuments,” in
e he wg e s e g ew ou es, ew o hes, e . M. Fatih Çalışır, Suraiya
Far qhi, an Mehmet Şakir Yılmaz (İstanbul: İbn al un Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2020), . 105-124, 109.
69
threat to Muslim shipping and pilgrims.229 Moreover, the navies that depended upon oartype
vessels on long-term operations needed safe harbors when a storm broke out.230
Thus, together with other strongholds in Maghrib, Malta was one of the most critical
bases in order to dominate the Mediterranean sea-route, despite its smallness.231
Meanwhile, the Knights of Malta were unprepared for a potential Turkish invasion due
to the financial crisis. In addition to compensating their casualties at Djerba, the costs of
reinforcing the fortification had demanded extra cash. Therefore, just like the Ottoman
corsairs did, the Knights engaged in plunder operations on their own account, mainly
seizing the pilgrim vessels when they were not occupied with joint operations with the
Spanish fleet. Ransoming money had provided a steady income to the Knights.232
However, when they attacked a ship laden with precious items belonging to a high-rank
Ottoman officer, the war became inevitable. 233 Thus, Divân-ı Hümâyûn (Imperial
Council) had gathered to discuss the matter. Grand vizier Ali Pasha held talks with
229 Kâtib Çelebi narrates that the re arati ns f r Malta ha alrea y starte in 1561, see Kâtib Çelebi,
158.
230 Gürkan, 271.
231 Metin Kunt, Christine W hea , an Ann Williams, “Me iterranean C nflict,” in e he
Magnificent and His Age the Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern World (London; New York: Routledge,
2014), pp. 39-54, 52.
232 Bruce Ware Allen, The Great Siege of Malta: The Epic Battle Between the Ottoman Empire and the
Knights of St. John (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2015),
https://muse.jhu.edu/book/42527/, 74.
233 Selânikî Mustafa Efen i, Tarih-i Selânikî (Ankara: Türk Tarıh Kurumu Basımevi, 1999), 5. Also, some
historians have implied that Sultan Süleyman was under his au hter Mihrimah’s influence, and his wife
ürrem also provoked him in the decision process. See Francesco Di Correggio Balbi, The Siege of Malta,
1565, trans. Henry Alexander Balbi (Copenhagen: Bogtrykkeriet Antikva, 1961), 31-32; Alphonse de
Lamartine, s h , trans. Serhat Bayram (İstanbul: Ka ı Yayınları, 2011), 462 ammer-Purgstall,
75. Moreover, there is a claim that the precious cargo was bel n e t Mihrimah, Süleyman’s au hter,
and to be sold in the Venetian market. See. Allen, 76.
70
Kaptan-ı Deryâ Piyale Pasha as well as experienced sailors regarding the materials
required for the expedition. The provisions were supplied as required, and many people
hearing the Sultan's call for a Holy War were voluntarily enlisted in the navy. 234 Turgut
Pasha was primarily ordered to thwart the Spanish backup to the Maltese garrison.235
Eventually, composed of 240 pieces ships, Donanma-yı Hümâyûn left Konstantiniyye
for Malta on March 29, 1565.236
During this time, the Spaniards were still pondering the next move of the Ottoman fleet,
although several reports indicated that the fleet was preparing for Malta. According to
the documents, the Spaniards thought that the Ottomans would land on La Goletta, a
point that was strategically more important. Indeed, a renegade who later took refuge in
the Maltese garrison had reported that the Ottomans' next objective would be La
Goletta.237
The general opinion amongst historians about the siege is that the Ottomans had made a
strategic error during the initial landing when they attacked Fort St. Elmo without
Turgut Pasha's consent, so the siege had failed. Upon his arrival to the island, Turgut
234“Ez-în-cânib ereği ibi mühimmât u âlât u esbâb örilmek e ve Pâ işâh-ı âlem- enâh hazretleri ‘Gazâ
vü cihâ ecr ü sevâbına tâlib ü râ ıb lanlar an ve ka um kulların an yararlık i ü her kimse ki terakkî ve
mertebe isterse varsunlar, rızâ-yı hümâyûnum var ur’ eyü fermân lunmağla Âsitâne-i Sa’â et
kulların an her sınıf an ç k kimse şevk u zevk ile yazılu nanmacı l ılar.” Selânikî, 6.
