5.4

 

2.1.  Sivilizasyon

 

According to Tuncer Baykara, the word ―medeniyet‖ as the translation of the French word civilisation possibly appeared for the first time in the Turkish language in 1834 when it was used by Mustafa Reşid Pasha, himself being praised later by Şinasi as a ―messenger of civilization‖ (medeniyet resulü).³⁶¹ For Mustafa Reşid Pasha, civilization meant the

―upbringing of the population and the execution of orders‖ (terbiye-i nas ve icra-i nizamat). Sadık Rifat Pasha also mentioned ―the present civilization of Europe, i.e., the principles of familiarity and culture‖ (Avrupa‟nın şimdiki sivilizasyonu yani usul-i me‟nusiyet ve medeniyeti‖), also equating Europe and ―medeniyet‖. It is also very illuminating to check the translation of the French word civilisation into Ottoman Turkish in the dictionaries of the time. Artin Hindoglu in his Dictionnaire Français-Turc in 1831 translated civilisation as ―edeb, erkan öğrenme‖ (cultivation, learning of manners) and civilité as ―edeb, erkan, çelebilik‖ (cultivation, refinement). The Vocabulaire Français- Turc of Bianchi published in Paris in 1831 translated civilisation as ―insaniyet‖ (humanity). In short, the word civilisation in Turkish implied good manners and elegance on the eve of the Tanzimat. By the 1870s, the word had attained a more political and ideological connotation besides its more personalized aspects. Redhouse, in his Lexicon in 1877, translated civilization as ―a-) medeniyet; terbiye; terbiye-i medeniye: tehzib-i ahlak ve tervic-i ulum ve fünun; içtma‟-ı kemalat-ı edebiye ve ilmiye b-) vahşilik halinden çıkarub terbiye ve medeniyet yoluna dahil etmeklik‖ (a-) civilization, politeness, development and perfection in learning, politeness and morality b-) giving up barbarism and becoming

³⁶¹ Baykara, Tuncer, ―Bir Kelime-Istılah ve Zihniyet Olarak ‗Medeniyet‘in Türkiye‘ye Girişi‖, in Osmanlılarda Medeniyet Kavramı ve Ondokuzuncu Yüzyıla Dair Araştırmalar, İzmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1992, pp. 16-17.

civilized and developing good manners). In his 1880 dictionary, Redhouse translated civilization as ―terbiye‖ (good manners). In short, medeniyet meant at the same time being refined and polite determined according to the contemporary code of conduct standards of Europe, which did overlap and complement each other.³⁶²

One of the important points to underline is that according to the perception of the time, there was one single civilisation. It was understood in some ways as the European civilization, and in some ways it was perceived as a laudable notion without any geographical and cultural references. The second point to be underlined is that this notion had an unambiguously positive connotation. Thirdly, civilization was an ideal to be emulated and attained. Furthermore, it was perceived as open to all who were eager to endorse it and who had the ability to internalize it.

Although we have tried to list the non-political conceptualization of ―civilization‖, this does not mean that ―civilization‖ was a non-ideological concept. On the contrary, civilization was an ideological concept reflecting and imposing the value system of a class, the class that distinguished itself from ordinary folk.

In the mindset of Tanzimat officialdom, the ideal of civilization was a very pivotal theme. In the culture of the classical Ottoman Empire, influenced by the pre-Islamic Persian and Islamic ideals, the state was associated with refinement and cultivation. Thus, a member of the privileged member of the askeri class (being part of the state), the Ottoman scribe was to be a figure of emulation. He perceived himself as a figure of emulation and was supposed to be distinctive from the common men due to his upbringing and refinement³⁶³. This traditional Ottoman/Islamic perception and ideal overlapped with the 19th century ideal of civilization. In fact, before the impact of the 19th century Western civilization ideal, a certain ideal of cultivation was a very prevalent and pivotal aspect of the classical Ottoman officialdom and worldview. In this regard, the endorsement of the

³⁶² For the civilization entries and the quotes from Mustafa Reşid Pasha and Sadık Rifat Pasha see Baykara, Tuncer, ―Bir Kelime-Istılah ve Zihniyet Olarak ‗Medeniyet‘in Türkiye‘ye Girişi‖, in Osmanlılarda Medeniyet Kavramı ve Ondokuzuncu Yüzyıla Dair Araştırmalar, İzmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1992, pp.15-32.

³⁶³ For the ideal of Ottoman refinement in classical age of the Ottoman Empire, see Fleischer, Cornell, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

19th century civilization ideal was not an entirely new phenomenon but an alteration/modification of classical Ottoman vision and ideology.

Civilization epitomized the imperial ideal as well. Civility was one of the hallmarks of being an empire and state. An empire was to be distinguished and revered by its claim to refinement, which set it apart from the sheer military might of usurpers and tyrants. These are some reasons why the endorsement of Westernization was so smooth before it began to be problematized in the late 19th century. In this regard, the import and endorsement of the

―ideal of civilization‖ has to be explained in structural terms rather than cultural terms.

Ebubekir Hazim, then a lower level official working in the Governorship of Konya and a dilettante poet and man of letters, was advised by the governor of Konya, Müşir Mehmed Said Pasha, as follows:

―I am reading your poems in newspapers. I do not get any taste from our poems which are mere imitations of the Persian poems....we have to acknowledge that in this country genuine talent in fine arts is restricted to only a few. I never heard of any poet, artist, or musician who became prosperous. Especially, all the poets live without any exception in conditions of misery and curse what they call fortune (felek)....I do not want to see you join this miserable community....You can specialize in a certain science. Even if you decide to continue your career in the bureaucracy, you have to have proficiency in fiscal, judicial, or administrative matters ... To acquire such an expertise in any of these fields, you are obliged to learn one of the European languages. This is because there are not enough books in any of the fields (in Turkish). To read the available books again and again is to be like a horse with his eyes closed and to run and run in a small circle. You cannot move one step forward in progress and maturity.‖³⁶⁴

Taking the advice of the governor seriously, Ebubekir Hazim decided to learn French although he was desperate to find a printed alphabet in Konya. He mastered the French language in the miserable conditions of the provinces in ten years.³⁶⁵ The French language symbolized the opening of a new world. In the person of Ebubekir Hazim, the learning of the French language also allowed him to become familiar with modern French poetry instead of only encountering ―monotonous‖ Ottoman poetry. The French language was a

 

 

 

 

³⁶⁴ Tepeyran, Ebubekir Hazim, Hatıralar, İstanbul: Pera, 1998, pp. 33-34

³⁶⁵ ibid, pp. 40-45.

passport allowing the bearer entrance into the modern world and civilization, and permitting travel from one world to another.³⁶⁶

Civilization was perceived as an elite ideal rather than a political and ideological concept. The endorsement of Westernization by the pre-political inter-elite world of the Tanzimat was based on this perception and asssumption. Münif Pasha equated civilization with Islam. For him, Islam advocates Bildung and civility in opposition to ignorance (cehalet) and barbarism (bedeviyet).³⁶⁷ Civilization was yet to be an subject of contestation. In fact, during the abolition of the janissaries and the establishment of a modern military corps, drastic reforms were presented as the clash between the righteous defenders of Islam and the ignorance and (religious) corruption prevalent among janissaries and other defenders of the ―old regime‖.³⁶⁸ Apparently, there was a class background to these representations since whereas the state and state elite were associated with (genuine as opposed to rhetorical) piousness, righteousness, and morality, the mob was associated with incivility, barbarism, and heresy. During the Tanzimat-period, rather than being an impediment to westernization, Islam was perceived as a supportive force in the course of Westernization. In the classical Ottoman Empire as well as throughout Islamic history, Islam epitomized civility, refinement, and the distinction of the elite. The contrast was drawn between the ignorant barbarism of the nomads and the ordinary folk, and the cultivated elite which were distinguished by their careful and strict observance of Islam. The ordinary folk were ignorant of Islam and its refinements. Tanzimat advanced on this

³⁶⁶ The impact of French novels in French on Mehmet Rauf was similar. He wrote that after reading and being disappointed by the literarily weak novels written in Turkish, the French novels mesmerized him and opened a new world in front of him. ―Halit Ziya ile İlk Temas‖, Şebab, 23 July 1336,excerpted in Mehmet Rauf, Edebi Hatıralar, Kitabevi, 2009,

p. 14. For the transformative function of the French language in the 19th century Ottoman Empire, see Davison, Roderick. ―The French Language as a Vehicle for Ottoman Reform in the Nineteenth Century‖, in De la Révolution Française a la Turquie d‟Atatürk: La Modernisation Politique et Sociale Actes des Colloques d‟Istanbul (10-12 Mai 1989), Istanbul-Paris, 1990, pp. 125-140.

³⁶⁷ For the long paragraph where Münif Pasha elaborates on his argument, see Budak, Ali, Münif Paşa, İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004, p. 551. Also see the contrast established between ―bedeviyet‖ and the (civilized) state, see Es‘ad Efendi, ibid, p. 623.

³⁶⁸ Es‘ad Efendi, Vak‟a-Nüvis Es‟ad Efendi Tarihi, pp. 644-650; Ahmed Cevdet Paşa,

Tarih-i Cevdet, pp. 154-170.

premise. Therefore, Islam was an integral part of the Tanzimat civility. It did not pose an obstacle. On the contrary, the Islamic ideal was complementary to and harmonized with the Tanzimat ideal. We do not observe a contradiction between Islam and the zealous

―imitation‖ of the Western ideal. Of course, such a harmony was possible within the traditionalist and elitist interpretation of Islam espoused by the Ottoman elite. An alternative and oppositionist Islam was also in the process of development, especially those ideas associated with the Khalidiyya-Naqshibandi order.³⁶⁹

We observe the emergence of a process of parting of the ways during the Hamidian era as religion/religiosity began to be perceived, particularly among the younger generations of educated intellectuals, to be incompatible with science and the emerging materialistic thought.³⁷⁰ This 19^th century Ottoman blend of Islam, progress, and science was not unlike the Victorian ideal which was in contrast to the strictly secular and emancipationist republican ideal of republican France. Much as the Victorian consensus was retreating in the very late post-Darwinian decades of 19^th century, simultaneously the Young Turks were revolting against the Islamic ideal (and Islamic-and Western- civility as well). Nevertheless, many other Young Turks continued to retain both their commitments. Contention over the ideal of civilization will emerge also as an impact on the West after the radicalization of German right with its emphasis on the deadly antagonism of the Western Zivilisation and the German Kultur among writers such as Oswald Spengler and Ernest Jünger.³⁷¹ Nevertheless, it also has to be pointed out that the first signs of this anti- civilizationist discourse developed during the Hamidian era. It is ironic that the post-

³⁶⁹ For the 19^th century rise of Khalidiyye-Naqshibandi order, see Weismann, Itzchak, Taste of Modernity:Sufism, Salaffiya and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus, Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2001; Gaborieau, Marc & Popovic, Alexandre & Zarcone, Thierry (ed.), Naqshbandis, İstanbul: Editions Isis, 1990; Mardin, Şerif, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, New York: SUNY Press, 1989; Algar, Hamid, Nakşibendilik, İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2007; Gündüz, İrfan, Gümüşhanevi Ahmed Ziyaüddin: Hayatı-Eserleri-Tarikat Anlayışı ve Halidiyye Tarikatı, İstanbul: Seha Neşriyat, 1984.

³⁷⁰ Doğan, Atila, Osmanlı Aydınları ve Sosyal Darwinizm, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006, pp. 185-203; Bein, Amit, The Ulema, Their Institutions and Politics in the Late Ottoman Empire (1876-1924), unpublished dissertation, Princeton University, 2006.

³⁷¹ Herf, Jeffrey, Reactionary Modernism, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 18-108.

Tanzimat anti-westernist discourse of the multiplicity of civilizations and of Western civilization as the (toothless) evil incarnate was also an outcome of Westernization.

It was the impact of the late 19^th and early 20^th century discourse of multiple civilizations and the rhetoric of anti-civilizationism especially prevalent in Germany that had diluted Tanzimat‘s civilizationism and generated the discourse of Ottoman/Turkish/Muslim authenticity and distinctiveness claiming to descend from a different and superior civilization. Although the great Islamic past was a theme to be articulated, its juxtaposition in opposition to western civilization and its transformation into a strategic asset exposing the deficiencies and hypocrisies of western civilization emerged from the late 19^th century onwards and gained prominence with the radicalism of Young Turks.³⁷² In fact, anti-civilizationism and the rhetoric of multiple civilizations were partially influenced by and imported from the German anti-civilizationism developed during the Wilhelmine era and peaked in the thoughts of post-war right-wing intellectuals such as Oswald Spengler³⁷³ and Ernest Jünger³⁷⁴. As these intellectuals juxtaposed Geman Kultur against cosmopolitan Western Civilization, the Young Turk generation proclaimed the irreconcilability of the Western Christian imperialist ―Civilization‖ with Turks and Muslims being the political leaders and representatives of Islam. In this view, imperialism, Europe, and Christianity became indistinguishable and virtually meant the same thing. It was equally true for the Turks, Islam, and the innate anti-imperialism of this cultural/political entity who began to be depicted as the diametrical opposite of the

―toothless‖ Western civilization.

 

 

 

2.2.     Reformism, Civilization, Progress, Science and Islam: The Consensus of the Tanzimat Bureaucratic World

³⁷² Aydın, Cemil, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p. 69.

³⁷³ Spengler, Oswald, The Decline of the West, New York: A.A.Knopf, 1926.

³⁷⁴ Herf, Jeffrey, Reactionary Modernism, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1986; Repp, Kevin, Reformers, Critics and the Paths of German Modernity, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000.

It is another question whether the Tanzimat scribal class had a comprehensive political worldview. It may be argued that they had divided political orientations and dispositions. The notion that people are to have encompassing political worldviews and orientations appears to be hardly applicable to the 19th century Ottoman context.³⁷⁵ Some fundamental assumptions of the Tanzimat scribes were clearly non-political or supra-political. Furthermore, these assumptions were not contested assumptions but the expression of a common understanding regardless of the minor differences among the political/social views of the Tanzimat officials. We have to await the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 or perhaps the Hamidian era for the differentiation and the flourishing of alternative and rivaling political/ideological stances.

One feature of the mindset of Tanzimat Ottoman officialdom was commitment to and belief in a standardized and fixed scheme of programs of reform. In the numerous ―reports‖ of the time, the issues suggested to be undertaken and accomplished were almost identical and straightforward: regulation of fiscal matters, improvement of education, alleviation of the agricultural infrastructure, improvement of the efficiency of the bureaucracy, et cetera. The very basic idea was that once all these reforms were accomplished, the serious, age- old problems would be overcome. This faith in progress via implementation of the necessary technical reforms was limited to the replication of what had been already done in the ―West‖. No structural impediments were to be expected once the necessary will and skills were put into effect. The agenda for the advancement of the Ottoman state was rather straightforward.³⁷⁶

One of the most overt examples of this optimism was arguably Mustafa Sami Efendi‘s

―Avrupa Risalesi‖ (Pamphlet on Europe) first published in 1840. Mustafa Sami‘s travel

³⁷⁵ For a criticism of the ―internal consistency of the text‖, see Skinner, Quentin, ―Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas‖, History and Theory, vol. 8, no.1 (1969), pp. 16-22.

³⁷⁶ A very similar state of mind in 19th century Persian reformists is caught by Shaul Bakhash. He dubs this the ―open sesame‖ approach which assumes that Persia can enjoy the benefits of Western civilization without any friction once they are introduced. For Bakhash, the ―open sesame‖ approach also assumes that when the positive effects of westernization become evident, any resistance or opposition to reform will evaporate. Bakhash, Shaul, Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy & Reform under the Qajars 1858-1896, London: Ithaca Press, 1978, p. 30.

account is a striking example of an utmost confidence in the achievements of Europe. At the end of his book, Mustafa Sami concludes that the advanced state of Europe was neither due to the climate of Europe nor to the fertility of its soil. For Sami, the reason for the advanced state of Europe was due to science and to science only. Mustafa Sami suggested that once Ottomans emulated this model, the abode of Islam would be even more advanced than Europe given that its land is fertile, its climate is fine, and its people are intelligent by birth.³⁷⁷ It is striking to notice that almost the same ―developmentalist‖, optimistic interpretation was articulated in the Rescript of Tanzimat in which it was claimed that due to the fertility of the soil and intelligence of its people, the Ottoman Empire will be an advanced nation ―in five to ten years‖ once the necessary measures were taken.³⁷⁸ In fact, what Mustafa Sami did was to reiterate and propagate the ideas of the Rescript of Tanzimat. Given that Mustafa Sami was appointed as a secretary in the Ottoman embassy to Paris (after serving in the Ottoman embassy to Vienna) and that this travelogue was written based on his observations while on his way to Paris to begin to serve in his new post and furthermore given that he was a confident of Mustafa Reşid Pasha, the political agenda of this text is evident. A similar and earlier analysis and prescription was presented by Sadık Rifat Pasha in 1837, who at the time of writing his report was the Ottoman ambassador to Vienna.³⁷⁹ It may be claimed that in his report, Sadık Rifat foreshadowed Tanzimat. In his risale, Sadık Rifat noted that the basis of advancement no more lay in military improvement but in peaceful means.

In fact, both Sadık Rifat Pasha and Mustafa Sami Bey‘s accounts could be understood as variations of the Rescript of Tanzimat. In fact, the same reasoning and policy proposals will be reiterated in many political pamphlets. Tunuslu Hayreddin Pasha forty years later suggested similar policy proposals to Abdülhamid. Although he was critical of some aspects of Tanzimat, his reasoning and arguments were strikingly reminiscent of Mustafa Sami and Sadık Rıfat. Like his predecessors, for him the Ottoman Empire regressed due to

³⁷⁷ Mustafa Sami Efendi, Avrupa Risalesi, İstanbul: Kitabevi, 1996, pp. 80-81.

³⁷⁸ See the text of the rescript in Alkan, Mehmet Ö, (ed.), Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet‟in Birikimi v. I, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001, pp. 449-451.

³⁷⁹ See his report‘s transcription in Seyitdanlıoğlu, Mehmet, ―Sadık Rıfat Paşa ve Avrupa Ahvaline Dair Risalesi‖, Liberal Düşünce, 1996, no.2.

its internal corruption and its diversion from the path of the golden age of the Ottoman Empire. The Empire will ascend by employing the Staatswissenschaft of Europe, reorganizing the state as a modern state, and avoiding corruption and lethargy.³⁸⁰

Münif Pasha was another representative of early Tanzimat. His years in Berlin as a secretary in the Ottoman embassy in his youth were constitutive of his later intellectual formation. Facing Western intellectual superiority, young Münif developed a radically Westernist orientation and contributed significantly to the transmission of Western knowledge in an encyclopedia format in the 1860s.³⁸¹ The same observation is equally valid for İbrahim Edhem, who along with Münif Pasha served as a secretary in the Berlin embassy in the same years. As suggested above, Münif‘s and İbrahim Edhem‘s were educated at a time when the astronomical gap between the Muslim Ottomans and Europe did not produce enmity but admiration of the West. Münif Pasha began his career in the Translation Office before his appointment to Berlin. ―In 1859, he returned to the Porte and reentered the Translation Bureau. In this year, he provided the Muslim Ottomans with the first translation into Turkish of what may be termed the ideas of the Enlightenment.‖³⁸² After a brief tenure in the Bureau, he rose to other governmental departments including a five- year tenure at the embassy to Teheran.‖³⁸³ Münif Pasha belonged to the very early Tanzimat generation and preceded Namık Kemal and his colleagues, who were frustrated by the shortcomings of Tanzimat and the attitudes of the Western powers and were seeking an authentic identity for Ottomans, Turks, and Muslims.³⁸⁴

Nonetheless, the optimistic vision of the undertaking of the necessary technical reforms and improvements was not as naive as it may seem. This faith also contained a resilient trust in the state as it was the only possible actor to direct and administer this sweeping

³⁸⁰ See Çetin, Atilla, Tunuslu Hayreddin Paşa, Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1988,

pp. 254-75. For the texts of his three policy proposals presented to Abdülhamid, see ibid,

pp. 312-56.

³⁸¹ Budak, Ali, Münif Paşa, İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004, p. 22.

³⁸² Mardin, Şerif, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, p. 234.

³⁸³ Budak, Ali, ibid, pp. 21-24, 31-35.

³⁸⁴ See for a comparison between Münif Pasha and Namık Kemal, Mardin, Şerif, ibid, pp. 233-246.

transformation. Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha‘s impressive account is a perfect example of the perception that the establishment of the order by the state was the primary condition for the establishment of a modern and well-ordered infrastructure.³⁸⁵ Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, an officer motivated by professional ethos and confidence in the progressive capacity of modern organization and technology, carried out his assignments by suppressing revolts in the various peripheries of the Ottoman Empire, moving from Yemen³⁸⁶ to Montenegro, from Lebanon to Serbia. In his account, he was anxious to suppress these revolts by violence if necessary, not because he was a merciless soldier filled with loyalist zeal, but because he regarded these rebels as unruly savages needing to be educated and tamed. For him, the modern organization of the state and society had to be handled with the iron and authoritative hand of the state, which was by definition the only legitimate authority capable of undertaking this demanding mission. Apparently, the reform project was welded around a benevolent state.

For the reformers, the state represented the ultimate good, not unlike the classical Ottoman and classical Islamic political imagination. The local resistance to the state simultaneously symbolized obscurantism, uncivilized manners, and treachery. That axiom definitely led to the assumption that all the opponents and critics of the state, at least those who were not favorable to the territorial integrity of the empire, were motivated by evil goals. The discourse of orientalism and colonialism of the Ottoman center towards the periphery had been scrutinized by Usama Makdisi. ―By casting the Ottoman Empire as the progenitor of the Enlightenment ideal (and therefore its natural inheritor), capable of its

³⁸⁵ Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, Serzügeşt-i Hayatım, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996 (2 volumes)

³⁸⁶ The Ottoman governmental elite‘s colonial perceptions of Yemen became a recent subject of inquiry. For colonial perceptions and remarks on Yemen in the memoirs, see Mahmud Nedim Bey, Arabistan‟da Bir Ömür, Istanbul: Isis, 2001; Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, Serzügeşt-i Hayatım, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996, v. I, pp. 40-97; Biren, Mehmet Tevfik, II. Abdülhamid, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Devri Hatıraları, İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1993, V. I, pp. 265-370. Ahmet İzzet Paşa, Feryadım, İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1992, v. I, pp. 87-107, Doktor İbrahim Abdüsselam Paşa, Yemen Seyahatnamesi ve Bitkisel Coğrafyası, İstanbul: Pan Yayıncılık, 2009; Süleyman Şefik Paşa, Hatıratım, İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 2004, pp. 7-43. Also see Namık Kemal, ―Yemen‘e Dair Mütalaa‖, in Namık Kemal: Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri, Nergiz Yılmaz Aydoğdu & Ismail Kara (ed.), İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2005, pp. 56-57.

own renaissance, Ottoman reformers also articulated the notion of the ‗Ottoman man's burden‘ toward its subject populations, who would have to be disciplined and reformed before the Ottoman Empire could firmly establish itself as a civilized power³⁸⁷.‖ Apparently, these ―reforms‖, ―disciplining‖ and civilizationist practices also included violence. The destruction of the Kurdish principalities³⁸⁸, the forced settlement of Turcoman tribes³⁸⁹, and the introduction of modern governance in Yemen³⁹⁰ were all achieved by violence legitimized on progressive and civilizationist grounds. These premises were the sanctity and rightfulness of the Ottoman state, and the intellectual and ethical superiority of the Ottoman ruling elite. A new expansionism molded with a civilizationist discourse emerged in the Tanzimat, especially in the Arab lands.³⁹¹ Here, the undertakers of the ―progenitoring of the Enlightenment ideal‖ were ―members of the state elite‖, ―Muslims‖ and gradually ―Turks‖ (especially vis-à-vis ―Kurds‖ and ―Arabs‖).

Not only the Tanzimat statesmen, but also Ottoman intellectuals displayed the amalgamation of these complex and overlapping identities and self-perceptions. Namık Kemal epitomizes the intertwined nature of these identities and ideals. In his article,

―Terakki‖ (Progress), published in the daily Ibret in 1862, we observe his commitment to

―civilizationism‖ and adoration and admiration of the West. Namık Kemal defined London as ―the photograph of the display of the progress of civilization‖.³⁹² After this introduction,

³⁸⁷ Makdisi, Usama. ―Ottoman Orientalism‖, The American Historical Review, June 2002, Vol. 107, No:3, p. 27.

³⁸⁸ Van Bruinessen, Martin. Agha, Shaikh and State, London: Zed Books, 1992, pp. 175- 84.

³⁸⁹ Gould, Andrew Gordon, Pashas and Brigands: Ottoman Provincial Reform and its Impact on the Nomadic Tribes of Southern Anatolia 1840-1885, unpublished dissertation, UCLA, 1973; Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Tezakir, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1963,

v. III, pp. 107-215.

³⁹⁰ Messick, Brinkley Morris, The Calligraphic State, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 37-58; Farah, Caesar, The Sultan‟s Yemen, London: I.B. Tauris, 2002.

³⁹¹ Kurşun, Zekeriya, Necid ve Ahsa‟da Osmanlı Hakimiyeti, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1998; Anscombe, Frederick F, The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.

³⁹² Namık Kemal, ―Terakki‖, Ibret, 3 Ramazan 1289/ 23 Teşrin-i Evvel 1288. Excerpted in Aydoğdu, Nergiz Yılmaz & Kara, İsmail (ed.), Namık Kemal, Bütün Makaleleri 1, İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2005, p. 212

Namık Kemal makes an imaginary visit to London with his readers. Namık Kemal describes certain buildings and what is done there. He visits Westminster, a building in which the hard-working parliamentarians are contributing to the progress of their homeland; the Palace of Justice, in which justice is distributed with utmost civility and politeness; schools in which children are given manners and erudition; libraries in which people are reading books about science, et cetera. After long paragraphs of fascination, Namık Kemal concludes by asking why the Ottomans were left behind. He also asks the reader if ―we‖ lost all our learning and why ―we‖ are in such a desperate situation.³⁹³ Namık Kemal suggests that London with all its glamour, civility, and elegance is the model to imitate. It is the ultimate goal in the quest for progress. In his other articles, Namık Kemal entertains colonial visions towards the Arab lands (with the motive of rehabilitating Arabs to their distinguished past as the original nation of Islam)³⁹⁴, dreams of a pan-Islamic enlightenment and revival³⁹⁵, claims authenticity and cultural distinctiveness from the Europeans³⁹⁶,  and  envisions  an  Ottoman  Empire  which  has  fully  appropriated

―civilization‖ and ―modern technologies‖.³⁹⁷ A recurring concern in his articles was to show and prove that Islam was not the cause of the deterioration of the Islamic lands. In other words, in Namık Kemal we observe the perplexed mind of the 19^th century Ottoman intellectual/bureaucrat, where all of these concerns exist intertwined and are meaningful only in interrelation with each other. Likewise, the ―we‖ of Namık Kemal remains vague. For example, although he has a clear idea of a community of Islam, Islam is inevitably politicized, and as soon as Islam was imagined as a politicized identity, the prospects of Islam were to be defined in terms of the prospects of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, for Namık Kemal, the Ottoman Empire was clearly an empire led by the Turks though they were supposed to serve an altruistic goal.

Namık Kemal‘s perception of Arabs is intriguing because although he respects the Arabs as the original nation of Islam, noting that Arabs had converted Turks to Islam and

³⁹³ Namık Kemal, ibid, p. 220.

³⁹⁴ Namık Kemal, ―Yemen‘e Dair Mütalaa‖, ibid, p. 57.

³⁹⁵ Namık Kemal, ―İttihad-ı İslam‖, ibid, p. 84-87.

³⁹⁶ Namık Kemal, ―Medeniyet‖, ibid pp. 358-361.

³⁹⁷ Namık Kemal, ―Nüfus‖, ibid, pp. 69-79; ―Maarif‖, pp. 109-113.

―educated them‖ (terbiye etmek), at the same time he points out that the Arabs were in a miserable condition at the time (Arap bizim fesad-ı rüzigar ile a‟sabına halel gelmiş üstadımızdır). Turks were to save the Arabs from their backwardness and restore them to their historical greatness.³⁹⁸ Apparently, he sees Turks as the nation destined to educate, civilize, and lead the nations of Islam as Turks were the ruling nation (millet-i hakime) of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, his ―we‖ is a complex one, amalgamating discrete identities although it is rather clear within his worldview and within his historical context that he arranges Ottoman imperialism, the Turkish nation, and Islam within a hierarchy. Given that there is no space here to enter into the convoluted structures of the mindset of Namık Kemal, it will be only noted that Namık Kemal illustrates the multilayered and anomalous nature of the late mind of the Ottoman bureaucratic elite at its best.

Within this encyclopedic intellectual milieu, ―knowledge‖ was perceived as a semi- sacred and ―objective‖ notion, not unlike the Islamic notion of ―ilim‖ with its divine/religious connotations. In fact, it may be argued that the Islamic ―ilim‖³⁹⁹ (which served as further proof of the existence and magnificence of God) was replaced by the modern/Western notion of science (ulum-plural of ilim) and thus, that the positivism of late Ottoman thought was derived from Islamic premises and outlook. ―Knowledge‖ was hailed as emancipating people (from ignorance and unjust oppression) and functioned as the beacon of humanity and progress. Thus, the attitude towards ―knowledge‖ derived not only from the 19^th century European positivist perception, but also from the authentic Islamic culturalization that consecrated authority and authoritative knowledge. Thus, 19^th century

―Western knowledge‖ was perceived as authoritative and worthy of being imported. However, this did not mean that they should merely imitate Western techniques and become ―modernists‖. On the contrary, their adaptation of technical knowledge was not to be  in  conflict  with  or  in  contradistinction  to  their  authentic  culturalization  and

 

³⁹⁸ Namık Kemal, ―Yemen‘e Dair Mütala‖, ibid, p. 57.

³⁹⁹ The value attributed to Western/technical knowledge and Ottoman positivism was in a sense the persistence of the traditional Islamic perception of knowledge. ―The concept of knowledge enjoyed an importance unparalleled in other civilizations.‖ Rosenthal, Franz, Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam, Leiden: Brill, 1970, p. 334.

distinctiveness. The western technical ―objective‖ knowledge was to be employed to strengthen the Ottoman state.

In the early Tanzimat, science and knowledge lacked any cultural connotations. There was yet no contestation over knowledge and science or an effort to Islamicize and indigenize them. Nevertheless, the discourse of the ―Islamic golden age‖ accompanied the reception of Western knowledge and science. The Western science and knowledge was adapted and digested with the discovery and articulation of ―Turkish-Islamic‖ scientists, such as Avicenna and al-Farabi, the glorification of the ―Islamic golden age‖, and an emphasis on the crucial Turkish-Islamic contribution to the development of (modern) science. A discourse of authenticity and distinctiveness in the late 19^th century developed. In fact, this discourse of authenticity was partially based on the conjectures of 19^th century French republican historiography -which constituted the chief and almost only source of information regarding the European medieval period for the Ottoman intelligentsia- and positivist thought, which depicted the feudal, European medieval age as obscurantist, uncivilized,  and  ―dark‖  and  which  juxtaposed  the  alternative  civilization  of  the

―enlightened Muslim East‖ against obscurantist Christendom.⁴⁰⁰ Nevertheless, there was not yet the ―indigenization of knowledge⁴⁰¹‖ and development of a discourse of an alternative and rival ―Islamic/local/traditional knowledge and civilization‖ which became visible later, especially after the Revolution of 1908.

Faith in science, a shared attitude among the late Ottoman bureaucrats, reached an extreme level within the context of the Darwinian ideas circulating in the Ottoman Empire

⁴⁰⁰ Ahmed Rıza, La Faillite Morale de la Politique Occidentale en Orient, Librarie Picart, 1922, pp. 100-132; Mizancı Murad, La Force et Faiblesse de la Turquie, Geneva, 1897,

pp. 10-16 quoted in Emil, Birol, Mizancı Murad Bey, İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2009, p. 374; Ziya Paşa, Endülüs Tarihi, Dersaaadet: Karabet ve Kasbar Matbaası, 1887 (4 volumes)

⁴⁰¹ For a parallel development of the ―indigenization of knowledge‖ and the emergence of nativism in culture, the social sciences, thought, and even in technology in Iran, see Boroujerdi, Mehrzad, Iranian Intellectuals and the West, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996; Fazeli, Nematollah, Fazeli, Politics of Culture in Iran, London; New York: Routledge, 2006. The 19th century Iranians also developed the idea that pre-Islamic Iran was ―the source of knowledge for the Greeks, the Egyptians, and (it) had been the fountain of civilization and education (chismish-i tamaddun va tarbiyat)‖. Thus, what had to be done was simply to rediscover the authentic and historic magnificance and erudition of Iran. Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh, Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804-1946, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 68.

in the 1890s. A new generation emerged, endorsing a materialistic worldview in reaction to conservative ideas, most famously in the thoughts of Doktor Abdullah Cevdet⁴⁰² and Beşir Fuad, but not limited to a small circle of people.⁴⁰³ However before the 1890s, the perception that science and religion are inevitably contradictory did not exist either in the Ottoman Empire or in Europe in general. Until then, science had been welcomed as the beacon of humanity. Such an infinite faith in science was also compatible with the assumption that the superiority of the European nations was principally due to science. Once the Ottomans appropriated science as the Europeans already had, they would reach the level of progress of Europe. Therefore, the superiority of Europe was not a matter of

―culture‖, as would be claimed from the 1890s onwards, but only a matter of delay. The ones who were suspicious of the achievements and limitless opportunities of science were mocked for failing to comprehend the modern world and were regarded as examples of an obsolete and archaic mentality as can be observed in numerous accounts of the time.⁴⁰⁴

A break in this optimistic faith in science and the idea that science and religion were not compatible but mutually exclusive emerged only in 1890s, a decade which was also critical for the transformation of the ―European mind‖ as well.⁴⁰⁵ In this regard, the generational drift observable in the Ottoman context was actually a continent-wide phenomenon and has to be assessed as part of a European intellectual phenomenon. The fall of the conservative Tanzimat men with their optimistic, conservative, and evolutionist

⁴⁰² For an impressive account of the prevalence of materialist thought among the students in Tıbbıye while Abdullah Cevdet was a student, see Hanioğlu, Şükrü, Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi, İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981, pp. 8-20.

⁴⁰³ For the prevalence of Darwinian thought in the late Ottoman Empire, see Doğan, Atila, Osmanlı Aydınları ve Sosyal Darwinizm, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006. The book reveals the prevalence of Darwinian and social Darwinian thought in the late Ottoman Empire before the Young Turks. The book‘s study of the Darwinian and social Darwinian thought of the ―conservative‖ Ahmed Midhad Efendi is particularly striking. See pp. 147-165.

⁴⁰⁴ See Biren, Mehmet Tevfik, II. Abdülhamid, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Devri Hatıraları, İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1998, vol I, pp. 34-35. He mentions and illustrates ―softa zihniyeti‖, which he depicts as not believing in science and progress.

⁴⁰⁵ The last three decades of the 19th century were transformative. The conservative and static nature of the social order of Europe was challenged by a new generation influenced by the materialistic and radical thought of the age. See Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1958.

visions was yet another manifestation of the European-wide transformation as has been previously pointed out.⁴⁰⁶

 

 

 

2.3.    The Image and Representation of the Tanzimat-Period in Official Hamidian Discourse

 

The discourse of the Hamidian regime did not level an open assault against the Tanzimat. On the contrary, the establishment and consolidation of the Hamidian regime was presented and legitimized by its contribution to the Tanzimat. The official Hamidian discourse acclaimed and extolled Tanzimat, which it celebrated as the rebirth and regeneration of the Ottoman state.⁴⁰⁷ The year 1839 continued to be year zero and the annus mirabilis of the ―new Ottoman Empire‖. For example, Mehmed Memduh Pasha, who served as the Minister of Interior between 1895 and 1908, eulogized Mustafa Reşid Pasha as follows: ―When we look at history, we see that the greatest achievements are performed not by administrators, but by geniuses who possess extraordinary skills from birth and who act in ways which no one else thinks of. Mustafa Reşid Pasha is such an unequalled person.‖⁴⁰⁸ The same commentary was also enunciated verbatim by Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, who was one of the grandees of the Hamidian regime⁴⁰⁹. Mehmed Memduh shared the antipathy towards Mahmud Nedim Pasha, whom he described as an unskilled and malicious, and towards his loyalists whom he defined as hypocritical and

⁴⁰⁶ ―Liberal conservatism‖, a disposition quite different from conservatism and liberalism and displaying a distinct and comprehensive political view within the context of the 19th century European context, is analyzed succinctly by Alan Kahan, See Kahan, Alan S, Aristocratic Liberalism: The Social and Political Thought of Jacob Burckhardt, John Stuart Mill and Alexis De Tocqueville, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Also see Kahan, Alan S, Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe: The Political Culture of Limited Suffrage, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

⁴⁰⁷ For the history textbooks of the Hamidian regime, see Demiryürek, Mehmet, Tanzimat‟tan Cumhuriyet‟e Bir Osmanlı Aydını: Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi, İstanbul: Phoenix, 2003, pp. 153-173.

⁴⁰⁸ Mehmed Memduh Pasha, Mi‟rat-i Şuunat, İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1990, pp.18-19

⁴⁰⁹ Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, Mira‟at-ı Hakikat, İstanbul: Berekat Yayınevi, 1983, p. 32

careerist.⁴¹⁰ The tone of Üss-i İnkilap (Foundation of the Revolution), which may be taken as the authorized account of the Hamidian regime, written by Ahmed Midhat Pasha to eulogize the ―revolutionary‖ takeover of Abdülhamid went along the same lines.⁴¹¹ Ahmed Midhat presented Abdülhamid as the revolutionary leader whose mission was to fulfill the undertaking of the Tanzimat. The book was not entitled Üss-i İnkilap for nothing. The name of the book established a connection and continuity from the elimination of the Janissaries⁴¹² to the Hamidian takeover. The book‘s criticisms were directed not towards the founders of the Tanzimat and not towards its founding motivations/orientation, but against those who diverged from the glorious path of the Tanzimat. The Hamidian discourse presented itself as the corrector of the misdeeds of the corrupters of the Tanzimat.

 

 

 

2.4.  De-whigging Late Ottoman History

 

How should we interpret the Hamidian takeover in light of the developments of 1870s

? As mentioned previously, the old paradigm was to present the Hamidian takeover as the return of reaction. However, scholars such as Stanford Shaw and Engin Deniz Akarlı challenged and demolished this cliché. Instead of symbolizing a break, the Hamidian establishment legitimized itself using the Tanzimat.⁴¹³ We may suggest that with the realization that reformism is not sufficient to maintain the empire intact and with the rise of authoritarian/conservative states such as Prussia and Russia (after the discrediting of liberal France), a mental turn was observed. The Hamidian regime was a process of redefinition of

 

 

 

 

⁴¹⁰ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, ibid pp. 62-64.

⁴¹¹ Ahmed Midhat Efendi. Üss-i İnkılap, İstanbul: Selis, 2004.

⁴¹² The book‘s name was inspired by Esad Efendi‘s Üss-i Zafer, in which Esad Efendi narrates and eulogizes the act of Mahmud II.

⁴¹³ For the textbooks, see Demiryürek, Mehmet, Tanzimat‟tan Cumhuriyet‟e Bir Osmanlı Aydını: Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi, İstanbul: Phoenix, 2003, pp. 153-173.

the Tanzimat after disillusionment with the liberal reformism of Tanzimat as it became apparent with the ―incident of Mahmud Nedim‖.⁴¹⁴

The ―whig interpretation of history‖ was first criticized by Herbert Butterfield and Lewis Namier. Butterfield defined the ―whig interpretation of history‖ as follows: ―To praise revolutions provided they have been successful, to emphasize certain principles of progress in the past⁴¹⁵....(and)...imagine it as working not to accentuate antagonisms or to ratify old party-cries but to find the unities that underlie the differences and to see all lives as a part of the one web of life.‖⁴¹⁶ For Namier, 18th century British political history was limited to factional strife among groups consisting of self-interested individuals. Namier denied any role to ideology and ideas. For him, politics was an arena for the clash of personal ambitions rather than the historic struggles of ideologies and social interest groups.⁴¹⁷

In the Ottoman context, it was Rifat Abou-El-Hajj who applied the Butterfield-Namier paradigm for the first time. Based on a case study on the origins and meaning of the 1703 Edirne Incident, he questioned the teleological assumptions attributed to developments in the early modern Ottoman Empire. By establishing factional lineages and coalitions between factions, he showed that the main tension was not between alleged progressives and defensive reactionaries, but between rivaling factions.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁴ Davison, Reform…, p. 269.

⁴¹⁵ Butterfield, Herbert, The Whig Interpretation of History, London: G. Bell and Sons, 1959, p. v.

⁴¹⁶ ibid, p. 3.

⁴¹⁷ Among his books, see England in the Age of American Revolution, London: St. Martin‘s Press, 1961; The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III, London: Macmillan, 1929. For a short biography of Namier, see Colley, Linda, Lewis Namier, St. Martin‘s Press, 1989. Also see, Price, Jacob M. ―Party, Purpose, and Pattern: Sir Lewis Namier and His Critics‖, The Journal of British Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (November 1961).

⁴¹⁸ Abou-El-Hajj, Rifat Ali, Formation of the Modern State, New York: State University of New York Press, 1991; Abou-El-Hajj, Rifat Ali, The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics, İstanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul,1984. Baki Tezcan also leveled a critique of this whiggish tendency. See Tezcan, Baki. ―The 1622 Military Rebellion in Istanbul: A Historiographical Journey‖, International Journal of Turkish Studies, 8 (2002), pp. 25-43, Tezcan, Baki, Searching for Osman: A Reassessment of the Deposition of the Ottoman Sultan Osman II (1618-1622),

In order to de-whig the 19th century Ottoman Empire, we have to reassess power struggles along these lines. That does not mean that we have to ignore/exclude ideology and politics, but we have to reassess ideology and politics in interaction with factionalism and to a certain extent, as a corollary of factional divisions. We may define the Hamidian status quo as a ―transition to a controlled and restrained modernization in reaction to the advancing threats supported and administered by the newly established Muslim elites aiming to avoid the rise of rival elites be it Muslim or non-Muslim‖. This endeavor necessitates the establishment of its value system organized hierarchically and symbolized in the persona of Abdülhamid.‖ Elites are not ideologically motivated. They seek to maximize their interests. The claim here is not that this elite had created Abdülhamid. What may be modestly suggested is that the consolidation of an established state elite after the precarious decades of the early Tanzimat provided the appropriate conditions for an autocracy to rise which nurtured and monitored an established status quo representing and upholding the values and priorities of this elite in the persona of the sultan and in the symbolism of the imperium. The state was reified for these self-interested reasons. The

―officials both contribute to the creation of standardized views of the state and experience the constraints on action that result from this constant process of reification.‖⁴¹⁹ Engin Deniz Akarli also notes that, ―This new elaboration of bureaucratic structure penetrated deep into society and enhanced the visibility, control, and to a certain extent also the respectability of the government. Equally important, it served as a mechanism to create a growing cadre of officials committed to the Ottoman cause.‖⁴²⁰ As it happens, self-interest and social/political visions are often negotiated and intertwined.

 

 

 

2.5.  Hamidian Autocracy as Class Politics and Class Formation

unpublished dissertation, Princeton University, 2001. Also see Erimtan, Can, Ottomans Looking West? The Origins of the Tulip Age and its Development in Modern Turkey, London: I.B. Tauris, 2008.

⁴¹⁹ Herzfeld, Michael, Cultural Intimacy, London; New York: Routledge, 1997, p. 10.

⁴²⁰ Akarlı, Engin Deniz, ―The Tangled Ends of an Empire: Ottoman Encounters with the West and Problems of Westernization—an Overview‖, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 26.3 (2006), p. 362.

Fatma Müge Göçek analyzes the making of Turkish modernity as a class formation. Discussing and criticizing the Marxist and Weberian interpretations of class formation, she establishes that, ―(i)n the context of Ottoman Empire, the Marxian and Weberian analyses help identify three significant elements of Ottoman social change: households as the unit of analysis, the sultan and the state as the significant social actor, and war and commerce with the West as the external catalyst.‖⁴²¹ She constructs a dichotomy between what she calls the ―commercial bourgeoisie‖ and the ―bureaucratic bourgeois‖. Without discussing the reliability of her label ―bureaucratic bourgeoisie‖ (a term which is an oxymoron), she explains the demise of the empire by pointing to the failure of the two social clusters to co- opt. For Göçek, these two social clusters felt apart because the bureaucratic bourgeoisie was predominantly Muslim/Turkish and the commercial bourgeoisie was predominantly non-Muslim. For Göçek, the bifurcation and polarization of the two segments became apparent in the late Hamidian regime and the polarization ended with the tragic collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of the nation-states founded with blood and iron. In Göçek‘s account, the culpability for the emergence of this polarization belongs to the Young Turks.⁴²² It is important to highlight that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie of Göçek had already seeded the mentality of the Young Turks. In a way, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie of the Hamidian era was already concerned with the question of how to deal with the non- Muslim commercial bourgeoisie. The motivations of the Hamidian ―bureaucratic bourgeoisie‖ were in accord with the coming generation sharing the same concerns with their successors. In fact, they were not only non-bourgeois, but also disturbed by the emerging commercial bourgeois which was predominantly non-Muslim. For this particular reason, the Ottoman state aimed to establish and promote a Muslim entrepreneurial class as well as Muslim professionals whom the state perceived as reliable and loyal, and

⁴²¹ Göçek, Fatma Müge, Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p.18.

⁴²² Göçek uses the memoirs of Mehmed Reşid to illustrate the changing and radicalizing tone of the Turkish/Muslim community (pp. 134-37). It is important to remember that Mehmed Reşid was the governor of Diyarbekir during the massacres of 1915 and was one of the most wanted perpetrators of the Armenian massacres. His extremely xenophobic and brutal tone cannot be taken as indicative of his generation.

established several agricultural, industrial, and commercial schools as well as schools of veterinary medicine and pharmacology.⁴²³ The state elite of the Hamidian era‘s vision of politics was centered on the well-being and security of the state. The macro-understanding of state politics which relates the interests of the state to the interests of the society and social forces was lacking in the Hamidian elite. Its reflexes derived from its class formation welded around a state. For that reason, it envisioned a class of entrepreneurs and professionals loyal to the state and not posing a threat to the state as opposed to entrepreneurs and professionals alienated from and adverse to the state. The Hamidian state elite conceptualized the interests of the state in contradistinction to the interests of the non- state actors, especially when the non-state actors were at the same time non-Muslim and therefore unreliable and even treacherous.

One of the crucial dynamics which set the ground for the Hamidian autocracy to emerge and to consolidate itself was the fear of the Tanzimat state elite of the rise of the non-Muslim bureaucrats. With the Reform Edict of 1856, public service was opened to non-Muslims. By the 1860s, the non-Muslims were beginning gradually to be promoted.⁴²⁴ Musurus Pasha was the first non-Muslim to hold the title of pasha. Non-Muslims were admitted to the Supreme Council (Meclis-i Vala) and later to the Council of State (Şuray-ı Devlet), established in 1868 and organized as the legislative organ of the Empire.⁴²⁵ The rise of the non-Muslims in the bureaucracy and the inevitability of the increasing presence and prominence of the non-Muslims within Ottoman statecraft with the supposedly hidden destructive agenda of the non-Muslims created questions in the minds of the state elite.⁴²⁶ The personal autocracy of Abdülhamid enabled the circumvention of the non-Muslims and avoided the interference of the rising non-Muslim threat within the government. The

⁴²³ For the observations of Eşref Albatı, one of the earliest military veterinary graduates, see Albatı, Eşref, Hatıraları, İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi,1945, pp. 16-17.

⁴²⁴ For the lists of the members of the Meclis-i Vala and the gradually increasing percentage of non-Muslisms appointed in the 1860s after the appointments of Logofet Bey and Mihran Bey in 1864-1865 (H. 1282), see Seyitdanlıoğlu, Mehmet, Tanzimat Devrinde Meclis-i Vala (1838-1868), Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1994, pp. 202-218.