235 Tabak ğlu, “The 1565 Malta Campaign”, 114.
236 İ ris B stan, “Malta Kuşatmasın an Tunus'un Fethine,” in B g o u K
De h 1, e . Salih zbaran an İ ris B stan (İstanbul: eniz Basım Mü ürlüğü, 2009), .
185-197, 186.
237 Balbi, “The Siege of Malta, 1565”, 51.
71
Pasha had also complained about Mustafa Pasha's strategy.238 However, some historians
state that capturing St. Elmo was crucial to bringing the fleet closer to the shore so that
the navy could support the land troops.239 On the other hand, the fleet had to be
protected at all costs because recruiting experienced crew was always difficult.240 For
instance, the Spanish had been following the same policy and were avoiding a clash with
the Ottoman navy.
Nevertheless, the Ottomans had paid dearly for this strategy when they finally
overwhelmed the fortress after a month. Even though pouncing St. Elmo had logic, the
execution of the plan was meager. They had lost some six thousand soldiers, Turgut
Pasha had been killed by a cannonball, and that encouraged the defenders even more.241
Thus, the course of the siege did not change in the following months, and the Ottoman
army had to leave Malta on September 12, 1565. There could be many reasons behind
the defeat. However, Balbi, who was enlisted as an arquebusier at the siege of Malta,
underlines two vital mistakes of the Ottomans. First of all, the misconception that St.
Elmo will be overwhelmed in a short time. Due to the time consumed in St. Elmo, Don
Garcia de Toledo (Spanish captain-general of the sea) had gained enough time to send a
relief force before the Ottomans could breach the walls. Secondly, Balbi also refers to
238 “On Santarma (St. Elm ) binâ lunsa Malta hisârı alınmayınca zabt et irilmek mümkin mi ir” Kâtib
Çelebi, 161.
239 Tabak ğlu, 115.
240 Tabak ğlu, 118-119.
241 Balbi, 87.
72
the decision to begin the assault prior to Turgut Pasha's arrival. 242 Notwithstanding, the
most crucial mistake should be considered the lack of coordination among the general
staff and the incompatibility of land and naval forces. For instance, Balbi narrates the
disagreements between corsairs and janissaries. When some Christian soldiers
surrendered to the corsairs, they had been claimed by Mustafa Pasha, yet the corsairs
had held them for ransom money.243 On the other hand, the navy had remained
ineffective throughout the offense and could not prevent the enemy navy's penetration
through the siege zone and stop them from landing the reinforcements. Still, naval staff
blamed Mustafa Pasha when investigated.244 Later, he was dismissed.
It would be more accurate to speculate on the consequences of the Malta siege rather
than its causes. It was not the first time the imperial armies failed before their enemies.
Nevertheless, the siege is rather important in terms of marking the limits of the Ottoman
war machine. First of all, it is necessary to focus on the decision process. The historical
accounts emphasize that the Sultan did not attack Malta within the framework of a broad
Mediterranean policy but instead aimed to punish the Maltese due to piratical actions.
On the other hand, Soucek questions why the Ottoman army returned to Istanbul instead
242 Balbi, 56.
243 Balbi, 86.
244 “Kemâl-i hacâlet ve şerm-sârî ile İstanbul’a elü biri birin suçla ılar. T atıl ıkça ‘Ser âr uyur, sabr
eylen’ erler i, ‘T çu ve asker neylesün’ eyü nanma halkı ünâhı ser âra yüklet iler.” Kâtib Çelebi,
161.
73
of wintering in Malta,245 disregarding the fact that the naval operations are expensive
projects. However, when the Ottoman navy had previously wintered in Toulon, the
expenses had been covered by the French treasury and Hayreddin Pasha's own pocket.
Since the second half of the 16th century, with the changing warfare technology, small
contingents had been emerged that could stop larger armies. Moreover, the wartime
period of the western armies had extended to a whole year, whereas the Ottoman troops
had to return when the summer season ended. The Ottoman Empire, which wanted to
adapt to this situation, had augmented the Janissary corps so the deficit in the treasury
increased.246 With the throne struggle between the ġehzades, and the wars with Safavids,
the imperial finances had been worn out. The emphasis on the Red Apple in the early
years of Süleyman's reign had been replaced by Safavids and Hungarian politics over the
years. Therefore, the following year Süleyman did not send his navy to Malta but to
Chios, where Donanma-yı Hümâyûn could compensate for this failure. The island of
Chios, an Ottoman tributary under the Genoese rule, was accused of providing
intelligence about Ottoman ships to the infidels and was subsequently occupied by
Piyale Pasha in 1566 and turned into an Ottoman Sancak.247
3.6 Defeat at Lepanto: The Change in the Course (1571)
245 Soucek, 95-96.
246 Şevket Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2000), 132.
247 Niccolo Capponi, Victory of the West: The Great Christian-Muslim Clash at the Battle of Lepanto (New
Y rk: a Ca , 2007), 91 Kâtib Çelebi, 162.
74
Accession to the throne had always been a complicated and fragile process in the
Ottoman Empire. Sultan Süleyman had witnessed his sons fighting for the throne in his
last years. First he had to have strangled ġehzade Mustafa and later Bayezid, who took
refuge in Safavid Palace. Thus, ġehzade Selim ascended to the throne as the sole heir in
1566 after a challenging period.
However before Selim officially took the throne, the Janissaries revolted. As is
customary, they had asked for the cülûs bahşişi, a bonus upon Sultan's accession, and
the Sultan fulfilled their requests. Though the Janissaries were not satisfied with this
payment, the situation was settled by Sokollu Mehmed and Ahmed Pasha.248 As Hess
stated, with the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, new political elites were formed and
the Janissaries had constituted one of the strongest elites within the bureaucratic
organization.249 Indeed, the Janissary corps wanted to increase their income by
participating in additional jobs during peacetime, yet this caused extra problems.
Although they were forbidden to engage in a business other than military service, this
was de-facto transformed over time. For example, from the early 17th century, the
Janissaries would gradually increase their numbers among the tradesmen and guilds. In
addition to this, they would also engage in trade and craftsmanship. That was also valid
248 Selânikî, 50-56.
249 Hess, 86.
75
in the North African regencies. As mentioned before, the janissaries had killed the
beylerbey assigned to Algiers, and considering their salaries insufficient, demanded their
share from the booty that the corsairs collected in the sea raids and that request was
fulfilled in 1580. Furthermore, according to a Sultan's decree dated 1567, the Janissaries
were too allowed to maintain the privileged "yasakçılık" duty that they had carried out
since the Algiers conquest. Therefore, the Sultan had to favor the Janissaries although
the marine-corps demanded the service. 250
On the other hand the Muslims of Granada, unable to withstand the oppression of the
Spanish administration, embarked on a large-scale rebellion in 1568. Furthermore, the
Ottoman support sent by the Beylerbey of Algiers Uluç Ali Pasha had made things
difficult for the Spaniards.251 Thus, Philip II ordered Admiral Don Juan de Austria to
stop the North African aid, although as Braudel stated, blockading the southern shores to
foreign aid was a very laborious task. The aid from North Africa had reached a level
where the corsairs exchanged a Christian captive for a musket.252 Nonetheless a
delegation from Granada arrived in the Sublime Porte to seek help from Sultan Selim
but the Sultan, who mobilized his navy for the Cyprus campaign, promised that he could
250 Yusuf Sarınay, s Belgelerinde Cezayir (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık evlet Arşivleri Genel
Mü ürlüğü, Osmanlı Arşivi aire Başkanlığı, 2010), 16.
251 The N rth African v lunteers am unte t 4,000 al n si e the M risc f rces. Carr, “Bl an
Faith”, 172.
252 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, vol. 2 (New
York: Harper & Row, 1972), 1063.
76
provide such assistance only after the conquest of the island.253 Hence, unable to find
outside assistance, the rebellion was gradually suppressed and eventually the entire
Morisco population was expelled from Spain in 1609.254
Apart from assisting the Morisco rebellion, Uluç Ali Pasha had annexed Tunis in 1570
by defeating the pro-Spanish Hafsid Sultan. However, the conquest remained incomplete
as the Spanish garrison in La Goletta did not abandon the city. Uluç Ali requested
additional support from the Sublime Porte in order to eject the Spaniards255 but the
Donanma-yı Hümâyûn was put to sea for the Cyprus campaign and the conquest of
Tunis could not be completed.