⁴²⁵ Shaw, Stanford J. & Shaw, Ezel Kural, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 2002, v. II, p. 80.

⁴²⁶ For example, see Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Ma‟ruzat, İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1980, p. 2.

number of non-Muslims and their promotions were restrained during the Hamidian rule although the number of non-Muslim officials continued to increase exponentially.⁴²⁷ The imperial prerogative served as the assurance of the preponderance of the Muslim character of the polity and the bureaucracy. It was the presence of the sultan and his title as ―caliph‖ which were the hallmarks of the Muslim (and tacitly Turkish) character of the polity. In short, Abdülhamid‘s personal autocracy resembled a coup in a situation in which elite interests could not be protected unless a deus ex machina was asked to intervene. Although Abdülhamid‘s autocracy partially eliminated a certain cabal, it was not simply a takeover of power from the Tanzimat bureaucracy given that the Tanzimat bureaucracy‘s institutional capacity and institutionalization had deepened and been strengthened. The Hamidian takeover may be regarded as a half-conscious strategy of the Tanzimat officials to counter the new realities. ―Fine tuning was concerned in the first degree with the power elite, the men who formulated and applied policy. Even as autocratic a sultan as Abdülhamid II, who was in effect the last real sultan of the empire, had to rely on a staff who fed him information, advised him, and indeed influenced him. So, the so-called ‗Red Sultan‘  who rarely left his palace, and never left his capital, depended on these men(.)‖⁴²⁸

With the 1870s, as discussed above, a reaction to the Reform Edict and to the new conditions triggered by that document was in the air. ⁴²⁹ Since the Reform Edict, trust in the Tanzimat reformism had eroded drastically. The autocracy of Abdülhamid was the only viable and optimum solution to the discomfort felt by the state elite in restructuring the Ottoman state to evade mounting European pressure and the troublesome non-Muslim clamor. Hamidian modernization was an example of ―controlled modernization‖ as an

 

 

 

⁴²⁷ Kırmızı, Abdülhamid, ibid, p.60; Ortaylı, İlber, ―II. Abdülhamid Devrinde Taşra Bürokrasisinde Gayrımüslimler‖, in Sultan II. Abdülhamid ve Devri Semineri, İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1994, pp. 161-71.

⁴²⁸ Deringil, Selim, The Well-Protected Domains, London: I.B. Tauris, 1998, p. 10.

⁴²⁹ For the severe opposition of Mustafa Reşid Pasha, the architect of the Rescript of Tanzimat, to the Rescript of Islahat based on his anxieties concerning the increasingly privileged role of the non-Muslims and its possible repercussions, see Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Tezakir, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991, vol I, pp. 75-82.

alternative to the uncontrolled modernization of the liberal Tanzimat.⁴³⁰ In short, the Hamidian era was a fine tuning which adjusted the Ottoman state machine against the newly rising and encroaching threats, whether merely perceived or real.

 

 

 

2.6.         Governance versus Politics: On the Social and Political Cosmology of the Tanzimat Bureaucratic World

 

Another issue that has to be highlighted is the lack of political space in the 19^th century Ottoman Empire. Politics may be defined as ―judgments and proposals for the conducting of matters of governance and society‖, whereas ―governance‖ may be defined as the

―application of the expert and decided policies.‖ Politics a priori assumes that there are equally legitimate alternative ways of addressing and resolving problems. Governance by contrast presupposes that the means to deal with the problems is a matter of technicality. It may be argued that the Tanzimat denied any legitimate role to politics.⁴³¹ Not distinct from the classical Islamic notion that was apprehensive of fitna (sedition), politics was perceived as divisive and corrupting. While the Young Turks, like the Young Ottomans preceding them, challenged the rule of Abdülhmid, they did not oppose him on political grounds.⁴³² They accused Abdülhamid of mismanagement of the state and of treachery. For them, Abdülhamid was betraying the supreme interests of the Ottoman polity, which was assumed to be monolithic, fixed, and identifiable. Abdülhamid departed from serving the metaphysical Ottoman polity and cared only about his own interests and throne. Thus,

⁴³⁰ For an impressive assessment of the Hamidian modernization, see Akarlı, Engin Deniz, The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and. Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdülhamid II (1876-1909), unpublished dissertation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976,

⁴³¹ See Findley, Carter Vaughn, ―The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East (Part I)‖, Studia Islamica, No. 55 (1982), pp. 143-169; Findley, Carter Vaughn, ―The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East (Part II)‖, Studia Islamica, No. 56 (1982), pp. 147- 180.

⁴³² For a discussion of the prevalence of Islamic notions in the thought of Young Turks such as Abdullah Cevdet and Ahmed Rıza, see Mardin, Şerif, Continuity and Change in the Ideas of the Young Turks, İstanbul: Robert College, 1969, pp.23-27.

Abdülhamid‘s reign was not legitimate for these reasons. The Young Turks claimed to defend the genuine interests of the Ottoman polity, which was facing the grave danger of partition and dissolution. Although they did not aim to introduce ―politics‖ and replace it with ―governance‖, it was the Young Turks who had unintentionally crashed the notion of the legitimacy of governance and introduced politics after the 1908 Revolution.⁴³³ It was the strikingly new conditions of 1908 that had imposed the introduction of ―politics‖. The Revolution of 1908 opened new channels for the democratization of the political sphere not in terms of procedures, but in terms of the emergence of a new legitimacy based on the masses (and political programs and manifestos) instead of on elite bargaining and compromises, especially observable in Armenian and other non-Muslim communities.⁴³⁴

The ideological assumption that politics was fitna and therefore evil and illegitimate does not mean that there was no politics. On the contrary, although not recognized as a legitimate activity, the deeds of the leading Tanzimat figures and the prerogatives of Abdülaziz and Abdülhamid were all acts of politics. The impetus behind these acts was clearly political concerns. Some concerns were related to the domestic inter-elite struggles and some others were strategies developed as responses to international developments. In many cases, international and domestic concerns were indistinguishable and cannot be taken into consideration in isolation. However, a conceptualization based on the understanding of differentiation of ideas and the equal legitimacy of varying opinions was non-existent due to the lack of a legacy similar to the European religious wars, which gave birth to an at first reluctant and gradually internalized respect for or at least recognition of

 

⁴³³ Carter Findley discusses the same development with regard to the advent of ideology. Findley claims that it was the Young Ottomans that had introduced the notion of ideology but only partially due to their strong allegiance to traditional Islamic thought. For Findley, whatever the limits of the Young Ottomans‘ vision of ideology, their impact was remarkable. Findley, Carter Vaughn, ―The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East (Part II)‖, Studia Islamica, No. 56 (1982), pp. 147-180. For a discussion of the role of ideology, also see Türköne, Mümtaz‘er, İslamcılığın Doğuşu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991.

⁴³⁴Kansu, Aykut, Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey, 1908-1913, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992; Kayalı, Hasan, Young Turks and Arabs, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997; Prator, Sabine, Der Arabische Faktor in der Jungtürkischen Politik, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1993.

alternative beliefs and opinions.⁴³⁵ Politics were yet to become legitimate in the late Ottoman Empire.

The Hamidian regime may be defined as an amalgamation of the institutionalization of a modern bureaucratic state under the supervision of a semi-aristocratic and patriarchal polity. The Hamidian bureaucracy was a loyalist bureaucracy, not necessarily loyal to the persona of the sultan, but loyal to the Ottoman polity, its image, its representations, and its ideal. Loyalty to the sultan was one of the indispensable and fundamental components of the Ottoman polity as the sultan‘s personality embodied and symbolized the integrity and immortality of the empire. In such a complex organization, the role of the sultan was pivotal. The office of the sultan was indispensable not because there was consensus over the legitimacy and efficiency of the system, but because there was no viable and promising alternative to it, not unlike the Habsburg monarchy in the perception of the German- speaking bureaucracy or in the perception of the Russian bureaucracy. The presence of the sultanic authority also excluded politics from the legitimate sphere of governance. Moreover, there would be no transcendentalization of the governing elite and the social internalization of the inherent superiority of the governing elite in the absence of the sultan and his metaphysical aura. Allegiance to the sultan meant allegiance to the class itself. Of course, the Turkish and Muslim (and caliphal) identity of the sultan established the ethnic and confessional nature of the imperium as well. Therefore, this was a class identity embedded in confessional and (to a certain extent) ethnic identities. In Marxian terms, this was class consciousness rather than a false consciousness.

It is also noteworthy to note that Engin Deniz Akarlı, one of the leading authorities on the Hamidian bureaucracy, suggests that the highest echelons of the Hamdian bureaucracy were an exception to the impressive professionalization and structuring of the lower and middle echelons. Akarlı writes that, ―other contradictions that embittered these young bureaucrats were related to the politicized nature of the upper reaches of the Ottoman officialdom. Each pasha was at once an administrative expert and a political figure, susceptible to the influence of different interest groups. Petitioning, persuasion, shared profits, and bribery were among the means available to influence a pasha's decision; the

⁴³⁵ On the ―birth of tolerance‖, see Zagorin, Peter, How the Idea of Religious Tolerance Came to the West, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.

nature of the business at hand as well as the personality and current power of the pasha in question determined the means chosen.‖⁴³⁶ For Akarlı, the critical function of Abdülhamid was to be the supreme arbiter between the pashas. Nevertheless, Abdülhamid‘s job was not easy. ―For one thing, he was openly afraid of the pashas' proven ability to seat and unseat sultans; for another, he believed that it was ‗the royal fountain of favor‘ that produced "the best harvest on the field of sovereignty.‖⁴³⁷ Of course, the arrogance and pettiness of the pashas does not mean that the Ottoman polity was mere the preserve of pashas for their corruption and plunder. On the contrary, it was a metaphysical entity in which pashas felt at ease and embodied the social and political cosmology of a certain mindset.

It was Şerif Mardin who first demonstrated that the thought of Young Ottomans in particular and the Tanzimat in general could not be understood without taking the Islamic worldview and Islamic visions of political and social order into account. Young Ottoman thought was very much molded within this mental/ideological formation. The Young Ottomans showed an intense ―concern for the welfare of the Islamic community.‖⁴³⁸ On the other hand, Selim Deringil showed that the Hamidian state policy displayed a more secular and utilitarian stance employing Islamic concerns for other political ends. In the words of Reinkowski, the Tanzimat aimed at ―the institution of a secular foundation for state ideology, but through the use of Islamic vocabulary and ideological tools. After having sifted a great amount of documents it seems rather that the Ottoman routine bureaucratic correspondence during the Tanzimat period shows, if anything, a kind of secularized ‗Islamic‘ vocabulary.‖⁴³⁹ He further argued that;

⁴³⁶ Akarlı, Engin Deniz, ―The Tangled Ends of an Empire: Ottoman Encounters with the West and Problems of Westernization—an Overview‖, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 26.3 (2006), p. 363. Also see İrtem, Süleyman Kani, Sultan Abdülhamid ve Yıldız Kamarillası, İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2003.

⁴³⁷ Akarli, Engin Deniz, …, p. 363

⁴³⁸ For a perfect demonstration of the role and meaning of Islam in the classical age, see Crone, Patricia, Medieval Islamic Political Thought, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005.

⁴³⁹ Reinkowski, Maurus, ―The State‘s Security and the Subjects‘ Prosperity: Notions of Order in Ottoman Bureaucratic Correspondence (19th Century)‖, in Legitimizing the Order, Hakan Karetepe, & Maurus Reinkowski (ed.), Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2005, p.199.

―At the heart of the Tanzimat political idiom it is a state ideology of order cum prosperity. Central to it is the term asayiş (public order, public tranquility; repose, rest). Similar to it, but more narrowly referring to the technical production of security is emniyet (safety, freedom from fear, security; confidence, belief; the police, the law). Security is granted by the state to its subjects, but the state is entitled in recompense to the subjects' complete obedience. The immediate outcome and positive product of as- vvi,s- is prosperity, expressed by the terms rahat (ease, rest, comfort, tranquility) or istirahat and refah (easy circumstances, comfort, luxury, affluence). The term refah is based on the general notion of mülkün ma‟murluğu (flourishing condition, prosperity) which seems nothing else than the Roman salus publica (public wealth) in an Ottoman disguise. Prosperity, hand in hand with security, will be of maximum benefit to the state's and society's order⁴⁴⁰….The official announcements of the Tanzimat stressed the quest for enlightened state policy and sought a new basis on which to legitimize the rule of the central power over the polity. However, the standard terminology of the bureaucracy stuck closer to the traditional concepts of order. All the images and terms that have been discussed to this point were in use not only in the early Tanzimat period but also in the later phases which started with the second reform rescript of 1856 and were to be enforced even in the empire's most remote provinces. New concepts central to the Tanzimat ideology did not supersede old concepts but only supplemented them, e.g., the confessionally neutral kb' a which could be applied to all subjects of the Ottoman state coexisted with the representation of the Christian people as members of the "flock" (re` aya). Tanzimat rhetoric and political terminology remained deeply embedded in the traditional Ottoman imagination of a perfect order and society.‖⁴⁴¹

 

This does not mean that Tanzimat remained within the premodern and traditional cosmology. On the contrary, gradually the Tanzimat figures learnt and adapted the modern political and social discourses and visions. These two cosmologies do not exclude each other. Based on the aforementioned premises, the Hamidian bureaucracy blended the traditional Islamic Ottoman political and social cosmology with the modern cosmology and institutionalized it. In this regard, Hamidian institutionalization of the bureaucracy sealed the perimeters of Turkish modernity. The Hamidian bureaucracy, considerably institutionalized and enlarged by the 1890s as an interest group which could influence (although not shape) the forging of the modern Ottoman polity was also compatible with their interests as individuals and as an interest group. This was an internalized and intimate state meaningful within a certain social and political cosmology. In this perception, the

⁴⁴⁰ Reinkowski, Maurus, ..., p. 200.

⁴⁴¹ Reinkowski, Maurus, …, p. 204.

nation was defined in reference to the state which was perceived within a cultural prism. The nation was to be submissive to the imperial state which represented the nation in it. This state also internalized the habitus of this state elite. Therefore, the ―nation‖ was imagined in line with the habitus, cultural formations, and premises of this state elite. The state was reified as long as it served as the embodiment of this habitus and become its disseminator.⁴⁴² Thus, the Turkish nation was imagined ―secular‖ and ―modern‖ as opposed to ―backward‖ and ―pious‖.

 

 

 

2.7.      The Enigma and Spirit of Tanzimat in the Eyes of Western Beholders

 

The Western perceptions of the Tanzimat and the Tanzimat men may be insightful for us to identify the patterns in which the ―new men‖ of Tanzimat were depicted and enable us to imagine the nature of the state elite of the Tanzimat and Hamidian periods. The Westerners‘ accounts perceived and interpreted the course of the 19th century Ottoman Empire entirely with regard to the developments in the Ottoman state apparatus. This narrative was ―statist‖ in the sense that the state was assumed to be the sole determinative actor in the flow of history and historical development.⁴⁴³ The Western interest was focused upon this supposedly omnipotent actor. They were interested in the reformation of the cruel Muslim institution called the Ottoman state. The Tanzimat, which was identified simply as ―reform‖ in the western accounts, constituted the central theme of the historical narrative. The disagreements among various accounts revolved around two questions: the

 

 

 

⁴⁴² For an impressive analysis of the familiar and intimate relation established by the people and by the bureaucracy, see Herzfeld, Michael, Cultural Intimacy, London; New York: Routledge, 1997.

⁴⁴³ For a balanced evaluation of the Tanzimat with pro-Turkish leanings, see Engelhardt, Turquie et le Tanzimat ou Historie des Reforms Dans L‟Empire Ottoman, Paris, 1882. Engelhardt portrayed the 19^th century Ottoman transformation as reformism and reorganization enacted by the state for reasons of state. Engelhardt focused specifically on the administrative and organizational reforms. However, he emphasized that this was not a technical process, but an ideological/mental decision and breakthrough.

degree of successfulness of the reforms and the sincerity of the reformers.⁴⁴⁴ With

―reform‖, they implied the Ottoman state‘s reorganization but also more importantly its evolving/emerging new mentality. Thus, the term ―reform‖ was associated more with a mental change of the Muslim ruling elite of the Ottoman Empire than a technical/organizational change.

So, here in these accounts we encounter not a Weberian legal/bureaucratic state, but a state governed by ideological concerns and ambitions. Here, the ideology determines the nature of the state, not vice versa. That is, these accounts assume an idealist theory of state and history. These accounts supposed that by understanding the dominant mentality of the ruling Muslim elite, they could grasp the nature of the Ottoman state. The Ottoman state was merely an embodiment of the ideological and mental disposition of the Muslim ruling elite.

It may be also claimed that these accounts did not specifically explore the ideological dispositions of the Ottoman elite (Islamism, liberalism, et cetera) but attempted to trace the intentions and good will of the Ottoman state as an abstraction. The critical question they had endeavored to decipher was if the Ottoman state had (inherently) ―good‖ or ―evil‖ intentions.

The western accounts had a very idealistic conceptualization of state of affairs. They discussed the political situation and developments in terms of ―good‖ or ―bad‖, or within the Christian value system, in terms of ―good‖ and ―evil‖. This is obviously not unexpected given that most of the accounts were written by the evangelical Protestant missionaries. However, the accounts of non-missionaries (diplomats, journalists, et cetera) were not very different. This is because the English observers especially revealed an intense Protestant devotion and commitment which guided the formation of their worldviews.⁴⁴⁵ There were two levels of ―idealizations‖ within this discourse. The first level was with regard to the

⁴⁴⁴ For example, David Urquart, the foremost Turcophile, in his effort to convince skeptics regarding the sincerity of Turkish reformism wrote that, ―all Turks nowadays exhibited

‗the strongest desire of instruction and respect for our customs and institutions.‘ ‖ Cunningham, Alan, Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century, London, Portland: Cass, 1993, vol II, p. 73.

⁴⁴⁵ The most important name whose worldview and political commitments were shaped by Protestant evangelism was definitely Stanford Canning. To understand his worldview, see the collection of his essays, Eastern Question, John Murray, 1881.

―essential nature‖ of the reforming Ottoman state, whether it was essentially blameless and innocent, determined to get rid of its unspeakable sins of yesteryear, or was it the old sinister and deceitful Ottomans posing as if reforming in order to deceive ―civilized nations‖. The second level concerned the extent of success of reforms if it was assumed that Ottomans were sincere in their endeavors. The accounts rated the level of ―purity‖ of the Ottoman state in terms of its success in its reformism. The more it was found

―reformist‖, the more ―benevolent‖ it was. It is worth noting that even the word ―reform‖ itself was a religious/Protestant concept and refers to a spiritual rebirth purifying the soul from degeneration and sinister corruptions, sins, and vices. Here, ―reform‖ did not imply the connotation the word gained in later times (gradual and modest transformation as opposed to a radical transformation), but on the contrary implied a strong commitment to complete transformation. This approach apparently reflected a Christian/Protestant worldview.

It is also important to bear in mind that the 19th century accounts were speaking of

―national traits‖ and ―national characters‖. As one ethnicity/nation/race might have round cheeks, narrow foreheads, and tough faces, they might be also sly, treacherous, hospitable, or quiet. These ―national characteristics‖ in fact reflected the moral judgments objectified by attributed national characteristics. These alleged characteristics might not necessarily be entirely good or entirely evil but in the amalgam of these attributes, authors revealed their sympathies and antipathies towards different ―races‖⁴⁴⁶. In various traveler accounts of Ottoman lands, some sympathized with Greeks and despised Armenians, whereas other travelers boosted Bulgarians and scorned Serbians.⁴⁴⁷ It is as if all the authors had their

⁴⁴⁶ For some obvious examples of attributing certain traits to certain ethnicities, among many other, see Mrs. Fanny Janet Blunt and Stanley Lane Poole, The People of Turkey: Twenty Years‟ Residence Among Bulgarians, Greeks, Albanians, Turks and Armenians, John Murray, 1878, 2 volumes; Reid, John, Turkey and the Turks Being the Present State of the Ottoman Empire, Robert Tyas & Paternoster Raw, 1840; Pardoe, Julia, The City of Sultan and the Domestic Manners of the Turks, 1862. For a study on the Russian observer‘s perceptions of the ―Persian‖, see Andreeva, Elena, Russia and Iran in the Great Game: Travelogues and Orientalism, London; New York: Routledge, 2007.

⁴⁴⁷ Because Armenians inhabit poor and inaccessible mountainous regions, display an authentic and uncorrupted pure version of Christianity, and possess a noble savage image, Armenians were the most sympathetic group. Armenians were the group most open to Protestant missionary propaganda, whereas Greeks were subjects of the strong and

―favorite races‖ among others which they observed as humble, trustworthy, hard-working, et cetera in contrast to other ―races‖ sinister, untrustworthy, and pernicious. Similarly, all these writers developed their opinions of Turks and their national traits, some high, some low, some very low.⁴⁴⁸ Apparently, different from the ―subject races‖, Turks were the

―master race‖, and therefore appraisal of the Turks could not be done without making statements about Ottoman rule. Some differentiated between the Turkish populace at large and Ottoman officialdom, and some commented that the differences were only on the surface.⁴⁴⁹ These prejudices (although derived from some factual observation) also influenced their assessment of the capacity of Turks to ―reform‖. They also judged the genuine sincerity of the Turks to reform. If the Turk was to be essentially sinister and treacherous, there would be no reason to believe in the word of the Turk.⁴⁵⁰ Of course, it

authoritarian Greek Patriarchy, which was perceived as a corrupted body. For such sympathetic Armenian accounts, see Tozer, H.P, Turkish Armenia and Eastern Anatolia, London, 1881, Dwight, H.G.O, Christianity in Turkey (A Narrative of the Protestant Reformation in the Armenian Church), London, 1854, Bliss, Edward M, Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities, London, 1896. Hamlin, Cyrus, Among the Turks, London, 1878.

⁴⁴⁸ For very useful documentation, Reinhold Schiffer documents parts of several early 19th century English travel accounts based on the subjects. For the analyses of the ―natural Turk‖ in five accounts (Thornton, Frankland, Madden, Kinneir, Carne, Emerson), see Schiffer, Reinhold, Turkey Romanticized: Images of the Turks in Early 19th Century English Travel Literature, Studienverlag Dr. N. Bockmeyer, 1982. Also see his Oriental Panaroma: British Travellers in 19^th Century Turkey, Rodopi, 1999.

⁴⁴⁹ Edwin Pears distinguishes between the ―private Turk‖ and the public Turk. He writes;

―(T)here was no one among us who hated the Turk as a private man. We all recognised that he had traits of kindliness, simplicity, and generosity which made him lovable. It was only when he was acting as one in authority, and when the damnable spirit of fanaticism took possession of him, that he became a savage beast.‖ Edwin Pears, Forty Years in Constantinople, Herbert Jenkins Limited, 1916, p. 60. Likewise, American journalist and historian William McCracken distinguishes between ―rural Turk‖ and the ―official Turk‖. Whereas the ―rural Turk‖ is hospitable, temperate, considerate, and kind to animals, ―there is, of course, nothing to say in favor of the official Turk.‖ Quoted in Moore, John Hammond, America Looks at Turkey, unpublished dissertation, University of Virginia, 1961, pp. 165-66.

⁴⁵⁰ In the introduction of his book, Sir Charles Eliot relates a story in this fashion. The vali of ―Karakeu‖ after all politeness reveals that he sees all the Christians as swine. The vali says that his father kept saying that all Christians were swine and that as a youth he disagreed with his father. He goes on: ―I thought my father was a fool. But now that my own beard is getting grey - by God, I think the old gentleman was right.‖ Eliot believes that

should be emphasized that these clichés predominantly derived from religious beliefs and premises.

Another  predominant  paradigm  of  these  western  accounts  was  ―liberalism‖.