Even though the Ottoman corsairs had continued their activities in the western and
central Mediterranean, the Viziers in the Sublime Porte had other priorities. While
Sokollu Mehmed Pasha insisted on taking measures against the Russian threat, both Lala
Mustafa Pasha and Piyale Pasha had supported the seizure of Cyprus.256 According to
Ottoman sources, Cyprus was chosen as the primary objective since the Muslim
253 “Ammâ ‘uzamâ-i erkân-ı evlet Cezîre-i Kıbrıs fethinin mühimmâtına mübâşeret sa e in e lma ın
nlara cevâb ön er iler. âlen ken ümize akreb ve ef’i husûsın a l kaziyye en enseb bir mühimme
ahi mübâşeret lınmış ır. İnşa’allâh bu hizmet ber-taraf l ık an s nar sizin me e inize ahi t nanma
ön erelim eyu bil ir iler”, 'Âlî Mustafa bin Ahmet an Çerçi Faris, Gelibo u u us e K h ' -
hb ' e , u e eh e De e (Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi, 2000), 65.
254 Tabak ğlu üseyin Ser ar, “ e ' e ”, 240-241.
255 a , 143.
256 İnalcık, 164-165; Hammer-Purgstall, 123.
77
shipping was disrupted due to the pirate activity around the island.257 When inquired
about this situation, Venice did not accept any responsibility for such incidents claiming
that the pirate vessels came from Messina (i.e. Sicily) and Malta.258 Actually the events
that support this view were based on the assault prior to the Malta campaign, where the
St. John Knights had captured a ship where the sancakbey was also on board off
Alexandria.259
It should be noted that these events occurred on a reciprocal basis. For instance, the
documents demonstrate that the Ottomans frequently complained about the
incompetency of the Venetian navy against the Uskok attacks.260 Eventually, in 1570,
the Ottomans had declared war on Venice for the same reasons as in the Corfu and
Malta campaign: to prevent the pirate attacks upon Muslim shipping. On the other hand,
whenever the Ottoman shipyards made preparations for the naval season, the Venetians
were alert for a possible Ottoman invasion. Indeed, after Sultan Selim's accession,
257 İsmail akkı Uzunçarşılı, “Kıbrıs Fethi Ile Le ant (İnebahtı) Muharebesi Sırasın a Türk evletile
Vene ik Ve Müttefiklerinin Faaliyetine air Bazı azinei Evrak Kayıtları,” e u s 3 (2010): pp.
257-292, https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/172752, 259.
258 “niçün böyle tu yân i ersün inil ük e, bu fesâ âtı i en Misine ve Malta Cezîrelerinin emileri ir biz
e iliz eyu ta’allul i üb” 'Âlî Mustafa bin Ahmet, “ e bo u u us e K h ' - hb '
e ”, 67.
259 Balbi, 31. Selânikî menti ns a ifferent inci ent where Sultan Selim ha alrea y eci e t c nquer
Cy rus bef re his accessi n: “şehzâ eliği hâlin e iyâr-ı Mısrıyye’ en murâ i in ükleri tuhaf ve sükker
ve irinç ve at içün ön er ükleri â emleri furtına ile erya an halâs müyesser l uk a melâ’în-i bî- în
sulh üzre iken atları vesâ’ir metâ’ı zabt i ü ‘Şahzâ enün i üği ne en ma’lûm’ iyü ba’ ehû niçe
ihânet en s nra virmeğle vic ân-ı şerîfelerin e mukarrer lmış i i.”
260 See Gökbil in, “Vene ik evlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Bel eler” an “Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki
Vesikalar”.
78
Venice was anxious if the Ottomans were going to attack Cyprus and only calmed when
Piyale Pasha invaded Chios.261 However, when the Sultan officially asked the Doge to
surrender Cyprus, the Republic had no doubt. Thus, they would fight for their most
valuable possession in the Eastern Mediterranean and seek allies from Europe.262
The first squadron of the Ottoman navy left Konstantiniyye for Cyprus in April 1570.
Piyale Pasha, responsible for preventing enemies from landing their army on the island,
and Kapudân-ı Deryâ Müezzinzâde Ali Pasha had sailed to Cyprus in May with an 84-
piece fleet.263 Later, Serdâr Lala Mustafa Pasha, commander of the land forces, departed
in May.264 Sultan Selim had warned Kapudan Pasha to listen to the experienced corsairs
and to act unanimously.265 On the other hand, another Sultan decree ordering Pertev
Pasha to recruit 300-400 oarsmen from each island (whether they were Christian or not)
indicates that the oarsmen shortage in the navy had bothered the officials.266
261 Ca ni, “Victory of the West”, 119.
262 Brau el, “ he e e e ”, 1080.
263 Ali Pasha was appointed to the Kapudan Pasha post after his service as Ye e s at the siege of
Zigetvar in 1566.
264 Selânikî, 77 Tabak ğlu, 241.
265 The Sultan must be a ressin t the c nflicts urin the Malta cam ai n. “ nanma-i
ümâyûnum' a lan ümerâ vü ru’esâ ve sâyir ehl-i vukûf k rsan ka u ânlar ile istişâre eyleyü hüsn-i
ittifâk u ittihâ ile yek- il ü yek-cihet lu ” Binark İsmet an Osman Yıl ırım, 12 u h e
Defteri (978 - 979/1570 - 1572), v l. I (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık evlet Arşivleri Genel Mü ürlüğü, 1996),
162.
266 “ nanma-i ümâyûnum ile müteveccih l u un taraflar a lan ba‘zı cezîreler en
avârız ve kürekci henüz alınmayu zikr lan cezîreler en keferesinün tahammüline öre her
birin en üçer- ör er yüz kürekci alınu yanun a lan emilerün n ksân üzre lan
kürekcileri tekmîl lunmasın emri ü (…) Cezâyir-i mezbûrenün keferesin ahı harâc cem‘ı bahânesiyle
vech ü münâsib ör ü ün üzre cem‘ u ihzâr it ürü ahı ele ireni küre e alık yasın”, Binark an Yıl ırım,
79
The Ottoman army had finally landed in Cyprus in July 1570. First, Nicosia was
conquered after two months of siege. After this defeat, the whole island was overrun by
the Ottoman troops (except Famagusta) which put up stiff resistance against the Turkish
onslaught thanks to its well-fortified garrison. Finally as the winter season was
approaching, the navy had returned to Konstantiniyye, leaving a small fleet behind.
However, Lala Mustafa Pasha stated that there would be a mutiny among the soldiers
since Famagusta could not be overwhelmed without proper naval support and requested
additional artillery and ammunition from the Porte.267
Meanwhile, the corsair squadrons had been called to join the navy for the Cyprus
expedition. They had ravaged the Adriatic coasts and through intelligence acquired from
the captives who had been taken during the raids, the Sublime Porte had been informed
about the enemy‟s movements.268 When the Porte found out that a Christian armada was
forming under Pope Pius V's initiatives in order to assist the Venetian resistance in
Cyprus, the Ottoman navy was ordered to search and destroy the enemy fleet.269 Sokollu
Mehmed Pasha, on the other hand, tried to establish peace with the Venetians because he
“12 Numaralı Mühimme efteri”, 236. Muslim oarsmen were generally preferred in galleys since non-
Muslim oarsmen could often revolt.
267 “evvelki donanma gibi Donanma-i ümâyûnum irişmez ise feth müyesser lma uğın an ayri asker
için e küllî fetret ü ihtilâl zuhûrı mukarrer lu ve muhâsara içün altmış kıt‘a t ve kırk a e k l nb rna
ve ana öre barut u âlât ve yarar t cı irsâli" Binark an Yıl ırım, 164.
268 Dubrovnik, a tributary of the Ottomans, was also keeping the Sublime Porte posted about the latest
developments in Europe. Binark an Yıl ırım, 209.
269 The Sultan firmly ordered that the enemy navy, wherever it is, should be destroyed without
hesitation. “küffâr-ı tu yân-âsârun sefâyin-i hezîmet-karâyinleri her kan e bulunursa tevakkuf eylemeyü
üzerlerine varu mukâbele vü mukâtele, muhârebe vü mücâ ele i ü ” Binark an Yıl ırım, 283.
80
worried that a Holy League could be formed against the Ottomans.270 Indeed, Sokollu
was right to fear this because the Venetians appealed to Pope Pious V to stop the
Turkish invasion. For the Pope, who had been planning such a project, it was a golden
opportunity. In fact, after his election in 1566, the Pope's priority was to bring together
the Christian Kings under a Holy League against the Turks and invest money in the
Spanish navy. Furthermore, the Pope believed that the only beneficiary of the past
conflicts were the Turks since they had established an alliance with the French King and
sown discord among the Christians.271
Finally the Christian navy set forth to Cyprus but, after news reached that the Turks had
overwhelmed the island and only a small Venetian garrison resisted in Famagusta, they
had to alter the course. Although Philip II was obstinate about striking the North African
regencies eventually, the allies decided to strike the Ottoman navy in the Eastern
Mediterranean.272 After a long and exhausting campaign season, the Ottoman navy had
anchored in the port of Lepanto to rest and resupply before wintering in
Konstantiniyye.273 Receiving the news, the Christian navy moved to Lepanto and the
two navies met on 7 October 1571. Thus, the Ottoman war council was summoned so as
to decide how to act against the enemy fleet. The corsair captains, including Uluç Ali