―Liberalism‖ embedded in these accounts was not an ideology with its 20th century implications and overt political connotations. Although French influence had its impact on the making of liberalism, the 19th century Anglo-Saxon weltanschauung was the primary foundation of 19th century liberalism. This liberalism was not a normative ideology but an expression of a time and space specific perception of social order. The liberalism of the 19th century (beginning with 18th century British political commentators, as well as Adam Smith, who succeeded them) was primarily the belief that with the progression of modern world, more liberties and freedom will make the world a better place.⁴⁵¹ This optimism was less a coherent ideology than a certain mindset and a set of attitudes and beliefs. Although this mindset was necessarily secular and distanced itself from conservatism, it had a strongly embedded religious motivation behind it. Liberalism was also an ethical perspective interpreting political developments in terms of value judgments, such as

―good‖ and ―bad‖. In this regard, liberalism in the eyes of ―liberals‖ was defending the

―good‖, the ―just‖, and the ―right‖ against the ―evil‖ and ―unjust‖. In this perception, the forces of conservatism and ―old mentalities‖ represented the evil. The shining brave new world was against the dark forces of the medieval mind. Therefore, in its assessments and perceptions, 19th century Anglo-Saxon liberalism was the reformed and secularized form of Christianity/Protestantism in the 19th century.⁴⁵² It was the new expression of the Christian/Protestant faith and ideals.⁴⁵³ In other words, liberalism was not a worldly

this anecdote exposes the real nature of the Turkish governing elite under their Western disguise. Sir Charles Eliot, Turkey in Europe, London: Cass & Co. Ltd., 1965, p.14

⁴⁵¹ For an overview of eighteenth century British liberalism, see Patterson, Annabel, Early Modern Liberalism, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1997.

⁴⁵² The word ―whig‖ would be more appropriate for the peculiar version of 19th century British liberalism.

⁴⁵³ Democracy was also seen as the perfection of the Christian/Protestant ideal. Graham Maddox contrasts the 19th and 20th century views of the emergence of Western democracy as follows. ―Whereas the religious influences upon emerging communities were once taken for granted, the very process of secularization required the preservation of religious liberties has in turn produced a climate in which the secular foundations are assumed to be

ideology with a political/economic program, but the political expression of Dissenting Protestantism. With regard to the Ottoman Empire, liberals tended to support or condemn the Ottoman state depending on their theological images and their interpretation of the divine essence of the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁵⁴

The pivotal and complicated problem in all these discussions was the Muslim character of the Ottoman polity. Could a Muslim polity ever be ―good‖? If the answer to this question was affirmative, then the entire Tanzimat was to be perceived as a test of this bold statement⁴⁵⁵. Although an analysis of the numerous accounts would show that most of the accounts tended to answer this question negatively, quiet a number of accounts were optimistic, some for political reasons (seeing Turkey as a political ally against the Russian menace⁴⁵⁶) or for religious reasons (the Christian idea that people are inherently good and act accordingly when the opportunity is given). The Palmerstonian foreign policy of safeguarding the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was launched against the expansionist ambitions of Russia. This Turcophile stance was criticized by many liberals for supporting

the only ones important to modern democracy.‖ Maddox continues; ―(t)his book attempts to reaffirm the essential nature of the religious background to democratic theory.‖ Maddox, Graham, Religion and the Rise of Democracy, London; New York: Routledge, 1996, p. vii. Also for the ―modernity‖ of the evangelical/Protestant inspiration and theology, see Bebbington, D.W, Evangelicalism in Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s, London; New York: Routledge, 1989; Brian Stanley (ed.), Christian Missions and the Enlightenment, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2001.

⁴⁵⁴ For a classic account of the perception of the zealous Dissenting Protestantism towards the infidel and barbarous Turks, see Shannon, Richard, Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation, Archon Books, 1975. The book‘s introduction perfectly illustrates the religious nature and origins of British liberalism.

⁴⁵⁵ ―Can the Koran stretch to this point ?‖ asks ―(o)ne Englishman, looking at the need for regenerating the Ottoman Empire in 1812(.)‖ Cunningham, Allan, ibid, p.99. Stratford Canning was very negative regarding the nature of Islam. He observes that ―(t)he master mischief in this country is dominant religion‖. For him, the prosperity and progress of the Ottoman Empire is ―to be measured by the degree of emancipation from the source of injustice and weakness‖ which is Islam. Ibid, p. 126.

⁴⁵⁶ The foremost advocate of Turkey as a staunch ally against Russia is David Urquart. See his Turkey and its Resources, London, 1833. His extreme Turcophilism (or his Turcomania according to some of his contemporary critics) was scorned and seen as the eccentricity of a crazy man. See Timur, Taner, Osmanlı Çalışmaları, V Yayınları, 1989, pp. 178-181. For an account of the thought and deeds of David Urquart, see Nash, Geoffrey, From Empire to Orient: Travellers to the Middle East 1830-1926, I.B. Tauris, 2005, pp. 43-73.

and buttressing Muslim oppression of the Christian rea‟ya. For these opponents of the policy, the Christian rea‟ya would prefer their co-religionist Russians vis-a-vis the Ottomans.⁴⁵⁷ The counter-argument argued that Turks were less oppressive than the Russians and furthermore that Turks were reforming with a tremendous zeal. Therefore, Turkey was by now a much better polity, and the old Turkish brutality was about to end for good soon⁴⁵⁸. In fact, throughout the 19^th century, the British political scene was characterized with the struggle between the Turcophil conservatives versus skeptical liberals (who represent different confessional and theological constituencies).

It is also noteworthy that the same word in English (reform) had two possible translations into Turkish with diverging connotations. Both ―Tanzimat‖ and ―Islahat‖ were referring to the same concept in the English political/theological vocabulary: Reform. In Ottoman political terminology, ıslahat (reform) referred to reforms addressing the rights of the Ottoman Christians whereas tanzimat (reorganization) implied the reorganization of the Ottoman state within the age-old, intra-Muslim world. Whereas ―tanzimat‖ was espoused unanimously by the bureaucracy, ―ıslahat‖ encountered fierce opposition, including Mustafa Reşid Pasha.⁴⁵⁹ For the Tanzimat bureaucracy, ―tanzimat‖ was ―necessary‖ and

―good‖, and therefore it had to be undertaken immediately and seriously whereas ıslahat was secondary, irrelevant, and even treacherous. Such differentiation was irrelevant for the Christian/Western observers of Ottoman reform for whom the gist of the matter was the amelioration of the sufferings of the Ottoman Christians. Within this perspective, the reorganization of the Ottoman state was a means to improve the conditions of the Christians. Amelioration of the life conditions of the Christians was perceived as the

 

 

⁴⁵⁷ Richard Cobden, the arch-liberal, pacifist, and strongest opponent of the pro-Ottoman policy in the parliament, said ―If I were a rajah I should prefer a Russian government rather than a Mohamedan one.‖ To this statement, Palmerston responded with saying that Cobden was ―greatly misinformed as to the state of Turkey for the last thirty years.‖ praising the advancements achieved by the Tanzimat. Cunningham, Allan, ibid, p. 214.

⁴⁵⁸ Cunningham, Allan, Eastern Question in the Nineteenth Century, London, Portland: Frank Cass, 1993, v. II, pp. 67-8.

⁴⁵⁹ For the notice of Mustafa Reşid Pasha against the Rescript of Islahat, see Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, Tezakir, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1953, v. I, pp. 75-85.

principal criterion measuring the level of the success of the ―Ottoman reform‖.⁴⁶⁰ These diverging perspectives caused misunderstanding between the two parties.

The assumption in these accounts was that the Ottoman state was the only agent of Ottoman political development. The will of the omnipotent Ottoman state was to determine the prospects of the Ottoman lands and the miserable Ottoman Christians. The litmus test of Ottoman goodwill was its commitment to ―reform‖. Reform was associated with all the good deeds. All the other issues were derivatives of reform with a capital R. The ―reform‖ requires the ―will‖ of the Ottoman leadership and also the technical/administrative capability of the Ottoman leadership. Both sympathetic and unsympathetic observers of the 19th century Ottomans make the observation that whatever the efforts of the leadership may be, the execution of the reform encounters severe problems.⁴⁶¹ There were different and varying arguments brought up by the observers who acknowledged the limitations of the reform. Some spoke about the lack of modern, technical knowledge. Some pointed out the financial inadequacy of the empire. Some others who preferred more ideological reasoning for the partial failure of the reform indicated the discrepancy between the visions and mentalities of the ruling central elite and the conservative provincial administrators and officials. For these observers, although there was an enlightened and determined leadership in Constantinople which was anxious to endorse liberal/western governance, the local officials were subscribing to the old, despotic oriental mind. This assumption was one of the most overt clichés of the paradigm of westernization which contrasts the enlightened few of the leadership with the ignorant and barbaric unenlightened oriental flock. In this assumption, with the emanation of the new enlightened ideas from the privileged few to the lower cadres of government and to the bulk of the Muslim populace, the transformation of

⁴⁶⁰ Davison, Roderick, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 6. Also see Iseminger, Gordon Llewellyn, Britain‟s Eastern Policy and the Ottoman Christians, 1856-1877, unpublished dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1965.

⁴⁶¹ A very sympathetic and optimistic account is by Ubicini, H.A, Etat Present de L‟Empire Ottoman, Paris, 1876. For a work very unsympathetic to the reforms of early Tanzimat, see Macfarlane, Charles, Turkey and its Destiny, Lea and Blanchard, 1850. Also for a severe criticism of Mahmud II‘s reform, see Slade, Adolphus, Records of Travels in Turkey, Greece, etc. and of a Cruise in the Black Sea with Capitan Pasha in the Years 1829, 1830, and 1831, London: Saunders and Otley, 2005, 2 volumes.

the Ottoman Empire will be completed. Given the small possibility of a mental transformation on such a scale, the western observers feel obliged to admit that the enlightened views of the leadership are not enough as long as the bulk of the officials retain oriental despotic worldviews.

As stated above, without developing a Weberian state theory of post-Holocaust 20th century, the western observers perceived the Ottoman state (as any other ―state‖) as the embodiment of a certain mentality and will of the ruling elite. In other words, the state was for them a matter of ―mentality‖. It was a mere reflection of the minds of the people holding the commanding positions. The western accounts observed that the emanation of this ―idea‖ could not be achieved by decree. This was a problem given that the Muslim masses and provincial petty officials continued to be ―fanatics‖ regardless of the intentions of the Tanzimat bureaucrats. The ―idea‖ had to be disseminated to be effective. Therefore, the ―old Turks‖ of all levels have to be eliminated, marginalized, sidelined, or transformed. As stated above, this line cannot be explained by reducing it to a modernist paradigm. This approach is also ―ethical‖. It perceives a struggle between ―good‖ and ―bad‖. We should bear in mind that in the 19th century, western supremacy was associated with Christian ideals, especially when encountering the non-Christian world.

Another major point that has to be emphasized is the dynamics of international relations and politics shaping the development of these clichés, prejudices and assumptions. Apparently, the sympathetic discourses developed by British and Franch authors towards the Ottomans derived from the fact that the Ottoman Empire was an ally of the British- French axis against the Russians.⁴⁶² With the dying out of this alliance and the failure of

⁴⁶² On the birth of Turcophilism in the establishment circles of Britain and its association with the championing of reformism in the Ottoman Empire, Alan Cunningham notes that

―(Turcophiles) during the rest of the 1830s....banished the traditional and picturesque impressions of the barbaric pageantries of old Turkey, and gave the Sultan‘s empire a new image and a new importance  (T)hey were Turcophiles who set out to show that common

problems confronted states, and that while the Ottoman Empire rather lagged behind other countries in dealing with these, there was no inherent reason why her rulers should not solve them successfully, given the time and the guidance. A rejuvenated Ottoman Empire would be a logical friend for Britain, she would stay the Russian penetration of central Asia, and consequently check the tsarist threat to the security of British India (.) Cunningham, Alan, ibid, p. 67. As seen clearly, the thrust of the Turcophile argument is that the Turk is not the unchanging barbarous and imprudent man. On the contrary, he is as

the Ottoman treasury to pay its debts to its English and French creditors in 1875, the English and French accounts will also change.⁴⁶³ The accounts written after the waning of Tanzimat were more critical and mistrustful of the Ottoman reformation. Around that time, the image of the unreconstructed barbaric character of the Ottomans made a sudden comeback. This is very understandable because as the Ottoman Empire lost its stance in the 19th century ethical battle to be placed on the side of the ―good‖ against the ―evil‖. By departing from the British-French axis, the Ottomans began to represent barbarism, bigotry, and the enemies of civilization. Its inadequacies and negative attributes became visible and disturbing in the eyes of the Western observers. The optimism of the early Tanzimat waned after the failure of the enactment of the reforms, and thus the shortcomings of the entire Tanzimat became more apparent in the eyes of the western accounts.⁴⁶⁴

 

 

 

2.8.      “Old Turks”

 

―Old Turks‖ versus ―Young Turks‖ was one of the favorite themes of the western observers of the Ottoman Empire, who felt no need to explain what these labels meant and assumed that they were self-evident. Mordtmann in his 1877 book Stambul und Das

normal as the others and therefore open to improvement and civilization. The British support for peripheral countries very much depends on the reformist zeal of the countries in question. Backing the British was one of the fundamental motivations for the political authorities to reform and empower the reformist party. For the case of Iran, see Bakhash, Shaul, Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy & Reform under the Qajars 1858-1896, London: Ithaca Press, 1978. For the Moroccan case, see Burke, Edmund, Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. In the Persian case, similar to the role they played in the Ottoman Empire, Russia was the chief sponsor of the anti-reformist party, whereas in Morocco, this role was assumed by France and Spain. Although the British ―open door‖ policy was the principal reason for the British championship of reform, the peculiar 19th century evangelical/Protestant liberal ideology of Britain was also a supportive motivation not to be ignored.

⁴⁶³ Clay, Christopher, Gold for the Sultan, London: I.B. Tauris, 2000, pp. 314-331, 544, 550-51.

⁴⁶⁴ For example see Dwight, H, Turkish Life in War Time, London, 1881; Sir Charles Eliot,

Turkey in Europe, London: E. Arnold, 1908.

Moderne Türkenthum⁴⁶⁵ elaborated on the meaning of these categories and criticized the erroneous usage of these categories. Mordtmann noted that westerners used the term

―Young Turks‖ in relation to Young Germany and Young Italy (which were movements with overtly liberal overtones) and understood Junkers when referring to the ―Old Turks‖. Mordtmann wrote that the genuine Old Turks were gone forever after the breakdown of the janissary corps. For Mordtmann, if there were a few of them surviving, they could never form a faction. Mordtmann established that there was no Old Turk party defending their interests fervently as the Junker party was doing in Germany.⁴⁶⁶ The ―Old Turks‖ were a new formation rather than being the unreconstructed remnants of the old guard and representing an old class. For Mordtmann, the Old Turks were conservative in the sense that they defended the autocracy in its existing form. The principal motivation of ―Old Turks‖ was to avoid foreign interference as much as possible. Here, Mordtmann made an interesting point, arguing that for this reason the Old Turks were keen to satisfy the non- Muslims and maintain good relations with the Western powers. Mordtmann opposed the commonly held view among European observers that Young Turks were preferable to Old Turks.⁴⁶⁷ Mordtmann went further and wrote that, ―Old Turks are with a few exceptions honorable men.‖ For Mordtmann, it was the Young Turks who were radical although he

 

 

⁴⁶⁵ A.D, Mordtmann, Stambul und das Moderne Türkenthum, Verlag Von Duncker & Humblot: Leipzig, 1877.

⁴⁶⁶ ―Old Turk‖ in the romantic 19th century western accounts referred to the oriental man with his turban on his head, sitting on his divan symbolizing the immortal Orient with all its idleness and lack of a concept of time. Mordtmann warns the readers that no such person exists, at least not in Istanbul. Charles MacFarlane, writing in 1850, illustrated the transformation/alteration of the ―Turk‖ vividly . ―The Turks over in Constantinople certainly looked much less like Turks, and were far more civil than in 1828. They were incomparably less picturesque and imposing in their outward appearance....(i)n many cases, it cost me thought and trouble in distinguish between Mussulmen and Rayahs. Twenty years ago, there was no possibility of confounding them; for, even without the then marked distinctions of dress, of head-gear, of boots and papoushes, the Osmanlees were to be known by their swaggering gait, their overbearing looks, and their contemptuous insolent manners.‖ Macfarlane, Charles, Turkey and Its Destiny, Lea and Blanchard, 1850,

p. 41.

⁴⁶⁷ Andreas David Mordtmann, İstanbul ve Yeni Osmanlılar, İstanbul: Pera Yayıncılık, 1999, pp. 153-54.

regarded all the Turks as chauvinists whatever party they belonged to.⁴⁶⁸ To sum up, what distinguished Old and Young Turks for Mordtmann was the methods they employed rather than their mentality. Moreover, because the ―Young Turks‖ were on better terms with modern equipment, they were more capable of realizing their ambitions and hence were more dangerous.

Mordtmann‘s assessment was prophetic. He was exceptional in seeing the complexities and contradictions of modernization in general and Turkish modernization in particular. The fundamental misrepresentation the western accounts held to was to construct the clash between the supposed ―Old Turk party‖ and the ―Young Turk party‖ as constituted with regard to their approaches to Westernization and modernization. This alleged distinction between the Old Turks and Young Turks was illusory and superficial in many ways. While it has a grain of truth in it, this distinction did not reflect a sharply defined ideological antagonism or even a factional division.⁴⁶⁹ The post-World War II Anglo-Saxon historiography was in agreement in calling the men of Tanzimat reformers⁴⁷⁰, but although the term ―reform‖ was in common usage at the time, what was meant by the word ―reform‖ was not always clear. The reformers did not face any apparent antagonistic party of considerable strength before the 1870s. In this regard, ―reform‖ did not imply any political or ideological standpoint, but implied only the concern to undertake administrative and legal changes to render the Ottoman state more efficient, stronger, and better able to respond to the challenges of the modern world (hence, Tanzimat). For

―reformers‖, reform was a technical matter rather than an ideological imperative in the absence of an outspoken opposition organized within the political/bureaucratic sphere. We observe the politicization and factionalization of ―reformism‖ with the1870s as alternative

⁴⁶⁸ ibid, p. 168.

⁴⁶⁹ Family ties and connections were more determining than ideological positions. A striking example of the priority of lineages over ideological stances was exemplified by the active support of Mehmed Bey for his uncle Mahmud Nedim Pasha. Mehmed Bey, a Young Ottoman who fled to Paris in 1865, epitomized the radical wing of the Young Ottomans, published Inkilab seeking a revolution, and personally fought with the Paris Commune publicly advocated the prime ministry of his conservative uncle. See Davison, p.218

⁴⁷⁰ See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence.... p. 127; Roderick Davison, Reform..... p. 81, Niyazi Berkes, The Development… p. 155.

voices within the bureaucracy and political sphere were heard and liberalism had to accompany the reform process.

Western observers were divided in their assessment of the capability of ―old‖ Turks to reform. Throughout the 19^th century, British authors had a tendency toward ―showing a very English respect for the Ottoman governing class‖ and ―constructed indigenous peoples (of the Balkans-DG) through the familiar motifs of chaos, savagery, backwardness, and obfuscation.‖⁴⁷¹ Burnaby, a Turcophile and propagator of support for the Ottoman Empire against the Russian aggression just before the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War, saw Turks as a race capable of governing, even governing Christians after the ―cadi‘s law‖ was abrogated given that this law, as Burnaby emphasized, does not accept the testimony of a Christian. Burnaby‘s sympathy for and confidence in the ―Turk‖ increased, especially after he encountered the unruly and savage Kurds in East Anatolia.⁴⁷² Although others were dubious of the ability of the ―Turk‖ to govern, they still respected the remarkable characteristics of the ―Turk‖. Mark Sykes, who travelled throughout Anatolia and Arab lands, observed the ―rule of the Turk‖ and wrote, ―A Turk will understand an Englishman‘s character much sooner than he will an Arab‘s; the latter is so subtle in his reasoning, so quick-witted, so argumentative, and so great a master of language that he leaves the stolid Osmanli amazed and dazed, comprehending nothing. The Turk is not, truth to tell, very brilliant as a rule, though very apt in assuming Western cultivation.‖⁴⁷³ In Edhem Bey, he found a reformist Turk who resolved the Armenian disorders. ―(H)ere the chapter of Zeitun closes, for within three weeks Edhem Pasha, a noble example of what a cultivated Turk can be, arrived on the scene, and with the assistance of the European Consuls concluded an honorable peace with the town(.)‖⁴⁷⁴ In another passage, he expressed his doubts that Turkey could ever be reformed in the grip of financial shortcomings, given the lack of a developed infrastructure and educational opportunities, though these structural limitations

⁴⁷¹ Hammond, Andrew, The Debated Lands: British and American Representations of the Balkans, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2007, p. 5.

⁴⁷² See Burnaby, Fred, On Horseback Throughout Anatolia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 193, pp. 224-26 among many other anecdotes.

⁴⁷³ Sykes, Mark, Dar-ul-Islam : A Record of a Journey Through Ten of the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, London: Darf, 1988, p.64.

⁴⁷⁴ Sykes, Mark, ibid, p. 76.

did not lessen his respect for the ―Turk‖.⁴⁷⁵ Likewise, the war correspondent of the Daily Telegraph in the Balkan Wars wrote, ―We were received on every hand with the greatest courtesy and politeness, the Turk being by instinct the first gentleman in Europe.‖⁴⁷⁶ These western (and indeed very much Anglo-Saxon ) stereotypes are presented to exemplify the complex reception of the ―transformed Turk‖ in the eyes of the western beholders. The personification of the nations was a prevalent theme in 19^th century political writings. The national stereotypes were not limited to distinguishing ethnicities, but also to distinguish between the imagined ―old Turk‖ and the ―young Turk‖. In fact, these supposedly ethnic stereotypes were in effect class-based observations. It was a habit of the 19^th century observers to associate ethnicities with certain class formations. Interestingly, ―the old Turk‖ was generally preferred by the Europeans, and especially by the British, who found their oriental counterpart in the gentlemanliness of the Tanzimat-Hamidian pasha. ―Ghazi Moukhtar.  s a splendid specimen of the old type of Turk(.)‖⁴⁷⁷

Obviously, there was no scientifically defined categorization of the ―old Turk‖. Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, who was an impressive military officer with a Western education, a distinguished professional record, and considerable erudition, turned out to be an ―old Turk‖ in 1913 (the year this account was published) in the reign of the young Turks. Here,

⁴⁷⁵ ―This may sound extraordinary but is nevertheless true so far as my experience carries me. Every Turk I have met who has dwelt for a considerable period in any European country, although never losing his patriotism and deep love for his land, has become in manners, thoughts and habits an Englishman, a German or Frenchman. This leads one almost to suppose that Turks might be Europeanized by an educational process without any prejudicial result, for at present they have every quality of a ruling race except initiative, which is an essentially European quality. Their ardent patriotism is their only incentive; and their intelligence is scarcely sufficient to show them that serving their country as soldiers is not the only duty of citizens. There are few Turks who would not lay down their lives for their country, there are fewer who would save it from internal decay; notwithstanding this, however there are many able and great men in Turkish official circles, but they are paralysed in action by the limited field open to them, and by want of funds and lack of communication. A Kaimakam may improve his Sanjak, a Vali his Vilayet; more than this it is impossible for one individual to do. A Colonel may bring his regiment to a pitch of efficiency, but he cannot organize the War Office, and so it is in Turkey(.)‖ Sykes, Mark, ibid, pp. 64-65.

⁴⁷⁶ Ashmead-Bartlett, Ellis, With the Turks in Thrace, London: William Heinemann, 1913, p.12.

⁴⁷⁷ ibid, p.13.

the label ―old Turk‖ attains an ideological connotation. The Young Turks, with their Prussian and social Darwinian attributes, were disdained by this British correspondent who favored men with whom he can trustingly bargain and compromise. The assumption was that they could collaborate with a Turkey which was governed by a class resembling the British cultural formation (in its social and cultural connotations) and the British governing elite.⁴⁷⁸ That is to say, ―old Turk‖ was not simply a cliché to refer to the ―modernization index‖, but a cultural/political/ideological concept determined by concerns and interests of the states coinciding with the imperatives of international politics. In this study, we are trying to portray this vanished elite dubbed by many Westerners as ―old Turks‖, but without the cultural implications the Westerner accounts maintain, and situate it within a historical framework and historical structure.