270 Uzunçarşılı, “K b s Fethi”, 261.
271 Braudel, 1029.
272 Tabak ğlu, 253.
273 Soucek, 106.
81
Pasha, did not favor an engagement and warned Ali Pasha that the soldiers had been at
sea for a long time and were preparing to return to their homes as the campaign season
was coming to an end. Also, the ships were either in bad shape or lacked crew
members.274 Therefore, if they fought, it would be better to stay in the harbor surrounded
by the fortifications instead of fighting in the open sea.275 Neglecting the opposing
views, Kapudan Müezzinzâde Ali Pasha had decided to engage in the Christian armada
in accordance with the Sultan's orders.276 However, he was killed in the first phase of the
battle. The collapsing of the center of the Ottoman navy manifested that the battle was
lost for the Ottomans. Only Uluç Ali had managed to retain his squadron and reach the
Sublime Porte.
3.7 Aftermath: Post-1571
The battle of Lepanto was a pyrrhic victory for the Holy League. While the Ottomans
had lost over 30,000 men, the Christian fleet also suffered heavily: approximately 8,000
dead and 21,000 wounded. On the other hand, 3,500 Ottoman sailors were taken captive
whereas 15,000 Christian oarsmen from Ottoman galleys were liberated. The allies had
274 “Uluc Ali Paşa cen e rızâ vermeyü ‘ nanmamız nâkıs ır, altı ay ka ar eryâ a ezmekle emiler
b z un ur, sâbıkā Körfez’ en İnebahtı’ya önül ük e önüş ür’ eyü si âh ve yeniçeri icâzetli ve
icâzetsiz ağılmışlar ır” Kâtib çelebi, 173-174.
275 “B ğaz hisârların an küffâr nanması içeri iremez, çıkılmak mahall-i hatar ır”
276 “Ve ken üye elen evâmir e ‘Elbette küffârın nanması her kan e ise üzerine varu mukābil lasın
ve illâ mu‘âteb lursın’ eyü fermân lunmağla cümle askeri ken i re’yine tâbi‘ kılu cen i mukarrer
et iler”.
82
shared 130 Ottoman galleys as spoils in addition to the 70 vessels that they sank during
the battle. At least Uluç Ali Pasha, due to bringing his 30-piece Algerian fleet back to
Konstantiniyye, prevented the total annihilation of the navy and had then been rewarded
with Kapudan Pasha‟s post and took the title of Kılıç.277 As a result, intensive work had
begun to build a new navy in the shipyards. Despite the enormous losses of 1571, thanks
to the vast resources of the Empire and efforts of Sokollu and Kılıç Ali, a 242-piece
navy managed to set sail in the 1572 season.278
Besides the military efforts, it should also be noted that the Ottoman diplomats put great
effort into splitting the Christian bloc. The Lepanto victory boosted morale in Europe,
and using this as a tool, the Pope had started to negotiate with France and German
princes to incorporate them into the Holy League. Yet, his efforts remained in vain. The
French-Ottoman alliance especially bore fruit during the post-Lepanto era. France got
involved in the Ottoman-Venetian peace talks and informed the German princes that if
they stay neutral against the Turks, the Sultan will not harm them. Moreover, extending
the eight-year armistice with Austria, Selim secured the western border of the Empire.279
The Venetians had already lost heart when they heard of the Ottoman recovery because
the extension of war was beyond the means of the Republic as its lifeblood depended on
the Levant trade. Hence, Venice signed a peace treaty with the Ottomans in 1573 and the
277 Tabak ğlu, 265-266.
278 Kâtib Çelebi, 176.
279 İnalcık, 167-169.
83
Holy League was dissolved.280 Although the Ottomans had lost the battle, they revived
through diplomatic maneuvers. Furthermore, the schism within the Holy League did not
afford to carry out further operations to the Ottoman realm. Only the Spaniards applied
their own agendas and recaptured Tunis in 1573. However, Donanma-yı Hümâyûn set
sail in May 1574 and laid siege to Tunis. Finally, Tunis had been integrated into the
Empire.281
However, the defeat at Lepanto had revealed the deficits and the fragilities of the
Ottoman maritime policy. Since Hayreddin Pasha's death, the Kapudan Pasha's office
was given to the statesmen educated in the Enderûn who had zero experience in
maritime matters. Since Piyale Pasha had worked in harmony with the corsairs and
respected them as expert sailors, this policy did not create a problem during his term.
Even though the Malta campaign had given the first signals of how fragile the Ottoman
naval policy was when Kara Mustafa Pasha (also raised in Enderûn) led the campaign,
this sharp contrast had surfaced in the battle of Lepanto once again and cost the Empire
a lot. The Ottoman chroniclers unanimously agree upon the incompetence of
Müezzinzade Ali Pasha and portray him as the scapegoat. For instance Kâtib Çelebi
points out that although Ali Pasha was a competent and gallant commander, he was
280 Venice accepted the loss of Cyprus and guaranteed to pay 300,000 ducats as compensation. Soucek,
112.
281 Tabak ğlu, 293-304.
84
restless as well as inexperienced in naval combants and had no idea about corsair‟s
craft.282
Therefore Lepanto resulted from faulty maritime policies, which had not been reassessed
after Hayreddin Pasha left the Kapudan Pasha office. The Ottoman statesmen raised
from the Enderûn, which belittled Hayreddin Pasha as a vulgar pirate, also judged
Turgut and Uluç Ali likewise and viewed them as pirates who provided nothing but
slaves to the Porte. The slave flow to the Porte by the corsairs as peşkeş and quick
victories such as in Djerba had covered up the fractures of the maritime policy.
282 “Mezbûr ka u an nefsin e yarar ve muk im i i lâkin eryâ cen lerini örmeyü k rsanlık fennini
bilmez mütehevvir ve şe î kimse i i” Kâtib Çelebi, 174. Mustafa Ali, another contemporary, also
underlines that nobody is worthy of the Kapudan Pasha title unless he is a corsair. See. ‘Âlî Mustafa an
Şeker Mehmet, e bo u u us î e e ' - e s î- ' - e s (Ankara: Türk Tarih
Kurumu Basımevi, 1997), 228.
85
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
As stated in the introduction, this thesis aimed to analyze the Ottoman corsairs and their
role in the slave trade in the central Mediterranean, and the Ottoman maritime policy
through the years between 1505 and 1571. The subject mainly covered Sultan Süleyman
I's reign and renowned Ottoman corsair admirals such as Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha
through archival documents and primary sources written by Ottoman and European
contemporaries. The historiography particularly highlights the Ottoman corsairs as an
auxiliary component. However, it is deduced that they constituted the backbone of the
navy from the early years of the Donanma-yı Hümâyûn. Furthermore, although the
researchers have produced significant studies on corsairs and slavery, the two notions
are mostly handled separately; thus, further research is needed to shed light on the role
of the corsairs in the slave trade. This thesis attempted to inspire future readers and
researchers that there is much to investigate on this subject.
Since the Ottomans understood the necessity of becoming a naval power to survive
against Christian rivals, they heavily invested in maritime policies (especially after the
conquest of Konstantiniyye). During the reign of Bayezid II, freebooters were authorized
86
by the Sultan and became corsairs en masse to fight against the Venetians and eject them
from their colonies in Aegean and Morea. This was crucial to secure the north-south sea
trade, from the Black Sea to Cyprus and Egypt for the Empire's livelihood. Sultan Selim
I achieved this goal in 1517 by eliminating the Mamelukes of Egypt. That was the
beginning of the growing Ottoman maritime supremacy in the central-eastern
Mediterranean and marked what would be the Ottoman maritime policy in the 16th
century. Finally, until the Empire had a dispute with Venice in 1645 over Crete, Selim II
managed to secure the eastern Mediterranean annexing Cyprus in 1571.