 

 

 

2.9.      The Problem of Generations: A Key to the History of the Late Ottoman Empire

?

 

It can be maintained that the world of the Tanzimat could also be understood by taking ideal-type generations into consideration. ―Generation‖ is a concept that seemingly refers to our individual daily lives rather than those lofty social concepts such as ―class‖,

―bureaucracy‖, ―status‖, and ―stratification‖. However, early experiences and particular modes of socializations in particular periods are crucial for the formation and development of individuals and constitutive of pervasive and shared mindsets. Arguably, a person who is a member of a certain generation has more affinity with his coevals than his parents regardless of differences of class, status, et cetera. However, it is also important to point out that a generation does not automatically include any person that is born within a certain time range. Generations are also class-bound. Generation is an ideational and cultural concept. Therefore, generations are exclusive rather than inclusive. For example, Robert

⁴⁷⁸ For the notion of ―cultural formation‖, see Poovey, Mary, Making a Social Body, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. Also see Corrigan, Philip & Sayer, Derek, The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution, Oxford; New York: Blackwell, 1985; Lloyd, David, Thomas, Paul, Culture and the State, London; New York: Routledge, 1998.

Wohl defines the generation of 1914 as follows: ―In early twentieth century Europe generationalists (generation of 1914-DG) were almost always literary intellectuals living in large cities. They were members of a small elite who were keenly aware of their uniqueness and proud of their intellectual superiority. What concerned these writers or would-be-writers was their decline of culture and the waning of vital energies; what drove them together was the desire to create new values and to replace those that were fading; what incited them to action was the conviction that they represented the future in the present(.)‖⁴⁷⁹ Paradoxically the generation of 1914 subsumed all Europe surpassing national borders, but excluded many of the layers and cultural formations of Europe at the same time. Likewise, the Tanzimat generations were also exclusive and inclusive at the same time. In short, generations do matter⁴⁸⁰, and they are not only simplifications and vulgarizations. Generation is a historical category constructed within social and political circumstances rather than a cultural conceptualization. In this regard, some generations are

―more generations‖ than others in the sense that they reveal very particular characteristics differentiating them from others. This is particularly so when history accelerates. Certain time periods witness drastic changes and transformations brought forth by certain generations. It is needles to point out that generation is a modern concept, meaningful only

⁴⁷⁹ Wohl, Robert, The Generation of 1914, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979, p. 5

⁴⁸⁰ Studies of generations are numerous although these studies of generations did not enable the emergence of an established conceptualization of generation as a historical and sociological category. For locating generations within a social framework, see Mannheim, Karl, ―The Problem of Generations‖, in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, London: Routledge & Paul, 1952; Eisenstadt, Shmuel, From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure, London: Routledge, 1956. For a review of studies taking generation as a proper sociological category, see Kertzer, David, ―Generation as a Sociological Problem‖, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 9, (1983), pp. 125-149. For some remarkable studies on certain ―generations‖; see Spitzer, Alan, The French Generation of 1820, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987; Wohl, Robert, The Generation of 1914, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979, Ekstins, Modris, Rites of Spring, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000; Owram, Doug, Born at the Right Time, Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1997. Some generations are ―more generations‖ than others. Both Spitzer and Wohl emphasized the extraordinary and exceptional nature of the generations they studied. Both the French generation of 1820 and the Europe generation of 1914 were revolutionaries and displayed very distinctive features that easily distinguished them from their preceding and succeeding generations.

in the context of the modern age in which time accelerates and the sharp discrepancies between fathers and sons are very easily noticeable.⁴⁸¹ The first Tanzimat generation was arguably the first generation in the course of the Turkish/Ottoman history per se that experienced an intentional and dramatic break from their fathers‘ experiences and intellectual formations. As Wohl points out, ―Historical generations are not born; they are made.‖⁴⁸² The second Tanzimat generation and Hamidian generations were more ―modest generations‖ in terms of their self-consciousness of their own generation and of their displaying the characteristics of a generation. The Young Turk (subsuming the young officials of the late Hamidian era) generation exemplifies a tremendous rejection of the values, codes, and mentalities of their fathers. As pointed out above, generational politics cannot be isolated from social changes and transformations. The reshaping of the class structures and the export of new thoughts gave rise to the emergence of new politics and new cosmologies. For example, Peter Wien illustrates a similar contrast in Iraq in the interwar period. Wien demarcates between the old school ―Sherifian generation‖ of officers in conflict with the coming radical nationalist ―Young Efendiyyah‖ generation sympathetic to Germany and inclined to fascism. Wien defines the Sherifian generation/class as ―regard(ing) themselves as an elite of Arab nationalism. Many of them had received an elevated military education at the Ottoman Staff College in Istanbul and had learned Western languages.  The Sherifian officers had managed to enter the old urban

landholding elite through shady moves in legislation, and thus the old and new urban landlords had the upper hand⁴⁸³.‖ For Wien, the Sherifian officers who turned out to be a

⁴⁸¹ Here, I do not refer to the ―fathers and sons‖ genre. Here, by generation, I understand a rigidly socio-economical formation determined by the conditions of the socio-economic and political realities. Although it is an undeniable fact that the 19th century may be read along the narrative of the revolt of the sons against their fathers, too much emphasis on this aspect of the 19th century would lead us to fail to consider that every generation has established their (strict) code of morality. The image of the hedonistic and dandy son which is prevalent in the Tanzimat literature would lead us to fail to see how slightly refashioned codes of moralities had been reproduced throughout 19th century Ottoman Empire. For a glance at the generational struggle in the Tanzimat, see Parla, Jale, Babalar ve Oğullar, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990.

⁴⁸² Wohl, Robert, ibid, p. 5.

⁴⁸³ Wien, Peter, Iraqi Arab Nationalism : Authoritarian, Totalitarian and Pro-Fascist Inclinations 1932-1941, London; New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 16.

ruling conservative elite had compromised with the landholding Sunni elite. In contrast, the Young Efendiyya were ―educated in the newly established nationalist schooling system...they challenged the ruling elite of the 1920s(.) They were disappointed by the collaboration of the Sherifians with the Mandate Power and by their abuse of power...Instead of the conciliatory and pro-British inclination of the Sherifian elite, the Young Efendiyya absorbed ‗Western Ideas‘ and ideologies as they were transported as translations in the press and on the book market.‖⁴⁸⁴ In short, generations are sets that intersect class, status, social backgrounds and age-groups, and are therefore a crucial social formation themselves.⁴⁸⁵ As argued above, the Hamidian generation represented the apex of the imperial elite at a time when the limits of liberal politics became apparent and the empire was failing to respond to the demands of its constituents. It is no coincidence that in these conditions, the last imperial generation had been crashed by the first generation of the nation. Nevertheless, this last imperial elite cluster was also constitutive of the first and later generations of the nation.

To conclude this chapter, because generations are not solely determined by time, but also by class and socializations, it has to be noted that all these clusters of generations are actually restricted to small elites. In fact, the Tanzimat period constitutes a process of elite- formation and elite-expansion. What we will investigate in the following chapters is an

―intermediate‖ generation that paved the way for the emergence of a new generation that I will call the ―Unionist generation‖. Nevertheless, as argued in the beginning of this chapter, the Tanzimat generation did not die out without leaving a trace. On the contrary,

⁴⁸⁴ Wien, Peter, ibid, p. 16. The case was no different in the Japanese modernization. ―This generation was ‗new‘ relative to the ‗old men of Meiji‘ who had engineered the revolutionary reforms of the Restoration; specifically, they were ‗the first generation of Japanese to attend the new Western-oriented schools of higher learning.‘ Reaching maturity in the decade before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, this generation struggled with the fundamental problem of national identity and of the proper use to be made of the Japanese heritage in the process of modernization.‖ Smith II, Henry Dewitt, Japan‟s First Student Radicals, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, ix. Also see Pyle, Kenneth B, The New Generation in Meiji Japan: Problems of Cultural Identity, 1885-1995, Stanford: Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969.

⁴⁸⁵ For the forging and dissolution of class/status groups in the course of time, see Batatu, Hanna, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

its worldviews, premises, and cultural and intellectual formations made a decisive impact upon the subsequent generations.

 

 

 

CHAPTER III

 

 

PRIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, DIPLOMACY, APPROPIATION OF THE “NEW KNOWLEDGE” AND THE OTTOMAN TRANSFORMATION

 

 

This chapter aims to show how diplomacy emerged as a primary concern of Ottoman statecraft and how this development triggered the appropriation of ―new knowledge‖ which consequently resulted in a new organizational and ideological restructuring of the Ottoman polity. In other words, it suggests the ―primacy of foreign affairs‖ in certain historical conjectures.

 

 

 

3.1.  Discovery of Diplomacy and the Rise of “New Knowledge”

 

Since the formation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1836 as a modern bureaucratic structure replacing the previous scribal service attached to the Office of the Grand Vizierate, the Ministry became a preeminent part of Ottoman statecraft.⁴⁸⁶ Although conducting foreign relations had never been an insignificant business, the increasing impact of international developments on the Empire, growing vulnerability vis-à-vis neighboring major powers such as Russia and Austria, as well as the requisites of the rise of the modern state turned the conduction of foreign relations into a prominent preoccupation of statecraft. Therefore, the Ministry gained an importance of unprecedented levels within the Ottoman establishment. It rose from a secondary position (especially vis- à-vis the military and the ilmiye) within the state to the forefront of Ottoman statecraft. The

⁴⁸⁶ The foundation of the Tercüme Odası in 1821 was also an important milestone in the modernization of the Ottoman Empire which preceded the reorganization of Ottoman foreign policy office.

Ottomans had to play according to the rules of the international game to respond to the immediacy of the international pressure on the Empire.

It may be argued that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the bureaucratic institution that played the most significant role in Ottoman transformation, a role different and more intense than that played by the military, especially after it became evident in the eyes of the state elite that something more fundamental than military prowess was necessary to survive the emerging international challenges. This became apparent after the acknowledgement of the enormity of Russian military might which became evident throughout the disastrous Ottoman-Russian wars in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.⁴⁸⁷ The Russian army had the capacity to mobilize millions of peasants as Ottoman contemporaries observed, and therefore it was literarily unbeatable given Ottoman military capabilities.⁴⁸⁸ The Ottomans suffered severe defeats by the terrifying Russian army in 1774, 1812, and 1829, when Ottoman defenses in Bulgaria collapsed and the Russian army crossed the Balkan mountains and reached as far as Burgas, Aydos, Varna, and even targeted Edirne.⁴⁸⁹

Under such circumstances, no domestic policy could be developed and implemented independent of its international consequences and imperatives. The Ottomans were well aware that they were dependent on and subject to international developments. This was also an opportunity for the Ottomans since exploiting diplomacy and the dynamics of the international balance of power provided them room for maneuver against the otherwise militarily invincible Russians. Especially from 1774 onwards, the Ottomans were cognizant of their retreat and reluctance to act in such an environment. They were obsessed

⁴⁸⁷ For the Russian-Ottoman wars and their impact on the Ottoman establishment, see Aksan, Virginia, Ottoman Wars, New York: Pearson Longman, 2007. For a risaleh of primary importance originally named Hülasat ül Kelam fi Redd il Avam, see Uçman, Abdullah (ed.), Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi, Kervan Yayıncılık, 1974. Also see Aksan, Virginia, ―Ottoman Political Writing, 1768-1808‖, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Feb., 1993), pp. 61-62.

⁴⁸⁸ For the czarist Russian army, see Keep, John, Soldiers of the Czar, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985; Duffy, Christopher, Russia‟s Military Way to the West, London; New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1994.

⁴⁸⁹ Aksan, Virginia, Ottoman Wars, New York: New York: Longman Pearson, 2007, pp. 349-356.

with the efforts to reverse their seemingly inevitable collapse. From 1774 onwards, the prospect of an eventual collapse of the Empire guided a substantial portion of diplomatic as well as domestic policies. The Ottomans knew that they were no more an independent actor in the international arena. The international alignments, rivalries, and aggressions were of primary importance for the prospects of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman establishment acknowledged that its well-being was dependent on a number of overlapping factors. Therefore, they had to accommodate themselves to the world around them.

To accommodate to the new circumstances, they had to import and appropriate the

―new knowledge‖. The ―knowledge‖ to govern, maintain and defend the state was no longer held by the ilmiye class, the prestigious class that held a monopoly and the halo of respectability for possessing the privileged knowledge throughout all the classical age. Although kalemiye rose to prominence within the Ottoman state as early as the eighteenth century (if not earlier), the ilmiye class was at the forefront of the ideological backbone of the state. Certainly, the very critical moment that had brought the sudden decline and marginalization of the ilmiye was the abolition of the janissaries given that the janissary- ilmiye alliance was the fulcrum of the institutional power of ilmiye. With the organization of the new army, the ilmiye retreated from its preeminent position within the power bloc.⁴⁹⁰ Nevertheless, we cannot explain this retreat merely as a consequence of the changing alliance structures. If that were the case, it would be even harder to explain the paradoxical involvement and support of ulema in the destruction of the janissaries. It is possible to conjecture that the ilmiye‟s prestige collapsed suddenly and drastically with the realization that they no longer possessed the superior and relevant knowledge. Islamic knowledge and science were increasingly discredited in the process of the Ottoman encounter with the modern and ―Western‖ sciences  (in the process of military revolution) as their

―knowledge‖ remained irrelevant and impractical.⁴⁹¹ The ulema became sidelined and

⁴⁹⁰ Levy, Avigdor, ―The Ottoman Ulema and the Military Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II‖,

Asian and African Studies, Vol. 7 (1971), pp. 13-39.

⁴⁹¹ Timothy Michell explored the meaning of modernity and the employment of modernity in the non-Western world. In his landmark study, Colonising Egypt, Mitchell argued that the inevitable entrance of the ―new knowledge‖ and ―modern mind‖ brought the collapse of the ―old ways of making things‖ and forced Egypt to submit to the modern discourse and therefore to the penetration of Western imperialism, which holds the monopoly on

marginalized within the new circumstances, and the social-cultural environment in which their knowledge remained was restricted to the private and non-political spheres.⁴⁹²

The holders of the ―technical knowledge‖, who had been recruited for conduction of daily affairs, were elevated from being secondary class auxiliaries to being captains of statecraft. The quality of having the definite skills to lead the ship of state had been taken over by a new group of officials from the kalemiye equipped with positive and pragmatic knowledge distinct from the ―philosophical knowledge‖ the ilmiye maintained. The ilmiye class gave way to a new class which was more compatible and in touch with the new developments (after a period in the late 18^th and early 19^th century in which the prominence of the ulema was at its zenith).⁴⁹³ The 18^th century rise of the kalemiye class, as shown by

modern knowledge. Local ―experts‖ also established their dictatorship based on their monopoly of the ―new knowledge‖. They were the only ones who were familiar with

―making things rationally‖. In ―Rule of Experts‖ Mitchell shows how the modern Egyptian bureaucracy had developed a novel mentality which recreates Egypt in their image and causes the eradication of the old knowledge. Thus, in the argumentation of Mitchell, the local elite of ―experts‖ and the Western imperialists collaborated, and the local experts functioned as the ―compradors of western knowledge‖ adapting the Marxist notion of

―compradorial bourgeoisie‖. Mitchell, Timothy, Colonising Egypt, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991; Mitchell, Timothy, Rule of Experts : Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. Also for the eradication of the effective ―local knowledge‖ by the states and the detrimental effects of states‘ intrusion into the traditional society, see Scott, James, Seeing Like a State, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. For another inspiring essay on the meaning of modern/Western bureaucracy, see Herzfeld, Michael, The Social Production of Indifference: Exploring the Symbolic Roots of Western Bureaucracy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.

⁴⁹² For the 19th century of the Ottoman ulema, see Kara, İsmail, ―Turban and Fez: Ulema as Opposition‖, in Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy, London; New York: Routledge Curzon, Elizabeth Özdalga (ed.), 2005, pp. 162-200; Kushner, David, ―The Place of the Ulema in the Ottoman Empire During the Age of Reform (1839-1876)‖, Turcica, XIX, pp. 51-74; Itzkowitz, Norman & Shinder, Joel, ―The Office of Şeyh ül-Islâm and the Tanzimat: A Prosopographic Enquiry‖, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Jan., 1972), pp. 93-101; Bein, Amit, The Ulema, Their Institutions and Politics in the Late Ottoman Empire (1876-1924), unpublished dissertation, Princeton University, 2006. For a case study demonstrating the decline of ulema in terms of prominence in the provinces as well, Yazbak,Mahmoud, ―Nabulsi Ulama in the Late Ottoman Period, 1864-1914‖, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 29(1997), pp.71-91. Also see, Yazbak, Mahmoud, Haifa in the Late Ottoman Period, 1864-1914, Leiden; Köln; Boston: Brill, 1998, p. 158.

⁴⁹³ The whole Tarih-i Cevdet can be read as a polemic against the crumbling ilmiye class. Coming himself from the ranks of ilmiye, Cevdet in his Tarih is a staunch modernist

Aksan, reached its apex in the early 19^th century. Although the rise of kalemiye can be witnessed as early as the 17^th century, it was only in the early 19^th century that kalemiye became a self-conscious group assuming immense political prominence and power. The new knowledge was now the monopoly of this new class, who had acquired the necessary skills to thrive in the new circumstances that were pushing the Empire into a corner. It was this group that assumed power with the Edict of Reform in 1839. Paradoxically, the authoritarian policies of Mahmud II that eradicated the opponents of the reform (i.e., policies of Mahmud II) enabled the newly rising class, who enjoyed the elimination of their rivals from offices of prominence, to grab power from the palace and the sultan with the coming to the throne of the young and inexperienced Abdülmecid in 1839.⁴⁹⁴

The analysis of Christoph Neumann on the foreign policy decisions of the Ottoman Empire in the reign of Selim III in his aptly named article, ―Decision Making without Decision Makers‖, demonstrates that the policy making was a fragmented vocation and that there was no authorized corporate structure to decide foreign policy. Neumann also underlines the prominent role of the ilmiye class in the making of foreign policy. In addition, Neumann shows that foreign policy decisions were dependent on personal relations and household rivalries. Before its institutionalization, foreign policy was hostage to rivalries of ―political factions aimed at achieving personal career enhancement, not political programs.‖⁴⁹⁵ Although members of ilmiye class had a prominent role in foreign policy, many other actors were also extensively involved in this process, such as the Admiral Gazi Hasan Pasha who had veto power over matters relevant to the North African Barbary Coast. From such a chaotic, uninstitutionalized configuration in which personal

propagating the new way of conducting the state. He does not spare his words when it comes to scorning the ilmiye and making fun of their lack of understanding of the new world. For Cevdet, the alternative to accepting the new modes of statecraft is the death of the Ottoman polity. See a broad analysis of the discourse of Tarih-i Cevdet, Neumann, Christoph, Araç Tarih Amaç Tanzimat: Tarih-i Cevdet‟in Siyasi Anlamı, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000.

⁴⁹⁴ For the power struggles after the death of Mahmud II and the subsequent victory of the reform party and Mustafa Reşid Pasha, see Ahmed Lûtfi Efendi, Vak‟anüvîs Ahmed Lûtfi Efendi Tarihi, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999, pp. 1006-1025.

⁴⁹⁵ Christoph K. Neumann, ―Decision Making Without Decision Makers: Ottoman Foreign Policy circa 1780‖, in Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire, Caesar E. Farah (ed.), The Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993, p. 34.

and interpersonal relations shaped foreign policy, the creation of an institutionalized and impersonal organization isolated from daily and personalized petty politics was no less than a revolution.

This institutional revolution was a victory of ―modern knowledge‖ replacing the reign of traditional knowledge⁴⁹⁶. This epistemological revolution compelled an institutional reorganization. The institutional reorganization was a corollary of the epistemological revolution. Apparently, ―modern knowledge‖ necessitated the erection of an autonomous bureaucracy to reproduce itself. Furthermore, it generated the development of notions of expertise and specialization. The modern epistemology maintains that what is valuable is not ―knowledge as a whole and in a totality‖ but knowledge as specified and particularized. Modern officialdom and its bureaucracy were to an important extent founded on these premises.⁴⁹⁷

In fact, the modern epistemology enforced a radical reorganization in the military.⁴⁹⁸ The Ottoman transformation began with the military sector.⁴⁹⁹ The reasons were obvious. The very visible symptoms of the Ottoman failure were observed in the devastating military defeats. Although the immediate aim of all the efforts was to reorganize and strengthen the military, in the ―new world‖, military prowess and military victory was less

⁴⁹⁶ In Iran, the reformist Malkom Khan makes a differentiation between ―natural intellect‖ and ―acquired education‖. He criticizes Iranians for preferring to see the former as more valuable and important, whereas for Malkom, this is not tenable in the modern world. Menashri, David, Education and the Making of Modern Iran, Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1992, p. 33.

⁴⁹⁷ For the rising prominence of the ilmiye in conducting foreign affairs in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the subsequent, drastic decline of their role in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and a detailed survey of the ilmiye members in the conduct of foreign affairs, see Cihan, Ahmet, Reform Çağında Osmanlı İlmiye Sınıfı, Birey, 2004, pp. 91-101.

⁴⁹⁸ For an application of the rationalized military reorganization and its proud announcement, see Mahmud Raif‘s Tableau des Nouveaux Reglemens de L‟Empire Ottoman printed in 1798 to advertise the recent Ottoman military reforms which made the Ottoman military a fully-fledged modern military. For the text, see Terzioğlu, Arslan; Hatemi, Hüsrev (ed.), Osmanlı İmparatorluğu‟nda Yeni Nizamların Cedveli, İstanbul: Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu, 1988.

⁴⁹⁹ See Levy, Avigdor, The Military Policy of Sultan Mahmud II, 1808-1839, unpublished dissertation, Harvard University, 1968.

decisive than before. After long efforts to overcome the military deficit, it was recognized that changes had to be made elsewhere. A new kind of knowledge other than military prowess had to be acquired. These motivations prepared the ground for the emergence and rise of the future-diplomats as a group.⁵⁰⁰ The discovery of diplomacy was the new great white hope for the Ottomans.

To establish a chronological order, we may contextualize the rising prominence of conducting foreign affairs beginning from the late eighteenth century. The continuous Russian wars, especially from the disastrous 1774 onwards, exposed the reluctance to know and exploit international political dynamics.⁵⁰¹ The helplessness of the Empire against the Russian menace compelled the Ottomans to seek long-lasting and comprehensive alliances rather than temporary alliances. The Western European states were now potential new comrades for the Ottomans against the Russians. These future comrades were sharing a common fear, the rise of the Russian bear.⁵⁰²

The second crucial period in the emergence of modern Ottoman diplomacy was the Napoleonic Wars. The term ―Napoleonic Wars‖ encompasses a more than twenty-year period not of continuous warfare, but a period in which coalitions and alliances were formed, dissolved, and reestablished. It was a period in which modern diplomacy became

⁵⁰⁰ The same can also be said for the rise of the modern bureaucracy. The bureaucratic model copied from the West was first introduced by Mahmud II, but it took the bureaucracy several decades to mature and exemplify a modern Western-type bureaucracy.

⁵⁰¹ The ―Russian dimension‖ had been neglected in the Ottoman historiography. The permanent Russian wars and menace had been treated as a side issue rather than the very fundamental problem of the Ottomans throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The ―Russian dimension‖ is significant not only in terms of military defeats, but also because the Russian army as a modernized army with western skills and training since Peter the Great was the first western model the Ottomans encountered face to face. This led the Ottomans to want to imitate it. The Russian army that overwhelmed the Ottoman army was the modern army Selim III, and subsequently Mahmud II, wanted to establish. Virginia Aksan writes: ―Napoleon‘s bold thrust into the Eastern Mediterranean in 1798, prelude to his imperial reign is very often held to be the beginning of the ―modern‖ age in the Middle East. My sense is rather that the modern age for the Ottoman Empire began on the fields of Kartal (referring to the Russian victory at the Battle of Kartal in 1770-DG) and at the walls of Ochakov.‖ Aksan, Virginia, Ottoman Wars, New York: Pearson Longman, 2007, p. 170.