What is more, after the Barbarossa brothers established their rule in Tunis and Algiers,
the Ottoman administration penetrated the central and western Mediterranean, growing
corsair influence fertilized the technical and strategic abilities of the navy together with
increasing slavery activity for the Sublime Porte. Due to the Ottoman failure to build a
competitive navy and thanks to handsome rewards to the Sultan, Hayreddin was called
to Istanbul. He modernized Donanma-yı Hümâyûn upon his arrival at the Sublime Porte
in 1533, but his presence disturbed the Palace bureaucrats as they did not want a vulgar
pirate as the kapudan pasha.
The Ottoman perception towards the pirates/corsairs should be discussed here. For
instance, there was no significant difference between pirate and corsair for the Ottomans
and all kinds of raids were considered "helal" as long as the Sultan authorized them.283
283 J shua M. White, “ w he o e e e ”, 32.
87
Ottoman historiography has always evaluated the Ottoman corsairs within the "gazi
thesis" and has portrayed them as holy warriors who spread Islam. The same goes for the
western scholars who considered the Christian corsairs as anti-muslim warriors who
defended Christianity against Islam. Therefore, corsairs were much more complex than
it seems. As White puts it, we should ask "when" rather than "who or what" while
defining a pirate.284
So much so that there is an inconsistency in Ottoman documents in this regard, and even
the Ottoman vocabulary does not contain a definite expression of piracy while European
sources clearly distinguish a pirate and a corsair. For example the word levend was
frequently used for freebooters independent from the state authority but it was also used
to describe a bandit in the second half of the 16th century, conveying a negative
connotation.285 On the other hand Ottoman contemporaries' thoughts varied on corsairs,
and instead of their religious missions, they assessed them in terms of their social effects
and their function within the Ottoman state's body. Mustafa „Âlî, a 16th century
Ottoman contemporary, revealed his thoughts considering the illegal actions against
Ottoman subjects imposed by the corsairs.286 Their negative reputation applied to
Hayreddin Pasha as well, and the corsair admirals were not appointed to the kapudan
pasha office after his death as they were banished from the center.
284 White, 2.
285 White, 32-33. See also, Mustafa Cezar, s h e e e e (İstanbul: Çelikcilt Matbaası,
1965), 170-188.
286 White, 30.
88
In the third chapter, the Ottoman strategy of appointing the kapudan pasha is discussed
and demonstrated that the Ottoman administration had to appeal to the corsairs only in
case of a calamity (such as the defeat at Lepanto). However, contrary to the standard
view, Ottoman maritime policy revealed its fragility during the siege of Malta in 1565.
A similar episode did not occur in Malta for two reasons. The first reason was the
unpreparedness of the Spaniards. When Garcia Toledo proposed to strike the Ottoman
navy, Philip II refused to do so and kept his fleet at all costs. After Djerba, the Spaniards
had built up a strong fleet to confront the Ottoman navy until the opportunity had risen
in 1571. The second reason was the neutrality of Venice. The Republic had remained
neutral during the Malta campaign so as to maintain the Levant trade. They had only
broken their neutrality when the Ottomans declared war and they joined the Holy
League.
Moreover, although the Ottoman historians considered the conquest of Cyprus necessary
due to pirate activities and the island's strategic location, they did not emphasize enough
that the Ottoman state adjusted its goals in the central and western Mediterranean as the
Empire had stretched too thin. It is true that, as Inalcık highlights, Sultan Süleyman's
89
idea to become God's shadow on earth to make the Empire a global power had
collapsed. 287
However it should be questioned how realistically this project is implemented, if nothing
else, through corsair and maritime policy. For instance, Uluç Ali's efforts fueling the
Morisco revolt to culminate the paranoia of a second Muslim invasion in Spain and the
conquest of Tunis in 1570 were ignored on the excuse of the Cyprus expedition. The
Ottoman Empire found a second chance to embark on a full-scale operation in Malta,
clinching its superiority over the central Mediterranean, but that was not prioritized by
the Porte.
Lepanto is the result of this political deviation. Ottoman sultans did not consider the
Ottoman corsairs within the framework of a master plan. Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha
could only place himself under the dome thanks to his political ability and exceptional
commandership. He constantly terrorized the infidels at sea and provided slaves to the
Porte. Therefore, the corsairs were integrated into the imperial structure as a profitable
enterprise and thus the corsair initiative in North Africa found itself an aegis.
287 İnalcık, 168.
90
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APPENDIX
Figure 1: Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi No: 635/1
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Figure 2: Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi No: 6082/1
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Figure 3: Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi No: 6456/1
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Figure 4: Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi No: 6590/1