⁵⁰² Blanning, T.C.W, The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars, New York: Longman, 1986, pp. 55-60.

formed and reached unprecedented levels of sophistication. The Congress of Vienna of 1815 can be seen as the founding moment of modern (aristocratic) diplomacy with its established codes of conduct.⁵⁰³ It was a very constitutive moment in the rise of the role and significance of foreign affairs in government policies, which was particularly true for the Ottomans. The Napoleonic Wars were an unprecedented episode in which war and peace were indistinguishable from each other and in which no power in Europe had the luxury of isolating itself diplomatically. The Ottomans were entangled in this complex web of relations oscillating within the complex web of alliances. With the aim of preventing a possible European-wide deal at the expense of the Empire, the Sublime Porte struggled to make the best of it within the European-wide politics of alignment, and thus the Ottomans became incorporated into the European order, albeit in a passive posture.

The European-wide Napoleonic ―Cold War‖ was also an opportunity for the Ottoman Empire. Russia and Austria had to give up their campaigns against the Ottomans by 1792 as a response to the French Revolution.⁵⁰⁴ After the break of the French Revolution and once the European powers including Russia and Austria were forced to track the post- revolutionary developments instead of fighting, the Ottomans not only found breathing space but found a chance to be allies with the Russians and others. Playing a diplomatic game between France on one side and Britain on the other, the Ottomans endeavored to maximize their interests.⁵⁰⁵

Recent studies have revised the Orientalist/reductionist image that Ottomans were completely ignorant of their time, demonstrating that on the contrary Ottomans were

 

 

⁵⁰³ For an appraisal of the congress, see Schroeder, Paul W, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 575-582.

⁵⁰⁴ Blanning, T.C.W, The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars, New York: Longman, 1986, p. 83.

⁵⁰⁵ For a diplomatic history of Ottoman during the Napoleonic Wars, see Shaw, Stanford, Between Old and New: Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Selim III, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971; Yıldız, Aysel Danacı, Vaka-yı Selimiyye or The Selimiyye Incident: A Study of May 1807 Rebellion, unpublished dissertation, Sabancı University, 2008; Aksan, Virginia, Ottoman Wars, New York: Longman, 2007; Gosu, Armand, ―The Third anti-Napoleonic Coalition and the Sublime Porte‖, International Journal of Turkish Studies, 9(2003), pp. 199-237.

perfectly aware of the conditions they were in and cognizant of the transforming world.⁵⁰⁶ However, such awareness does not automatically break the impasse. Diplomacy requires a massive technical knowledge to be acquired as has been best exemplified by Venetian diplomacy.⁵⁰⁷ Diplomacy also needs accumulated experience and practical skills developed over a long time span. Diplomacy as a craft and an art developed in Europe in the early modern period, first becoming visible in the Italian city states in the fifteenth century and gradually becoming established in the sixteenth century throughout Western Europe.⁵⁰⁸ The Ottomans were not complete foreigners to the world of diplomacy. They pursued a rather sophisticated diplomacy in the post-classical centuries.⁵⁰⁹ However, Ottoman diplomacy failed to adopt many of the specifics of the intra-Christian codes and cultures of diplomacy. Moreover, they failed to modernize the craft and techniques of diplomacy such as information-gathering and utilization of gathered information. The Ottomans had to acquaint themselves with the new language, new skills, and new code of conduct. They lacked the accumulation of knowledge and experience which Europeans amassed in the few centuries of early modernity.⁵¹⁰ Furthermore, the terrain of diplomacy was a foreign

 

 

⁵⁰⁶ See Aksan, Virginia, An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783, Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 1995; Goffman, Daniel, The Ottoman Empire and the Early Modern Europe, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 2002; Goffman, Daniel & Aksan, Virginia (ed.), The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 2007; Agoston, Gabor, Guns for the Sultan, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 2005.

⁵⁰⁷ For a reassessment of early Venetian diplomacy, see Valensi, Lucette, The Birth of the Despot: Venice and the Sublime Porte, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 14-20.

⁵⁰⁸ For the classical study on how diplomacy had risen to become the professional and institutionalized activity of states beginning from the early modern era, see Anderson, M. S, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919, New York: Longman, 1993. Also see Anderson, M.S, The Origins of the Modern European State System 1494-1618, New York: Longman, 1998.

⁵⁰⁹ For example, see Kolodziejczyk, Dariusz, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th- 18th Centuries), Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2000.

⁵¹⁰ In 1838, while he was the foreign minister, Mustafa Reşid Efendi was appointed as the ambassador to France, retaining his ministerial post. This was ―to examine the European codes of conducts and the developments in Europe in situ.‖ Akyıldız, Ali, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında Reform, İstanbul: Eren, 1993, p. 79.

land for Ottomans, and they were trying their best not to act not as guests, but as one of the hosts. In other words, they were on the fringes, but not quite ―in‖.

In short, the Ottomans were not unaware of the world around them as they used to be portrayed by the earlier Eurocentric historiography, but they were certainly far from grasping the very exact circumstances in which they could thrive. They had a clear vision of what to do to survive in this new jungle, but they lacked the necessary equipment to implement complex and sophisticated policymaking. The Ottomans were not naïve observers failing to understand the world around them and the new developments therein. However, the lack of background knowledge and background training rendered them incompetent to react effectively although they were not entirely unaware of their incompetence and superficiality.⁵¹¹ Knowing the existing circumstances around and having the skills to master those circumstances are two different phenomena.

After the defeat of Napoleonic France and the conclusion of the Congress of Vienna, the new ―European concert‖ and the diplomatic world became even tougher for the Ottomans. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha in his Tarih-i Cevdet is highly critical of the non- participation of the Ottomans in the Congress of Vienna, which in his opinion Pasha cost the Ottomans greatly in the diplomatic arena.⁵¹² He went further in exposing the diplomatic blunders of the Ottomans which were to a large extent responsible for the Greek independence movement, which was unthinkable and undesirable in the eyes of the Western powers at the beginning of the rebellion.⁵¹³ The blunders of the Ottomans guaranteed the changing attitude of the European powers towards the Greek rebels. This fiasco was the last warning for the Ottomans that full participation and involvement within the Concert of Europe was necessary to avoid further setbacks. Ottoman reformism was born in such an environment. The so-called Ottoman Westernization was not only motivated, but also led, by anxiety about surviving in such a predatory environment. The

 

 

⁵¹¹ For 18th century Ottoman diplomats, see Aksan, Virginia, An Ottoman statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783, Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 1995.

⁵¹² Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, Tarih-i Cevdet, İstanbul: Darü't-Tıbaat'ül Amire, 1309, v. XII,

pp. 194-196.

⁵¹³ Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, ibid, v. XII, pp. 215-219.

Ottoman reformism cannot be dissociated from these diplomatic entanglements.⁵¹⁴ It was a function of international developments and alignments. The so-called Ottoman Westernization was not a process that started at a certain time in history with a clear intention and direction. It was only a set of responses to Western (mainly Russian) aggression. There existed no conscious ―break/rupture‖ from the ―old‖. The operation was limited to the acquisition of new knowledge first in military matters (Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers onwards) and then in diplomacy. Instead of being a dependent variable of socio- economical and political developments, diplomacy became a transformative force itself, and it shaped and influenced socio-economical and political developments.

The new knowledge was to be rational, measurable, and free of any metaphysical assumption, hence ―modern‖. Therefore, ―modern‖ was first and foremost a methodology and organization designed by people mindful of the aforementioned principles.⁵¹⁵ The implementation of this methodology was dubbed ―Westernism‖ or ―reformism‖ retrospectively with the hindsight of the drastic transformation it triggered. In short, although it prompted an inevitable massive scale transformation, it was not an intentional project. As argued above, diplomacy and diplomatic considerations were major dynamics in this process.

 

 

 

3.2.  Origins of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry

 

 

 

⁵¹⁴ For the emergence and development of the concept of ―Westernization‖ in Turkish historiography, see Murphey, Rhoads, ―Westernization in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire: How Far, How Fast?‖, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies vol. 23, 1999, pp. 116-139.

⁵¹⁵ This is no place to discuss or evaluate the ―nature of modernity‖. However, it may be necessary to define what we understand from modernity. It will be denied that modernity is an unprecedented transformation of our mode of thinking and, therefore, of our relations with the world. Modernity is a passionate challenge to transform/control the natural world around us. However, this kind of passionate modernity reflects the mental worlds of Enlightenment philosophes, adventurers, overseas tradesmen, and bankers but not necessarily the world of everybody facing modernity. The understanding of modernity by the Ottoman statesmen will be evaluated throughout the essay.

The Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Umur-u Hariciye Nezareti) was established in 1836 by an edict of Mahmud II.⁵¹⁶ Akif Efendi, the incumbent Chief Secretary of the Sublime Porte (Reis-ül-Küttab) since 1832, was named as the first Foreign Minister.⁵¹⁷ Hulusi Pasha replaced Akif Efendi after the latter was dismissed in four months‘ time. However, it was with the appointment of Mustafa Reşit Pasha in 1837 that the new ministry began to become a modern office. Before the establishment of the Foreign Ministry, the institution of Reis-ül-Küttablık was a department within sa‟drazamlık. The official titles of the Reis-ül-Küttabs were lower in comparison to the other holders of prominent offices. Whereas the Chief Financial Official (defterdars) and the Drawer of the Sultanic Seal (nişancıs) were among the top functionaries of the Sublime Porte (erkan-ı Babıali), the reis-ül-küttabs belonged to the rank of ―higher officials‖ (rical-i Babıali). Recognizing the rising importance and increasing role of foreign relations, Mahmud II allowed the upgrading of the title of the Reis-ül-Küttablık. Mahmud II in the very beginning of his edict established that the the title of the Foreign Ministry had to be upgraded because they represent the Ottoman Empire vis-avis the European powers and they are in a position to serve the Empire in very important issues. (“çünki rütbe-i evveliyede bulunanlar Devlet-i Aliyye‟mizin en büyük hizmet ve maslahatlarına me‟mur olduklarından ve zat-ı me‟muriyetleri i‟tibarıyle lazım gelen nüfuz ve haysiyyetleriçün fi ma ba‟d müşirlik ve vezaret rütbe-i celileleri sıralarında add ve i‟tibar olunmaları hususu geçende tıbk-ı irade-i şahanem üzre icra olunmuş idi.”⁵¹⁸)

By 1836, the new Foreign Ministry became an independent body with the ministers enjoying the title of vezir.⁵¹⁹ A regulation for the new organization had already been prepared by 1835. The regulation clearly established that only the ministry had the authority to conduct foreign relations. Parallel to Mahmud‘s centralizing policies and institutionalizing and restructuring of the state bureaucracy, the new Foreign Ministry was

⁵¹⁶ See Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciyye, (1301/1885), pp. 162-163.

⁵¹⁷ For the foundation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see Akyıldız, Ali, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında Reform, İstanbul: Eren, 1993, pp. 70-91.

⁵¹⁸ For the text, see ibid., p. 152.

⁵¹⁹ Akyıldız, Ali, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında Reform, İstanbul: Eren, 1993, p. 78.

established and organized as the sole authority to conduct foreign policy in contradistinction to the fragmented and collective nature of the earlier policy-making organization and process.

However, the ministry did not become a modern/Weberian institution overnight. On the contrary, it took a few decades for the institution to professionalize and create its own esprit de corps. Before its professionalization and specification of knowledge in the Hamidian era, it was one of the major offices of the Sublime Porte where there was a flow of recruits in and out. In the absence of trained bureaucrats, many preeminent statesmen served in diplomatic posts for a while. The Foreign Ministry became an office where bureaucrats and men of future political prominence were trained and acquired experience.

The Tanzimat Foreign Ministry had a very minor influence in the making of foreign policy as an institution.⁵²⁰ Foreign policy had been determined in the upper echelons by the

―political initiative‖. In this regard, it would be wrong to speak of a self-serving and autonomous bureaucratic polity reminiscent of the Prussian model.⁵²¹ It seems that, the 19^th century Ottoman pattern resembled the Russian example more than the Prussian one.⁵²² The Foreign Ministry‘s mission was confined to carrying out the tasks it was given. This can also be seen in the very low number of Foreign Ministers who came from the ranks of the ministry itself, especially in the Hamidian era. The post of Foreign Minister was a political post and not a bureaucratic post, being merely the supreme functionary of the ministry on top of the undersecretary. Nevertheless, given the small size and intertwined nature of the political-bureaucratic elite, it was not a place of minor significance.

Reviewing the literature on 19^th century Ottoman foreign affairs, one sees too much written on foreign relations and almost nothing on the actual daily conduct of foreign

⁵²⁰ Akyıldız, Ali, ibid, p. 90.

⁵²¹ The myth of Prussianism had been questioned by John Röhl. See his The Kaiser and His Court. Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1996. Röhl shows the role of the Kaiser and his personal circles in the making of foreign policy. In Röhl‘s assessment, German foreign policies did not develop from professional analysis and work, but from personal and irrelevant motivations.

⁵²² For a sharp contrast between the Prussian and Russian bureaucratic structures in the 19th century, see the articles in Heper, Metin (ed.), The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative Perspective, New York: Greenwood Press, 1987. However, such a dichotomy has been discredited by the latest studies on Russian bureaucracy.

affairs, particularly in view of the relatively recent declassification of the files of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That is to say, we know a lot about Ottoman foreign policy yet almost nothing about the technicalities and procedures of making the foreign policy. In the absence of documents kept in the archives of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the archival evidence used in all the relevant studies on Ottoman foreign relations consists of sources other than the archives of the Ministry. The bulk of the material used in these studies are irades and correspondence between the Palace (in the reign of Abdülhamid II) and the Babıali, and the correspondence between the Foreign Minister and his international counterparts. Given all these, we still know very little about the Foreign Ministry. This observation contradicts the superficial impression that diplomatic history is one of the most developed areas of 19^th century Ottoman historiography.⁵²³ In other words, diplomacy has been interpreted and analyzed as a response to international developments rather than a comprehensive profession. Moreover, we lack the insights of the new critical diplomatic history. We have not gained sufficient information and insights about the Foreign Ministry from all these diplomatic histories. The men in charge implemented their policies based on certain information, but how this information had been obtained has yet to be researched.⁵²⁴

⁵²³ The doyen of Ottoman diplomatic history is arguably Roderick Davison. Yet in the absence of the diplomatic archival sources of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we learn very little (almost nothing) from his collected essays about the Foreign Ministry. See his Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms, Istanbul: Isis Press, 1999. Also see his Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History: 1774-1923, Austin: University of Texas, 1990. Also it should be noted that in his ―Reform in the Ottoman Empire‖, he did not show a particular interest in the bureaucracy. He focuses on the ―political level‖ to prove the development of Ottoman reforms. Here, it is not claimed that he is wrong. The point made here is that we lack sufficient knowledge of the Ottoman bureaucracy and cannot determine the role of the bureaucracy throughout the 19th century.

⁵²⁴ The same criticism was leveled against the diplomatic historians by a student of the diplomatic establishment. ―The attention of those studying modern history and international relations in the past has focused largely upon three areas: the political substance of major foreign policies, the personalities of leading decision makers, and the events of dramatic crisis situations. As a result, our knowledge of diplomacy frequently has been confined to ―high policy‖ regarding such issues as war or peace, to a restricted number of leaders whose names and actions made headlines, or sporadic episodes of tension and conflict. Obviously the problems and intricacies of international politics are infinitely more complex than indicated by these few highlights. Integral –but largely

What we know is that the Foreign Ministry was a very fundamental source of knowledge required for the age. Findley speaks of the renunciation of ―military politics‖ in favor of diplomatic politics.⁵²⁵ A competent Foreign Ministry became more decisive than a strong army in the survival of the state. Civilians (efendi-turned-pashas in Itzkowitz‘s formulation) began to rise in the state administration as early as the 18^th century.⁵²⁶ However, it was the Tanzimat in which the civilian supremacy was made routine, institutionalized, and consolidated after the reorganization of the military as subordinate to the political authority following the destruction of the janissaries and the pre-modern military organization. The reign of Abdülaziz was the high point of the Foreign Ministry with many recruits of the Ministry occupying the highest posts. ―(I)t became common for the foreign minister to go on to serve as grand vizier. Dominating this combination of posts, Mustafa Reşid (1800-58), Keçecizade Fuad (1815-1869) and Mehmed Emin Âli Pashas (1815-71) shaped the period.‖⁵²⁷ But with the coming of Abdülhamid, the Foreign Ministry lost its glory days. The reason for that relative decline in prominence within the state machine may lie in the fact that the Foreign Ministry cadres lost their monopoly on speaking French and being acquainted with the European realities. Their technical information and relatively superior level of knowledge regarding European realities might have continued to be useful, but possessing the technical knowledge no longer automatically provided political prominence. By then, Ottoman statecraft was much more sophisticated than it had been half a century earlier. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to be one of the most prestigious offices.

neglected- features of diplomacy, particularly in the twentieth century, must include the management of those policies encompassing more subtle commercial or ―cultural‖ questions, the responsibilities of lesser bureaucratic officials in periods of both turmoil and stability, and the actual administrative machinery or organized context of policy formulation and execution.‖Lauren, Paul Gordon, Diplomats and Bureaucrats, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976, p. xvii.

⁵²⁵ Findley, Carter, ―The Tanzimat‖, in The Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. 4, Reşat Kasaba (ed.), Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 13.

⁵²⁶ Itzkowitz, Norman, ―Eighteenth Century Ottoman Realities‖, Studia Islamica, No. 16 (1962), p. 86.

⁵²⁷ Findley, Carter, ―The Tanzimat‖, in The Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. 4, Reşat Kasaba (ed.), Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 13.

3.3.       Ottoman Foreign Ministry as Precursor of “Westernism” and Pseudo- Nationalism: Making of the Ottoman Modern Transformation

 

As has been suggested several times above, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry was a preeminent institution in the process of the Ottoman transformation in the 19^th century. This was because after the final collapse of the conventional prescription advocating stronger military stockpiling for the healing of all ills, it was the Ministry that had represented the novel and ambitious promise of ―salvation‖ through ―other‖ means. It was the Foreign Ministry that held the means to deal with and weather the dire situation. In the early Tanzimat period, the ministry was the institution which had the foremost and best direct contact with the ―West‖. The ministerial personnel were in everyday touch with the

―Christian‖ powers, and therefore they had the advantage of following the latest developments closely in comparison to the other governmental offices. Hence, they were the ones who felt the urgency, acuteness, and graveness of the situation not only regarding diplomatic realities, but also regarding the technical retardation of the Ottomans. Furthermore, they ―possessed‖ the best available prescription for the healing of the ―Sick Man‖. Only they had the skills to apply the proposed remedy. They were the ones who were perfectly aware that a new and complete reorganization of the state and state affairs was not a matter of intellectual debate and preference, but an imperative. For these reasons, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry not only recruited and trained the bulk of the Tanzimat (Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Âli Pasha, Fuad Pasha) leadership, but also represented a role model for the desired new Ottoman civility. It assumed the role of the carrier of the Ottoman transformation before this model had been endorsed by the larger bureaucracy within a few decades. It is not a coincidence that Western observers of the Ottoman Empire found diplomats those with whom they most sympathized while considering them to be the most

―Westernized and civilized‖.⁵²⁸

One example of how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was perceived to be the transmitter of the Western way of conduct and Western knowledge is the fact that

⁵²⁸ For example, see Mordtmann, Andreas David, İstanbul ve Yeni Osmanlılar, İstanbul: Pera, 1999, pp. 279-304.

institutions such as the ―Council of Agriculture and Manufacture‖ and the ―Council of Quarantine‖ were established in 1838 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Council of Agriculture and Manufacture was transferred to the Ministry of Trade in 1839.⁵²⁹ Likewise, the ―Council of Public Education‖ was established in 1846 under the supervision of the ministry. Apparently, these committees were established under the ministry due to its proximity and access to the ―centers of modern/Western knowledge‖. The Foreign Minister was also the head of the Board of Health (Meclis-i Umur-ı Sıhhiye) and therefore de facto ―Minister of Health‖.⁵³⁰ Thus, the offices to monitor and improve public health were to be included in the Hamidian Foreign Ministry yearbooks. The Board of Public Education, founded in 1846, was also to be monitored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵³¹ The diplomats functioned as intermediaries for the ―import of Western and technical knowledge‖ into the Ottoman Empire in addition to their diplomatic responsibilities. For example, it was the embassy to Paris that found, negotiated, and contracted two French forest engineers to come to Istanbul, supervise the forests, and establish a modern forestry office.⁵³² The embassies were coordinating the recruitment of experts of all kinds of engineering, mining, medicine for the introduction of industrial production and establishment of modern public institutions in the Ottoman Empire and actively involved in this process. The first president of the board established to modernize Istanbul and create a modern municipal organization (İntizam-ı Şehir Komisyonu) was

 

 

 

 

⁵²⁹ Martha Mundy, Richard Saumarez Smith, Governing Property, Making the Modern State, London: I.B. Tauris, 2007, p. 42. Also see ―Hariciye Nezareti‖, DİA

⁵³⁰ Findley, Carter, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 261.

⁵³¹ Akyıldız, Ali, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında Reform, Eren, 1993, p. 81, 231.

⁵³² Keskin, Özkan. Orman Ma‟adin Nezareti‟nin Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri, unpublished dissertation, Istanbul University, 2005, p. 18. These two forest engineers were invited for the following reasons: “Esbab-ı siyasiye ilcasıyla Avrupa Hey‟et-i Düveliyyesine mümaşat etmek ve hoş görünmek, peyda-yı vukuf olunamayan fünun ve „ulum-ı mütenevvia tahavvülat ve tebeddülatından istifade etmek, bizde henüz tatbik edilmeyen fenn vesair mevadı tatbik ve ta‟mim etdirmek”.

Emin Muhlis Efendi, a diplomat and a chief official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵³³ Apparently, his experience and knowledge he obtained in his years in Europe should be the reason of his appointment to this post. Likewise, ―Kamil Bey, the chief of protocol in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was the first director of the Sixth (municipal-DG) District‖ comprising of Pera, the European part of Istanbul. The board of Sixth District was created comprising of Europeans, non-Muslims and a few Muslims resident in the Sixth District to administer and develop Pera following the West European urban planning and urban developments.⁵³⁴

Apparently the pioneering role of the Foreign Ministry was not unique to the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, the same pattern was visible in all the other non-Western modernizing states. Like the Ottoman case, the first generation of the Iranian modernization movement was comprised of employees of the Foreign Ministry who were assigned to posts in the Persian embassies in Europe. The Persian diplomats, who all came from the traditional bureaucracy not unlike the first Ottoman generation of reformers, were frustrated with their homeland‘s incapacity to adapt to the modern world.⁵³⁵

―Persia‘s diplomats also assigned to the ministry of foreign affairs and themselves as members of it a pivotal role in bringing the new civilization to Persia. Malkam believed that the foreign ministry had the duty of acting as a channel through which the achievements and knowledge of Europe could be directed towards Persia. Others, as we have noted, believed that Persia‘s ambassadors abroad had a special mission to enlighten their government and people and lead both along the right path to progress.‖⁵³⁶

―Those who were advocating reform in the 1860‘s were never a large group, and they were not a tightly knit one. But their contacts with one another and the fact that they shared many attitudes in common seems to have given them a certain group feeling...The diplomats urging reform in the 1860‘s also believed that their foreign experience and training better qualified and equipped them to guide the country than those who had not been abroad. In vaunting the superiority of the new arts and sciences of Europe, they were also suggesting that as Persians with a knowledge of

⁵³³ Ergin, Osman Nuri, Mecelle-i Umur-ı Belediyye, İstanbul : İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür İşleri Daire Başkanlığı, 1995, v. III, p. 1275, quoted in Gül, Murat, The Emergence of Modern Istanbul, London; New York: I.B.Tauris, 2009, p. 44.

⁵³⁴ Gül, Murat, ibid, p. 45.

⁵³⁵ See Bakhash….p. 28.

⁵³⁶ Bakhash, Saul. … p. 52.

these sciences, they had a special claim to higher offices of the state⁵³⁷…This elitist attitude, which owed something both to the Persian bureaucracy and to Islamic traditions, was closely bound up with the attitude to government that they looked on as the central guiding force in determining and directing the affairs of the people. They favored schools and newspapers because these offered a means for creating a better informed and better educated public. But this was at the same time a desire for newspapers, for instance, that would educate the public in ideas they believed suitable for Persia rather than as a means for permitting many schools of thought to compete for the people‘s allegiance.‖⁵³⁸

In Persia, the role and active involvement of diplomats was arguably significantly stronger than in the Ottoman Empire due to the less institutionalized nature of the early modern Persian state. In China, the transformative, modernizing, and civilizationist functions of the foreign ministry far exceeded the missions of its Ottoman and Persian counterparts.

―The activities of the Tsungli Yamen (the de facto Chinese Foreign Ministry) involved not only foreign affairs but also the promotion of modernization and defense projects. The office was concerned with the introduction of Western science and industry, modern schools, customs and the purchase of ships and guns⁵³⁹…Functionally, the Yamen handled many duties far beyond the normal limits of a foreign office. In addition to diplomatic affairs, it coordinated almost the entire range of ‗Western affairs‘ (yang-wu) such as foreign trade, customs, education, overseas affairs, postal service, national defense, and cultural affairs. It oversaw the work of the Trade Inspectorate General of customs and indirectly supervised the port commissioners in consultation with the two trade superintendants. It was involved in mining, machine factories, telegraph construction, Chinese laborers abroad, missionary incidents, and the manufacture and purchase of guns and ships. Further, the Yamen supervised the two T‘ung Wen Kuan for the training of language students and future diplomatic and consular personnel. After 1867, when astronomy, chemistry, mathematics, and physics were added to the curriculum of the school, the Yamen defended this development against conservative opposition. All in all, the Yamen‘s activities were too diverse to be functionally efficient.‖⁵⁴⁰

The same was true for the Japanese Foreign Ministry. ―In this quarter-century (the end of the late 19th century), the Foreign Ministers enjoyed high status since they had generally

⁵³⁷ Bakhash, Saul...pp. 51-52.

⁵³⁸ Bakhash, Saul...pp. 52-53.

⁵³⁹ Immanuel C.Y. Hsü. ―The Development of the Chinese Foreign Office in the Ch‘ing Period‖, The Foreign Ministry: Japan‖, in The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, Zara Steiner (ed.), Westport: Times Books, 1982, p. 126.

⁵⁴⁰ Immanuel C.Y. Hsü. ―The Development of the Chinese Foreign Office in the Ch‘ing Period‖, The Foreign Ministry: Japan‖, in The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, Zara Steiner (ed.), Westport: Times Books, 1982, p. 128.

played some role in the civil war or the imperial restoration that followed it. In a way, many of them were statesmen and enjoyed a prestige second only to the Prime Ministers of today. In some cases, they possessed an exceptional knowledge of foreign countries by virtue of having travelled abroad. Of the early Foreign Ministers the following had visited overseas before taking up office: Inoue Kaoru; Saionji Kimmochi; Mutsu Munemitsu; Enomoto Takeaki; and Aoki Shuzo.‖⁵⁴¹ For the same reason, many Japanese foreign ministers subsequently became prime ministers, a pattern reminiscent of the Ottoman pattern in the Tanzimat era.⁵⁴² In all of these four countries, bureaucratic modernizers were to introduce ―modern knowledge‖ to their people as well as minor officials. In all four countries, these bureaucrats were members of a small elite originating from the traditional elites of the preceding decades and centuries.⁵⁴³

In fact, the Ottoman statesmen and diplomats-to-be were exporters of their mission. The Persian modernization project was influenced by and modeled on the Ottoman modernization. Malkam Khan, the Persian ambassador to London and other capitals, and a pioneer and leading figure of the Persian modernization, was heavily influenced by Ottoman reformers during his post in the Persian embassy to Istanbul.⁵⁴⁴ While, he was a low-ranking official in the Persian embassy in Istanbul, he cultivated friendships with people such as Âli Pasha, Fuad Pasha, Ahmed Vefik Pasha, and Münif Pasha.⁵⁴⁵ His closeness to these names benefited him financially as well. When the Persian government stopped paying his salary (for reasons which remain obscure), he was granted a salary by the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁴⁶

⁵⁴¹ Nish, Ian, ―The Foreign Ministry: Japan‖, in The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, Zara Steiner (ed.), Westport: Times Books, 1982, p. 328.

⁵⁴² Nish, Ian.   p. 328.

⁵⁴³ For the social origins of Persian diplomats, see Bakhash, Saul, Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the Qajars: 1858-1896, London: Ithaca Press, 1978, p. 28.

⁵⁴⁴ Algar, Hamid, Mirza Malkum Khan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973, pp. 66-67.

⁵⁴⁵ Algar, Hamid… pp. 65-74. Also for Abdülhak Hamid‘s meeting with Malkom Khan several times in the residence of Ahmed Vefik Pasha (and also in London), see Abdülhak Hamid… p. 178.

⁵⁴⁶ Bakhash, Saul… p. 27.

The transformation was not limited to the reorganization of the state. The officials‘ own conduct of affairs and their self-imagination changed as well. As pioneers and promoters of the modernization/Westernization process, 19th century bureaucrats endorsed and replicated a new way of ―officialdom‖ and ―refinement‖. The servant of the state turned into a civil servant. However, that does not necessarily imply the transformation of the pre-modern servant of the state into a rational, modern bureaucrat. The adaptations are not necessarily ―transformations‖. This ―process of adaptation‖ may be divided into several stages. Shifting of the structures of mentalities throughout the decades of the Tanzimat were examined in the previous chapters. However, such a periodization should not be understood as a linear evolution from one world to another. Continuities as well as disruptions can also be observed. It may be a more insightful perspective to perceive the transformation not simply as the renunciation of the ―old‖ and adoption of the ―new‖, but instead as a complex historical process in which a new reference and value system was created coexisting with the previous reference and value system. Following this perspective, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry exemplifies a distinct internalization of modernity in a certain social-political milieu and weltanschauung. This selective reception of modernity by the Ottomans was not a phenomenon peculiar to the Ottomans. Rather, it was a pattern observable in other exemplary experiments of non-Western modernization.

 

 

 

3.4.  The Foreign Ministry in the Hamidian Era

 

Abdülhamid II preferred to appoint men originating from other civilian organizations to prominent posts in the Sublime Porte. Of the sixteen Grand Viziers of Abdülhamid, only one of them (Arifi Pasha) was a diplomat. Two others (Ibrahim Edhem Pasha and Safvet Pasha) served as ambassadors, but it would not be appropriate to regard them as diplomats. Of the ten foreign ministers of Abdülhamid, only three (Turhan Hüsnü Pasha, Arifi Pasha, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha) had extensive diplomatic backgrounds. Possibly, Abdülhamid was suspicious of the power of the Ministry and feared that he might be forced to share power with the ministry in foreign policy decisions once he allowed others some power in the

decision-making process.⁵⁴⁷ The memory of the dictatorial Âli Pasha and his close associate Fuad Pasha (who were known for their sympathies to Britain and France) should have been a warning for Abdülhamid not to favor diplomats in statesmanship. He might also have thought that appointing ex-ambassadors to posts in the foreign ministry or prime ministry might enable the countries where these ex-ambassadors had served to interfere and develop influence over the policy making of the Ottoman Empire. The suspicion of Abdülhamid was equally true for any individual of the Porte who might rise to challenge the supreme authority of the sultan as Said Pasha had. Instead, he preferred the Palace to be the sole authority in making foreign policy. He used to correspond with the ambassadors and consulates personally from the Palace and bypassed the Ministry and Grand Vizirate⁵⁴⁸ as he did with governors and local officials.

Abdülhamid founded an alternative and coexisting bureaucracy in the Yıldız Palace. It was a very efficient and well-structured manifestation of a modern bureaucracy. The immense and orderly correspondence, their registration, and the documentation of the Yıldız offices clearly demonstrates that it was a modern-bureaucratic structure in terms of organization and methodology, albeit patrimonial in other aspects and rivaling and interfering with the regular offices and bureaucracy.⁵⁴⁹

On the other hand, it was the Hamidian period in which the ministry was professionalized and bureaucratized like the other bureaucratic offices. It was this period in which the modern Turkish Foreign Ministry as a professional Weberian bureaucracy emerged. Mahmud Esad Bey (later Pasha) was the first career diplomat to be appointed as ambassador after passing through necessary levels and promotions. He was recruited following his graduation and promoted consistently beginning from his first appointment

⁵⁴⁷ For how Abdülhamid II had established direct contacts with officials bypassing the Grand Vizirate and the Sublime Porte in general, see Akarlı, Engin Deniz, The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and. Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdülhamid II (1876-1909), unpublished dissertation, Princeton University, 1976.

⁵⁴⁸ See Yıldız Esas Evrakı-Elçiler,Şehbenderlik ve Ateşemiliterlik under the Yıldız archives in BOA.

⁵⁴⁹ For depictions of the Yıldız bureaucracy, see Mayakon, İsmail Müştak, Yıldızda Neler Gördüm ? İstanbul: Semih Lütfi Kitabevi, 1940; Tahsin Pasha, Abdülhamid Yıldız Hatıraları, İstanbul: Mualllim Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1931. Also Georgeon, Francois, Sultan Abdülhamid, İstanbul: Homer, 2006, pp. 170-74.

as the third secretary in the embassy to St. Petersburg and then serving as the second secretary and the first secretary in the embassy to Paris, besides his services in the ministry in Istanbul (a total of twenty years before reaching the rank of ambassador).⁵⁵⁰ Mahmud Esad Bey was first appointed as ambassador to Vienna in 1877 and then subsequently as ambassador to Paris in 1880. He also served as the ministerial undersecretary for one year in 1879. By the 1880s, the Ottoman ambassadors were predominantly career diplomats who had begun their service as third secretaries in the 1850s. Furthermore, it was the Hamidian era in which appointments and promotions created career paths, which became regularized and standardized. New recruits were to be appointed as third secretaries and promoted in time. After they were promoted to the rank of first secretary, many served in the embassies to Balkan capitals as ambassadors or undersecretaries before they were appointed as ambassadors to the capitals of Western Europe. In short, in the Hamidian era, Ottoman representatives of the higher and lower echelons were predominantly professional diplomats who had risen within the ministry (with the exception of some military appointments to various ambassadorial posts).

The presence/representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was remarkably high in the senates of both the first and the second constitutional periods, demonstrating the prestige and distinguished place of the ministry. It is not possible to make a table and a comparative analysis of the senators due to the lack of stable career patterns for the Ottoman bureaucrats, especially with regard to the Senate of 1877. The names of those who rose up from the ranks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be appointed to the Senate in 1877 were Musurus Pasha, Ahmed Arifi Pasha, Ahmed Vefik Pasha, Ali Rıza Bey, Kostaki Antopoulos Pasha, and Server Pasha, not counting a few others who served in diplomatic posts briefly. A typical career pattern for a member of the Senate of 1877 required an earlier appointment in the Şuray-ı Devlet (Council of State). For their lack of domestic experience, the diplomats were rarely appointed to the Şuray-ı Devlet and therefore lacked a very crucial stepping stone for promotion to either a seat in the senate or

⁵⁵⁰ For a biography of Mahmud Esad Pasha, see Salname-i Hariciyye Nezaret-i Celilesi, (1306/1889), p. 537-538; Kuneralp, Sinan. ―Tanzimat Sonrası Osmanlı Sefirleri‖, in Soysal, İsmail (ed.), Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1997, pp. 113-114.

a position in the cabinet. In that regard, a diplomatic career was not as promising as a career in the military or in the civil administration.

In the early Tanzimat period, the lack of sufficient education and necessary knowledge permitted the diplomatic service to assume a privileged position by holding a monopoly on

―Western knowledge‖. By the Hamidian era, the development of better communication facilities and access to Western printed materials rendered the privileged knowledge of the earlier decades more accessible.

The Senate convened in 1908 displayed the increasing prominence of the diplomatic service. The career diplomats who began their civil service careers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, served only in the ministry, and developed distinct professional socializations and intellectual formations emerged as a group only in the second half of the reign of Abdülhamid II and constituted a sizeable number in the senate of 1908, which was in fact a council of the dignitaries of the Empire. The senators of 1908 with Foreign Ministry backgrounds included Gabriel Noradonkyan, Yusuf Ziya Pasha, Keçeçizade İzzet Fuad, Yusuf Azaryan Efendi, Abdülhak Hamid, Ali Galip Bey and Damad Ferit Pasha, disregarding those who served briefly in diplomatic posts. Several others began their careers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but then moved to other administrative offices at various points such as Dimitri Mavrokordato Bey, Ibrahim Faik Bey, Bohor Efendi and Nail Bey.⁵⁵¹ All these figures were elected not only due to their impressive diplomatic careers but possibly also for their aristocratic genealogies. Almost all of the non-Muslim senators were from well-known (and therefore reliable) families. This was especially true with regard to the Greek senators. Thus, we can argue that the diplomats were acknowledged as constituting one of the most prestigious segments of the state elite (although lacking the political power and prominence normally accompanying this social prestige).

 

 

 

 

⁵⁵¹ For the list and biographies of the senators, see Demirci, Aliyar, İkinci Meşrutiyet‟te Ayan Meclisi 1908-1912, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006, pp. 453-508; Türk Parlamento Tarihi- I. ve II. Meşrutiyet, Ankara: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Vakfı Yayınları, 1997, v. II.

3.5.  Changing International Environment and Changing, Transforming Identities

 

The Foreign Ministry tried its best to enable the Ottoman state to survive against all odds through its involvement in European diplomacy and its tackling of the delicate and robust matters the Empire had to face and resolve. The Ministry had not developed, but had pursued the idea that the Ottomans had to emulate the Westerners in order to survive. From correspondence, we may observe that, bearing the anxiety regarding the (non)future of the Empire in mind, the Ministry had contributed to the crafting of its imperial nationalism not necessarily by referring to a certain ethnicity (Turkishness), but by allegiance to a certain imperial center. In other words, their preoccupation and responsibilities were to create an identity formation. This identity formation was not an ideological preference, but the imposition of a raison d‟etat. Their structures of loyalty were also formed by their appreciation of the imminent and longer term threats to the Empire, and therefore to themselves, as an examination of the ambassadorial dispatches will reveal in the coming chapters.

A new Ottoman identity had been forged in the 19^th century, influenced by modern and medieval European traditions. The Ottoman imperial ideology inherited from the classical ages of the Empire had been redefined and refashioned in interaction with the modern European imperial pageantries and discourses. The synthesis and integration of different traditions created an entirely new Ottoman imagination. Of course, it is senseless to assume that the 19th century Ottoman imagination directly evolved from the earlier Ottoman imperial tradition. On the other hand, it is also important to recognize the critical role of the former Ottoman representations in the forging of the novel 19^th century Ottoman imperial symbolism. However, again we need to emphasize that it is the brand new modern framework that utilized the traditional Ottoman representation to propagate the new modern Ottoman imperium. The Ottomans were ready for the modern challenge at least in their politics of imagination.

The content and essence of the new imperial ideology (officialization of Ottomanism by the 1860s) is another subject for debate revolving around the questions of whether there was room for Ottoman universalism; whether the imperial ideology was merely window- dressing for the control of the ―sovereign nation‖; whether this ―sovereign nation‖ was

comprised of Turks or Muslims. An Ottoman imperial nationalism referring to various and not necessarily contradicting identities had developed in defense against European aggression.

The structures of loyalty of the diplomatic service will be investigated in the coming chapters. Some questions that may be posed are as follows: What were the motivations of the Ministry personnel in fulfilling their duties? Was their supreme loyalty towards the idea of the supra-national Ottoman Empire as believers in a Kaisernatioanalismus or did they nurture a superior loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty without a certain political agenda ? What did the imperial family and the sultan mean to the ranks of the Ministry? Was the dynasty a central figure in their conception of the political body they were serving ? How did they relate the survival of the Empire with Islam? For them, did the Ottoman Empire represent the realm of Islam and did serving the Ottoman Empire also imply serving religion and God? How secular were their political commitments? Were they ―political‖ in any sense beyond dealing with technicalities and bureaucratic niceties? Did they have a perception of representing Turks, ―the sovereign nation‖ among other Muslim ―nations‖, the ―Muslim nation‖ being the nation more sovereign than others ?⁵⁵² Although no conclusive or even satisfactory answers will be given to these questions in the coming chapters, some preliminary observations will be made based on the limited evidence available.

The interrelations of Muslim identity (as a political modern construct rather than a personal faith) and imperial-dynastic discourse (based on various legitimizations) will be explored. As has been shown in many places, identity construction is a modern phenomenon and a consequence of modernity. In the Ottoman context, the identity- formation was also directly related to European aggression against the Empire. Modes of identity-formations are strategies to react to the complexities of international, social, and political developments.

The Foreign Ministry‘s crucial efforts were directed towards incorporating the Ottomans into Europe proper. This was presumably a foundational motive in the construction of loyalties and ideological commitments in the diplomatic service. Instead of

⁵⁵² A recent but already classical study on the forging of the imperial Ottoman ideology is Deringil, Selim, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire: 1876-1909, London; New York: I. B. Tauris, 1998.

being relegated to the collapsed nations/states, the Ottoman Empire had to be elevated to the league of European powers. The international situation was such that there was no third option. It was a zero sum game in which the Ottomans will lose everything or will be victorious in the end, victorious in the sense that the Empire will be stabilized and saved from collapse.

The founding diplomatic strategy of Tanzimat was persistently to seek an alignment with the ―West‖ (England and France against the Russians) and a strict adherence to the

―order party‖. This ―French-British‖ connection was the basis of what had been labeled as

―reformism‖. Being in alliance with the French-British bloc, the Ottomans were influenced by the ―French way‖. ―To gain internal strength and external legitimacy (in the eyes of France, the symbol of progress), the Empire must modernize itself.‖⁵⁵³ However, the Ottomans knew that these alignments were not between two equal parties but between states at two different levels. It was not up to the Ottomans, but up to the British to decide the future of the alliance. As is well known, the British decided to loosen the ties between the two states after observing the devastation of the Ottomans against the marching Russian army in 1877-1878. By then, the British realized that it seemed unsustainable to bet on the protection of the Ottoman Empire against the Russians. Britain gravitated to new alternative diplomatic policies and took Egypt as its new defensive border in the south against Russian aggression. Britain assumed the control of Cyprus (and subsequently Egypt) to sustain its new policy.⁵⁵⁴ By the 1880s, Abdülhamid was obliged to turn to Germany for a new partnership, a new move in his game of survival. The new partnership was not between two equal parties, either. The Ottomans were placing yet another bet on their survival. These diplomatic and strategic shifts and moves were influential in the redefinition of ideological fronts as well. The three modes of international alignments of the Ottomans (in the Tanzimat, in the Hamidian era, in the Unionist rule) were accompanied by three modes of modernizations and ideological dispositions.

 

 

⁵⁵³ Hanioğlu, Şükrü, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 77.

⁵⁵⁴ Millman, Richard, Britain and the Eastern Question, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 459.

In such an environment, the self-representation of Ottomans became ambivalent. It was up to the Ottoman Empire itself to survive. These circumstances enforced Abdülhamid to fabricate an imperial grandeur. Although on the one hand, the very fear of being annihilated was pervasive, on the other hand, a certain pride in belonging to the pompous Ottoman imperial body was entertained to counter and avoid the fear. These two motivations were not necessarily contradictory. On the contrary, they complemented each other. The fiction of ―grandeur‖ magnified the obsession with being annihilated, and the fear of collapse motivated the construction of a fictitious grandeur in response.⁵⁵⁵

Abdülhamid strove to create an aura around himself. He personalized the Empire in himself. The traditional Ottoman self-representation was married to the 19th century modern European imagination and reached its zenith in the Hamidian era. In short, the Ottomans did not fail to present themselves as another prestigious and well-respected Empire.⁵⁵⁶ The limits of persuasion were yet another matter. The Hamidian Empire was in a sense the era of the ―invention of Empire‖.⁵⁵⁷

―Empire‖ is one of the latest ―fads‖ of historiography and social sciences. While

―Empire‖ used to be a specialty of a small circle of historians until recently not highly regarded by others, the retreat of nation-states in the 1990s has made ―Empire‖ an

 

 

 

⁵⁵⁵ For some prominent and impressive works on Ottoman imperialism and colonialism, see Usama Makdisi. Makdisi, Ussama, The Culture of Sectarianism, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000; Makdisi, Ussama. ―Ottoman Orientalism‖, American Historical Review, 107(3), June 2002, p. 768-796; Ersoy, Ahmet, ―A Sartorial Tribute to Late Tanzimat Ottomanism: The Elbise-i Osmaniyye Album‖, Muqarnas, Vol. 20 (2003), pp. 187-207; Deringil, Selim, ―They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery‖, Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 2, (2003), pp. 311-343.

⁵⁵⁶ For a study on the self-image and self-display of the Ottoman Empire in its ambivalences, complexity, and contradictory manifestations, see Çelik, Zeynep, Displaying the Orient: Architecture of Islam at Nineteenth Century World‟s Fairs, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.

⁵⁵⁷ Deringil, Selim, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire: 1876-1909, London; New York: I. B. Tauris, 1998; Karateke, Hakan, Padişahım Çok Yaşa, İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2004. For the ―invention of emperor‖ in Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Fujitani, T. Splendid Monarchy, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, p. 233.

attractive theme to study. Yet, Bernard Porter, one of the oldest scholars of ―Empire‖⁵⁵⁸ and one of the foremost ―imperial historians‖ of the British Empire, criticizes the new, booming interest in ―studying Empire‖ arguing that the ―imperial rhetoric‖ was restricted to the ruling aristocratic class, and hence it would be inappropriate to discover the

―imperial‖ elsewhere.⁵⁵⁹ Bernard Porter was particularly critical of the studies advanced by Mackenzie⁵⁶⁰ which purported to establish that ―Empire‖ was at the center of 19^th century British society, politics, and culture. For Porter, ―Empire‖ was a class-related phenomenon and ideology. Therefore, one must not be thrilled with the attraction of ―Empire‖. Nevertheless, the discovery of the Empire opened new horizons challenging the conventions of ―modern historical scholarship‖ which was mesmerized by the modern- nation-states and tacitly took the premises of the modern nation-states for granted.

Impressed by these new horizons, Fujitani, a prominent historian of 19^th century Japan, writes; ―In this respect, I consider myself to be among a number of scholars of the so- called emperor system who have begun in various ways to critique the view long espoused by Japanese Marxists of the koza school, as well as modernists such as Maruyama Masao, that treated the prominence of the monarchy in modern history as a reflection of and reason for the incompleteness of Japan‘s modernity. By resituating the emperor at the center of a modern panoptic regime, as I propose, we see not only that the cults of nation and emperor

⁵⁵⁸ For an impressive introduction to the concept of ―Empire‖, see Howe, Stephen, Empire: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. For a few other impressive studies, see Pagden, Anthony, Lords of the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France 1500-1800, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995; Armitage, David, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 2000; Porter, Bernard, The Lion‟s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-2004, New York: Longman, 2004.

⁵⁵⁹ Porter, Bernard, The Absent-Minded Imperialists, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. viii-x.

⁵⁶⁰ Mackenzie, John, Propaganda and Empire: Manipulation of British Public Opinion 1880-1960, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1984; Mackenzie, John, The Empire of Nature, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997; Mackenzie, John, Orientalism: History, Theory and the Arts, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985; Mackenzie, John (ed.), Imperialism and Popular Culture, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989. Mackenzie also edited the Manchester University Press‘ series of

―Studies in Imperialism‖ which published books examining the impact of imperialism in the 19th (and 20th) century on politics, society and culture.

were created in relatively modern times, but also that what has been called the emperor system, far from being characterized by its ‗feudal‘ characteristics, was central to the production of Japan‘s modernity.‖⁵⁶¹

Apparently, what Fujitani did with respect to Meiji Japan (and Richard Wortman to imperial Russia⁵⁶²) was done by Deringil to the Hamidian Ottoman Empire.⁵⁶³ The premodern political structures all used mechanisms of legitimizations, but traditional strategies of legitimizations came following the construction and consolidation of political powers rather than vice versa. However, modern political structures should have a

―mission‖ and ―meaning‖ from their very beginning. The political power struggle should never mean a merciless struggle for domination. The modern polities struggle for an ideal. This was the case for Great Britain, France, Russia, and also the 19^th century Ottoman Empire. What did the Ottoman Empire mean in the eyes of its reorganizers ? Or to formulate the question better, what did the reorganizers want the Ottoman Empire to mean

? Furthermore, how much of this pursued ideal had been internalized ?

Of course, instead of speaking of the ―Empire‖, we need to historicize and contextualize the ―Empire‖. The Tanzimat was the introduction of a totally new and unfamiliar language. With Tanzimat, the self-imagination and self-representation of the Ottoman Empire were recast from the medieval to the ―modern‖. Whereas the Rescript of Tanzimat in 1839 may be seen within the traditional Ottoman political vocabulary⁵⁶⁴, the Rescript of Reform (Islahat Fermanı) in 1856 marked a drastic shift in taking and endorsing the ―modern‖ and ―universalist‖ (with regard to its subjects) discourse. The

⁵⁶¹ Fujitanii, Takashi, Splendid Monarchy, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998,

p. 26.

⁵⁶² Wortman, Richard, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

⁵⁶³ Deringil does not develop his arguments from Fujitani‘s book which appeared just two years before the publication of Deringil‘s book. Deringil depends on Carol Gluck for his comparison with Japan and was inspired by her analysis of the representation of the Japanese monarchy. See Gluck, Carol, Japan‟s Modern Myths, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.

⁵⁶⁴ Abu Mannah, Butrus, ―The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript‖, in his Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century 1826-1876, Istanbul: Isis Press, 2001,

pp. 73-97.

spontaneous and necessary alignment of the Ottoman Empire with the European ―party of order‖ was strongly grounded in the Crimean War.⁵⁶⁵ The vocabulary and language employed in the Edict of Reform demonstrated the transformative role of the diplomatic alignment of the Ottoman Empire in the previous two decades with regard to political discourse and visions. The Rescript of Reform also symbolized the entrance of the Ottomans to the ―European family‖, following the wartime alliances with France and Britain and the signing of the Paris Treaty which admitted the Ottomans into the ―Concert of Europe‖.

The reign of Abdülhamid can be interpreted as the perfection and sophistication of the Tanzimat discourse dressed in authoritarian garb (not unlike the authoritarianism discourses of Russian czardom⁵⁶⁶, Prussia, and the European-wide conservative- reactionary monarchism in reaction to the ―democratic‖ currents of the time). It was the zenith of Ottoman imperialism. The Hamidian era may be regarded as the maturation of Tanzimat after its infancy in the 1840s and its adolescence in the 1860s. It was the legal and institutional undertakings in the late 1860s, such as the new codes of Public Education (1869), Provincial Administration (1867), and Citizenship (1869), that set the ground for the Hamidian autocratic institutionalization. At the same time, the Hamidian regime was the foundational stage in the emergence of the Republic, not only in the microcosm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in the entirety of Ottoman statecraft. This was not only true in an institutional context. The men who had been educated and recruited to the state service in this reign would establish the Republic and constitute its bureaucratic and political elites.

⁵⁶⁵ For an impressive study on how the Ottomans used symbolism to deepen the temporary military alliance with the countries of Order in the Crimean War, Eldem, Edhem, İftihar ve İmtiyaz: Osmanlı Nişan ve Madalyaları Tarihi, İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2004. The book shows the very strong urge of the Ottomans to present themselves as a respectable European Empire equal to the others. For the earliest observation of such symbolism back in the reign of Selim III, see Berktay, Halil & Artan, Tülay, ―Selimian Times: A Reforming Grand Admiral, anxieties of re-possession, Changing Rites of Power‖, in The Kapudan Pasha, His Office and His Domain, Elizabeth Zachariadou (ed.), Crete University Press, 2002, pp. 7-45.

⁵⁶⁶ For the display of Russian authoritarian glory, see Wortman, Richard, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995

As has been tried to be established, international developments were at the center of changing and transforming Ottoman identities, cultural and intellectual formations, and the structures of mentality of the Ottoman bureaucratic establishment. Therefore, the Ottoman diplomatic service was at the hub of these shifts, formations, and transformations. In this foundational stage, the identity formation of diplomats was constituted by three complementary dynamics, one primarily ―political‖, the second ―structural‖, and the last primarily ―socio-cultural‖. The first one was the encounter with external actors ranging from Düvel-i Muazzama (Great Powers) to Armenian, Albanian, Arab dissidents, and from the social and cultural habituses of Europe to various political networks of Turcophobe and Turcophile tendencies. The second dynamic was international politics, entanglements, and rivalries. The last was their social culturalizations and social backgrounds which influenced and determined their reactions and perceptions in encountering political developments. In fact, it was the intersection of these three dynamics that led to the formation of a certain identity and cultural/ideological/mental formation.⁵⁶⁷ Moreover, the Hamidian regime‘s official views and stances (with the legacy of the Tanzimat in the background) had shaped their political, social, and cultural dispositions. Therefore, the international entanglements and encounters were constitutive in the intellectual formation of the Ottoman state elite in general and Ottoman diplomats in particular.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

⁵⁶⁷ For a recent collection of articles in tribute to Norman Itzkowitz with a particular emphasis on ―identity formation‖ in the Ottoman Empire, see Barbir, Karl & Tezcan, Baki (ed.), Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007.

 

 

 

CHAPTER IV

 

 

A SOCIAL PORTRAIT OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

 

 

4.1.  The Service Aristocracy: Who Were The Diplomats?

 

The 19^th - century Ottoman bureaucracy was a habitus with regard to its mores, internal codes of conduct, socialization and attitudes, and it also lacked Weberian structure. The visits of Ahmed İhsan in his travels have already been mentioned. When two sons of Hayrullah Efendi, Abdülhak Hamid and Nasuhi arrived in Paris in their teens to study at the Ottoman School and Saint-Cyr, respectively, they immediately went to the embassy. The ambassador, Cemil Pasha, welcomed them at the embassy. Abdülhak Hamid, who claimed to be the first Ottoman child ever in Paris,⁵⁶⁸ visited the embassy daily throughout his stay in Paris and was entertained by the ambassador. The child Abdülhak Hamid also became friends with the scribes Artin, who was to become Artin Dadyan Pasha, and Esad, who became Esad Pasha, the first career diplomat to be appointed as ambassador (first in Vienna, then in Paris). He also met Edhempaşazade Hamdi, the future Osman Hamdi Bey, who also happened to regularly visit the embassy while studying law in Paris.⁵⁶⁹ When their father, Hayrullah Efendi, arrived in Paris, he also immediately visited the embassy.⁵⁷⁰ During his stay in Paris, he frequented the embassy regularly.⁵⁷¹ We may observe that, the ambassadorial staff performed their daily routines in line with the habitus in which they

 

 

 

⁵⁶⁸ Abdülhak Hamid, Abdülhak Hamid‟in Hatıraları, İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1994, p. 32.

⁵⁶⁹Abdülhak Hamid, ibid, pp. 33-34.

⁵⁷⁰ Hayrullah Efendi, Avrupa Seyahatnamesi, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 2002, p. 89.

⁵⁷¹ Abdülhak Hamid, ibid, pp. 44-45.

operated and from which they had been recruited in the first instance.⁵⁷² Apparently, Ottoman embassies, besides attending to their professional obligations and preoccupations, served as the hub of an Ottoman network and an ―Ottoman club‖ where Ottomans belonging to the same social class met, socialized, and asked for help when necessary.⁵⁷³ Ahmet İhsan, in his travels to Europe, visits the Ottoman embassy as soon as he arrives at a certain capital city. In his travel account, which was one of the earliest of the genre of Ottoman/Turkish touristic guides, he found worth mentioning to describe the physical aspects and qualities of the Ottoman embassies in the cities he visited as one of the most important information regarding the cities. His socialization and the intimate relations he nurtured with the staff in the embassies are instructive. For example, desperate to check if the new issue of his journal Servet-i Fünun was printed and in circulation, he obtained a copy of the latest issue of his journal from Rıfat Bey, the military attaché in the Berlin embassy.⁵⁷⁴ In Rome, Mahmut Nedim Bey awakened from his sleep to welcome Ahmet İhsan and hired the carriage of the embassy for Ahmet İhsan to wander in the city⁵⁷⁵. Ahmet İhsan found and befriended Katibyan Efendi in London, a new graduate of the school of engineering and a secretary in the embassy, who was a nephew of Hayik, a friend of Ahmet İhsan‘s from his high school, and they wandered around in the city together.⁵⁷⁶ Ahmet İhsan met and befriended many Ottoman university students working as secretaries in the Ottoman embassies.⁵⁷⁷ Reading Servet-i Fünun and other journals, and socializing

 

⁵⁷² The term ―habitus,‖ as first used by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, is defined as, ―…the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations, produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus.‖ Bourdieu, Pierre, Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 78.

⁵⁷³ For example, see Abdülhak Hamid, ibid., pp. 356-57; Ahmet İhsan, ibid., pp. 432-33.

⁵⁷⁴ Ahmet İhsan, Avrupa‟da Ne Gördüm ? İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2007, p. 315.

⁵⁷⁵ Ahmet İhsan, ibid, pp. 432-33.

⁵⁷⁶ Ahmet İhsan, ibid, p. 161.

⁵⁷⁷ Alain Servantie, Preface to Avrupa‟da Ne Gördüm, p. xlviii.

within the same milieu inhabited by the privileged few, we may observe that, Ahmet İhsan and the staff in the embassies shared the same closed world.

One rejected applicant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the future Mehmed Tevfik Bey, later governor, Minister of Finance and President of Şuray-ı Devlet (Council of State). He applied for a position in the Foreign Correspondence Office in the ministry after his graduation from Mülkiye in 1885. Yusuf Ziya Bey (the future Ziya Pasha, the ambassador to Paris and Vienna) was a close friend of young Mehmed Tevfik‘s family. Therefore, young Mehmed Tevfik asked the acquaintances of his family to get him a post in the ministry. According to Mehmed Tevfik‘s account, Ziya Bey had shown interest in the request of the young Mehmed Tevfik. He asked his brother, Mustafa Reşid Bey (Mustafa Reşid Pasha, the future Minister of Foreign Affairs), to arrange Mehmed Tevfik‘s employment through Naum Efendi (the future undersecretary of the ministry), then an official in the Foreign Correspondences Office. To his regret, no suitable post was arranged for the young Mehmed Tevfik. Instead, he was assigned to a less prestigious position in the Translation Office. Mehmed Tevfik resigned after three months to move to the Mabeyn (the chancellery of the Ottoman palace).⁵⁷⁸ Mehmed Tevfik Bey‘s application for employment and his short tenure is yet another demonstration of the intra-elite character of the Ottoman bureaucracy. He was admitted to the ministry not due to his merit but because he was the son of Şirvanlı Ahmed Hamdi Efendi, an educator and a high-ranking bureaucrat who served in various posts related to education (though he was a graduate of Mülkiye and his credentials were superior to any ordinary son of a bureaucrat). Young Mehmed Tevfik was not the only recruit appointed due to family connections. Galip Kemali‘s (Söylemezoğlu) employment in the Foreign Ministry was thanks to his father‘s post. At the start of Galip‘s bureaucratic career, his father was no less than the Head of the Committee of Recruitment (of Civil Servants). Apparently, he secured the appointment of his son to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the office of Tahrirat-ı Hariciye.⁵⁷⁹ Abdülhak Hamid‘s appointment as a scribe to the embassy in Paris was arranged by Ibrahim Bey,

⁵⁷⁸ Mehmet Tevfik Biren, II. Abdülhamid, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Devri Hatıraları, İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1998, v. I, pp. 13-14. Also see Naciye Neyyal, Mutlakiyet, Meşrutiyet ve Cumhuriyet Hatıraları, İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 2004, p. 40.

⁵⁷⁹ Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, Hariciye Hizmerinde Otuz Sene, İstanbul: Şaka Matbaası, 1949, p. 53.

who was a relative of Abdülhak Hamid and son-in-law of Raşid Pasha, the foreign minister at the time.⁵⁸⁰ Given that Abdülhak Hamid came from a prominent family and had many family connections, all his appointments were made due to personal requests and some of his undesired appointments were annulled thanks to his connections.⁵⁸¹ Young Mehmet Murad (yet to be Mizancı Murad) was appointed to an office (kalem) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thanks to the patronage of Midhat Pasha.⁵⁸² After arranging the appointment of his younger brother Receb as an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Tevfik Bey (Pasha) thanked the sultan in a rather submissive tone rearticulating his obedience and allegiance to the sultan.⁵⁸³

In the pre-modern perception, this was the most reasonable and anticipated recruitment pattern. It was yet to be dubbed as nepotism in a culture in which oral communication was as reliable as, if not more so than, the written word. This was far from a bureaucratic culture of individualism and meritocracy. This was seen as the most reliable method for recruitment in a culture of orality before the culture of the text. It was the usual way of conduct in a system of references in which genealogies and family reputations were taken as more substantial credentials and references than personal achievements and competences. This was viable not only because there was no regularized official procedure of recruitment, but also because the recruitment pool was small and those who were within the circle knew each other, if not personally, at least by name. The recruitment pool would grow after the number of graduates of imperial colleges increased exponentially and class/social origins of the officials changed and became diversified. Recruitment patterns would become considerably regularized and formalized after the 1908 Revolution and after the purge (tensikat) of officials on a grand scale. In fact, as argued previously, the ―myth of

 

 

 

 

 

⁵⁸⁰ Abdülhak Hamid, ibid, pp. 99-101.

⁵⁸¹ Abdülhak Hamid… pp. 213-14, p. 321.

⁵⁸² Emil, Birol, Mizancı Murad Bey, İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1979, p. 57.

⁵⁸³ BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 19/6, 1311 C 19.

the bureaucracy‖ in its rigid Weberian definition was hardly applicable to the 19^th century European bureaucraciesas well where patronage reigned.⁵⁸⁴

Nevertheless, efforts to transform the bureaucracy were attempted in the Western European polities at an earlier stage. The Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1853‘s Ottoman counterpart⁵⁸⁵ was to be undertaken in the Ottoman Empire only after the 1908 Revolution. The reaction to the bureaucratic machine of the Hamidian era and concerns with reform and modernization of the bureaucracy became one of the most pressing issues of the early Second Constitution Era.⁵⁸⁶ Hüseyin Cahid Bey was an outspoken critic of the Hamidian bureaucracy.⁵⁸⁷ For him, the inefficient bureaucracy was a product of the degenerate ancien régime (devr-i sabık) and was completely corrupt and self-interested. What he (and all the other reformers) proposed was recruitment based only on merit measured by objective and standardized examinations and promotions again based on merit measured by strict criteria. ―Examination‖ became a magical word/concept in the writings of Hüseyin Cahid Bey and other political opinion leaders, as well as in the eyes of the parliamentarians.

The Hamidian bureaucracy can be characterized as a closed world in which personal relations were of primary importance. This was more evident in the highest echelons of the bureaucracy, where social exclusion and elitism survived after its dissolution in lower echelons of the bureaucracy. This culture was most manifest in the diplomatic service given that it was one of the most elite governmental offices. The end of the Hamidian

⁵⁸⁴ For example for the patronage in the British navy in its transition to a bureaucratic institution, see Dandeker, Christopher, ―Patronage and Bureaucratic Control--The Case of the Naval Officer in English Society 1780- 1850‖, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Sep., 1978), pp. 300-320

⁵⁸⁵ For the Northcote-Trevelyan Report and reforms based on this report in Britain, see Dreyfus, Françoise, Bürokrasinin İcadı, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007. In Britain, France and the United States, a dispassionate Weberian bureaucracy appeared only in the second half of the nineteenth century, when it began to be institutionalized, albeit partially and slowly. It was only in the 20^th century when a modern bureaucracy based on strict procedures and formality, and on merit instead of recommendations was institutionalized.

⁵⁸⁶ For the political debates and reforms, see Tural, Erkan, Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi: II Meşrutiyet Dönemi‟nde Bürokratlar, İttihatçılar ve Parlamenterler, Türkiye ve Orta Doğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü, 2009.

⁵⁸⁷ ibid., pp. 76-78, 96.

regime widened the pool of recruitment and weakened the intimate nature of the bureaucracy. However, the dispassionate Weberian bureaucracy never replaced the Hamidian bureaucracy. No such duality existed. This culture of bureaucracy was considerably modified but continued to reproduce itself.

Michael Herzfeld argues in his study on bureaucracy that ―the family provides an easily understood model for the loyalty and collective responsibility that citizens must feel towards the state.‖⁵⁸⁸ He also argues that; ―(t)here is no such thing as an autonomous state except in the hands of those who create and execute its ostensibly self-supporting teleology…To recover accountability, we should not simply revert to the Weberian ideal type of the legal-rational bureaucratic state. We should instead ask who makes each decision on the basis of ‗the law.‘ Restoring time and individuality to our analyses –the recognition of human agency- is the only viable defense against the reification of bureaucratic authority.⁵⁸⁹‖ For the late Ottoman bureaucracy, and especially for the diplomatic service, where the staff was recruited from a small and intimate social milieu, Herzfeld‘s suggestions are particularly applicable. The perceptions of the state by the bureaucrats and their self-perceptions were to be understood within the metaphor of the

―family.‖ This perception maintained a loyalty to the ―intimate state‖ and developed a

―group identity‖ imagined and forged around the familiarized state. Thus, the state was not an entity above the clouds to be subordinated. It was the perceptions and self-perceptions of the members of this group that had constituted and developed the idea of the state, which was transcendentalized only to serve more personal goals and aspirations. The rhetoric of submissiveness and rhetorical obedience to the sultan, which was one of the hallmarks of this imperial culture, was also a manifestation of this familiarization process. For example, the thank you letters of Yusuf Ziya Bey for his appointment as ambassador to Vienna and the thank you letter of Mahmud Nedim Bey for his appointment as ambassador to Rome display the extent of level of submissiveness to the sultan.⁵⁹⁰ However, this

⁵⁸⁸ Herzfeld, Michael, The Social Production of Indifference, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, p. 12.

⁵⁸⁹ Herzfeld, Michael, ibid., pp. 156-57.

⁵⁹⁰ Mahmud Nedim Bey writes the sultan: ―velinimet-i bi- minnetimiz padişahımız şevketmeab efendimiz hazretlerinin sadık bir abd-ı memluk ve ahkârları olmaktan başka

allegiance of obedience was less referring to submissiveness to authority than reiteration of adherence to a certain community (family) which was legitimized and upheld by a culture of hierarchy. The sultan was perceived as the pivot that enabled the maintenance of this habitus. The relationship established with the sultan and the symbolism employed in addressing the sultan was reminiscent of intra-family relations.

Despite the somehow aristocratic character of late Ottoman diplomatic service, the Hamidian diplomats were not financially secure. On the contrary, in their missions abroad, many suffered from financial problems arising from the financial difficulties the Empire was facing. Complaints to the sultan for the non-payment of the salaries of the ambassadorial staff abounded.⁵⁹¹ The embassies were not financially supported adequately enough to be able to pay their routine daily and professional expenditures.⁵⁹² The second military attaché of the embassy to St. Petersburg complained that he had been paid one salary for the preceding seven and a half months.⁵⁹³ It was not only the average officials who complained about unpaid salaries. Şerif Pasha, the ambassador to Stockholm and son of Kürd Said Pasha requested his back salary to be paid⁵⁹⁴. Tevfik Pasha, while he was ambassador to Berlin in 1899 asked for his back salary from previous years to be paid⁵⁹⁵. After eight years (in 1907), he reiterated his request asking the palace either to pay his unpaid salary or to remove him from his post.⁵⁹⁶ Izzet Pasha, the ambassador to Madrid and son of Fuad Pasha requested a loan from the treasury to be repaid by cuts in his future

asla bir değer ve liyakatim olmadığı halde bu kere dahi nail ve mazhar olduğun lütf ve inayet-i mahsusa-yı cenab-ı tacdarinin binde birinin ifası faraza-yı şükran ve ubudiyetten vücuh ile acizim bulunduğum dua-yı bil-hayr-ı şehriyarilerini bu vesile ile dahi yüzümü yerlere sürerek…‖ BOA, Y.PRK. EŞA, 13/29, 1308 Ş. 13. For the thank-you letters of the ambassadors to Vienna (Yusuf Ziya Bey) and to Madrid (İzzet Pasha) with the same submissive and obedient language, see BOA, Y. PRK.EŞA, 13/30, 1308 Ş.13; BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 42/21, 1320 Z. 4.

⁵⁹¹ BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA 41/15, 1320 C. 29; 40/67, 1320, Ra. 27; 40/45, 1320 S. 27; 40/26,

1320, M. 27;38/52, 1319 Ra. 14.

⁵⁹² BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 40/83, 1320 Ra. 30; 44/31, 1321 Ş. 2.

⁵⁹³BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 35/101, 1318 Ra. 15.

⁵⁹⁴ BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 42/63, 1321 M. 8.

⁵⁹⁵ BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 28/46, 1315 C. 29.

⁵⁹⁶BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 47/75, 1323 Ra. 26.

salary.⁵⁹⁷ Mustafa Reşid Pasha, while serving as ambassador to Rome complained of the financial burden caused by his unpaid salary and expenditures.⁵⁹⁸ Apparently, only those who were able to bear such financial burdens could be diplomats, not unlike the European diplomatic services. Although many diplomats suffered financial burdens abroad, they enjoyed a privileged life in Istanbul and, more importantly, shared a culture of their own. More importantly, the social capital and prestige they entertained was more valuable and preferable than material wealth in a world where many benefits were enjoyed not based on cash but based on reputation and social respectability.

The annal of the Foreign Ministry published in 1889 (1306) provides us an opportunity to view the social portrait of the Ministry (as of 1889). A list of the officials of the Ministry is presented with information on the occupation of their fathers, their birthplaces, and the offices they held. Although three other annals of the Ministry were published during the Hamidian era, the best and most comprehensive information is provided in this annal. Only the data in this annal is suitable to prepare a statistical observation although the rich data on the social background of the officials in the other three annals are also employed throughout this chapter⁵⁹⁹. This survey of the middle and lower cadres of the ministry illustrates clearly that Hamidian diplomats were predominantly scions of state officials and members of this semi-closed world. The ranks of the fathers of the diplomats vary significantly. The sons of grand viziers, governors, and ministers worked together with the sons of minor officials. These minor officials whose sons became diplomats predominantly worked in offices in the capital rather than in the provinces. For example, of the 35 Muslims who were employed in the ministry working in Istanbul as of 1889 and who are listed in the annals of the ministry, only eight were not born in Istanbul. Of these eight, only three of them were sons of provincial officials. That is, of the 27 officials who were

⁵⁹⁷BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 48/42, 1323 L. 15.

⁵⁹⁸BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 28/23, 1315 C. 1.

⁵⁹⁹ Carter Findley develops a much more sophisticated social portrait of the Ministry from the early Tanzimat to the demise of the Empire based on the Sicil-i Ahval (Personal Registers). With regard to the social origins of the Muslims and non-Muslims, many of the conclusions suggested below had been already made by Carter Findley based on his findings and counts. Findley, Carter, Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

sons of officials, only three of them were born outside Istanbul. The others not from Istanbul were fathered by ulema (2), local notables (2) and merchants (1). In short, a typical official in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs was raised in Istanbul in the family of a state official. Some also had grandfathers who were state officials that had been recruited in the very early phase of Tanzimat. Of all the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs counted (a total of 152) and listed in the annals of the ministry for the year 1889⁶⁰⁰ including the consulates, only 28 were born outside Istanbul. However, some were born outside Istanbul while their fathers were serving in the provinces – for example, the magisterial Sadullah Pasha, who was born in Erzurum while his father was serving as the governor of Kurdistan. Therefore, not all of those born out of Istanbul can be regarded as recruits from the provinces. Of these 28, some others were sons of minor provincial officials and three were sons of provincial ulema. Two of the Muslim officials were born out of the domains of the Ottoman Empire: one in Anapa in Crimea, the other in Circassia. The map of the births of the Muslim and non-Muslim officials does not display any meaningful variation. The Arab lands, Macedonia, and Anatolia seem to be equally represented. The only meaningful variation observed in the geographical distribution of their births is the prevalence of Istanbul as a birthplace.